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Abstract 
 
The prevailing view of China’s engagement in Africa is that African countries are being 
exploited for their mineral wealth by a country whose political and economic power is much 
greater than their own. These largely government – to – government contracts are criticized 
by the international community, ostensibly due to their lack of transparency and 
accountability but also because China is perceived to be gaining preferential access to 
natural resources.  
 
One of the more prominent cases cited is that of state-owned China Export-Import Bank 
making available loans for Angolan post-war infrastructure rehabilitation. This work sets out 
to analyse the mechanism of these contracts and the infrastructure construction that they 
are intended to facilitate. It is consequently an interrogation of the nature of the 
relationship between the Chinese and Angolan governments.  I will argue that previous 
analyses of the relationship between China and Angola, while noting the role of African 
agency in such a mechanism, have not fully explored its implications and explanatory 
powers for China-Angola relations. The Angolan government plays an important role in the 
outcome of this bilateral co-operation. 
 
 The strength of the rhetoric surrounding China’s relations with Africa, from Chinese, 
Western and African sources is of central importance to this study. This, ultimately, I argue 
here, shapes the context in which the relationship is viewed. China’s approach to 
development in Africa is interpreted as a threat by the West and is broached as such. The 
Angolan elite are in a position to exploit such tensions between China and the West to 
leverage their own political agenda. I argue that while the political relationship has not been 
without its problems, both the Angolan and the Chinese government view the relationship 
as necessary, as much for the economic gains it brings as for its importance in trying to 
define and establish both states’ positions in the eyes of the international community. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction the Study  
1.1 Introduction 
China’s growing role in African countries has been a subject of some controversy for the 
past decade, generating sensational headlines across the world. Muekalia’s (2004:5) claim 
that Sino-Africa relations were a ‘little noticed trend’ would hardly hold water now. Having 
caught the imagination of the mainstream media, much of the academic debate necessary 
to develop this field of study has been overshadowed by its treatment in the popular press. 
A lack of access to empirical data has also caused academic literature to lean heavily on 
journalism, exacerbating this problem.    
 
One of the earliest books attempting to investigate China’s emerging contemporary role in 
Africa is Snow’s Star Raft (1988). What is striking about his analysis of Chinese contact with 
the African continent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries1, are the many 
parallels in the fears evinced by Western observers of this dynamic then, and those voiced 
now. Debates regarding the Chinese traders that were infiltrating even the remotest African 
villages to sell cheap goods occurred as far back as 18862 (Snow, 1988:55-56). Newspapers 
carried headlines warning that China would ‘drive the white man from the Continent’, such 
fears having emerged as early as the 1920’s3 (Snow, 1988:49; 53). Interestingly, there was a 
fixation on the crafty Celestial corrupting the essentially pure nature of the African ‘noble 
savage’ (1988:52). The problematic nature of this theme, quite aside from its racist 
undertones, occurs with tedious regularity in contemporary China-Africa discourse, 
assuming passivity on the part of African actors. Consequently, 20 years later, a substantial 
                                                 
1
 Snow’s (1988) work actually documents Chinese relations with Africa beginning with the first ever records of 
such contact, some 600 years ago. For the purposes of this study, however, only his analysis beginning at the 
turn of the twentieth century is immediately relevant.   
2
 The irony to note here is that these Chinese traders came to Africa in the wake of Chinese indentured labour 
brought to Africa in a European colonial attempt to engrain the ‘Chinese work ethic’ into the African 
populations of their colonies (Snow,1988:47). The contemporary influx of Chinese traders to Africa have also 
come in the wake of Chinese labourers coming to Africa, but this time the former are working largely on 
Chinese state-sponsored infrastructural projects.  
3
 This refers particularly to the misgivings of Sir William Butler, among many Europeans who feared that 
Johannesburg, after having received Chinese indentured labour to work in the gold mines, would become a 
giant China town. Rather bizarrely he voiced the fear that the city’s principal language would become Chinese! 
(Snow, 1988:49). 
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portion of commentary on China’s role in Africa has changed little4 as Mawdsley’s (2008) 
content analysis of British broadsheets reporting on China-Africa relations attests.  This 
underlines Inayatullah and Blaney’s (2004:2) assertion that ‘the current shape of 
International Relations is shaped by the legacy of colonialism’. 
 
It is clear that there are two inherent problems with the approach of previous literature on 
China’s foreign policy towards Africa. Firstly, there is a systematic neglect of the ‘power of 
words’, as identified by Beer and Hariman (1996:2). Where Chinese foreign policy towards 
Africa is interpreted solely through a realist positivist lens (an excessive focus on China’s 
search for raw materials in Africa), with scant regard for the importance of the political 
rhetoric in this relationship, the analysis loses the depth it might otherwise attain. This leads 
to the second issue, in that a neglect of Chinese and African rhetoric allows a Western- 
centric perspective to dominate the discourse. According to Beer and Hariman (1996:11) 
‘…the rhetorical tradition includes appreciation of the dynamics of power, the valorisation 
of both argument and style, a focus on negotiation , involvement in the dialectic of elites 
and their publics, a strategic sensibility, and an ambivalent mixture of technical skill and 
ethical themes’. The importance of these aspects in framing an analysis of negotiation 
between elites and their resultant political posturing cannot be underestimated in terms of 
their influence on shaping the resultant discourse. 
 
Forcing a Eurocentric interpretation of two non-Western actors obscures the agencies at 
work in the relationship. I propose to set out a new framework for analysis that incorporates 
the importance of rhetoric from not only Western, but African and Chinese sources5, in 
order to address these issues. 
 
Rhetoric aside, while it is disingenuous to believe that academia occurs in a political and 
sociological vacuum, much of the literature, by Western, African and Chinese scholars alike 
                                                 
4
 See for instance Naím (2007).  
5
 This is to be discussed and analysed in chapter 2. 
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is remarkable in its departure from objective analysis. The focus to a great degree is on 
whether China should be in Africa and what Chinese actors’ motivation are, rather than first 
establishing a solid empirical basis on which to ground an analysis.6  
 
Conspicuous in its absence from this discourse until recently, African scholars’ contribution 
to the literature on China-Africa relations is under-represented. Gaye (2006) is perhaps one 
of the first attempts to address this. Manji and Marks’ (2007) edited volume, followed by 
Ampiah and Naidu (2008) are also important offerings in this regard, but even these 
volumes are supplemented with contributions by non-African authors. A follow-up volume 
Harneit-Sievers, Marks and Naidu (2010) was much more successful in producing a volume 
solely of Chinese and African perspectives on China in Africa as the eponymous title 
suggests. The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) has also since 2008 produced a 
series of scoping studies and in-depth analyses on Chinese relations with African countries.7   
 
Chinese Africanists have however not been as prolific as their European and African 
counterparts. Li (2009b:6) argues that Chinese scholars’ writings on Sino-African affairs, 
while in existence, were previously scattered and isolated, with little international exchange, 
resulting in Western scholars being more well-known in this regard. Despite the long history 
of China-Africa relations, continually referred to by politicians from both sides; arguably 
neither has regarded the other as a foreign policy priority until very recently.8 One Chinese 
diplomat remarked that African studies in China had become dominated by a small group of 
academics who had until recently never been to Africa, calling them ‘dragonflies’, due to the 
superficiality of their research.9 Furthermore, in international scholarly fora, as noted by 
Lagerkvist (2009:120) ‘Chinese perspectives have seldom been noted or even sought.’ This is 
                                                 
6
Perhaps partially explaining this is the notable difficulty many researchers observe in acquiring empirical data 
in this field, from either Chinese or Africa sources, on which to base their studies. This is recognised as one of 
the principle research challenges in this field, and will be treated with other methodological issues below.  
7
 The author is a member of this consortium. See www.aercafrica.org for their available research papers. 
8
 Furthermore, it is unlikely that Africa, despite the media sensationalism of the past decade has accrued the 
status of a foreign policy priority even now (Raine, 2009). Shirk (2007) suggests that Chinese foreign policy 
priorities are the relations with the US, Japan and cross-strait relations with Taiwan.  
9
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009. He went on to say that these 
academics relied on Western-based Africa studies sources and did none of their own in-depth research. 
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probably due to the fact that many Western academics distrust the independence of 
Chinese research and commentary, assuming it to be merely government propaganda, 
particularly with regards to a topic as overtly political as China’s relations with Africa. In 
recognition of this, and the negative connotations of the term ‘propaganda’ in the West, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has changed the English translation of the Propaganda 
Department to the Publicity Department and its sister organisation, tasked with 
international communications, is known as the State Council Information Office (Jakobsen & 
Knox, 2010:7) The Chinese government furthermore has embarked on a considerable drive 
to revitalise the image of its state media agency Xinhua and develop closer links with their 
African counterparts (Efande,2010). Chinese official rhetoric communicated through this 
channel is important in flagging foreign policy evolution.   
 
A core issue raised both in academic research on China-Africa relations as well as in popular 
media, is what kind of impact China’s strengthening relations with Africa will have on the 
latter. Inevitably such questions are couched within the assumptions of developmental 
discourse. As previously mentioned, through the normative slant of many such 
investigations, there seems to be an implicit expectation that China has a duty to ‘develop’ 
Africa. This is in fact indirectly recognised through Chinese officials’ use of the ‘win-win’ 
partnership rhetoric (He, 2006). It appears that China has accepted that one of the duties of 
‘great powers’ is to develop the third world as described by (Berger, 2008:4). The problem 
that arises however is the lack of a satisfactory definition of ‘development’ generally, and 
what it entails.  
 
Theories of how best to ‘develop’ poor countries have not remained constant; they have 
changed continually over the years (Browne, 2006:23). During the 1950’s and 1960’s, it was 
accepted wisdom that infrastructure development was important and such projects were in 
fact a large portion of aid money to developing countries. Buoyed by the success of the 
Marshall Plan, much of the development aid at the time was geared towards reconstruction 
(IDA, 2007:35). Particularly in the 1960’s, the role of the state was central. Despite the Cold 
War, the Western and Soviet blocs’ approach were remarkably similar.  Western 
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development theory at the time espoused the vision that assisting with large-scale 
construction projects that provided public goods were the best way to ensure economic 
take-off (Rostow, 1960; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). Soviet aid sought to replicate its own 
heavily industrialised development experience in satellite states. Indeed, as Browne 
(2006:25) notes, ‘The Soviet Union also developed elaborate trade and barter schemes to 
provide essential imports’. China was at the time a recipient of considerable aid in this 
manner and it is clear that China’s approach to development was informed by this 
experience. Interestingly, (Vines, et al,2005:4) have also remarked on the ‘Soviet-style’ 
approach to development employed by Angolan political elites, suggesting that such an 
emphasis on infrastructure was outmoded, having been discarded by all other donors. It 
does however, illustrate clearly that Luanda’s approach to development was much more in 
line with Beijing’s than those accepted by Western capitals. 
 
Western donor agencies had discarded a state-centric approach focussed on 
industrialisation and large-scale infrastructure after several decades of white elephant 
projects did not produce the expected development dividends. Instead, it appeared that 
such government-directed projects only benefitted political elites (IDA, 2007:37; Stern et al, 
2008:33). Donors thus tried to re-organise development agendas in order to attempt more 
broad-based benefits for the poor. This saw a proliferation of aid agencies as governments 
began supporting non-governmental organisations (NGOs) directly in an attempt to bypass 
corrupt officials (Cohen et al, 2008:76).  
 
Official development assistance (ODA) suffered a protracted decline in 1990’s largely due to 
‘donor fatigue’ (Stern et al, 2008:4) and the disappearance of Cold War geopolitics (Severino 
and Ray, 2009:3). Furthermore, the preceding economic crises of the 1980’s had ushered in 
the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) which focussed on fiscal austerity.10 
                                                 
10
 Angola is one of the few Africa southern African countries that did not succumb to an SAP, although the 
country had an IMF staff monitoring programme until 2002. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), an 
initiative supposed to allow recipient countries to develop endogenous solutions to their poverty issues, was 
rejected by the international donors. 
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Infrastructure continued to form part of aid projects, but the turn of the century and the 
rise of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)11 saw short-term targets being prioritised. 
According to Glennie (2008:20) whereas infrastructure and productive sector aid 
constituted 53 percent of the total in the early 1990’s, this had dropped to 31 percent by 
2004 in favour of social spending. The International Development Association12 (2007: i) 
found that their largest proportion of ODA was in debt relief and grants, and that 
infrastructure spending had dropped from 59 percent to 38 percent from 2001 to 2004.  
 
When China initially began funding infrastructure across Africa, many donors accused China 
of being retrogressive, saying that Beijing was following development policies discarded by 
other countries decades previously. OECD countries worried that China was ‘free-riding’ and 
re-indebting poor countries that had just been given debt relief through various bilateral 
initiatives (IDA, 2007:14).13 In fact, Reisen (2007:2) argues that this is not the case as China’s 
lending profile is very different from the West. The countries that China is lending to are 
those that did not receive debt relief from OECD as they did not qualify. 14 Indeed, China 
only lends to countries that have the proven means to repay the loans (see chapter 3). 
There was also concern as to the level of tied aid accompanying the construction projects. In 
fact, despite the Paris Declaration15 and many other such initiatives to untie aid, Glennie 
(2008:110) points out that a number of traditional donor countries still tie aid.16  
 
Complete treatment of China’s growing influence on the discourse of development is 
beyond the scope of this thesis; however there are certain signs that seem to show the 
influence that the Asian country is having on development perspectives.  
                                                 
11
 See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/  
12
 Established in 1969, the IDA is the channel through which World Bank facilitated its concessional lending 
activities (IDA, 2007:30).  
13
 Interestingly, despite the accusation that China is non-cooperative on bilateral aid initiatives, According to 
IDA (2007:4) 70 percent of all aid is still bilateral.  
14
 For instance, IDA provided Angola with less than 5 percent of ODA from 2001-2004.  
15
 The Paris Declaration of 2005 was targeted at harmonising donor endeavours in order to streamline aid 
initiatives. See (IDA, 2007:24).  
16
 According to IDA (2007:39) 42 percent of DAC ODA remains tied. 
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Following the lack of delivery from infrastructural projects, donors, as described above 
rejected such initiatives, focussing more on healthcare and education. However, in recent 
years, infrastructure has once again become en vogue in development circles. The World 
Bank published an influential report (Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2009) estimating that the 
African continent required US$ 93 billion annually in infrastructure spending to catch-up to 
the West. This is an implicit endorsement of infrastructure spending. Various infrastructure 
funds have been created to look at the problem such as the Emerging Africa Infrastructure 
Fund (EAIF)17. China’s own development was state-led public infrastructure spending and 
investment (Stern et al, 2008: Paris, 30)18; furthermore, China’s approach to development 
assistance is largely in favour of infrastructure spending, and has been welcomed by African 
governments. China’s approach has gone some way to swing the pendulum of opinion back 
to spending on infrastructure. 
 
Browne (2006) argues that much Western development assistance has been misdirected. He 
points out that aid from such countries as the United States can be used as a proxy for ‘what 
many are describing as a new form of imperialism’ (Browne, 2006:11). It is significant that 
this is precisely what Western donors are accusing China of.  Ironically, Western countries 
use such accusations to isolate China’s development aid mechanisms from the West’s own 
such structures, with the implicit assumption that Western aid is more ‘beneficial’. This 
discourse therefore has significant bearing on understanding not only whether China is 
acting in a neo-imperial manner in Africa, but why it should be accused of so doing and by 
whom. China uses aid to accumulate influence; it also counter-balances what Browne 
(2006:11) terms ‘rich country aid’.  Implicitly, this identifies the political nature of 
development assistance regardless of its source. As Mathisen (1971:207) warns, despite 
weak countries looking to great powers with which they have an alliance as benefactors, the 
                                                 
17
 Established in 2002, the EAIF is a public-private partnership initiated by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) to provide ‘long-term debt finance for the construction and development of private 
infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa’ (see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Working-with-DFID/Funding-
opp.ortunities/Countries-and-regions/EAIF/)   
18
 Indeed, although a popular misconception is that China’s growth was driven by foreign direct investment, 95 
percent of investment in China is domestic, largely public sector spending (Mahon, 2006:1).  
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latter should be seen as ‘selfish creatures’.  Such discourse forms the backdrop to 
perceptions of China’s relations with African countries, particularly those with considerable 
need for development, such as Angola.  
 
1.2 Contextualising China-Angola relations  
Angola, together with Portugal’s other former colonies achieved independence in 1975. 
Prior to decolonisation and in the years following, during Angola’s subsequent civil war, 
China at various times supported several of Angola’s political parties including the 
Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional para a 
Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
(UNITA) (Taylor, 2006). In the 1960’s Jonas Savimbi and several UNITA guerrilla soldiers 
were offered training at China’s Nanking academy19. One Angolan academic suggested that 
UNITA became China’s favoured movement because Savimbi’s guerrilla tactics were similar 
to Mao’s ‘revolution from the countryside’, whereas MPLA was a much more urban-based 
elite-dominated organisation. 20 However, such ideological proximity was doubtless 
overplayed in order to reinforce a mutually convenient relationship as the MPLA’s already 
strong Soviet links precluded China’s support following the Sino-Soviet split. China’s links to 
FNLA were brokered by Mobuto’s Zaire and Beijing later also gave direct military assistance 
to Holden Roberto’s movement from 1974-1975 (Guimarães, 2002:158). China’s early 
engagement with these movements was thus rather confused, propelled as it was by the 
China’s primary motive of countering Soviet influence in the third world (Jackson, 1995:389).  
 
Taylor (2006: 81) places some importance on China’s earlier role in Angola, as support of 
UNITA in unwitting alliance with apartheid South Africa cost China dearly in diplomatic 
terms. Desphande and Gupta (1986:46), concur that China’s early intervention in Angola 
was calamitous for China’s relations with African countries in the 1960’s. Apart from 
violating China’s sacrosanct principle of non-interference, China’s de facto alliance with a 
                                                 
19
 According to Guimarães (2002:79), Savimbi’s guerrilla operations began with his Nanking-trained ‘Chinese 
Eleven’ Angolan soldiers  
20
 Interview, university professor, Luanda, 28 April 2010 
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racist white-minority government drew heavy criticism from even China’s closest allies on 
the continent.  Jackson (1995:389) argues that China viewed the conflict in Angola as a 
manifestation of Cold War polemics and did not recognise the internal impetus for rivalry 
between Angola’s liberation movements nor the broader regional context in Africa. As such, 
China severely misjudged the impact of its disastrous involvement in Angola’s protracted 
civil war and was only able to normalise relations in 1983. This historical background added 
impetus to the Chinese government’s willingness to reach an economic agreement in favour 
of Angola years later, in order to make up for China’s messy involvement in Angola’s civil 
war.21     
 
Snow (1986:77) however draws attention to the fact that despite China’s infamy in 
supporting UNITA, the MPLA’s first crucial, albeit limited, funding came from China. The first 
contact between the MPLA and CCP was at Conference of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity 
Organization (AAPSO) held in Guinea Conakry in April 1960. Following an invitation from the 
CCP, Mário Pinto de Andrade, the MPLA President, Viriato da Cruz, MPLA Secretary General, 
and Lúcio Lara, visited China in August 1960. They brought back crucial funding for the 
nascent independence movement. The MPLA leadership actually experienced a schism as to 
whether to ally with Soviet Russia or Communist China. Viriato da Cruz, one of the founding 
fathers of the MPLA was ousted as a result of the decision to follow Moscow. He fled to 
Beijing, where he died in exile in 1973 (Pinto de Andrade, 2007:3). It is suspected that the 
liberation movement turned to the USSR in order to access more advanced weapons 
technology than those available from China.  
 
The existence of prior early links allows Chinese and Angolan officials to gloss over China’s 
rather inconvenient support of the Angolan incumbent regime’s mortal enemy, UNITA, over 
a period of time. Politicians from both countries also liberally refer to a long ‘history of 
relations’ between the two countries, despite the fact that Angola’s official bilateral contact 
with China has not been as extensive as that of other African states. 
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 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009 
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The MPLA established official relations with the CCP in 1980, three years prior to China’s 
official recognition of the new Angolan government on 1 January 1983 (Davies et al, 2009:7). 
Party-to-party relations have become a more prominent feature of China’s relations 
generally (Shinn and Eisenman, 2008:2), but are significant in this case. In many instances, 
the party structure of both countries supersedes those of the government (Jakobsen and 
Knox, 2009:1; Messiant, 2007). It is would have been a prerequisite to official governmental 
relations being subsequently established.     
 
A bilateral commission between the two countries was set-up in 1988 although due to the 
disruptions caused by the on-going civil war, its inaugural meeting was only held in 
December 1999. After this, sessions took place more regularly; the next occurring in May 
2001 and then in March 2007 and March 200922 (Alves, 2010a:5).  
 
The end of Angola’s civil war in 2002 provided an opportunity for closer interaction between 
China and Angola. In the same year, China Construction bank and China Exim Bank made 
US$ 145 million available in financing for Chinese companies operating in Angola (ERA, 
2009:81).From the late nineties, the Chinese language business journals were full of the 
economic opportunities waiting for Chinese companies in Angola (See Zhang, 1998; Huang, 
2002, 2003). The telecommunications company Shanghai Bell signed an agreement with 
Angola Telecom worth US$ 60 million to expand and optimize the existing network. 
Furthermore, in 2004, Shanghai-based China Overseas Engineering Corporation completed 
the construction of the Luanda General Hospital (An, 2008:21). Bilateral relations reached a 
new height when on 26 November 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC23) signed a framework agreement with the Angolan 
Ministry of Finance that would form the basis of Chinese state lending to the Angolan 
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 See Appendix 2. 
23
 MOFTEC was later restructured that year to become the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (Brautigam, 
2009:107) and will subsequently be referred to as such. 
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government24 (ERA, 2009:91).  The following year, during a visit of Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan 
to Angola, it was announced that China Exim Bank would lend US$ 2 billion to the Angolan 
government to finance the country’s reconstruction efforts. An Angolan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs called the credit lines the ‘key point’25 of the relations between the two countries. 
These loans have been increased several times and will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
The early 21st century marked a new phase of bilateral interaction, focusing on the 
increasingly economically driven and pragmatic relations between China and Angola as 
described by Campos and Vines (2007) and Corkin (2008b), particularly as regards Angola’s 
plans for post-war reconstruction Burke & Corkin (2006). Angola is currently China’s largest 
African trading partner, primarily due to China’s hunger for crude oil. Indeed, the ruling 
party now has strong ties to Beijing due to China Exim Bank and several other Chinese 
financial institutions’ sizeable loans to the Angolan government.  Thus, in the so-called ‘new 
type of China-Africa strategic partnership’ (He, 2006:5) China has only been a serious 
commercial actor in Angola since approximately 2004 (Corkin, 2008d: 110).  
 
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official described Angola’s relations with China in the following 
manner: ‘Today bilateral co-operation is excellent. We have privileged relations with China. 
The relations are characterised by rapid evolution, established and strengthened by the two 
governments.’26 These sentiments are reflected in almost exactly the same words by the 
Chinese Ambassador Zhang Bolun speaking before the beginning of the fourth Bilateral 
Commission in March 2009 (Dai, 2009). As with most official diplomatic rhetoric, both claim 
a flawless relationship and no hint of the challenges both sides faced in negotiating Angola’s 
finance from China Exim Bank.   
 
                                                 
24
 According to ERA (2009:81) it was stipulated that the loan could reach up to US$ 10 billion, ‘until the of the 
reconstruction period.’ 
25
 Interview, Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 May 2010. 
26
 Interview, Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luanda, 11 May 2010. 
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1.3 Angola’s Political Elite: The Rise of the MPLA  
In order to understand the set of Angolan political actors which negotiated with China, it is 
important to understand their historical context. Angola’s current ruling party, MPLA,27 was 
formed in 1956 and largely drew its support from intellectuals, educated, urban-based 
Mbundu and Afro-Portuguese28. The parties that would become their political opponents 
FNLA formed in 196229 under Holden Roberto to champion Northern-based Bakongo 
political ambitions30 (Legum, 1976:10); whereas in 1966 Jonas Savimbi, formerly a key FNLA 
leader, broke away to establish UNITA; garnering most of his support from his ethnic group 
the Ovimbundu. During the war for independence therefore liberation movements formed 
and consolidated approximately along ethnic lines. This was by no means however, the 
overriding factor that determined party affiliation. Hodges (1976:49) maintains that ethnic 
divisions were exploited to drum up support for the deeply divided leaderships of the three 
liberations movements. Similarly Cilliers (2000:1) remarks that these divisions were among 
the movements’ leadership specifically rather than amongst Angolans in general. Indeed, all 
three movements were led by figures who increasingly centralised political control and 
ultimately refused to share power.31 Marcum (1975:4) provides a more nuanced picture, 
contending that the parties’ leadership and support bases were distinguishable by variances 
ethnic origin, cultural, class and racial stratification which led to entrenched divisions 
between the liberation organisations.    
 
1.3.1 The Assimilados and the question of legitimacy 
Colonial Portugal throughout the occupation of her African territories, practiced a policy of 
assimilation, whereby native Africans, indígenas, could acquire certain civil rights by proving 
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 According to Sogge (2011:85) the MPLA has discarded the name ‘Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola’, but retains the acronym as a name.   
28
 The Afro-Portuguese is the term given to mixed race descendants of Portuguese settlers who retained 
Portuguese cultural, language and identity.  
29
 FNLA was a united front formed by three political parties but dominated by the leadership of Holden 
Roberto, the leader of the largest party in the alliance, União dos Povos de Angola (UPA). 
30
Holden Roberto, the leader of FNLA was in fact a kinsman of Mobuto Sese Seko by marriage and received 
support from Zaire throughout Angola’s civil war (Legum, 1976:10).  
31
 Ironically, it was Holden Roberto’s refusal to delegate authority within the FNLA that led in part to Jonas 
Savimbi breaking away from this party to form UNITA (Guimarães, 2002:78), of which Savimbi himself became 
a notoriously despotic leader (Tandon, 1988:2606). 
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they were fluent in Portuguese, literate and without a criminal record, hence becoming 
civilizado or assimilado. This fed a theory of ‘lusotropicalism’, whereby the power of the 
Portuguese culture was seen as a civilizing force, perpetuating the myth of multi-racial 
utopias in Portuguese colonies32 (Marcum, 1969:319). However achieving civilizado status 
was often arbitrary and it served to drive a wedge between black Angolans and  mixed-
raced mulatto or mestiço Angolans (considered automatically assimilated by virtue of blood), 
as well as deepen the divide between rural and urban communities (Marcum, 1975:6).   
 
These deep-rooted suspicions were exploited by Roberto’s FNLA and Savimbi’s UNITA, who 
both claimed to better represent Angolans’ cause as black Africans, deriding to the 
privileges received by (mixed-race) mestiços and educated black Angolans (most of which 
flocked to MPLA) under Portuguese colonialism. Guimarães (2002:46) suggests that both 
leaders feared domination by the MPLA intellectuals. Nevertheless, their accusations laid 
bare an MPLA vulnerability in terms of their legitimacy as a genuine African liberation 
movement, representative of Angolans.33 Although the MPLA denounced mistrust of 
mulattoes as racist, (Marcum, 1969:161) the over-representation of whites, mestiços and 
assimilados in MPLA leadership continued to haunt the party.34 Indeed in 1963 the newly 
established Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recognised Roberto’s FNLA and its 
precociously formed Govêrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio35 (GRAE) as sole legitimate 
party fighting for Angolan self-determination. By 1971, due to MPLA’s skilful manoeuvring, 
these fortunes had been reversed and MPLA was considered the dominant anti-colonial 
force in Angola (Guimarães, 2002:72). Nevertheless, the question of MPLA’s legitimacy was 
never conclusively resolved, resting on external endorsement, rather than domestic support. 
This issue will be returned to in later sections.  
                                                 
32
 According to Guimarães (2002:25) less than 5 percent of the local Angolan population ever achieved 
civilizado status. 
33
 Marcum (1969:29) and Guimarães (2002:45) both point to inconsistencies in the stories of how the MPLA 
was established, and both suggest that history was rewritten in order to lay a stronger claim of legitimate 
leadership of the anti-colonial struggle with genuine Angolan roots; respectively commenting on the omission 
of the influence of the Portuguese Communist Party and the fact that the movement was first established in 
Paris.     
34
 Neto was himself married to a white Portuguese woman, and his successor dos Santos to a Russian (Marcum, 
1976:412). Later in 1977, an attempted coup of MPLA leadership led by Interior Minister Nito Alves, a black 
Angolan, was in part directed at the party’s high-ranking mulattos.   
35
 Revolutionary Government in Exile. 
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1.3.2 The Decolonisation Struggle 
The wealth and prestige of overseas colonies was perceived as a survival imperative for 
Salazar’s regime, and equally for that his successor Marcelo Caetano’s Estado Novo.  
However, after Caetano was toppled in a coup, known as the Carnation Revolution, in 1974 
decolonisation was hastily arranged. The Alvor Peace Accords signed on 15 January 1975 
were supposed to see political power officially handed over from Portugal to a coalition 
government of all three major liberation parties in 1975, to be followed by elections 
(Heywood, 2000:189). However, mutual suspicion between the liberation movements, 
combined with Portugal’s inability to provide decisive and non-partisan36  oversight of the 
decolonisation process, gave rise to a power struggle amongst the Angolan parties. In the 
power vacuum left by the rushed Portuguese withdrawal, the violence escalated. MPLA, 
with Soviet support, sought to consolidate political control through force, as control via 
elections did not necessarily guarantee outright power.37 They were opposed by FNLA and 
UNITA covertly aided by the US and China (Marcum, 1975:7).  With South Africa joining the 
anti-MPLA forces in October 1975, UNITA and FNLA were able to overturn MPLA’s previous 
military advances, but could not oust them from Luanda by the officially agreed date of 
independence, 10 November 1975. MPLA’s Dr President Agostinho Neto unilaterally 
declared the establishment of the People’s Republic the following day and was swiftly 
recognised by several communist countries and Brazil (Guimarães, 2002:111). Furthermore, 
UNITA’s military assistance from apartheid South Africa backfired by lending MPLA the 
moral high ground in defending themselves against forces allied with a racist country.  
Influential African states such as Nigeria and Tanzania switched their support from FNLA and 
UNITA to MPLA (Ogunbadejo, 1981:265). Indeed South African support of UNITA was 
decisive in shifting enough support for the OAU to recognise the MPLA government in 
February 1976 (Daddieh & Shaw, 1984:37).  
                                                 
36
 According to Heywood (2000:189), the Portuguese colonists preferred handing power over to an assimilated 
Portuguese-speaking elite rather than Umbundu-speaking groups from the interior. A more charitable 
interpretation is that the Portuguese preferred to see power handed to a party that transcended ethnicity and 
MPLA was the only party that could credibly claim to do so (Malaquias, 2000:106)  
37
 According to Heimer’s estimations (1979:260) UNITA, with the support base of the Ovimbundu, Angola’s 
largest ethnic group, would probably have achieved a relative majority of 40-45%, against MPLA’s 35-40% and 
FNLA’s 20%.   
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The party, cognisant of their weakness in drawing support from predominantly the minority 
urban-based Mbundu and assimilados (Cornwell, 2000:52), campaigned to increase their 
support base by promoting a modern form of Angolan nationalism ‘homen novo’ (Heywood, 
2000:202). Leaving nothing to chance, Angola was also declared a one-party state shortly 
after independence. This plunged the country into civil war. The context of the Cold War 
polemics allowed each political party to consolidate external assistance.38  
 
1.3.3 Fair-weather Marxists?  
The President of the MPLA, Dr Agostinho Neto, and several other party leading lights such as 
Mário Pinto de Andrade and Lúcio Lara maintained initially that the MPLA was non-aligned 
(Hodges, 1976:49), despite FNLA accusations to the contrary. Indeed Heywood (2000:183) 
suggests sharper ideological positions were only formed in the context of the Cold War in 
order to garner stronger support from external allies by conforming to Cold War polemics. 
However, Marcum (1969:254) and Guimarães (2001:61) both argue that MPLA intellectuals 
were truly Marxist, but prior to 1964 attempted to appear non-aligned in order to garner 
broader international support, particularly from the vehemently anti-communist US. This 
demonstrates a pragmatic approach geared towards maximising the potential gains of 
external assistance. 
 
Equally pragmatically, the MPLA later used Marxism-Leninism as a guiding ideology both to 
deflect class-based criticisms against the Afro-Portuguese (Newitt, 2007:74) and because it 
was a popular conceptual vehicle for independence movements, reflecting the revolutionary 
zeitgeist of the times (Guimarães, 2002:170). Marcum (1969:27) further suggests that 
Portugal’s political oppression had led to the radicalisation of Angolan opposition. 
Furthermore, from the mid-1960’s identification with Marxism ensured allies in USSR and 
other communist states (Messiant,2007:107). MPLA was thus Soviet-backed, whereas 
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 For more detailed analysis, see Legum (1976).  
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UNITA was supported by the US and apartheid South Africa. FNLA received support from US, 
China and Zaire.  
 
1.3.4 Internal Party Rivalry 
Bayart et al (1999:21) contend that ‘political life in Africa consists first and foremost of the 
management of factional intrigues for personal interest.’ The MPLA has also faced serious 
rivalries from within the party, often with severe consequences (Legum, 1976:11). These 
have manifested almost since its inception. In 1962, Dr Agostinho Neto escaped 
imprisonment in Portugal to join the MPLA in Kinshasa (then Leopoldville), where the 
movement was then based, in order to take up his presidency, which had until then been 
honorary (Marcum, 1969:299). In December that year, the MPLA held the conference that 
resulted in the ousting of Viriato da Cruz, then party secretary general, and the 
consolidation of party control under Neto. It has variously been suggested that a 
combination of factors led to da Cruz’s ousting: was too overtly Marxist (Marcum, 1969:318), 
too ‘white’ (he was mulatto) (Guimarães,2002:59) and too pro-China (versus in favour of the 
USSR) (Pinto de Andrade,2007:3), but it is clear that his perceived threat to Neto’s 
leadership were what ultimately removed him from power within the party.39  
 
A more dramatic internal threat occurred 15 years later. In late 1976, it became clear that 
Nito Alves, the Minister of the Interior, had garnered support within the party through his 
opposition to several government policies (Fauvet, 1977). A failed coup attempt by Nito and 
his supporters unleashed a bloody party purge that went on for three years. As Ogunbadejo 
(1981:257) points out, while Neto’s restructuring eliminated what he considered to be the 
elitist forces of bureaucracy, it also conveniently removed anyone who might threaten his 
authority from a position of power. The president constantly emphasised ‘party unity’ 
largely due to the level of factionalism inherent in the party. By the time Eduardo dos Santos, 
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 Da Cruz’s expulsion from MPLA was unfortunately timed as it occurred days before an OAU delegation 
visited Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), to assess candidates for official recognition. Da Cruz’s vehement 
denouncements of MPLA leadership and subsequent application to FNLA gave an impression of a divided and 
disorganised movement, leading OAU to support FNLA and almost leading to MPLA’s demise (Guimarães, 2002: 
70).   
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formerly Minister of Planning40, was appointed MPLA President on Agostinho Neto’s death 
in 1979, presidential powers had been increased significantly. Dos Santos’ appointment 
made him automatically head of state and Commander in Chief of the armed forces 
(Somerville, 1986:56).  Another purge, albeit of a lesser magnitude occurred in 1983, 
strengthening dos Santos’ hold on power (Somerville, 1986:103).   
 
The consolidation of MPLA political power has largely occurred within the context of 
protracted civil war. Both Marcum (1988:15) and Rothchild and Hartzell (1991:57) suggest 
that a series of attempted settlements were signed through external pressure, but failed 
through a lack of conviction on the Angolan parties. This underlines the agency of the 
Angolan parties in frustrating attempts at conciliation, even if these were led by powerful 
external powers.  
 
In December 1988, accords were signed leading to the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the 
disengagement of South African forces from Angola. The Gbadolite Declaration of 22 June 
1989, brokered by Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko saw the first direct contact between 
dos Santos and Savimbi was supposed to lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but 
soon broke down (Rothchild and Hartzell,1991:46). As the Cold War drew to a close, a brief 
ceasefire occurred between early 1991 and late 1992 (De Beer and Gamba, 2000:81). The 
peace agreement was signed in Bicesse, Portugal in May 1991 under the eyes of the United 
Nations and the so-called troika of the US, USSR and Portugal, the three foreign powers with 
the most vested interests in the conflict (Hodges, 2004:12). An insufficient UN presence 
(UNAVEM II41) could not prevent voter intimidation and accusations of election irregularities 
(Mills,2006:126). Nevertheless, Angola officially became a multi-party democracy and 
elections were held in September 1992, with MPLA winning 53.7 percent of the 
parliamentary vote against UNITA’s 31.4 percent and FNLA’s 2.4 percent (Orre, 2010:5). 
                                                 
40
Of interest is the fact that when the positions of Prime Minister and vice Prime Minister were abolished by 
President Neto at the end of 1978, dos Santos, who had been a Vice Prime Minister at the time, was made the 
Minister of Planning (Ogunbadejo, 1981:257). This made him overall co-ordinator of economic policy co-
ordination (Somerville, 1986:133) 
41
 UNAVEM I had overseen the withdrawal of the Cuban forces between 1989 and 1991.  
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More controversially, dos Santos won 49.6 percent of the presidential ballot versus 
Savimbi’s 40.1 percent (Orre, 2010:6). This result required a run-off, as no candidate 
received an outright majority. However, Savimbi rejected the result42 and civil war quickly 
resumed. This was largely facilitated by the fact that mutual distrust had ensured that 
neither MPLA nor UNITA has demobilised regardless of prior pledges to do so. The short-
lived Lusaka Accords brought about a temporary cease-fire in 1994, but this soon broke 
down into renewed conflict. Of consequence is that given the suspended result of the 1992 
elections, dos Santos was never officially elected, although he remained state president (De 
Beer and Gamba, 2000:81).   
 
Civil war came to an end following the death in combat of Jonas Savimbi in 2002. However, 
the MPLA procrastinated until 2008 to hold parliamentary elections, with presidential 
elections postponed indefinitely. The MPLA won a landslide victory of 191 from 220 
parliamentary seats, representing an 87 percent majority. On the strength of this, 
parliament voted in a new constitution, ratified in 2010 which allowed the president to be 
indirectly elected via parliament, ensuring dos Santos’ retention of power. Under the new 
constitution he could theoretically remain head of state until 2022.  This means that 
President Dos Santos has never been directly and conclusively elected to his office by the 
Angolan electorate despite his control of power in Angola. This has implications for his 
legitimacy as a leader, which will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
1.4 Conceptualising African Agency 
Although frequently overlooked in the context of China-Africa relations, the concept of 
African agency has its roots in the work of several scholars who have considered the very 
survival of post-independence African states in the international system a manifestation of 
their agency. 
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 As observed by (Newitt, 2007:84) Savimbi, as with all the other party leaders, saw the Angolan 
independence struggle and fight for political dominance as ‘zero-sum’. Furthermore, as his ethnic support base, 
the Ovimbundu, were a large segment of the population (35-40 percent) and he believed this should have 
carried him to victory (Malaquias, 2000:102). As such, first-past-the-post (FPTP) was a poor choice of electoral 
format in this context.  
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1.4.1 Sovereignty and statehood 
Jackson and Rosberg (1982:22) distinguish between de jure (negative or externally derived) 
and de facto (positive or internally derived) statehood and argue that it is the former that 
has ensured the persistence of some African states. While these states may not conform to 
the Weberian (1964:156) definition of a state, which demands empirical evidence of the 
monopoly of force over a territory and population; African states’ recognition and 
acceptance by the international community has conferred on them legal equality with other 
states and certain unalienable rights and privileges, regardless of relative political and 
economic power. This leads to what Clapham (1996a:12) has termed ‘the gap between the 
myth and reality of statehood’. African states have successfully used this membership of the 
‘sovereignty regime’ to ensure their self-preservation.  Given the artificiality of the states, 
defined as they had been by colonialism in most cases, these ‘improbable candidates for 
survival … have often done better than might have been expected’ (Clapham, 1998:263). 
 
Kremenyuk (1991:23) notes, the main currency in international negotiations is sovereignty. 
Consequently, recognition by the outside world affords political elites access to state 
monopoly on economic rents such as international trade, establishment of official exchange 
rates and import licenses among others (Clapham, 1999:527).  Indeed, political elites define 
their role by brokering internal resources and striking further bargains in the international 
arena. They thus marshal external support and resources to maintain domestic control, 
through their monopoly of foreign relations (Clapham, 1996a:62). In this way, they have 
effectively subverted formal sovereignty in the right of people to govern themselves 
(accorded African states during decolonisation) as a mechanism to maintain internal control 
(Clapham, 1996a:268).  
 
In this manner sovereignty conferred on states gave political elites the right to represent 
their people and act as intermediaries for them with the international community, 
regardless of whether the government in question was in fact legitimately representative of 
the people. Clapham (1999: 530) argues that using sovereignty garnered in this way as an 
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ideology for state power is fragile, dependent as it is on the tacit acceptance of both the 
international community and that of domestic constituencies. A paucity of internal 
legitimacy inevitably leads to an over-reliance on external legitimacy.  
 
Angola’s nascent independence movements placed a great deal of importance on being 
recognised by OAU, as this provided access to financial resources to support their party and 
was in itself a foot in the door to recognition as legitimate government post-independence 
by the outside world. As a result the political contenders were constantly challenging each 
other’s legitimacy as representatives of the Angolan people, in order to try to claim a 
monopoly on such legitimacy and hence sovereignty. Such conflicts between FNLA, UNITA 
and MPLA went further than the politicisation of ethnicity; they represented challenges to 
the parties’ actual survival as political organisations. However, OAU recognition in 1976 of 
the MPLA state structures as the sole legitimate government of Angola lent credence to the 
latter’s claim that its rivals were illegitimate tribalists and rebels (Clapham, 1985:20). 
Ironically, such rhetoric was less for the benefit of the Angolans themselves, but to reinforce 
and defend their legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. The MPLA 
government has continued to define its legitimacy largely through external means. 
 
1.4.2 Extraversion 
The International community conferred the MPLA government its statehood. As a 
consequence, their sovereignty, as with other African states’, is externally derived and they 
are dependent on exogenous factors for continued recognition (Clapham, 1996a:7). 
However, Bayart et al (1999: xvi) maintain that this external dependence, far from implying 
a submissive role for the African political actors, is in fact intentionally maintained by them. 
The nature of this relationship allows the African political elites to act as a bridge between 
the international actors and the populations, perfectly placed to take a cut from these 
transactions (Clapham, 1996a:26). Whilst multinationals and external powers are painted as 
the villains in this relationship, they are in fact the mechanism through which the political 
elites extract economic rents from the country’s internal resources and forge and maintain a 
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clientelistic relationship with the outside world (Clapham, 1985:183). There is thus a 
symbiotic relationship between the political elite and transnational business interests, 
whereby the former can extort benefits from latter, as much , if not more so, that the other 
way around (Clapham,1985:97). Thus it is in the interests of both the African government 
and the external powers to maintain the structure of the mythological state (Clapham, 
1985:116). This form of interaction is very evident Angola given the political elites’ brokering 
of Angola’s oil resources with the international petroleum regime and oil multinationals, 
and is the subject of further discussion in later chapters.  
 
Fundamentally, African agency rests on the fact that African elites can manipulate the 
external world and adapt it to their needs (Clapham, 1985:5). This simultaneous 
dependence on and subversion of external forces is best encapsulated by Bayart’s (1993:74) 
concept of ‘extraversion’, whereby the monopoly of access to foreign influence and capital 
is used as a tool to maintain internal power. Thus African elites have exploited their 
‘weakness’ in the international system to bolster their position. This is the case both in a 
legal sense through externally derived sovereignty and in a commercial sense through the 
acquisition of internationally derived economic rents.  
 
In Angola’s case this is important, as external relations have been the MPLA political elite’s 
source of power since their assumption of government.43 Ever pragmatic despite ideological 
pronouncements, when the MPLA assumed control of the government in 1975, following 
the prescriptions of the guiding ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the MPLA nationalised land 
and industry (Ferreira, 2002). This was in order to be able to take up property left by the 
fleeing Portuguese and to break the backs of the rich landowners so they could not present 
a viable ‘power centre’ from an independent economic base. It also allowed the state to 
bring the externally focussed economy under indigenous control (Clapham, 1985:105). 
Notably however, property owned by foreigners was left untouched if they were prepared 
                                                 
43
 This is evident throughout Angola’s history, beginning with trade relations between Angola’s pre-colonial 
coastal elite and foreign powers (Newitt, 2007:47). Even in pre-colonial times and during Portuguese 
occupation Angola’s coastal-based elite drew their economic power from relations with external forces, in 
previous cases through trade (Chabal and Vidal, 2007:6). 
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to work with the new government. This indicates that while the MPLA was intent on 
eliminating domestic threat to political power, they maintained astute relations with foreign 
investors.   
 
Extraversion was also clearly manifested in African states’ behaviour during the Cold War. 
Clapham (1996a:135) asserts: ‘…African leaders were not always as powerless in the face of 
the superpowers as a crude comparison of relative capabilities would suggest.’ Indeed, 
African leaders had a freedom of action in the bipolar nature of the world and juridical 
sovereignty enhanced this. Clapham (1996a:139) maintains that the superpowers did not so 
much impose themselves on the various parties to proxy war conflicts as they were ‘sucked 
into them’, regarded merely as a resource via which the African actors could enact their 
own battles, while paying lip service to the causes espoused by their patrons. Of course, 
although alignment with one superpower delivered tangible economic rewards, non-
alignment was diplomatically preferable (Clapham, 1996a:64). This is part explains the initial 
reluctance of the MPLA to announce its Marxism to the world, thus aligning itself to USSR, 
before the imperative to garner material support for armed conflict made this a necessity.  
 
From an economic perspective on extraversion, the MPLA was sustained throughout the 
civil war by revenue from oil, which was exploited by Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC), 
owned by US oil major Chevron, despite the fact that Washington officially supported the 
opposition UNITA. Soares de Oliveira (2007a:155) points out that the recognition of the 
MPLA government, as is the case with many ‘successful failed oil states’ hinges on the fact 
that the very exploitation of oil requires that the host area have a sovereign government 
with which the oil investors can make the required transactions.  As such the MPLA 
benefitted from the international system substantially, essentially pointing to their having 
‘won the war via international extraversion’. The end of the Cold War had also led to a 
disillusionment of Savimbi, combined with MPLA’s successful campaign to demonise him 
(Messiant, 2007:258). Global initiatives such as the Kimberley Process, which prevented the 
sale of so-called conflict diamonds or ‘blood diamonds’ were instrumental in cutting off 
Savimbi’s access to capital, as he was supported by international trade in alluvial diamonds, 
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much as the MPLA was supported by oil.   Messiant argues (2008: 298) that through the civil 
war the MPLA successfully manipulated the international community (itself willing to be 
manipulated in the context of the Cold War). As with other oil-state elites, their interests 
were completely externally directed (Soares de Oliveira, 2007b: 82). Indeed, Shaxson 
(2007:49) notes the supreme irony that during one of the hottest battles of the Cold War, 
the US-operated oil rigs exploited oil in collusion with the Marxist MPLA; were guarded by 
Cuban troops against US-funded guerrillas and the oil revenue used to purchase Soviet 
weapons. Both van de Walle (2001) and Chabal (2007) point to the fact that the 
manipulation by Angolan political parties of such external actors is routinely 
underestimated , once again denying the role of African agency in prolonging the conflict in 
order to accrue economic benefits. The dominant and extroverted nature of the Angolan 
government was thus solidified during three decades of civil conflict during which time an 
all-encompassing war was used as an excuse for distracted governance and a cover for elites 
with access to oil and other rents to amass fortunes.   
 
The emergence of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1980’s was also 
testament to the African elites’ ability to pursue their own ends. The fiscal austerity 
measures imposed upon African countries, by their nature required the buy-in of the 
political elites whose privileged position would be compromised by these reforms (Kahler, 
1993:376). The utter failure of the programmes was due to the African actors’ ability to 
manipulate and frustrate the ‘would-be interveners’ (Clapham, 1999:535). Interestingly, 
Angola was one of the few African countries who refused to even submit to a SAP (Clapham, 
1996a:170). Instead, quick off the mark in exploiting the emerging polarity between the 
West and China, MPLA government brokered alternate and less conditional financing from 
Beijing.44    
  
 
                                                 
44
 It is a moot point as to whether Angola would have submitted to an IMF programme had financing from 
China not been forthcoming. As discussed in later chapters, Angola signed a loan agreement with IMF in 2009 
and, as will be discussed, in just as skilfully avoiding the sorts of fundamental reforms that would threaten the 
political elite. 
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1.4.3 African Agency in China-Africa Relations 
While the end of the Cold War removed African countries’ strategic position vis-à-vis the 
superpowers, China’s commercial challenge to Western interests in Africa has renewed 
African governments’ potential to leverage their position (Taylor, 2006:12). (This is explored 
more fully in Chapter 2.)  This raises the thesis proposed by Clapham (2008:366) that China 
will merely become the next in a long line of actors to be channelled by African elites for 
their own political agendas.  
 
Even the mainstream media has recognised that African governments have become more 
discerning generally in their engagement with China (Russell and Green, 2008; Faucon and 
Swartz, 2009; Wallis, 2010). Indeed, Cargill (2010:22) recognises that African countries are 
playing a more assertive role in international relations generally. This is in part due to the 
increased leverage afforded African governments against the West by emerging powers 
such as China. As Chan (2008:347) notes: ‘Being courted is a prelude to being taken 
seriously’. Certain African countries have been able to ‘play the China card’ well. This has 
involved soliciting renewed interest from foreign powers. Strengthening relations with China 
has thus altered the dynamic of their relations with other countries. Still others have 
managed to successfully use the leverage this has afforded them, to use China to balance 
the influence other countries have on their political economy. Angola has successfully 
managed both, as I will demonstrate in later chapters.  
 
One Chinese scholar took exception to the fact that I even suggested African agency had not 
always been present:  
 
‘… Western scholars say that the relations are often driven more by China, actually 
Chinese scholars always emphasise that China has always operated within a framework of 
equality. African countries are considered equal and China believes in the idea of mutual 
benefits. In fact firstly, China’s foreign relations are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
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Co-existence developed in relation to India, and contained within in these principles is the 
consideration of political equality. Secondly during the reform and opening up period, 
mutual benefits were emphasised – drawing on political and economic equality. Therefore 
Angola is an example of this relationship, but not the exception.’ 45  
 
It is clear from this statement that China, itself a country most defensive of its sovereignty, 
has chosen to emphasise the de jure equality of sovereign states in the international system. 
De facto equality, given China’s economic and political clout relative to African countries is 
of course another matter. As Raine (2009:191) points out: ‘The danger here is that China’s 
government might fail to look beyond its own rhetoric about equal engagement with Africa 
to acknowledge the practical reality that many of these relationships are far from equal…’ 
 
One of the common short-comings of many early analyses is that, in their eagerness to 
uncover broad trends and patterns in the development of China-Africa relations, 
researchers treat both ‘China’ and ‘Africa’ as singular units. Although this plays well to the 
incorporation of conceptualising ‘China as the biggest developing country and Africa the 
biggest group of developing countries’ (Hu, 2006), it masks the diverse regional contexts 
found within both China and Africa. It has more recently been recognised that an attempt to 
tackle ‘China-Africa’ is too broad a scope to render any analysis meaningful (Asche & 
Schüller, 2008:55). Alden et al (2008) also make a determined effort to steer clear of 
generalised analyses.46  
 
It is important to recognise that talking about ‘African’ agency as an undifferentiated unit is 
meaningless in the context of this research. Not only do different African countries, on a 
bilateral level, have different capacities to negotiate with China effectively (Jackson and 
Rosberg, 1982:7), but, as is the case with the Chinese state, each African state is made up of 
                                                 
45
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Shanghai, 17 September 2009 
46
 Alden et al (2008)show-case in-depth niche studies as evident in Carling & Østbø Haugen and Hsu’s 
contributions entitled respectively ‘Mixed Fates of a Popular Minority: Chinese migrants in Cape Verde’ and 
‘Medicine as Business: Chinese Medicine in Tanzania’ respectively to Alden et al (2008). 
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various different sets of actors.  The Angolan political elite, acting as intermediary with 
China through its defined foreign policy is similarly factionalised and subject to domestic 
pressures and tensions. As Woolcock (2007:22) notes, realist perspectives that assume the 
unitary nature of the state are overly reductionist.  Underdal (1991:106) expands on this: 
‘Modelling the state as a unitary actor is likely to lead us to overestimate the willingness or 
the capacity of governments to pursue ‘net national gain’ by sacrificing the welfare of one 
group or sector of society for that of another’.  
 
As Obiorah (2008:2) notes, African agency within the context of China-Africa relations is 
often overlooked. Furthermore, although African agency has entered debates, it is almost 
always a question of ‘how far African states are able to hold up their national interests’47. 
This implies the assumption that the actors of African states, primarily the political elite, will 
act in the ‘national interest’. While they may profess to do so, it must be borne in mind that 
it is often they who define the national interest, almost certainly to their own advantage 
and often to the detriment of other domestic actors not within their sphere of influence.   
 
Putnam’s (1988) concept of ‘two-level games’, posits that the interplay of both domestic 
and international factors in dynamic interaction influences international bargaining. Thus, 
where actors can simultaneously manipulate a domestic and an international set of policy 
issues, there emerges what Moravcsik (1993:15) terms ‘creative opportunities for statecraft.’ 
This ‘dynamic interaction’ (Evans, 1993:397) is very much in evidence in terms of the MPLA’s 
(and other Cold War proxies) use of Super power agendas to serve their own domestic 
needs (Krauss, 1993:291) and is equally valid in Angola’s new set of interactions with China. 
Because the power of the political elites is tied to external relations, the domestic and 
foreign policy are inextricably linked (Clapham, 1985:113). 
 
                                                 
47
 Dr Alistair Fraser, Philomathia Fellow and College Lecturer in Politics, University of Cambridge, Chatham 
House conference: ‘Emerging Agents of Change: African and International Negotiations’, London, 2 February 
2011.  
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Luanda’s need for financing was closely related to the domestic imperative for national 
reconstruction in order to bolster the government’s internal legitimacy to its people.  China, 
by the same token required energy resources to maintain its economy’s momentum for the 
same reasons of maintaining domestic legitimacy through economic growth.  
 
However, as will be shown in later chapters, both sets of domestic actors have used 
negotiations with the other country to pursue internal agendas, leading to what Putnam 
(1988:448) terms ‘synergistic issues linkages’.  This relates to the fact that domestic and 
international factors are mutually influential and can ‘change the game’ for the other side of 
the board. In the case of Angola, it has been the President’s consolidation of economic 
control by balancing of factions within his own party; in the Chinese government, is has 
been the tussle between different ministries for foreign policy influence. Thus, it becomes 
easier to discern a raft of competing agendas underlining once again that assertion that the 
‘the unitary actor assumption is often radically misleading’ (Putnam, 1988:452). I will return 
to this concept in later chapters.  
 
1.5 Conceptualising Angola as a ‘Weak State’  
In chapter 1, I drew on the theoretical frameworks of Clapham (1985), Mann (1986) and 
Migdal (1988) to conceptualise the Angolan state as a ‘weak’ state internally. It is important 
to note here that there is a conceptual difference between ‘state’ and ‘regime’; ‘state’ 
defined here as the permanent structures of government and ‘regime’ as the organisation of 
powers in these structures (Fischer, 1990:428). Angola’s political reality is thus a product of 
the way the state has been organised and power exercised, hence a function of the regime. 
However, the ruling party MPLA has been in power since Angola’s independence, and the 
country has had the same head of state since 1979. Restricted political participation has led 
to the growth of an entrenched political elite far removed from the rest of society 
(Malaquias, 2000: 109). In order to preserve its status, the political elite has successfully 
collapsed the division between the state and their ruling party’s regime (Orre, 2010:8).  
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1.5.1 Legitimacy and Internal Weakness 
Migdal (1988:4) defines the strong state as having the ability to penetrate society, regulate 
social relationships, extract resources and appropriate them. He assesses state strength in 
the context of the relationship between the state and society and the relative strength of 
these sets of institutions in comparison to each other (Migdal, 1986:35). In this case, Angola 
is a strong state, as the state has a very dominant relationship with society. However, the 
Angolan Presidency uses tactics Migdal (1988:214) terms the ‘politics of survival’ in order to 
retain a grip on power, indicating the very tenuousness of this grip and demonstrating the 
simultaneous weakness of the regime.  
 
Characterising Angola as a ‘weak state’ may seem as being at odds with the argument that 
the Angolan government displays considerable agency in efforts to consolidate its own 
internal political position. However, this is perfectly aligned to Clapham’s (1985:42) 
definition of a weak state, meaning fragile internal political legitimacy – applicable to MPLA.  
He distinguishes lack of legitimacy from lack of capacity (considered a characteristic of a 
‘strong state’), pointing out that an inherent feature of the third world post-colonial state is 
to be both ‘strong’ and ‘fragile’ or weak (Clapham, 1985:39).  
 
Angola’s current political reality appears to be an entrenched de facto one-party state. 
However, the MPLA, in power since Angola’s independence since 1975, has faced constant 
threats to its monopoly of political power and internal legitimacy. These have occurred on 
three levels: intra-party factionalism (discussed above), rural resistance within Angola 
(galvanised by FNLA and UNITA during the civil war) and intervention from foreign powers. 
Such challenges to regime point to weak legitimacy, which in many instances have only been 
countered by renewed external intervention further eroding the regime’s domestic 
legitimacy (Clapham, 1996a:21).  
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Contrary to Clapham (1999:264) , Migdal (1988:142) does not consider the fragility of post-
independent states as path dependent on a history of colonialism. The existence of 
colonialism and the decolonisation process that followed represented a fundamental 
change that the actors who became state elites were in a position to exploit (Migdal, 
1988:86). Thus although a colonial history is a contributing factor, Angola’s current context 
is ultimately determined by the choices and actions of state elite.  Indeed, although 
Mustapha (2002) claims that Bayart (1993) argues the criminality of the state to be inherent 
in African politics, I interpret Bayart’s (1999:43) argument as an indication of a conscious 
strategy on the part of certain groups to extract rents through monopolies on commercial 
relations with the outside world. I therefore argue as does Soares de Oliveira (2007b:129) 
that the relationship between the Angolan state and its political elite is a product of its 
specific political history (not the history of ‘Africa in general’) and the agency of the political 
elite in manipulating such a context.  
 
In describing state power, Mann (1985:113) distinguishes despotic and infrastructural power, 
the former referring to ‘the range of actions that the elite is empowered to undertake 
without routine’ and the latter the ability to execute them. Using these criteria, I classify the 
Angolan state as having high despotic power, but low infrastructural power. It is important 
to distinguish the state as a political space (Mann, 1986:134) from the political elite which 
are state actors, but not necessarily the state themselves.  Although the political elite 
centralised around the presidency is considerably powerful, the state bureaucracy, aside 
from the important exception of the state oil company Sonangol48, is weak and inefficient. 
This weakness is perpetuated by design, in order to loosen the institutional framework that 
would otherwise bind elites and limit their despotic power.   
 
Thus, despite the Angolan political elite’s outward show of power, the presidency 
demonstrates several key characteristics of so-called ‘weak states’ as defined by Migdal 
(1988:214) in that dos Santos has prioritised regime survival over the growth of the country. 
                                                 
48
 Soares de Oliveira (2007a) explores in details rise of Sonangol as a relatively efficient state in the midst of 
the weakness and chaos of the rest of the Angolan state institutions. 
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The contradiction of Angola displaying at once signs of a strong and weak state has been 
commented on several times, leading to the description of a ‘successful failed state’ being 
liberally applied to Angola (Soares de Oliveira, 2007a; Sogge,2009).  
 
President Dos Santos, having centralised power around his position and personality faces 
the dilemma of balancing political stability and economic growth as described by Migdal 
(1988: 236).  Migdal (1988:226) argues that political elites’ tactics to retain control of 
political power does not mean that political elites have never had a social or developmental 
agenda, merely that the imperative to remain in power has superseded any plans for 
development. Chief among these is a fear of decentralisation which might give rise to 
‘power centres’ that could ultimately threaten the supremacy of the President and his clique 
who remain loyal through patronage linkages.   
 
1.5.2 Re-emergence of Cultural Identity as a Vehicle for Political Opposition  
Angola, like many post-colonial African states, has multiple regionally-based ethnic groups. 
The predominance of Portuguese culture and language in the Luanda and other urban 
centres is characteristic of the fact that most Angolan political elites have stronger cultural 
links to Europe than their African roots. In the early days, the Ovimbundu and Bakongo 
particularly viewed UNITA and FNLA as cultural movements that would represent the 
interests of their respective ethnic groups (Malaquias, 2000:106). Malaquias (2000: 96) 
argues that as most MPLA cadres were descended from Portuguese and largely intellectuals, 
they used a discourse of class struggle to mobilise support, whereas UNITA leaders played 
the race card and ‘claimed to represent the “real Africans”,  sons of the soil, living in the 
bush, fighting against a wealthy cosmopolitan, better educated urban elite’ (World Bank, 
2007:12). The consolidation of political identity through the prism of race and culture thus 
had profound implications for Angola’s future as a nation state. 
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Sogge (2011: 85) argues that ‘Urbanised and Portuguese-speaking, most people see 
themselves no longer chiefly as members of ethnic blocks, but as citizens of one Angolan 
nation’. This is blatantly not the case. Although UNITA and FNLA have ceased to become 
viable political threats at the ballot box, the grievances they represent remain. Indeed, 
Heywood’s (2000) study of the political history of the Ovimbundu people points out that 
traditional forms of political organisation amongst the Ovimbundu re-emerged post-
independence and largely thwarted MPLA attempts to remould the Angolan nation-state 
(Heywood, 2000:182). Chabal (2007:5) argues that the present configuration of power 
transcends the historical domination of creole families as President Dos Santos forms his 
alliances pragmatically rather than based on ethnic identity. This is better described as a 
form of co-optation of elites in order to neutralise possible political threats. From 1978, in 
order to placate popular demands, Neto deliberately increased the representation of black 
Angolans in the MPLA Politbureau, a practice continued by his successor (Ogunbadejo, 
1981:258).  Indeed, as Roque (2011:4) points out, in October 2010 Dos Santos appointed 
two former UNITA members, both Ovimbundu into key positions: Jorge Rebelo Chicoty as 
Foreign Minister and General Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda as chief of staff of the armed 
forces. This caused controversy amongst the MPLA, indicating that the political past of these 
two figures still matters, but also that the President is sensitive to the need to make small 
political concessions if he hopes to retain power.  
 
Dos Santos and the MPLA are acutely aware that the interior of the country is not a 
traditional power stronghold for them. Despite a show of strength in Luanda, MPLA support 
and power diminish the further one ventures from the capital and certain remote areas are 
beginning to mobilise cultural movements as a vehicle for political expression (Ruigrok, 
2010). In order to combat this, certain practices have been put in place. For instance Orre 
(2007) documents in some detail how the MPLA has since the end of the civil war been 
subsidising traditional leaders (sobas) in order to win their loyalty. The sobas are now 
openly supportive of the MPLA and were instrumental in garnering support for the MPLA 
elections (Orre, 2010:12).  The implications of this are that the MPLA is rather than 
abolishing traditional political practices, seeking to co-opt them for their own purposes.  
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Less resolved is the political situation in Cabinda, the Northern enclave province from which 
60 percent of Angola’s oil wealth comes is a stronghold for the Frente para a Libertação do 
Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) which has been agitating for Cabinda’s secession since 1963. 
Although many have disregarded the severity of the political threat, FLEC claimed 
responsibility for an attack on the Togolese soccer team travelling overland to Luanda for 
the 2010 African Cup of Nations (COCAN) in January of that year. The incident highlighted 
the instability rooted in ethnic politics that still plagues that province in the power struggle 
for its offshore oil wealth.   
 
1.5.3 Atrophying bureaucracy  
Shaxson’s (2007:183) description of Angola as ‘the two –speed nation where the apparatus 
of government was stripped down to little more than its sovereign, extractive core, leaving 
the rest to wither’ is brutally apt. The only exception to the atrophying of the state organs is 
the oil parastatal Sonangol whose efficiency stands out in contrast (Reno, 2000:225). Indeed 
Soares de Oliveira (2007a:595) posits that Sonangol is ‘… the centrepiece in the 
management of Angola’s “successful failed state”’. Essentially, this situation serves to 
ensure the weakness of potentially powerful state agencies that might threaten the power 
of the Presidency as suggested by Migdal (1988:213). This thesis is supported by Van de 
Walle (2001:127) who further describes the neo-patrimonial state as a ‘hybrid regime’ with 
a parallel structure of informal institutions within the formation of the state. He asserts that 
this serves the purpose of undermining a bureaucracy that might otherwise serve as a 
restraining influence on elite power. In the case of Angola, such informal networks provide a 
channel through which the resultant inefficient bureaucracy can be circumvented should 
the need arise. This produces a further centralisation of power around the Presidency to 
whom these channels inevitably report. It also distances the President from the 
bureaucratic inefficiency of his own creation (Comerford, 2005:110). As noted by Reno 
(2000:231-232):  ‘…the Angolan government shows a great capacity …to manipulate the 
conditions of their own bureaucratic weakness.’ These parallel structures are very evident in 
the control of Chinese financing and will be discussed further in chapter 6. By 2002, the 
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MPLA government had definitely vanquished its political rivals UNITA. However, despite this 
consolidation of power, the maintenance of domestic authority and the apparatus of power 
have not been without their challenges.   
 
1.6 Central Research Question  
An analysis of China-Angola relations would ordinarily be classified as Chinese foreign policy 
research. As this shows therefore, the African actors involved in relations with China are 
often overlooked or dismissed as passive or inconsequential. African agency is nonetheless 
an important concept to grapple with in the context of relations with China, as recognised 
by Yu (1975:xv). The relationship central to such research, in this case study, namely that of  
China Exim Bank making available loans for Angolan post-war infrastructure rehabilitation 
has been regarded with a rather jaundiced eye by Western donors and development 
agencies. I intend to analyse the mechanism of these contracts and the resultant 
infrastructure construction that they are intended to facilitate. It is consequently an 
interrogation of the the nature of the relationship between the Chinese and Angolan 
governments.  Previous analyses of the relationship between China and Angola have ignored 
the role of African agency in such a mechanism. I investigate the set of agencies at work 
behind the contracts, on both the Chinese and the Angolan side. The analysis operates on 
two levels; a more practical examination of who specifically is involved in these transactions 
followed by a more theoretical analysis  examining the role and implications of Angolan 
agency. 
 
Chinese political rhetoric plays an important part not only in validating and substantiating 
Chinese lending practices in Africa, but also in distinguishing it from that of its Western 
counterparts. I propose to deconstruct this rhetoric, using a post-realist perspective, thus 
taking the rhetorical claims seriously, but not necessarily at face value, as described by Beer 
and Hariman (1996:11). Operating as a backdrop to the Chinese government and related 
agencies’ lending role in Angola is the claim of the fulfilment of a ‘win-win’ partnership for 
development (Hu, 2006). I will thus examine the nature of this proposed ‘win-win’ situation.  
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Benefits undoubtedly are accrued to each country, but these benefits may not necessarily 
be aligned with those stated in the rhetoric.  
 
Rhetoric used by the Angolan government in creating and consolidating its position of 
power is equally important, given that the loan transaction rests on the control of the 
country’s national resources. The mandate to develop Angola is a strong theme in this 
rhetoric, particularly in the wake of legislative elections (2008) and the lead up to the 
following elections in 2013. Such rhetorical imperatives require investigation, particularly as 
concerns the Angolan government’s ability or ‘agency’ to carry out such intentions. As will 
be shown in subsequent chapters, the ‘win-win’ rhetoric is used equally by the Angolan 
government in its national project of consolidating domestic political power. 
 
Significantly, in voicing its objections to the lending contracts between China and African 
countries, Western countries also employ rhetoric. Its influence on shaping the debate and 
resultant policy responses is thus also an important consideration.49 Consequently, I argue 
that such rhetoric is constitutive in nature, as it influences the way in which such actions are 
perceived and approached. This is particularly relevant as regards the concept of 
‘development’. I shall investigate to what extent development is defined within the rhetoric 
espoused by both the Chinese and Angolan governments and how this contrasts with 
Western-determined definitions of this concept. 
 
There is a tendency on the part of many Western observers to assume that because African 
elites do not seem to be working for the development of the masses, they are powerless. 
Indeed, this is far from the case. I propose that an examination of Angola’s dealings with 
China will allow me to analyse African agency in China-Africa relations, an aspect previously 
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 For instance, although healthcare and education was prioritised over infrastructure projects in developing 
countries in previous years, it has recently been recognised as an important contributor to economic growth as 
discussed previously. Furthermore, although the road and railways funded by China are criticised of 
perpetuating Africa’s exploitation as a primary commodities supplier, they are necessary for African countries 
to fully exploit their natural resources.  
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under-emphasised or, in some cases, ignored completely. The importance of demonstrating 
African agency and therefore responsibility for developmental priorities will better inform 
the key assumptions used in analysing China-Africa relations within an International 
Relations framework.50  
 
My defined problematic is as follows: The prevailing view of China’s engagement in Africa is 
that African countries are being exploited for their mineral resource wealth by a country 
whose political and economic power is much greater than their own. These largely 
government – to – government contracts are criticized by the international community, 
ostensibly due to their lack of transparency and accountability but also because China is 
perceived to be gaining preferential access to natural resources. Using the case of Angola, 
what is the mechanism China (through China Exim Bank) uses to provide financing for 
infrastructure to an African country? And what is the role of the Angolan elites in this 
process? 
 
Using a post-realist framework and drawing on the ‘great power/weak power’ and trade 
bargaining/ international negotiation literature, I argue that the predominantly Western-
centric view of Chinese loan mechanisms to Angola denies agency on the part of the 
Angolan actors.  Angolan actors exert an observable influence on the nature of both the 
mechanism of financing negotiated with China Exim Bank, and its implementation. 
Furthermore, Angolan political elites, in a post-civil war environment, are attempting to use 
Chinese financial assistance as a state-building device. Although this might be through 
infrastructure creation in the expansion of state capacity, it is more that Angolan elites are 
exploiting the policy space afforded by a political relationship with China to pursue an 
agenda according to their professed national priorities.  
 
Despite the China Exim Bank loan agreement having been hailed as a form of ‘win-win’ co-
operation by both China and Angola, this mutual benefit extends to some groups of actors 
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one both sides, but is by no means universal.  As observed by one Chinese researcher with 
fieldwork experience in Angola, the Angola-China relationship is very much now at an elite, 
business level.51 One academic pointed out that if a crisis in the relationship between 
Angola and China occurred, as has happened in the past, it would be resolved at the very 
highest level, essentially because it is in both parties’ interests to do so.52   I investigate the 
gains experienced by the elite in both China and Angola, relative to each other and other 
sets of actors. 
 
The set of research questions I sought to answer and inform my work are as follows: 
1. What is the set of agencies at work (both Angolan and Chinese) behind these 
contracts, in terms of both a theoretical underpinning of the concept of African 
agency and a more practical concern of the operational actors involved. 
2. What is meant by ‘win-win’ in terms of both the Chinese governments’ rhetorical 
and material benefits and the Angolan government’s rhetorical and material benefits? 
Have these changed over time? Who is the audience? 
3. What does the rhetoric of the Chinese, Angolan and Western governments say about 
the way the China-Angola relationship is viewed, both in terms of rhetoric’s 
constitutive nature and the actors’ evolving strategic priorities? 
I developed the following framework to use during fieldwork: 
Figure 1.1: Research Design 
Research Questions Information Required Targeted Source 
1.1 What is the operational 
set of agencies at work 
(both Angolan and 
Chinese) behind these 
contracts? 
 
 
Organogram of links, chains 
of command of agreement 
structure, with relative 
weight 
 
 
 
 
China Exim Bank, Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
Angolan Embassy, Ministry of 
Finance (MinFin) 
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1.2 What is the theoretical 
underpinning and 
application of these 
relations in terms of 
African agency?   
 
Suitable application of 
theoretical framework 
Rothstein (1968), Handel 
(1981), Mathisen (1971) 
2.1 What are the Chinese 
government’s 
rhetorical/political gains 
and who is the 
audience?  
 
2.2 What are the Chinese 
material gains and who 
are the beneficiaries?  
 
 
 
2.3 What are the Angolan 
government’s 
rhetorical/political gains 
and who is the 
audience? 
 
 
2.4 What are the Angolan 
government’s material 
gains and who are the 
beneficiaries? 
Perceived strategic 
advantages to partnership 
with Angola (development, 
South-South, political 
leverage/support?) 
 
 
 
Perceived economic 
advantages of Angola 
partnership (energy, market, 
overseas learning, portfolio 
expansion)  
 
 
Perceived strategic 
advantages to partnership 
with China, (development 
rhetoric, elections gains, 
leverage against West?) 
 
 
 
Perceived economic 
advantages of China 
partnership (cheaper 
lending, rent-seeking, 
economic catalyst) 
 
Chinese academics, Chinese 
(MFA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
China Exim Bank, China-Africa 
Business Council, MOFCOM, 
Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and 
private enterprises  
 
 
 
Angolan Ambassador, 
Angolan Ministry of Finance 
(MinFin), Angolan MFA 
 
 
 
 
 
Angolan Ambassador, 
Angolan MinFin, Angolan 
MFA 
 
 
3.1 How has the China Exim 
Bank’s strategic priorities 
changed over time? 
 
3.2 How has the Angolan 
government’s strategic 
priorities changed over 
time 
 
Initial priorities, current 
priorities, perception of  
changing environment 
 
 
Initial priorities, current 
priorities, perception of  
changing environment 
 
 
 
China Exim Bank, Chinese 
Academics 
 
 
 
Angolan Ambassador, 
Angolan MFA, Angolan 
MinFin 
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3.3 How does Chinese 
rhetoric describe the 
Angola-China 
relationship, and how 
has this influence the 
way it is perceived in 
China, Angola and the 
West?   
 
3.4 How does Angolan 
rhetoric describe the 
Angola-China 
relationship, and how 
has this influence the 
way it is perceived in 
China, Angola and the 
West?   
 
3.5 How does Western 
rhetoric describe the 
Angola-China 
relationship, and how 
has this influence the 
way it is perceived in 
China, Angola and the 
West?   
Content analysis/views of 
stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Content analysis/views of 
stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Content analysis/views of 
stakeholders 
State Council speeches, 
National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), 
Speeches, Academic 
publications/Chinese 
academics, Chinese MFA 
 
 
 
 
 
Speeches of President, 
Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on China-Angola 
relations, Angolan academics, 
Angolan Ambassador 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature review 
 
1.7 Methodology 
My research will make its most significant contribution through findings generated from 
fieldwork.  This is due to the relative lack of studies based on in-depth primary research to 
be found currently on China-Angola relations.53 While the Angolan case study has received 
much attention in the context of a post-conflict African state and as an oil producing country, 
focussed in-depth research on China’s role in the country’s plans for reconstruction post-
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 There are only a few such studies of note published during the time this thesis was being prepared. See for 
instance Campos and Vines (2007); Vines et al (2009), Alves (2009) and Tang (2010a). 
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2002 does not yet exist in as much abundance, due to the speed with which the 
phenomenon has occurred in recent years. 
 
Angola is one of the most controversial cases of China’s contemporary phase of engagement 
on the continent, not least due to the ad hoc formulation of the ‘Angola Model’. In order to 
establish the extent to which African agency is involved in such a mechanism, I will examine 
this so-called model, which has already been lauded by Chinese and African sources as a 
model for other African countries to follow. Angola is without doubt an important case 
study, but although dubbed the Angolan model, whether the Angolan case has served as a 
model for China’s relations with any other African country is less clear.54  
 
Consequently I have adopted the case study methodology as the most appropriate,55 using 
the point of departure that Angola, in this context, due to the development of the ‘Angola 
Model’ is rendered as a an archetypal case in the Weberian sense.  Gerring (2004:341) 
defines a case study as: “… an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded 
phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar 
phenomena.” I define the unit or phenomena under study as the relationship between the 
Angolan and Chinese government, rather than as the geographical unit of Angola itself. 
Gerring (2004:348-349) asserts that the case study has certain methodological affinities as 
forming the basis of descriptive inferences and causal mechanisms rather than causality and 
causal effects. The emergence of China’s role in Angola’s national reconstruction 
programme cannot be dated back further than 200456. While it may be considered 
premature to investigate the causal effects and developmental outcomes of China’s role in 
Angola, I argue that the results of the relationship between the elites in each country can 
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 Given the limited amount of time and resource allocated for field research and the complex nature of the 
primary case study to be used, it was decided that Angola would be used as a stand-alone case study, despite 
the obvious merits of a comparative study. 
55
 To a lesser extent, a comparative framework will also be used to compare Chinese aid practices to Angola 
with those of Western countries.  
56
 During the visit of Chinese Vice premier Zeng Peiyan to Angola in March 2004, the first of several co-
operation agreements were signed between China Exim Bank and the Angolan government in terms of 
government concessional loans geared specifically for infrastructure rehabilitation. This is thus taken as the 
beginning of China’s engagement in Angola’s reconstruction programme. 
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already be observed.57 While these results may yet change over time, I will also offer a 
preliminary picture of the effects of the relationship on Angola’s prospects.  
 
The case study methodology has come under sharp criticism from positivists, and is 
generally seen in an inferior light when compared to large-N studies, due to a perceived 
paucity of ‘scientific capital’ and overly ‘idiographic’ content (Steinmetz, 2004:383).  I do 
however consider it the most appropriate methodology for this study due to the largely 
qualitative and in-depth nature of the research. Furthermore, the unique characteristics of 
‘process tracing’ as described by Gerring (2007) are of particular relevance to this research 
process as I have constructed an argument collated from various respondents in different 
sectors across two different countries. As Gerring notes (2007:178): 
 
“… the most distinctive feature of process-tracing styles of research… [is]… the 
noncomparability of adjacent pieces of evidence. All pieces of evidence are relevant 
to the central argument (they are not ‘random’), but they do not comprise 
observations in a larger sample. They are more correctly understood as a series of 
N=1 (one-shot) observations.”    
 
 One of the most important challenges inherent in the research undertaken was access to 
the relevant data, from both Chinese and Angolan sources. This was a difficulty experienced 
throughout the research process in previous studies pertaining to China-Africa relations 
(Burke & Corkin, 2006; Burke, Corkin & Tay, 2007; Asche & Schüller, 2008:55).  
 
For Angola’s part, much of the difficulty lies in a lack of capacity (or political will) for official 
statistics to be generated by the Angolan government. One Angolan academic referred to 
the search for data regarding China-Angola relations specifically as ‘a black hole’ in this 
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 See chapter 5. 
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regard. 58 Messiant (2007:107) comments on the general reluctance of the Angolan 
Government to publish official data, particularly where oil revenue is concerned. Messiant 
(2007:110) further points to the active efforts on the part of the Angolan Government to 
reduce transparency in this sector as reportedly “The law regulating oil production 
stipulates that the parties concerned refrain from making public the terms of their 
involvement, which obviously makes transparency impossible.” Shaxson (2007:64) also 
remarks on secrecy that permeates Angola, suggesting that this is due to the dominance of 
the oil industry which is governed by the control of access to information. The Angolan 
Ministry of Finance has since renovated its website and made public information on projects 
financed by oil-backed loans from Portugal and China59. This is a decided improvement, but 
by no means sufficient. One Angolan NGO activist was adamant that the figures published 
by the Angolan Ministry of Finance were fictitious. 60 Indeed, Global Witness (2011:9) 
remarks that despite an increase in the availability of official data from Angolan Ministries, it 
is unclear that these published figures are reliable.  
 
Furthermore, the media is tightly controlled. One Angolan academic bemoaned the fact that 
Angola ‘has no newspapers that take public opinion into account’ and moreover that 
Angola’s academic community is severely lacking.61 In support of this claim, during the start 
of my fieldwork in Angola, three independent weeklies were bought by a hitherto unknown 
media group, suspected to be owned by figures close to the President62 (Croese, 2010). 
 
There is an active rumour mill present in Angola due to a lack of media circulation outside of 
Luanda. Comerford (2005:235) takes a more positive stance on the role of such informal 
communication channels, known locally as mujimbu and argues for their importance as a 
means for a largely illiterate population, with a strong oral tradition, to gain access to 
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 Interview, Academic, Luanda, 14 July, 2010 
59
 See www.minfin.gv.ao  
60
 Interview, NGO, Luanda, 18 August 2010 
61
 Interview, Academic, Luanda, 14 July, 2010 
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 Interview, Consultant, Luanda, 10 May 2010; See also: Club-K.net (2010) 
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information on current events, in an environment of heavy censorship. In this context, my 
choice of semi-structured interviews to generate data (see below) is particularly appropriate.  
 
Data collection from Chinese sources is similarly challenging. Asche & Schüller (2008:26) 
express frustration at the discrepancies between statistics reported by Yearbooks of the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce and IMF reports. This is explained in part by Chinese 
reporting methods’ current failure to (or lack of interest in) conforming to international 
standards (Davies, 2007:35).   
 
Brautigam (2009:166) in her study of Chinese aid to Africa, found that Chinese academics 
cited reasons for a paucity of published statistics specifically on aid to Africa as cultural 
tendencies, as well as the fear of reprisal from the Chinese public that such large funds were 
being sent overseas despite that fact that areas of China are still very poor.  Hubbard (2007) 
in contrast, has pointed out that there is data available, albeit in the Chinese language. 
Consequently, it is not necessarily opacity on the part of the Chinese government, but the 
inability of foreign researchers to read Chinese; a ‘”veil of ignorance” rather than “lack of 
transparency”’ (Hubbard, 2007:3). Large (2008:54) emphasises that Chinese-language 
sources are often neglected by Western scholars. 
 
Many scholars have been reduced to using grant and loans figures as they are reported in 
Xinhua63 newspaper reports (Taylor, 2006). As the development of relations between China 
and Angola are very much a contemporary phenomenon, I will also be forced to use 
newspaper articles as a reference source throughout the data collection process. One 
Chinese researcher commented: 
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 Xinhua News Agency is one of the most important news agencies in China. Xinhua reporters are often also 
intelligence agents (see Shaxson, 2007), so their information is presumably accurate. To counter-balance this is 
consideration that Xinhua is also beholden to China’s press censorship.  
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‘There is a compromise on content in terms of China-Africa related media – it is very 
distorted. There is little about the basic relationship, only a desire to pick up on what 
is “special or particular”. Chinese journalists have limited resources and must stick to 
official interpretations. This is also not enough and it can become “deformed”. There 
is also a problem with statistics, both African and China-Africa statistics.’64  
 
However, as noted by Franzosi (1987:6)  
‘…despite the limitations of the newspapers as a source of historical65 data, they 
often constitute the only available source of information.’ 
 
While not immune to biases, this does not necessarily distinguish newspapers articles from 
any other written source media. It appears that there is more bias in the interpretation and 
frequency of reported events rather than the reporting of the events themselves (Franzosi, 
1987:7).  
 
The manner in which the information is rendered is also a source of information in itself. Wu 
(2005:99) highlights the importance of People’s Daily in conveying the official government 
view in a process he terms ‘documentary politics’. He further suggests articles found within 
state media, as well as the rapid proliferation of local newspapers are often key indicators of 
power struggles within certain political individuals or representative of provincial defiance 
of the central government (Wu,2005:122;144).  Such dynamics are mirrored in the 
instrumentalization of the official state newspaper in Angola Jornal de Angola, as the 
mouth-piece of the state, and various ‘independent’ newspapers that are often a public 
forum for elite spats.    
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 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 2 December 2009. 
65
 ‘Historical’ in this context is taken to mean the record of events, both past and contemporary. 
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Given the problematic nature of quantitative data, and the importance of rhetoric to my 
study, I followed a more qualitative approach, using in-depth interviews as a principle 
source of primary data collection. As my research concerns a mechanism established 
between the political elites in two authoritarian governments, I used purposive snowball 
sampling. I compiled a specific list of target respondents, who in turn were suspected of 
being the most likely to be able to identify further appropriate respondents. This is 
particularly appropriate in the context of China, where the use of ‘guanxi’66 is considered 
paramount (Brautigam, 2009:71).  This relates theoretically to Gould’s (2003:266) 
conceptualisation of network analysis and its usefulness in discovering ‘important 
phenomena not identifiable, or at any rate not easily identifiable, through other means with 
regards to elite collective actions and patron client linkages’.67    Studies by Brautigam (2009), 
Davies (2007), Jakobsen &Knox (2010), Burke and Corkin (2006) and Burke et al (2007) all 
adopted the methodology of conducting field research comprising in-depth interviews with 
a broad range of respondents from various sectors such as government, civil society and 
business in order to construct a composite impression of the interactions between various 
actors and the processes under study within the discipline of China-Africa relations.     
 
The inherent value of an interview is not necessarily in terms of the information rendered, 
but the manner in which it is done, as this reveals important information as to the attitude 
and opinions of the respondent to the subject at hand (Christensen, 2006:405). In line with 
Soss (2006:128) I sought to locate specific statements within a broader web of narratives. I 
was conscious of the potential for perceived asymmetrical power-relations to impede the 
data gathering process in the context of such interviews. I attempted to create the 
atmosphere of ‘an instructional session in which the interviewees hold privileged in 
knowledge and researchers play the role of the uninitiated student’68 (Soss, 2006: 135).      
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 This concept is the subject of considerable literature, particularly as regards business relations. See for 
instance Pye (1992) ; Goh (1996); Heisey (2000),  
67
 For a more in-depth discussion on patronage networks among the political elite in China and Angola, see Wu 
(2005); Lam (2006) and Shaxson (2007) respectively 
68
 My appearance, that of a young woman, may inadvertently have helped in this case as despite the sensitive 
nature of the interview content, I was in most cases not perceived to be a threat, given the largely patriarchal 
nature of both countries in which field work was conducted. 
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I anticipated difficulty in accessing high-level respondents and did therefore not discount 
interviews with lower level personnel, which were sometimes very useful. As discussed by 
George and Bennett (2005:81) 
“Often, lower level officials who worked on an issue every day have stronger 
recollections of how it was decided than the top officials who actually made the 
decision but who focussed on the issues in question only intermittently.” 
 
While the bulk of my data was generated through interviews, I also collected and analysed 
the relevant policy documents, press statements and published local commentary. 
Particularly given my interest in the constitutive nature of rhetoric in China-Africa relations, 
and the importance Wu (2005) attributes to such sources with this context, as described 
above, these documents all provide important framing for my research.   
 
Large (2008:59) recognises the pronounced need to generate research that takes account of 
Chinese perspectives on the matter, instead of merely those of the Western observer. He 
warns specifically against the potential of ‘self-referential logic’ in using exclusively English 
sources (Large, 2008:58). I argue that the same imperative exists to include African, in this 
case, Angolan voices. Two challenges on this front concern the fact that Chinese Africa 
studies are an under-developed research genre as are Angolan China studies, although this 
is currently rapidly changing. Nevertheless, Chinese-language material related specifically to 
China-Angola relations is sparse, with most articles of a more business or trade focus. This 
reveals the lack of strategic significance that Angola as a separate country is viewed by 
Chinese researchers. Indeed one Shanghai academic commented that despite all the fuss 
about China-Africa relations, South Africa was a much more strategic African partner.69 
Furthermore, until recently, there existed few studies on China-Africa relations with genuine 
African ownership, still more rare are those studies emanating from the African country 
whose relations with China are under study. Nevertheless I have made a pointed effort to 
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 Interview, Chinese research institute, Shanghai, 17 September 2009 
61 
 
 
 
use Angolan (Portuguese) and Chinese-language based texts where they are available in 
order to reintroduce their voice to the discourse. 
 
Fieldwork comprised six months in the field in China July 2009 to January 2010 and three 
months in the field in Angola; April-May 2010 and June – August 201070, with a brief return 
to Angola from 29 January to 4 February 2011. Due to the sensitive nature of the research71, 
most interviews were conducted on condition of anonymity. I did not use a dictaphone to 
record interviews, choosing instead to write notes, where this was permitted by the 
respondent. Given reluctance of many respondents to speak openly about Angola-China 
relations, I felt that even should a respondent have agreed to be recorded, the presence of 
the dictaphone would have altered his or her attitude in the interview and possibly have 
compromised the quality of information that he or she was willing to surrender. 
 
China field research took place in Beijing and Shanghai, during which interviews were held 
with a total of 71 respondents, from various sectors including several ministries in the 
Chinese government such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China Export- Import 
Bank (China Exim), African diplomats, non-governmental organisations, (NGOs), state-
owned enterprises, (SOEs), and foreign consultants. The spread of respondents is reflected 
in the table below (Figure 1.2): 
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 The prohibitive costs of living in Angola prevented a longer stay. According to a Mercer ‘Cost of Living’ study 
Luanda was rated the most expensive city for an expatriate in 2010 (Financial, 2010) 
71
 At various times, several respondents in both China and Angola referred to the sensitive nature of my 
research and the fact that much of the data I sought was considered a ‘state secret’. Brautigam (2000:2) also 
found this in her research of Chinese aid to African countries.  
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Figure 1.2:  China Interview Spread 
 African Chinese Western TOTAL (%) 
Government 
(Diplomats, MFA, MOFCOM, 
NDRC, CADF, Exim Bank ) 
4 16  20 28.1 
Int. institutions  
(IMF, World Bank) 
  2 2 2.8 
Private companies/ 
consultants 
2 2 8 12 16.9 
SOEs 2   2 2.8 
NGOs  2 3 5 7 
Media  2 3 5 7 
Academia/  
think tanks 
3 19 3 25 35.2 
TOTAL 11 41 19 71 100 
 
As can be observed from Figure 1.2, the China sample is heavily skewed towards 
academia/think tanks (35.2%), and government ministries (28.1%); this is generally a 
function of access. The sample was therefore a rich source for Chinese foreign policy-related 
research questions bearing in mind that most of the academics interviewed are policy 
consultants for ministries and the State Council.  
 
Angola-based field research took place in Luanda and Cabinda. A total of 96 interviews were 
collected from a range of respondents including the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Petroleum, Ministry of Planning, foreign diplomats and 
employees of various Chinese firms, both state-owned and private. In the case of Angola, 
the sample is skewed towards private companies/consultants (35.4%) (see Figure 1.3). This 
is largely because most respondents ‘wear several hats’ and appeared to prefer to meet me 
in their personal rather than in an official capacity. Government officials and diplomats are 
also well-represented (29.2%).  This was again a function of access. Although particularly 
with the Angolan Ministries there was a strict protocol for interview requests, once made 
and followed up on, these met with remarkable success - (50%). 
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Figure 1.3:  Angola Interview Spread 
 African Chinese Western TOTAL (%) 
Government officials 
Diplomats  
12 2 14  29.2 
Int. institutions  
(IMF, World Bank) 
  1  1.0 
Private companies/ consultants 10 18 6  35.4 
SOEs 2 5  7 7.3 
NGOs 8  2 10 10.4 
Media 1  2 3 3.1 
Academia/  
think tanks 
10  3 13 13.5 
TOTAL 43 25 28 96 100 
 
All interviews were collected and arranged through snowball sampling and conducted in 
English, Chinese and Portuguese. The interviews were semi-structured lasting from 40 
minutes to 3 hours, rendering primarily qualitative data.  
 
1.8  Literature Review and Chapter Outline 
I have engaged with several relevant strands of study in an attempt to place my research in 
an appropriate context. Rather than expounding an exhaustive literature review in a 
singular chapter, I shall treat each separate body of literature in individual chapters 
according to their relevance to the chapter’s subject matter. From the literature, it is 
evident that the role of rhetoric will be an important aspect to consider in analysing China’s 
relations with Angola. Furthermore, the need to draw several different strands of literature 
illustrates the relative novelty of the topic I have chosen to research. The challenge I face in 
my research is combining these disparate theoretical approaches in order to strengthen 
rather than detract from my research. 
 
This chapter has introduced the central research question and principle aims of the research. 
I have outlined my analytical approach and the methodological framework that I followed. I 
have introduced the importance of rhetoric as a central theme of the research and provided 
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a brief overview of China’s relations with Angola as well as the formation and Angola’s 
political elite in order to contextualise the discussion to follow in subsequent chapters.  
 
In chapter two I will treat the role of rhetoric in constructing China-Africa relations. I will 
review relevant literature on the theory of political rhetoric and the power of dominant 
discourse. I will discuss the importance of soft power and the much touted ‘China 
Development Model, particularly in the context of China’s foreign policy towards Africa. I 
will deconstruct the discourse surrounding China and Africa using the case of Angola. Key 
political rhetoric from both Chinese and Angolan leaders as regards their relations will be 
contrasted with that of Western leaders and the international financial institutions as 
regards China’s role in Angola in the period 2004-2010. I have framed these discussions in a 
post-realist perspective72, in order to highlight the importance of rhetoric in shaping these 
debates. 
 
In chapter three I draw on the fieldwork conducted in China. I will outline the structures, 
actors and processes responsible for China’s finance mechanisms to Angola. I place this in 
the broader context of China’s foreign policy formulation, drawing on the literature 
regarding China’s foreign policy as an emerging great power, with particular reference to 
Africa. I will explore the instruments of China’s foreign policy towards Angola with particular 
reference to China Exim Bank’s concessional loans as a function of China’s ‘going global’ 
policy. 73  
 
In chapter four I will continue with a brief historical overview of Angola in order to place the 
reconstruction programme and the development of Angola’s relations with China in context. 
I discuss the specific nature of China Exim Bank’s loans to Angola. The bulk of this chapter 
will stem from field research conducted in Angola, focussing on the management of the 
Chinese credit lines in Angola and comparing the Angolan respondents’ conceptualisation 
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and experience of the process with that of their Chinese counterparts. I will unpack China 
Exim Bank’s approach towards lending to Angola and contrast it with other institutions, both 
public and private, that have comparable loan mechanisms and credit lines. I explore the 
conditionalities, mode of negotiation and appetite for risk. 
 
In chapter five I focus on the execution of the China Exim Bank funded projects, examining 
in particular the challenges of their implementation and the Angolan elites’ role in this 
regard. I look at the various types of Chinese companies active in Angolan and their role in 
the reconstruction process. 
 
In chapter six I draw together the aspects of the study that have manifested Angolan agency 
in the political elites’ dealing with China. I discuss how Angolan elites have manipulated the 
China Exim Bank loan process for their own political and material gains and their leverage in 
the relationship. This will be contextualised in Angola’s specific political situation as a 
qualified ‘weak’ state in the international system. I will draw on international negotiation 
and trade bargaining literature to further illustrate this point  
 
In chapter seven I draw final conclusions from my research, synthesising arguments put 
forward in previous chapters. The rhetorical tensions emerging in China’s relations with 
Angola will be explored and contrasted with rising stresses experienced by China, as it 
challenges the status quo of the international architecture, and the resultant influence this 
has on its relations with Angola. I will examine the Angolan government’s use of relations 
with China as political leverage internationally as well as domestically, placed within the 
context of a greater emergence of African agency globally. In recognition of the nuances of 
‘win-win’ implicit in the bilateral relations, I will analyse both the Chinese and the Angolan 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’. I will also outline the contribution of my thesis to the current body of 
research and its significance as well as suggesting areas for further inquiry.  
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 CHAPTER TWO: The role of rhetoric in constructing China-Africa relations  
In this chapter I will examine the political rhetoric used by Chinese, African and Western 
actors that shape the discourse surrounding China’s relations with African countries. As 
noted by Lynch (1999:2): 
‘If a state can control society’s communications processes, it can structure the 
environment in such a way that citizens will be more likely to accept the state’s 
political order as legitimate. There will be fewer challenges to the state’s rule and 
citizens might even be encouraged to identify affirmatively and enthusiastically with 
state goals.’   
 
Rhetoric is thus employed as a political tool to ‘win hearts and minds’. By definition 
therefore, it is a political instrument that can be used by governments. Rhetoric, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, plays a considerable constitutive role in the discourse 
accompanying China-Africa relations (Alden and Large, 2011:25). Importantly, both Chinese 
and African respondents interviewed felt that the discourse is largely dominated by their 
European or North American counterparts, disregarding the voice of other actors74. As one 
Angolan observed, ‘There is a kind of academic fundamentalism to ‘manage others’, 
particularly in terms of Africa-China relations.75 Similarly, a Chinese respondent referred to 
the West’s ‘dictatorship of words’.76 As posited by Sautman and Yan (2009): 
 
‘The main problem with the China-in-Africa discourse is not empirical inaccuracies 
about Chinese activities in Africa, but the de-contextualization of criticisms for 
ideological reasons.’ 
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 See  for instance Zhang (2010)  
75
 Interview, Academic, 18 August 2010 
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 Interview, chief executive officer of a Chinese import-export company, Luanda, 10 August 2010 
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This chapter distinguishes three separate lines of conversation comprising the discourse 
surrounding China-Africa relations: that from ‘the West’77, that from China and that from 
Africa, more specifically Angola. I will highlight each in turn, looking not only at the agency 
of the actor, but at the intended audience.  
 
From Western sources two central themes emerge: the possibility of a ‘China threat’ to the 
established order, in a political and economic sense and furthermore the challenges China 
poses for the ‘development’ paradigm in a broad sense. Chinese concerns centre around the 
need to distinguish China from African countries’ other partners and the importance of 
strengthening ‘soft power’ in the international community. Africa is seen as a testing ground 
for such diplomatic experiments. Chinese scholars posit an alternative vision for 
development stemming from China’s own experience that implicitly challenges established 
dogma. African rhetoric encourages China’s role, despite various challenges to the 
relationship, specifically in order to exploit the arising tensions between China and ‘the 
West’. In order to crystallize the meaning of such messages, I examine how Chinese and 
Angola elites use rhetoric in the context of their bilateral relations for both international and 
domestic audiences. The Angolan government has specifically built up rhetoric to 
consolidate political power and cultivate a position in the international community.78 
 
2.1 From the ‘West’: Emerging Concerns regarding China’s Role in Africa  
Most Chinese sources remark upon a perceived bias in the way Western sources portrayed 
China’s relations with African countries (Li, 2008:6; Li, 2009:10; Zhang, 2010). These are 
generally characterised as a misguided concern that China is ‘locking out’ European energy 
interests in Africa (Downs, 2007:43) or that China is exploiting African countries, the latter 
generally portrayed as passive victims in this exchange (Mawdsley, 2008:9). Indeed, one 
                                                 
77
 While it is recognised that in many ways this term is as analytically poor as referring to ‘China’ or ‘Africa’, it is 
a term consistently used by Chinese and African commentators alike and I will therefore retain its use. I take it 
to mean the ‘industrialised North’ or countries composed predominantly of North America and Europe. 
78
 This chapter will focus more broadly on Chinese rhetoric, as chapters 4 and 6 will deal in more depth with 
the Angolan elites’ rhetoric and agency. For more on the Angolan (specifically MPLA’s) rhetorical project, see 
Messiant (2007, 2008).  
68 
 
 
 
Chinese company representative put forward that a reluctance to talk to Westerners about 
their operations in Africa was due to the unbalanced nature of Western media.79 Although 
functions just a well as an excuse to avoid transparency in terms of their commercial 
engagement on the continent, it does not reduce the validity of the complaint. The Chinese 
Ambassador in Luanda furthermore implied that the only reason he granted me an 
interview was in order to ‘set the record straight’. 80 
 
2.1.1 Western Perceptions of China as a ‘Status quo’ or ‘Revisionist Power’ 
In terms of China’s global role in general, a broader debate exists as to whether China is a 
‘status-quo’ power, seeking to assimilate and promote the current architecture of 
international institutions, or a ‘revisionist’ power, with intentions to disrupt and rebuild 
them (Mawdsley, 2008:7).  
 
Elements within US foreign policy circles have long advocated the increased assimilation of 
China as an emergent power into the international order, in order to viably sustain the 
current global architecture (Kim, 2004:42).  The European Union (EU) is increasingly 
recognising the inevitability of modifications to the international architecture (Geissmann, 
2006:2). This has been made even more evident given the recent global financial crisis of 
2008-2009. Calls have come from the EU for China to play a ‘full role… [in] creating an open, 
flexible and robust global economy’ (Weir, 2009). 
 
Several sympathetic scholars have sought to show that China’s re-engagement with the 
world is causing acculturation in terms of internationally held practices and values. Carlson 
(2006:217) recognises a shift in Chinese foreign policy, pointing to the influence of ‘norm 
diffusion’ on the former’s evolution. China’s shifting foreign policy approaches thus reflect 
the changing status of China as a global power. He suggests that a certain flexibility has 
crept into official rhetoric even as regarding such important concepts as sovereignty. This 
                                                 
79
 Interview, chief executive officer of a Chinese import-export company, Luanda, 10 August 2010 
80
 Interview, Chinese official, Luanda, 10 May 2010 
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resonates with Kim (2006:281) who points out that as China further integrates into the 
international system, so shall the rhetoric of China’s political leaders  conform to convention 
within the current international system. Within this debate, there is an implicit assumption 
that China’s rapprochement with Western norms is an inevitable linear development as the 
country’s stature increases. Thus the international community applauds any ‘…move meant 
to bring China into closer conformity with international (read: Western) legal norms.’ (Chin 
and Thakur, 2010:129) 
 
Pearson (2006:242) however, while agreeing that China is a ‘status quo’ power, thus posing 
no threat to the current international political structure, contends that China will not 
compromise on such issues as ‘non-interference’. Perhaps closer the mark, Chin & Thakur 
(2010:120) posit that China will continue to internalise those global norms deemed 
advantageous ‘….alongside registering its desire and right to be at the table for rewriting 
some others.’ This is supported by Zhang and Luo (2008:27) who suggest China could 
transform current norms from within international institutions. Indeed Economy (2010:142) 
has gone as far as to call China a ‘revolutionary power’ in the context of its transformative 
power within international institutions.  China is outwardly supportive of international 
norms and institutions, as the current global order has been very conducive to its growth 
thus far (He, 2007:10). Indeed, Ikenberry (2008) argues that China is conforming to 
international norms such as foreign assistance precisely because the existing structure has 
assisted and continues to aid its objectives. As this is in line with China’s national interests, it 
will seek to perpetuate, rather than transform, the status quo.  In clear approval of such 
conformity, Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008) for instance claim that China is showing a 
‘new maturity’ in its dealings with pariah countries and dictatorial regimes.  
 
Such an analysis of Chinese foreign policy reveals a Western-centric bias, in that China’s 
polices are seen as laudable given that they are conforming to a universalism of which 
Europe is the ‘author and the embodiment’ (Ayers, 2006:156).  This idea is developed by 
Inayatullah and Blaney (2004) as the ‘politics of difference’. They suggest that under current 
norms, equality among states is achieved through reaching a ‘level of sameness’ with the 
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West. Conversely, not to do so implies inferiority to Western practices. According to 
Inayatullah and Blaney (2004), ‘difference is expressed largely in one’s own terms; by 
appropriating the other within one’s own cultural categories, the values and visions of the 
other are thoroughly obscured.’  
 
However, Segal (1999:16) suggests that China is careful to retain a rhetorical vagueness in 
order to be able to effect diplomatic a volte face if required. Furthermore, although 
increasingly aware of the opportunity cost of remaining an outsider in international 
institutions, Chinese policy-makers are seen as being reluctant to subscribe to a regime that 
they had no part in formulating (Stähle, 2008:145).  
 
The debates surrounding China’s foreign policy thus mirror the debate of China as an 
emerging power. However, failure to take into account the rhetoric of the Chinese 
government and thinkers will result in an overly Eurocentric and thus flawed argument. 
China’s foreign policy has increasingly come under fire from the international community 
particularly as regards relations with African countries. As in the case with its involvement in 
the conflict in Darfur81, Sudan, Chinese politicians have shown what Carlson (2006:224) 
describes as ‘cautious acceptance and incremental change’. However, these propounded 
international norms and institutions are placed at odds with China’s activities in Africa. 
Faced with mounting criticism, and the threat that Beijing’s international acceptance as a 
fully-fledged member of the international community will be withheld, Chinese policy-
makers are being coming up against increasing challenges when confronted with Western 
discourse.  
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 For an in-depth discussion of China’s involvement in Sudan and the evolution of its foreign policy in this 
regard, see Srinavasan (2008); Large (2008) and Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small (2008).  
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2.1.2 The ‘China threat’ – ‘Responsible Stake-holder Dichotomy’ 
Linked to the above debate is the discourse regarding the rise of China as a ‘threat’ and 
possibilities for the country to be assimilated as a ‘responsible stakeholder82’ in the global 
institutional architecture. Perhaps underlining China’s awareness of this uncertainty, 
Mierzejewski (2009), drawing on the debate surrounding Zheng Bijian’s (2005) ‘Peaceful 
Rise’ concept, pointed to a lack of consensus as to the image that China should outwardly 
project. The carefully cultivated concept of ‘peaceful rise’ was used to counter the 
perception that China’s rise was a ‘threat’ to the global status quo. It was hoped it would 
address the tension emerging between China’s support for the global status quo as a 
structure within which it can develop, and the challenge to the status quo that China’s 
development brings (Kim, 2004:37). The controversy surrounding the theory eventually led 
to its withdrawal from official documents and China reverted to insisting on developing 
country status to assuage Western fears of Chinese ascendency.  
 
According to Leonard (2008) Chinese foreign policy hawks resent the fact that each time 
China displays any kind of assertiveness on the global arena, the US uses it’s ‘moral height’ 
to resurrect the ‘China threat’.  Li (2008:45) likens this to a kind of ‘containment’ of China by 
the international community. A growing frustration at the sustained negative image of China 
in the West thus remains (Yong Deng, 2006:200). Indeed, Yong Deng (2006:192) suggests 
that China’s ‘threat image’ is used by state actors to further their own agendas, rather than 
representing any genuine concerns. Luo (2007:20) has gone as far as to suggest that 
Western countries deliberately seek to destroy China’s reputation internationally for their 
own gain. 
 
2.1.3 Changing development paradigm: China as the donor ‘outsider’: 
International aid agencies and donor organisations have joined their voices to Western 
governments expressing the concern that China is causing retrogression in the supposed 
gains in a good governance agenda pursued through responsible aid policies. In rebuttal, 
one Chinese respondent questioned using the West as a kind of ‘principled example’. As 
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 The term was first used by the then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in the context of urging 
China to be a ‘responsible stake-holder’ work[ing] to protect and strengthen the international system as it is 
currently constituted; they do not merely derive benefits from it.’ (Blumenthal, 2007:1).  
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with many others (see for instance Shu, 2008:17; Gao, 2009) he pointed out that China, 
unlike the West, has never used force, to take strategic possession of African countries. By 
implication it is hypocritical of former colonial powers to lecture China on best practices as 
regards Africa (He, 2009a:46).   He argued that China’s practices were far superior to those 
of the West: ‘Instead China is providing finance for constructing basic infrastructure like 
schools, housing, roads, hospitals. It is the kind of infrastructure that the people need the 
most.’83 Another commented on the double standards of the West, in that although the 
West opposed dictators in theory84, never was a word said about President Omar Bongo85, 
although much attention is focussed on President Bashir86. China, he said, does not 
discriminate and deals with all of them.87  
 
2.1.4 China’s Outlier Perspective on Development and Aid  
Brautigam (2009) emphasises that fact that China’s development assistance policy was 
influenced by and strongly mirrors China’s own domestic experience with Japan as a 
development partner several decades ago.  A Chinese academic confirmed this:  
 
‘I can give you some examples of China's early development.  In the early 1980s, the 
Japanese government offered some aid for some infrastructure projects in China, in 
return for some favorable [sic] conditions for investment, trade and natural 
resources. China accepted that way, because there was no other way, and we 
needed money at that moment. We consider that as aid. What is more, it was a win-
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 Interview, chief executive officer of a Chinese import-export company, Luanda, 10 August 2010 
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 In fact, a study by Midford and de Soysa (2010) showed that the US has actually sold more arms to regimes 
considered oppressive than has China. 
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 El-Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba was president of Gabon from 1967 until his death in 2009. Although Gabon is 
an oil-rich state, the 1.6 million inhabitants are largely poor. Despite relative peace during his rule, he was a 
highly authoritarian leader who has been succeeded by his son Ali Bongo in elections widely believed to have 
been rigged. Wide-spread popular protest broke out when France endorsed the election result. For more on 
Bongo’s rule and collaboration in France’s neo-colonial role respectively, see Ngolet (2000) and Reed (1987). 
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 President Omar al-Bashir, the political leader of (Northern) Sudan was indicted by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity following sustained conflict in the Darfur region. Chinese leaders have 
sought for the charges to be suspended on the grounds that it ‘might damage the Darfur peace process’ 
(Bezlova,2008) 
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 Interview, reporter, People’s Daily, Beijing, 3 December 2009 
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win situation. Later, all the foreign investment companies enjoyed more favorable 
[sic] conditions than their Chinese counterpart [sic]. Until quite recently, foreign 
companies had very much more favorable [sic] conditions (such as lower tax) than 
Chinese companies, that's why some Chinese companies asked for a "national 
treatment" since they received an unequal treatment from their own government. 
Why? Because China needed investment and the government wanted to create 
better conditions to attract foreign companies.’88  
 
One Chinese academic highlighted the important of ‘no strings attached’ assistance, again 
based on China’s own development experience. She explained: ‘China’s aid needs to be 
assessed on a country-by-country basis; China cannot adopt a multilateral model. China has 
never considered itself a “donor” in economic co-operation, so can never integrate into the 
multilateral framework. The bilateral nature of China’s aid is an issue with the West because 
it is not transparent enough, but the bilateral model is the most effective in terms of rolling 
out projects.’89 While implicitly criticizing the ‘one-size-fits-all’ structural adjustment policies 
employed by the international financial institutions in years gone by, she neatly provides a 
defence for China’s reluctance to join organisations such as the OECD. 
 
Stähle (2008) puts forward an argument for how China can be cajoled into ‘playing by the 
rules of the game’ by raising the opportunity costs of China remaining outside the existing 
aid regime. Such commentary has not gone unnoticed. Fang (2009:58) points out that China 
will increase its ‘soft power’ by participating in more international organisations. Stähle 
however, as with most Western commentators, assumes the infallibility of the aid 
architecture and does not question whether China’s implicit challenge merits a re-
examination of the current system. Interestingly, some Chinese respondents suggested that 
in terms of aid, China was still learning and could learn a lot from the West in terms of 
standards and norms. Such suggestions have also emerged recently in Chinese scholarly 
literature (Zhou, 2009; Zhang& Zhu, 2009). Wang (2005, 2009) has made studies of the 
                                                 
88
 Chinese academic, personal correspondence, 11 June 2009 
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He Wenping, IWAAS, presentation: ‘China’s Aid to Africa: Developing Features and Challenges Ahead’ at 
‘Symposium on Sino-African Relations: Reflections and Prospects’, Beijing, 13 October 2009. 
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administrative procedures of Western countries’ aid programmes. He was particularly 
interested in the reporting structure of the aid department vis-à-vis other ministries and the 
accountability mechanisms. It has nevertheless pointed out that the West can also learn 
from China in terms of the results achieved in such a short time90 (He, 2009a:51).  
 
Chinese researchers cite both Angola and Sudan as examples of China’s successful 
development co-operation with African countries91 (He, 2009a:46, 51). Given the notoriety 
among the international community of China’s involvement in these states as a ‘rogue 
donor’ (Naím, 2007), it is clear that rhetorically at least, Chinese commentators see their 
country’s involvement in a very different light.  Western narrative on both countries 
generally focuses on the authoritarian and corrupt nature of the African regimes and China’s 
apparent disregard for human rights violations in dealing with the incumbent governments 
(Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008).  Chinese respondents however, repeatedly emphasise 
that through economic co-operation with China, Sudan has become an oil exporting country, 
and Angola had received the means to begin post-war reconstruction. This is bound up by a 
concept of governance that facilitates development borne of China’s national experience. As 
one commentator opined, ‘Stability is the most important thing for a country – without 
stability there is no basis for development. Africa needs strong leaders like Bashir and dos 
Santos.’92  Stability as a prerequisite for economic growth is thus the key to the Chinese 
approach to development both domestically and abroad. 
 
The criticism of Western aid practices is clear. As a representative from China Exim Bank put 
it, ‘Africa is a huge continent with lots of people needing development and basic services 
such as clean water and electricity. They don’t need charity or lectures. Most of the money 
from the international financial institutions was used for a few contracts with international 
consultants recycling the money back to their own countries. There was never any real 
                                                 
90
 Interview, reporter, People’s Daily, Beijing, 3 December 2009 
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benefit. Angola needed help. They needed access to finance and investment, despite their 
oil wealth.’93  
 
One Chinese respondent’s rebuttal to the Western fixation with democracy and human 
rights was that it is ‘not really about these things’, suggesting that it was rather a stick to 
beat China with as regards its engagement in African countries. He went on to say that the 
Western definition of human rights and democracy compromised both these things94 . This 
resonated with many respondents who talked about ‘international social justice’ as being 
paramount, i.e. democracy between states, rather than the state of democracy in a country 
internally. Li (2008:11) suggested that this concept of equality challenges the current 
international order; hence Western countries’ resistance to it. President of China Exim Bank, 
Li Ruogu has commented in a public lecture: 
 
‘…a truer way is giving society their basic needs; this is much more powerful than 
democratic rights. In terms of democracies, all countries are different…. you must 
meet the needs of the people. In terms of human rights; the developed countries 
have an internal contradiction. Their standard of living uses so many resources of the 
world, that we would need so many resources if the whole world had the kind of 
standard of living that these developed countries enjoy. If all countries used 
resources equally, the developed countries’ standard of living would go down, as the 
world does not have enough resources.  This is a fake democracy. When you are 
talking about democracy, equality and human rights in China, the US still consumes 
most of the products that are being produced in China under the conditions that 
they purport to criticize. Is this the Western implementation of equality? When 
Western countries talk about democracy, equality and human rights, it is generally 
according to their own internal situation, but it does not reflect in their behaviour as 
states in the international context. They try to control others. They try to be the 
representatives.’95 
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As another Chinese respondent commented along similar lines:  
 
‘The Western perspective is often put forward, but all countries have different 
development levels. The method of managing a country is not the same if the level 
of development in different. To talk about democracy is not wrong, but this is for 
advanced countries; it is not appropriate for less advanced countries... If you just 
give them the vote, but not a better life, will this change anything? On the contrary, 
other people cannot follow what you want them to do. The biggest problem is that 
you need education, food and shelter. This is more important before other 
considerations.’ 
 
This implies that raising a population’s material standard of living should be prioritised over 
civic liberties. In fact, ‘human rights’ are conceptualised in material terms. There is also the 
presumption that the kind of projects endorsed by Chinese institutions will in fact lead to 
these material gains for the masses. This was reinforced again by President of China Exim 
Bank, Li Ruogu’s comments regarding Africans:  
 
‘Western countries talk about human rights and freedom every day, but if the people 
there can't even watch television or listen to radio, how can they enjoy human rights 
and freedom?’ (Reuters, 2007b).  
 
This again reflects China’s internal narrative, or a ruling party whose current generation is 
the first to have their political legitimacy hinging solely on economic performance and public 
service (Lam, 2006:32).  
 
To return to Li Ruogu, his attitude regarding China’s role in Africa, while interesting in its 
outspokenness, is not surprising, given the increasingly active profile the state-owned China 
77 
 
 
 
Exim Bank has in Africa, specifically to fund tangible, material public goods.96 Li (2009) in a 
strongly worded academic essay points to the hypocrisy inherent in Western criticism of 
China’s role in Africa.  In contrast to earlier criticisms from predominantly European media 
of Chinese exploitation of African natural resources, Li advocates for African countries to 
harness their resources to kick-start development97, implying that Chinese involvement is 
facilitating this process. Formerly deputy governor of China’s Central Bank and having 
worked at the IMF and Asian Development Bank, Li is well-known for his outspoken opinions 
regarding the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI). That they are often printed in official 
Chinese media sources implies state approval (Brautigam, 2009:112).  
 
Li dismisses concerns about African countries’ debt sustainability as an excuse used to 
influence and control their debt:  ‘For instance, China has US$ 2 trillion in reserves and 
US$ 600 billion in debt-- this is operating at full capacity.’98 This is echoed by Ministry of 
Commerce official Zhong Manying who in response to concerns that China’s increased 
lending to Africa would deepen debt issues said, ‘What is the most important thing for 
Africa? Survival and development’ (Zhou & Yao, 2010). Li continues: 
 
‘Human rights, development, debt – these all sound so beautiful and reasonable, but 
they cover the main purpose to restrain developing countries. They are all the results 
of development, not the pre-conditions for development. There is Western criticism, 
but development is the primary task of developing countries and sometimes there 
must be sacrifices to achieve this. In terms of human rights and democracy, you must 
take into consideration the stage of the country’s development. You cannot look 
solely to external assistance to develop. You need to “give full play” to competitive 
advantages and integrate it into the international division of labour. The costs of 
development should not be used as an excuse to hold back development. The 
sacrifices for development will be well paid back. Western occupation of developing 
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 Press interview with Li Ruogu at World Economic Forum (2007), available: 
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countries is the cost of history but Western exhortations for human rights and 
democracy ‘so-called’ in Africa is putting the incidental before the fundamental. 
These are the outcomes, not the preconditions of development. We cannot talk of 
human rights and democracy irresponsibly. The real purpose of these Western 
criticisms is to restrict Africa’s growth from playing a dominant role.’99  
 
Figure 2.1: Li Ruogu’s conceptualisation of a sustainable development path 
  
 
 
 
 
Li Ruogu, Chairman and President of China Exim Bank, Presentation at the Tsinghua University School of Public 
Policy and Management Lecture Series, 11 January 2010. 
 
Li advocates:  ‘….proper balance between stability (the precondition) and reform (the 
driving force), in order to develop (goal/ objective)….’ 100Interestingly, this almost exactly 
echoes the former Angolan Central Bank Governor Aguinaldo Jaime on the same topic:  ‘If 
you say to a country, “We’ll reward you when things are perfectly O.K,” the country will say, 
“When things are perfectly O.K., we won’t need you anymore”’ (Traub, 2006). 
 
Sautman and Yan (2010) argue that despite China’s portrayal through international media, 
the Asian country’s role in Africa is on balance, positive. Indeed, Chinese respondents have 
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repeatedly stated that critics should ‘come and see themselves what is happening’101 and 
that ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’102 , showing a clear confidence in the effect of 
Chinese engagement in Africa  
 
Chief among these propounded benefits is the fact that cheaper (relative to European) 
Chinese imports afford most African consumers more disposable income and buying power 
(He, 2009a:49). Wang Wei, the Chinese Embassy’s political counsellor has urged Angola to 
import more from China for this reason (Exame, 2010a). In the case of Angola, one 
respondent said that China provides a second benefit: buoying the oil price, thus increasing 
government revenue. He suggested that by contrast, European companies did the opposite -   
buying resources for very low prices, and selling manufactured goods at very high prices. 103  
 
A second bone of contention is the perspective on trade in natural resources.  One former 
Chinese official dismissed this stating, ‘Chinese don’t rob and will never rob from Africa’. 
Lots of Western countries (and China) import oil; it is not exploitation; it is trade!104 Indeed, 
several academics, both Chinese and Western have pointed out in studies that China 
imports a good deal less oil from Africa than either Europe or the US105 (Luo, 2009:33).    
 
2.2 Playing to the Gallery: Rhetoric’s intended audience   
The Chinese perspective on Western concerns for African countries vis-à-vis their 
engagement with China is highly cynical. Most believe it is rhetorical warfare ‘aimed at 
                                                 
101
 Interview, Chinese official, Luanda, 10 May 2010 
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squeezing China out of Africa.’ 106 Furthermore, charges of neo-colonialism are deemed to 
be Western jealousy of Chinese diplomatic and economic success in Africa (He, 2007:29). A 
Chinese diplomatic based in Luanda suggested that the negativity of Western countries 
towards China’s role in Africa was due to ignorance: 
 
‘They feel that some of their influence is being taken away, so they are smarting a 
bit. Angola is however an independent country and has the right to deal with 
whomever they like, according to their own thoughts.’ 107  
 
This view is shared by many African observers. As one Angolan civil society representative 
put it: 
 
‘The World Bank, the IMF are ‘losing’ to the Chinese. It is all business, all business. 
The approach is a question of competition. China is a threat, but for whom? Africans 
or Western business? Chinese goods are in US and Europe; you see ‘made in China’ 
products everywhere. All the Western companies have migrated to China to take 
advantage of the cheap Chinese labour. The discourse of academics and 
businessmen is not about ‘protecting in Africans’. They are threatened and worried 
about Western business interests, not ‘Africa’s destiny’. ‘What China is doing is what 
the West did for more than 500 years, there is no difference. In the West, Africa is 
much more indebted than with China. We see this like business, so we make the 
‘easier deal’, which is China, with all its consequences. Africa is now more in debt 
than before independence. The problem is that China, in little time is overtaking US, 
Canada and Europe in this. In terms of investments in Africa, China is not surpassing. 
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But the US is the biggest debtor to China. They should not be ‘worrying for Africa’. 
China is a challenge for Africa, but a threat for the West.’108 
 
Chinese perspectives differ, subtly but crucially, in that charges of neo-colonialism, laid by 
both Western and African commentators (as above) are hotly denied.  He (2009b:5) claims 
that African scholars are excessively influenced by their Western counterparts. Zhang (2010) 
goes as far as to say that ‘Almost all the reports about China in the African newspapers are 
the "secondhand ones" from Western media’ and that African media does not understand 
China. Luo (2007:22) points out that many African leaders have had a Western education. By 
contrast, Chinese cultural exports are currently not high in either quantity or quality (Zhang 
& Luo, 2008:27). Liu (2008) suggests that cultural diplomacy has become an increased 
priority for the Chinese government, particularly in the context of relations with African 
countries. 
 
2.2.1 Message from the East: China’s Rhetorical Priorities in Africa 
Although China’s relations with Africa are a small percentage of China’s global economic 
engagement overall, a disproportionate amount of high-level diplomacy has been showered 
upon the continent in order to promote ‘win-win’ co-operation.109 One Chinese policy-
maker declared:  ‘Africa has rising international status and is the cornerstone of China’s 
policies.110 Chinese political rhetoric vis-à-vis African relations is significant for two reasons. 
Firstly it is an important tool that Beijing has used in order to distinguish itself from Western 
practices in Africa and the developing world. Secondly, it is a manifestation of China’s 
increasing interest in using ‘soft power’111 to cultivate ‘great power’ status.  
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There is a strong discourse among Chinese scholars on the importance of China developing 
‘great power status’ (Jiang, 2007; Wang& Wang, 2008; Zheng, 2008). A published discussion 
between Chinese scholars on whether China has indeed achieved ‘great power’ status in a 
prominent foreign policy journal (see Shen,2007) indicates not only the spectrum of 
opinions on the subject, but the Chinese government’s implicit desire to explore this debate.  
However, this is a controversial issue. Chin (2010) comments that Chinese diplomats are at 
pains to reign in ‘excessive public exuberance’ regarding China’s place in the world.  
Ye Hailin (quoted in People’s Daily, 2010a) urges Chinese people to be humble, as narcissism 
detracted from China’s international image. Furthermore, Qiu Shaofang, Chinese 
Ambassador to Sierra Leone wrote in an open letter in one of the African country’s 
newspapers than China was most definitely still a developing country, despite its status as 
the second largest economy (Qiu,2010).  There is thus a growing tension between the idea 
that  ‘China is just regaining its long lost right to have its say in world affairs’ (Liu Xiaoying 
quoted in China Daily,2010) and Deng Xiaoping’s notion of ‘hiding brightness and nourishing 
obscurity’112 which has been a foreign policy guiding principle.  
 
2.2.2 China’s Soft Power in Africa 
Nye and Wang (2009:18) define soft power as ‘the ability to shape the preferences of 
others’. Importantly, it relies on the powers of attraction, rather than coercion.  In 2007, Hu 
Jintao drew attention to the importance of soft power, calling it ‘a factor of growing 
significance in the competition in overall national strength’ (quoted in Lawrence, 2009). 
 
At a conference on China-Africa relations, one academic suggested that the ‘big powers’ 
want to influence Africa and are increasing their political clout through economic co-
operation frameworks. 113 This is precisely what China is doing through the Forum on China-
Africa Co-operation (FOCAC)114.  Indeed, one Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official 
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talked about the increased influence of China and that FOCAC is becoming more important 
and is now a ‘brand’ or a banner in China-Africa relations.115 
 
 China feels the need to counterbalance the impression that: ‘The big powers want to force 
Africa to accept their world view; they want to improve their international image, they want 
to expel China from Africa, and they want to consolidate their influence in co-operative 
areas.’ 116 Fang (2009:58) points out that it is the strength of Western soft power that allows 
them to attack China’s image and that China’s own soft power needs to be further 
developed in order to counter this, particularly the evocation of the ‘China threat’.  One 
Chinese academic suggested that China should select some African NGOs to support, in 
order to promote Chinese “soft power”.’117 Tellingly, this shows not only that China is 
drawing lessons from Western countries in terms of promoting a sphere of influence’, it 
betrays the fact that many Chinese commentators see NGOs as a vehicle for the promotion 
of foreign influence in a country’s domestic context. This is reinforced by the Chinese 
academic adding: ‘an African friend [one of the diplomats in attendance] said “we don’t like 
the “‘noisy’ NGOs”, well we don’t like them either. We will choose to support the “non-noisy” 
NGOs.’118 
 
Western scholars have been concerned as to the rise of China’s soft power in Africa. 
Kurlantzick (2007b) for instance claims that Beijing is using its diplomacy to limit US 
influence. However, this is felt to be exaggerated by many Chinese scholars. He (2009b:11) 
suggests that Africa is the only place that China’s soft power has ‘vitality’, pointing out that 
the ‘China threat’ concept has not caught on as readily here. Lu (2009) contends that China’s 
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lack of understanding of a foreign audience has limited the impact of soft power and 
cultural diplomacy. 
 
A Japanese diplomat suggested bluntly that China’s practice is to ‘… “buy friends”; no-one 
can follow them, Japan cannot copy them… They have a large population and they need [sic] 
much energy; to develop they need oil. This is their basic policy. They are investing a lot of 
money into oil-rich countries, and a lot of money in African countries.’119 This reference to 
dollar diplomacy is relevant, as it was recognised to be Taiwan’s strategy for maintaining 
diplomatic allies for decades (Taylor, 2002). Taiwan announced in 2009 that it would 
discontinue such a strategy, an implicit admission that it could no longer outspend the PRC 
(Brautigam, 2009:125).  From the above comment, it appears, China is willing to outspend 
other countries to develop ‘soft power’. As one observer from the IMF commented, ‘From 
China’s perspective, involvement in Africa has huge payoffs relative to the cost. Chinese 
reserves are huge in comparison to what African needs.’120 
 
There are also political implications for China exercising soft power. He (2007:28) tellingly 
says that ‘Africa is perhaps the most important testing ground for China’s soft power’ and 
Luo (2007:18; 2009:26) discusses this in great detail. Another commented that China’s 
relations with Africa are a driving force for China’s relations with the outside world.121 
 
2.2.3 Distinguishing China from Western Donors  
China has been at pains to distinguish itself from Africa’s Western partnerships by carefully 
constructing a message devoid of the donor-recipient motif and emphasising the mutually 
beneficial relationship between developing countries (King, 2006:2; Zhang& Luo, 2008:26). 
The roots of this discourse are found in the ‘Five Principles for Peaceful Co-existence’: 
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mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-
interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful 
coexistence, about which more will be said in the following chapter. Of relevance here is the 
way that these concepts are used to craft a diplomatic framework that has been well-
received by African governments. 
 
He (2009b:7) places emphasis on the advantage that China has over the West given the 
former’s approach to ‘no-strings attached aid’ and mutual respect and equality as guiding 
principles. Luo (2007:22) points out that China, in contrast to the West, has kept its 
promises on aid deliverance and is not hypocritical. As one researcher commented: ‘The 
Chinese principle is not to impose what you do not want for yourself.’122  
 
Fundamental amongst China’s rhetorical tools, is the concept of ‘win-win’, indicative of 
mutual benefit to both China and her African partners, intended to contrast sharply with 
their narrative of African countries’ experience with the West. Alden and Large (2011) 
examine in some detail China’s attempts to distinguish itself from other donors, noting the 
increasing challenges China faces to do so. This was admitted by one Chinese academic who 
voiced the concern that: ‘There are high demands on China now and China has to work very 
hard to fulfil them.’123 This was echoed by a Chinese foreign ministry official who suggested 
that should China not be able to fulfil the higher expectations of African countries, this will 
be used as ammunition by ‘anti-China forces’.124 Another suggested hopefully that Angola 
should rely on its own efforts and the help of the West; implying that she could not rely on 
China alone for assistance.125  
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An Angolan official confirmed the importance of ‘no-strings attached’ co-operation, whereas 
Europe: 
 
‘…in order to help Africa, demands a lot. China does not yet do this. Africa needs 
more than it can give. They say Africa is rich, but we are not able to exploit this 
wealth. Europe knows how to do this because they were the colonisers.’126  
 
Interestingly, one Chinese diplomatic remarked that the only difference between Euro-
African relations and Sino-African relations was that China treated Africa equally; the 
respondent felt that in some ways, China needed Africa more than Africa needed China: 
 
‘We do not have many friends. With the US and Europe, even though we are friends 
at the table, under the table we are fighting, whereas with Africa, maybe we quarrel 
some times, but we never feel that bad.’127 
 
2.2.4 Chinese Model, Beijing Consensus   
Chinese officials have noted various African countries’ eagerness to learn from the Chinese 
experience of development. 128 Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, well-known for his 
‘Look East’ policy, was quoted as saying: ‘China has been able to develop its economy 
without plundering other countries, and the Chinese economic miracle is indeed a source of 
pride and inspiration,’ (Bezlova, 2009). Indeed, some have even suggested that China is 
exporting a political model of authoritarianism (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008).  Suzuki 
(2009:780) questions this interpretation, arguing that this betrays a tendency to ‘ “look for 
enemies” at the expense of empirical accuracy’, pointing out that rather than Beijing 
propagating a model of development to follow, it is other countries that have chosen to use 
China as an example.  One Angolan civil society respondent expressed fears that Angola was 
‘becoming very close to China, and adopting social policies that are very close to China’s as 
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‘there is no economic assistance that has no political agenda’. 129  He suggested that this was 
a challenge for the West, which had left Angola ‘at the mercy’ of China and consequently 
lost some leverage. 130 Chinese officials are cautious as to the applicability of Chinese 
development experiences to the African context:  
 
‘China’s own experience and character may not apply to everyone, but it may benefit 
to a certain extent. Developing countries are interested in China’s development 
concept and experience. Asia in general and China in particular can give some 
lessons.’131  
 
There is however some doubt as to what exactly this ‘Chinese model’ of development 
entails. Zhang (2006) tentatively characterises it as ‘gradual reform’; ‘constant 
experimentation’ and ‘selective cultural borrowing’. However, the lack of a perceived 
coherent policy outlook, particularly towards the developing world, has caused Western 
policy-makers to impose their own models. The phrase “The Beijing Consensus” was coined 
by Ramo (2004) to describe what he perceived as a new form of power politics emanating 
from Beijing that sought to challenge US hegemony implicit in the Washington Consensus:  
 
‘China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure 
out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the 
international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect 
their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful 
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centre of gravity. I call this new physics of power and development the Beijing 
Consensus.’ (Ramo, 2004:2-3) 
 
Particularly as China itself did not conform to recommendations implicit in the Washington 
Consensus, China has prematurely been touted as a new development model for Africa. 
Although the Chinese government has not accepted the term ‘Beijing Consensus’, it set off 
vigorous debate in policy circles (He, 2009b:8; Zhao, 2010; Huang, 2011:4). Western scholars 
are divided on this. While some acknowledge the difficulties of applying China’s 
developmental model to other parts of the world (Lagerkvist, 2009:119; Kennedy, 2010), 
many other are hopeful. This is misleading however as the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a Western 
term imposed upon China’s development circumstances132, which do not follow a coherent 
model (Ni, 2010). Leaders since Deng Xiaoping have been at pains to emphasise that China’s 
growth path should not be imported wholesale in order to attempt to mimic China’s 
trajectory (Tao,2009b:41; Luo, 2007:23). Zhang (2006) among many other Chinese 
scholars133 and policy-makers is hesitant to promote the applicability of any ‘Chinese Model’.  
The most important contribution of the ‘China Model’ to the development debate is that it 
provides a conceptual alternative to the Washington Consensus, proving that a country can 
successfully pursue an endogenous development plan tailored to its own context and 
achieve results, rather having to accept Western doctrine (Tao,2009b :56). He (2009b:10) 
and (Luo, 2007:23) take this argument further, arguing that China’s development has proved 
that Western values are not universal, and are not necessarily valid for all countries. Tao 
(2009a:37) suggests that in the context of Africa, China can be used as a reference point, so 
that Africa can learn from China’s experience, but stops short of advocating blind copying of 
any development practices.  
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2.2.5 Third world solidarity, when appropriate  
As noted above, several Chinese respondents pointed out that while Western countries 
harp on about internal democracy of countries, they pay scant attention to issue of global 
justice and democracy within the context of the global system.134 He (2007:31) points out 
that this is also to the detriment of ‘weak and small countries in Africa’ while at the same 
time arguing that China’s policies in Africa are ‘largely in line with those of the international 
community, not in opposition to them’ (He,2007:32), apparently to once again assuage 
fears of a ‘China threat’.   A tension however emerges, in that China appeals to developing 
countries on the basis of a history of colonization and its own developmental challenges, 
whereas it strives to achieve recognition from more powerful nations as a ‘responsible 
power’. It is this attempt by China to be ‘all things to all nations’ (Kim, 2004:46) that leads to 
the inherent contradictions of Chinese foreign policy, even as effort is made to ensure the 
continuity of its policy standpoints.  
 
Luo (2007:19) points out that China is careful to use phrases such as ‘common prosperity’ 
suggesting that China and Africa need each other to develop, thus avoiding the idea of 
China as a donor nation, helping an impoverished continent. This not only reinforces the 
‘win-win rhetoric’, but allows China to identify itself as a developing, rather than a 
developed, country when it is in China’s interests to do so. Furthermore, a People’s Daily 
(2010b) editorial firmly defended China’s status as a developing country, suspecting 
Western countries ‘lavishing praise’ on China to be a ruse to ‘declare that China is no longer 
a developing country’ resulting in the loss of concessions that this implies.  Despite a 
yearning for China to be able to take its place among the ‘great powers, China emphasises 
the developing country nature of the national economy, with many commentators 
emphasising that Shanghai is not representative of the country’s level of development as a 
whole.135 
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There is thus also a tension that has been identified between China’s political overtures to 
Africa as a partner, rather than a donor, and China’s aspirations to be the leader of the 
developing world (Asche & Schüller, 2008:14; Taylor, 2006:4). The tendency to act as a ‘first 
among equals’ again brings to the fore China’s composite identity of having characteristics 
of both a developed and a developing country and the tendency to vacillate between the 
two as circumstances and perceived interests dictate. The lack of certainty in China’s foreign 
policy approach to Africa is thus indicative of a much broader domestic debate concerning 
the theoretical underpinnings of China’s foreign policy.136 Carlson (2002: 229) points to 
theoretical changes in foreign policy thinking that are not yet reflected in active policies. 
 
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official also mentioned the Tazara Railway built in the 1970’s137 
in this context; pointing out that despite China’s poverty and difficulties at the time, this 
substantial aid project was undertaken. Although enacted in the context of an aggressive 
anti-imperialist foreign policy under Mao, this project has come to symbolise in the current 
discourse that ‘Poor helps poor’. China as the largest developing country is thus seen to 
show solidarity with Africa as the largest continent of developing countries138; as China’s 
international obligation139.   
 
China’s scholars and policy-makers, despite distinguishing China from other Western ‘great 
powers’, do believe that China will one day rightfully take its place among the ‘great powers’ 
of the world (Leonard, 2008; Dong, 2009).  As such, should China’s role in Africa prove 
successful, or at least more successful than that of the continent’s former colonial rulers; 
not only will China have by the current norms become a ‘great power’ by developing an 
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international sphere of influence, but it will have achieved one-upmanship over the West, 
having succeeded in developing Africa where the West has failed.  
 
There is a contradiction here as whereas China’s aid policies are often described as ‘selfless’ 
(He, 2009b:8), the rhetorical emphasis on ‘win-win’ means rather that ‘Chinese companies 
must make money but also help people.’140 This implies a long-term and holistic view as 
China wants to help African countries develop so that they can be developed into markets. 
This idea was developed further towards the end of 2009, when it was debated in some 
policymaking circles that China should launch a kind of ‘African Marshall Plan’141. 
Superficially, this holds several similarities with US efforts to assist Europe destroyed after 
the Second World War.  China would also be assisting a group of countries, many of them 
war-ravaged in rebuilding their economies, with the hope of creating powerful future 
political allies and markets for Chinese goods. Perhaps as a result of Beijing’s initial 
enthusiasm, several figures claimed authorship of the idea. Gu (2009) reports that former 
Deputy Director of State Administration of Taxation Xu Shanda142 proposed the notion. The 
idea was also mentioned as having been an inspiration of China Exim Bank President Li 
Ruogu.143 A China-based consultant144 remarked on having attended an entire conference 
dedicated to the topic. However, after debate the only representative still in favour of the 
idea was from the NDRC145, as he viewed it as a policy to generate export markets.  Even 
African countries which have extensive loan agreements with China Exim Bank for 
reconstruction, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola have borrowed the 
concept of the ‘Marshall Plan’ to describe the agreement (Jiang, 2009a). Of particular 
interest here, is that the Angolans do not see it as munificence from China, but from their 
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President as the orchestrator of the agreement: ‘It is like the Marshall Plan – Europe would 
have gone to war again if it were not for this plan. Dos Santos knows this. 146  
 
As pointed out by Brautigam (2009:164) the Marshall Plan was predominantly in the form of 
grant aid. Furthermore, it focussed on institution-building.147 Total disbursements were 2.5% 
of Europe’s collective GDP and lasted only a few years. This is in comparison to ODI to Africa 
from OECD countries from 1992 -1993 totalling 12 percent of Africa’s collective GDP, with 
few results (Van de Walle, 2006:206). Not surprisingly, Chinese respondents view China’s 
role in Africa as more beneficial to the continent than that of Western countries: ‘The aid 
and financing that Western countries offered were not with very good conditions. Angola 
therefore went to China to ask China to provide the required financing. China’s help is with 
very good conditions.’148 
 
2.3 The View from Angola  
In analysis of ‘African rhetoric’, the distinction between African political elites and the 
discourse regarding China-Africa relations of their citizens needs to be made.149 
Furthermore, the individual contexts of the more than fifty African countries will dictate 
their circumstances. Although at risk of reductionism, various studies have noted this, and 
the fact that while African elites tend to be largely positive rhetorically of China’s role in 
Africa, the discourse amongst ordinary citizens is more of a mixed bag.  
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In the case of Angola, as a formerly Soviet-supported state150, and particularly given the 
country’s historical context, there are some that still view external relations through a Cold 
War lens. One respondent commented that he thought China’s role in Africa was a ‘good 
idea’ as ‘China is the weapon that Africa can use to end western hegemony’. 151  
 
The Angolan government has also developed a strong narrative variously directed at both 
domestic and international audiences. Of central importance, given the relationship with 
China, is the story of rejection and abandonment by the international community following 
the end of the civil war. A planned conference of donors to drum up support for 
reconstruction did not materialise, despite the government having ‘used all their diplomatic 
means’ to try to get this result. This was a bitter pill for the government it seems, as it was 
believed, that due to the involvement of the international community, there would be  a   
‘moral obligation for them to help us reconstruct.’152 Interestingly, this is believed across all 
sectors of Angolan society and by international observers as well. 153 One Angolan civil 
society advocate voiced the belief that Angola had been thrust into the arms of China due to 
the West’s abandonment of Angola ‘demanding things that were completely 
unacceptable’154.  China is seen as having been opportunistic, as Angola was ‘desperate’. 
Another respondent said she personally was ‘thankful’ for the Chinese, saying that ‘…we 
would not have been able to get what we have, done in such a short space of time if it were 
not for them. Eight years is a short time and Angola is a big country.’ 155  
 
The Angolan government, following almost a decade of reconstruction, has begun 
cultivating the international image of a regional hegemon, to rival South Africa (Gerardy, 
2009). Most of the Chinese respondents I spoke to, despite enthusiasm for the economic 
opportunities to be found in Angola, thought this to be an over-ambitious project. However, 
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one former MOFCOM official did suggest that the China’s facilitation of reconstruction 
financing had also begun to rebuild the country’s confidence. 156 Furthermore, one former 
Angolan diplomat suggested that renewed US interest in Angola stemmed not only from 
energy concerns, but also due to the ‘stabilising role’ Angola plays in the region and Angola’s 
active leadership in the Gulf of Guinea Commission157. He said, ‘The US is looking for 
countries that can provide examples of leadership in conflict resolution, in terms of 
economic reform and democratic process.’158 Angola does have the largest standing army in 
the region159, and as such could play such a part regionally, although the country’s 
‘stabilising’ role is as much due to an absence of its own civil conflict as active peace-keeping 
on its own part. The Gulf of Guinea Commission for its part, although established in Nigeria, 
was resurrected by President Eduardo dos Santos and saw its headquarters moved to 
Luanda.  While this is directly related to regional relationship-building, Angola also became 
the 11th member of the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on 1 
January 2007, assuming the presidency of the organisation for 2009.   
 
It is clear therefore that Angola is seeking to cultivate regional influence and punch above its 
weight in international affairs. Consequently, the earlier apathy of the West in the face of 
Angola’s reconstruction is considered even more bitterly. As put by one MPLA 
parliamentarian, ‘We should have received more consideration from the West because we 
are more European.’160 Another commented: ‘The Africans here are very specific and 
particular – they don’t consider themselves African, they consider themselves different from 
African Continent representatives.’161 These statements betray the belief of most urban 
Angolan elites that they have more in common with Europeans, than other African people 
and nations, demonstrating a sense of national superiority in the context of other African 
countries, and their own compatriots in the rural areas, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Africa (Hodges, 2004:64) 
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Furthermore, despite apartheid South Africa’s role in Angola’s civil conflict, South Africa is 
believed to have become a darling of the international community.162 This still rankles. 
‘Angola could not get help when others did. The West should respect and protect Angola – 
they did this for South Africa, but Angola for secular reasons, was not.’163 
 
Prestige building has also followed a domestic discourse. Angola hosted the ‘Afrobasket’ 
African Basketball Championships in 2007 (which it won) and the African Cup of Nations in 
2010. Although this was very much directed at an external projection of the country’s rising 
prestige, it was also important for domestic constituencies, given the universal popularity of 
football (Almeida, 2009a).  
 
Regarding national reconstruction:  
‘Of course the availability of China is important for what we are doing en masse. It is 
not normal what we are doing – you need strong political will. It is the response of 
the volume of resources we have – the lending to Angola. If we don’t manage to get 
infrastructures, we will be less competitive, and our productivity will be less. If we 
didn’t do what we are doing, our difficulties would be worse and our social problems 
much larger. We are resolving our social problems. We have schools built by China – 
we have the structures, which have opened education to many children. Our 
hospitals are also rehabilitated. The administrative productivity is the biggest in the 
growth of the country. We are not sure yet how it is helping. Technology is the 
problem.’164  
 
The Angolan government has used the argument of political expediency to validate the 
process: ‘In terms of value and time-period, for instance with Angola’s roads, the quantity in 
the case of the roads – we would not have been able to do as much in 15 years without the 
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Chinese. We will look to the quality issue. We want quantity not quality. The Europeans, on 
the other hand, have high prices, and our money would not go as far.  If we waited for the 
Portuguese and the Brazilians, we would still be killing each other’.165  
 
The arrangement of Chinese financing has been promoted as crucial for rapid national 
reconstruction, the project of rebuilding the country physically after so many decades of 
civil war. Through the rhetoric of the Angolan government, is has also taken on a politically 
spirit, intended to galvanise nation-wide popular support for the regime in Luanda. But as 
Clapham (1985:120) notes cynically ‘… nationalism is not, save in the rhetoric of leaders, the 
united feeling of a single people.’ It is instead the demands put forward by a dominant 
group within the state. The completion of many of the public works carried out for national 
reconstruction were timed to coincide with electioneering and have been used gratuitously 
as primarily as an election campaign slogans to combat abysmal service delivery. 
 
Much has been made of the ‘3rd Republic’, a reference to Angola following the ratification of 
the new constitution in 2010. 166 Essentially the Constitution of 2010 marks entry into the 
‘3rd Republic’ and re-entry into the ‘real world’. This also means a re-engagement by Angola 
of the international community in order to carve out a sphere of influence regionally and 
internationally. One former African diplomat noted that Angola had sent an observer to the 
recent Mauritian elections. The representative observer, he noted wryly, ‘made many 
proclamations about democracy as if it were embedded into Angola’s political psyche’.167 
 
However, just like in the case of China, the Angolan government, despite aspirations to 
regional hegemony, does continue to plead developing country status when it behoves the 
country to do so. A prominent example is Angola failing to adhere to its set production 
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quota. Oil Minister José Botelho de Vasconcelos, concurrently President of OPEC advocated 
an outright exemption from quotas for Angola, likening the country to Iraq, which had 
already been granted such an exemption due to its history of conflict and need for post-war 
reconstruction (AFP, 2009c).  
 
A similar narrative has been used in the face of calls for greater transparency.   However, 
the Angolan government has accepted a US Treasury official seconded as resident advisor to 
the Ministry of Finance. As one Western diplomat put it ‘Now why would the Angolans be 
interested in an “embedded” US Treasury officer in their Ministry of Finance? Because they 
can tell the world!’168 Thus despite their disdain for Western norms, there is a recognition of 
status acquired by at least appearing to conform to them.  
 
2.3.1 Narrative on Corruption 
Soares de Oliveira (2007a:146) notes the importance of anti-corruption rhetoric for the elite 
in order to present a façade of ‘making the right noises’; a kind of ‘reform-lite’ while 
placating critics and enemies. As early as 1975, President Neto warned against ‘petty 
bourgeois opportunism’; or party members taking up government office for self-enrichment 
(Somerville, 1986:99).  Fauvet (1979:148) evidently an admirer of the party in its early years 
of rule vociferously defends the MPLA, noting the specific structure set up by the party to 
‘keep opportunists and careerists out’.  Smith (1980:75) more moderately contends that 
there were very definite benefits to party membership, albeit that the MPLA were ‘not 
hopelessly corrupt’. The Angolan government has also developed a discourse around 
corruption and transparency for the international audience. This, as with Chinese 
internationalisation, is an attempt to be seen to assimilate accepted norms of the 
international community in order to boost external legitimacy. One foreign correspondent 
described it as more ‘for show, in a kind of box-ticking exercise rather than any kind of 
sincere effort. It is almost as if Angola has realised that this is what the international 
community want to see, and as long as they get it, it keeps them happy and they send more 
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money and they really don’t care what is really going on. It is a new way of controlling how 
they appear.’169  
 
Particularly during the latter part of the Angolan civil war (after 1992) corruption and the 
misallocation of funds was extensive. The IMF reported that US$ 4.3 billion in revenue 
remains unaccounted for between 1997 and 2001 (Pearce, 2005:131). Political elites have 
been accused of facilitating capital flight from Angola to the value of US$ 5.8 billion in 2009 
alone, largely through trade ‘mispricing’ (Stoddard, 2011). However, the Angolan Ministry of 
Finance reportedly made a statement that such discrepancies were ‘perfectly consistent’170 
(Reuters, 2011a).  Indeed, this is despite the President in 2009 introducing a campaign of 
‘zero tolerance’ against corruption (Almeida, 2009c). President dos Santos introduced a Law 
of Administrative Probity rendering it illegal for political figures to use their position for 
personal  financial gain, in order to ensure public servants work with ‘honesty, honour and 
integrity of character’ (Esau, 2010:37). However, Marques de Morais (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 
2010c, 2010d) has documented numerous instances where contraventions of this law were 
not punished argues that the discourse of combatting corruption in Angola and within the 
party has existed for decades without much effect. Messiant (2007:96) argues that political 
elites pillage state assets with impunity save the displeasure of the President. Indeed, these 
newly instated laws are retained purely as a mechanism through which the President 
punishes his cadres if they overstep his boundaries, thus using the threat of prosecution for 
corruption as a stick to keep them in line.  
 
As to why corruption once again became an important issue in 2010, one Ambassador 
suggested three possible reasons; firstly that it might be President Dos Santos’s vision for a 
personal legacy – to have brought an end to corruption. Secondly, it may have something to 
do with the IMF standby loan of US$ 1.4 billion that was signed in September 2009, ‘…the 
largest ever advance of that nature in a single tranche’. Thirdly, he suggested that perhaps 
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dos Santos has recognised that ‘this is the way that the world is moving’   and Angola ‘can 
no longer hide away on the western seaboard and make lots of money. Fourthly, and most 
importantly it is about image and international standing in fora such as the AU and SADC.171  
 
President dos Santos’ speech at the opening of the first extraordinary session of the MPLA 
Central Committee focussed on several aspects. Among them was what he called the ‘battle 
for the communication of truth’ (Dos Santos, 2011a). He declared that poverty had not been 
created by the MPLA, but was a legacy of colonialism. Such pronouncements allude to the 
rising dissatisfaction with inequality experienced by Angolans. Interestingly, the President 
for the first time felt compelled to defend himself against accusations posted on the 
internet of keeping a fortune amounting to US$ 20 billion massed in overseas bank 
accounts.172 Transparency when it comes to relations with China is another matter.  A senior 
official from the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that relations between China and 
Angola were ‘the responsibility of the state’, claiming that they were managed by China and 
Angola and only these two countries ‘… know what they are about. You cannot go and tell 
the rest of the world; that would mean that you have no respect.’173  As Shaxson (2007:183) 
notes: ‘But if we want to tackle “corruption”, we must understand clearly what it is. It is 
often about greed. But at these levels it is also about staying in power and getting things 
done.’ 
  
2.3.2 Good relations between Friends  
In looking at China-Africa relations specifically, it is increasingly apparent that two separate 
narratives exist between political elites at high-level and day-to-day transactions between 
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Chinese and Angolan citizens. Most respondents with political office, as expected, 
emphasised the ‘friendly’174 and ‘excellent’175  relations between the two governments:  
 
‘What is important for relations between two countries is that the agreement is 
strong, loyal and that it is in the two countries’ interests. China’s relations with Africa 
are not emerging, they are being reinforced. They began at the Bandung conference, 
which is where they were agreed; they just took some time to manifest; we are only 
now seeing the fruit of it. China has assisted African countries for a long time. Every 
co-operation partner is welcome, as long as the co-operation is built on respect.’ 176 
 
A Chinese diplomat was however adamant that the Chinese government provided 
assistance to Angola according to their needs for the population177. Indeed, particularly after 
the flurry of stadium construction, the Chinese negotiators have voiced an apparent 
reluctance now to carry on building prestige projects and a shift to towards projects that will 
benefit the local people more.178 (However, as a concrete shift to only providing socially 
relevant projects is not yet clearly discernible at a policy level). It is evident that both the 
Chinese government and the Angolan government claim to have the interests of the 
‘Angolan people’ at heart. Nevertheless, the benefits of relations with China are 
overwhelmingly felt among the political elite. A study by Horta (2009) found that while 
China is viewed positively by African elites, other groups ‘non-government affiliated people 
interviewed – among them street sellers, teachers, and small business people’ were more 
negative. However, as will be discussed in later chapters, this is as much the responsibility of 
the African government in question, as with dissatisfaction with ‘the Chinese’ themselves. 
 
One Chinese respondent mentioned that in Angola, there was not a complete trust of China; 
he suggested this was possibly due to past experience of Western influence. This was 
reinforced by another Chinese businessman in Angola. He said that Angola feels a lot of 
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pressure from the Western governments.179 He suggested that some African countries may 
not trust China, probably because they are accustomed to the meddling and negative 
influence from outsiders; a result of the colonial experience.180 The more candid Chinese 
businessmen, especially from the private sector, mentioned that government-to-
government relations work well, relations between ‘ordinary people’ are more difficult.181 
One elaborated: ‘The problem with Angola is that the environment is lacking; young people 
don’t like to be here. Also, although the Chinese don’t like the Angolans, the Angolans don’t 
like the Chinese either. They don’t like each other.  Firstly, the culture is not the same, 
neither is the language.’ Two aspects that were regularly repeated were the fact that the 
average Chinese person that Angolans came into contact with was a migrant worker; 
‘peasant people – they are very uncultured and uneducated. They do not give a good 
impression.’182 Secondly, he believed that Angolans were under the misconception that 
Chinese companies are ‘…taking away from Angola and the Angolan economy, but China 
imports much more than it exports to Angola.’ Also, he said that even though there was a 
lot of Chinese labour in Angola, these labourers only earned between US$ 700 – 900.  
‘Angolans don’t understand, they think China is getting more out of it than Angola, but 
actually it is the other way around’183. Aside from problems with the local population, 
Chinese private companies do not benefit from preferential treatment from the Angolan 
government. In fact, a private Chinese entrepreneur mentioned, that despite all the 
welcoming high-level discourse, the Angolan government does not make the process of 
entry easy – the reality did not sit well with rhetoric (at least with the private companies).184 
This indicates that there are also Chinese actors that feel hard done by the manner in which 
China-Angola relations are conducted, an aspect little studied.  
 
Angola’s more long-standing traditional partners are careful not to speak too critically of 
China in Angola. This shows the level of power of the Angolan government vis-à-vis such 
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relations, as such utterances might compromise their position.185  One ambassador 
cautiously described the Chinese presence in Africa as ‘well-established’ and ‘very active’, 
but suggested that there was a ‘mismatch between perception and reality’. He argued that 
although an intrinsically poor country, ‘…it is not as if Angola needs much in the way of aid. 
What it does need is support in redistributing the wealth’, and he ‘didn’t see that China was 
particularly well-placed to help with that. China’s traditional approach to African countries 
can’t help Angola.’186  
 
Most foreign diplomats interviewed remarked on the subtle diplomatic competition that 
existed between China and US, although this was denied outright by the US Embassy.187 A 
former Angolan Ambassador to US suggested that at the time of reconstruction, ‘the US was 
in no position to provide assistance.  China has promised to assist Angolan’s reconstruction. 
He continued ‘The US, as far as I know, doesn’t feel threatened by China’s position. 
Understandably, both countries have aid and can be complementary. The US encourages 
the Angolan government to be more aggressive in economic diversification. This can only be 
done if one has infrastructure rehabilitation; roads, bridges, people, money.’188 However 
after the emergence of key diplomatic missives in the ‘Wikileaks’ scandal, it emerged that 
several US embassies’ diplomats in Africa do indeed feel threatened by China’s growing 
presence in Africa (Stumme,2010).  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
It is clear that China’s political rhetoric in Africa, more specifically Angola, is a function of the 
country’s process of internationalisation and consequent domestic debates concerning 
China’s rise in the international community. Furthermore, China’s rhetorical position 
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regarding development assistance is informed by lessons learned from the country’s own 
developmental experience. Many aspects of this are appealing to African elites. China 
advocates ‘gradualism’, rather than ‘shock therapy’ administered by the West (Zhang and 
Luo, 2008:25). This is much more in line with the gradualismo the Angolan government 
prefers to practice. (Vines, Shaxson and Rimli, 2005:13). 
 
However, as noted above, the audience of China’s public diplomacy is not restricted to 
Africans, be they elites or the masses, but it also intended for the international community 
at large, in order to project a positive image more broadly (Cull, 2009). Indeed, as has been 
seen, Africa is actually viewed as a test case scenario where Chinese diplomats can perfect 
the art of soft power, increasingly recognised as being important to cultivate the kind of 
stature China wishes to attain on the global stage.  
 
The Angolan government on the other hand has managed to exploit a diplomatically 
strengthened relationship with China for gains in domestic, regional and international 
narratives. Consequently, the ‘win-win’ relationship seems to play out well for both Chinese 
and Angolan officials at the level of rhetoric. The actual mechanism of the agreements 
between Angola and China presents a difference state of affairs. It is this that the following 
chapter seeks to address.  
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CHAPTER THREE: The Development of China’s Africa Foreign Policy  
China’s relations with Angola are encompassed by the context through which China pursues 
relations with Africa as a whole. This chapter traces the historical origins of China’s foreign 
policy towards Africa, and the institutional mechanisms that currently drive foreign policy 
formulation towards the continent. In this chapter, I conceptualise China Exim Bank’s rise as 
a foreign policy instrument and describe the bank’s generic lending process, paying 
particular attention to the various Chinese government bodies involved in its 
implementation.  
 
 3.1 A Brief History  
China’s relationship with Africa was initially guided by a broader set of general foreign policy 
principles developed over time in response to China’s geo-political reality from the 1950’s 
onwards. This framework, the ‘Five Principles for Peaceful Co-existence’ were jointly 
developed and publically released by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai at the historic 1955 Bandung Conference where they were adopted by 29 
other non-aligned countries (Muekalia, 2004:6).189 Significantly, the intention of this 
conference was to cement Afro-Asian solidarity in the face of the Cold War political divisions. 
African leaders however were to a large degree under-represented as attendance of the 
conference was largely disapproved of by the colonial powers. Nevertheless, China’s pledge 
to adhere to the declared principles of respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence, have, at least on a 
rhetorical level continued to inform China’s contemporary foreign policy, particularly 
towards the developed world.  
 
China’s foreign policy towards Africa throughout much of the Cold War period was in 
solidarity with the various liberation movements struggling for decolonisation across the 
continent. It was also an effort to carve out a sphere of influence in competition with the 
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prevailing ‘great powers’;  the US and the  former  USSR. China was drawn into various proxy 
wars across Africa, arguably compromising the sacrosanct principle of non-intervention 
(Snow, 1988:96). Indeed, the underlying intention to export revolution to Africa as a 
transformative project was embodied by the infamous pronouncement by Premier Zhou 
Enlai on his 1963-1964 tour of ten African countries that ‘prospects for revolution in Africa 
are excellent’ (Taylor,2006:25). For many years, relations with African countries were an 
outlet for rivalries with both ‘imperialist’ America and Soviet Russia. Following the political 
turmoil resulting from the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, the Chinese 
Government turned inward throughout the 1980’s in order to address pressing domestic 
economic crises as Deng Xiaoping emerged as political successor to the Great Helmsman190. 
China was during this time content to remain relatively withdrawn from international 
conflicts, abandoning the project of exporting revolution to Africa and choosing to abstain 
for the most part in the decisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), of which it 
had been a member (having ousted Taiwan) since 1971 (Geissman,2006:3).  
 
Under Deng Xiaoping, Premier Zhao Ziyang was dispatched on a tour of 11 African countries 
in 1982, not only to patch up relations that had soured following China’s involvement in 
various Africa conflicts, but also to prepare Africa leaders for a reduction in the amount of 
aid they would hence forth receive191 (Taylor, 2006:56). The aid would also be restructured 
in order to benefit both sides (Brautigam, 2009:114), thus paving the way for the ‘win-win’ 
relations witnessed in contemporary times. This is a reflection of the Asian country’s internal 
upheaval as dogmatic political ideology was by and large replaced by economic imperatives. 
Thus, whereas China-Africa relations throughout much of the Cold War period were 
characterized by the rhetoric of solidarity in the face of colonialism and imperialism, 
contemporary relations are much more about relations of mutual benefit with a distinctly 
economic flavour (Brautigam, 2009: 53-54). This is not to say that political rhetoric is not 
heavily employed, but it is rather used as a means for consolidating strategic economic 
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relations with African countries and affirming the ‘One-China’ policy, than as a political end 
in and of itself.    
 
The year 1989, however, marked a watershed in Sino-African relations (Taylor, 1998:445). 
Following the Tiananmen Square ‘incident’, China was severely criticised by Western powers 
for the heavy-handedness that Deng’s regime had used against student protestors 
advocating political reforms in the model of Western-style liberal democracies. African 
countries, on the other hand, were quick to praise the decisive actions of the Chinese 
leadership in “quelling the counter-revolutionary rebellion”192. African leaders not only 
wished to show solidarity with China in the face of Western criticism, but also approved of 
China’s authoritarian style of leadership. They also hoped that Chinese aid, which had been 
dwindling in previous years, would increase as a result of their support. They surmised 
correctly, and China, realising the renewed political usefulness of allies in the global South, 
began to take greater interest in relations with the African continent.     
 
The Forum on China Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) was established in 2000193, with the first 
Ministerial Meeting taking place in Beijing of that year, at the instigation of President Jiang 
Zemin. The forum was China’s largest ever multilateral undertaking at the time. The 
inaugural FOCAC Conference produced the “Beijing Declaration”, a document that affirmed 
the consensus between China and Africa on certain international issues affecting developing 
countries. This was followed in 2003 with FOCAC’s second Ministerial Conference in Addis 
Ababa, which served to consolidate Sino-African relations and earmark further areas of 
cooperation in the areas of trade, economic assistance and cultural exchanges. The PRC 
delegation announced the Special Preferential Tariff Treatment program that removed 
import tariffs on 190 different items from twenty-five least-developed African countries 
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when it was implemented in January 2005.194 The year 2006 was unequivocally declared by 
the Chinese leadership to be the year for China-Africa relations. January of that year 
heralded the release of China’s African Policy Paper, which reiterated China’s declared policy 
of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. 
The paper confirmed rhetoric dating back to President Jiang Zemin’s declaration in 1996 that 
the five cornerstones of China’s Africa policy are “sincere friendship, equality, unity and co-
operation, common development, and looking to the future” (Holslag, 2006:145).  This 
document is significant as it was at the time only the second such policy paper dealing with 
an entire region, to have been launched by the Chinese Government (the first being the 
Europe Policy Paper of 2003). China’s policy outline contrasted with Western donors’ policy 
stances and conditional assistance, and was well received by African heads of state. At the 
following FOCAC meeting, held in 2009 in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, the Chinese leadership 
continued the established ritual of making generous pledges in an eight-point proposal, 
offering multi-billion dollar packages covering a broad range of development sectors.  
 
In December 2010, the State Council for Information released a White Paper on China’s 
Trade and Economic Relations with African countries195.  This was followed by the Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and Economic Co-operation (CAITEC)196, releasing the first 
annual report on China’s Trade and Economic relations with African Countries in early 2011.  
In April   2011, the State Council released a White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid197, which 
largely treats foreign aid to Africa. Such a proliferation of official documents, despite their 
thin content, signifies the acknowledgement of the political importance of relations with 
Africa, described by Wu (2005:99) as ‘documentary politics.’ 
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While the pace at which China’s relations with Africa have strengthened is remarkable, it is 
important to bear in mind that China’s relations with other regions have shown similar levels 
of stimulation. While African countries may be of strategic significance to China, increased 
outreach to Africa is merely a component of China’s growing global integration and 
culmination of the ‘going global’ (zouchuqu) 198 policy. The African continent captures only a 
fraction of China’s global trade and investment, 4.2 percent and 2.7 percent respectively 
(State Council Information Office, 2010; Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2010b:10). Despite 
this, Africa’s relations with China have received a disproportionate amount of international 
scrutiny. Consequently therefore, the political aspects of China’s foreign policy towards 
Africa cannot be overlooked.  
 
 3.2 China’s Prioritization of Foreign Policy Principles 
The two most important pillars of China’s foreign policy are that of the ‘One China’ principle 
and an uncompromising stance on non-interference in the domestic matters of other states 
(Zheng, 2005). Non-interference, a foreign policy principle developed from a strong aversion 
to perceived external meddling in China’s own domestic affairs, has continued to direct 
much of China’s external affairs on the level of rhetoric. The approach is warmly welcomed 
by African leaders and China further capitalizes on the shared experiences of a history of 
colonialism. The growing role of China on the African continent has served to illustrate not 
only the importance the PRC attaches to such principles, but the order in which they are 
prioritized. 
 
In recent years, the inevitability of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) dominance over 
Taiwan in the realm of international affairs is self-evident. Only a handful of states globally 
continue to recognise Taiwan instead of Mainland China. Indeed, in Africa alone, since 2005 
                                                 
198
 The ‘going global or literally ‘go out’ (走出去) policy was a series of policy initiatives beginning in the early 
eighties but promulgated officially in approximately 2002, encouraging Chinese companies to internationalise 
their operations.  
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Senegal, Chad and Malawi’199 have all reversed diplomatic relations switching to recognition 
of the PRC Government.200 This has almost halved the number of Taipei’s diplomatic allies in 
Africa, leaving only four.201 The ‘Taiwan issue’ nevertheless remains a thorn in the side of 
Chinese foreign policy. It has not been forgotten that it was largely due to the support of 
newly independent African states at the UN General Assembly, that in 1971 the PRC 
assumed a permanent seat on the UNSC that had until then been held by the government in 
Taipei. Consequently, ostensibly great store is set by diplomatic relations with African 
governments. In the run-up to the Zambian presidential elections of September 2006, 
Michael Sata, leader of the prominent opposition party the Patriotic Front (PF) used anti-
Chinese sentiment to bolster his support following China Non-ferrous Metal Company’s 
assumption of the majority shareholding in the Chambishi Copper mines, a Sata stronghold. 
Xenophobic tensions had already flared in the region in 2005 when an explosion at the 
Chinese-owned mines killed 51 Zambian workers (BBC, 2005). Sata stated at the time that 
should he win the election, he would rid the country of ‘unnecessary Chinese, Lebanese and 
Indians’ who were viewed by many as taking away jobs from local Zambians (Burke & Corkin, 
2006:60). A senior official at the Economic and Commercial Section of the Chinese Embassy, 
along with several Chinese managers interviewed at the time, reportedly dismissed the 
remarks as ‘cheap politics’ (Burke & Corkin, 2006:60). Subsequently, Sata described Taiwan 
as a sovereign state, prompting the Chinese Ambassador to Zambia Li Baodong to announce 
that should Sata win and establish relations with Taiwan, Beijing might think of cutting 
diplomatic relations with Zambia. Li’s statement days before the country’s national election 
may certainly be considered interference, but not necessarily a departure from China’s 
longstanding policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, provided they 
recognize Beijing’s ‘One China Policy’. While Sata’s presidential bid failed, he retained a 
stronghold in Zambia’s Copperbelt region and his remarks could be interpreted as reflecting 
an underlying antipathy at the time toward one of Zambia’s most important investors. Both 
Sata and Chinese diplomatic officials have since put forward a more pragmatic face. Sata, 
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 Senegal re-established ties with the PRC in October 2005, Chad in August 2006 and Malawi in December 
2007. 
200
 Several countries in Africa have switched relations a number of times between Beijing and Taipei as 
documented by Brautigam (2009:68), according to the political expediency at the time and the volumes of 
external assistance that would be offered in return. This gave rise to the so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’ (see 
Taylor, 2002). The Kingdom of Swaziland is the only country in Africa that has never established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC. 
201
 These are Burkina Faso, The Gambia, São Tomé e Principe and Swaziland.  
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since winning presidential elections in 2011 received Chinese ambassador Zhou Yuxiao as his 
first official appointment to discuss China’s continued investment in Zambia (Wan, 2011).  
 
There is the growing recognition by Chinese diplomats that African political factions are 
prepared to ‘play the China card’ to garner sympathy and support for their cause and the 
need to address this as a political tactic rather than antagonism towards Chinese people per 
se. (Russell and Wallis, 2008). Nevertheless, it is clear that for China, pretensions towards 
non-interventionism disappear in the face of the threat to the One-China policy. This was 
made official by Chinese State Councillor Chinese Dai Bingguo in his identification of ‘core 
interests’202, thus giving China a theoretical justification for adopting a position of ‘no 
compromise’ on issues concerning territorial sovereignty (Rajan, 2010). 
 
While the political aspect of China’s ‘One China’ policy seems immutable, on the economic 
front this does not seem to be so. Of the four African countries that still retain diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan; Burkina Faso is China’s fifth largest supplier of raw cotton (China 
Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export Textiles, 2009)203. Furthermore, Sinopec 
embarked on oil exploration in the Blocks 2 and 4 jointly held by São Tomé e Principe (40%) 
and Nigeria (60%) in the Gulf of Guinea, having entered into a production sharing agreement 
in 2006 (Winning,2009)204. As will be discussed in later chapters, this level of pragmatism is 
displayed both in term of Chinese diplomatic dealings with Angola, and in the way that 
Angola itself manages relations with China.   
 
                                                 
202
 ‘Core interests’核心利益 – were outlined by Dai Bingguo as ‘the PRC’s first core interest is maintaining its 
fundamental system and state security, second is state sovereignty and territorial integrity and the third is the 
continued stable development of the economy and society (Xinhua, quoted in Rajan,2010). Consequently, any 
perceived threat to China’s territorial integrity is prioritised over friendly relations with foreign countries. 
203
Of the top 10 suppliers, of cotton, Burkina Faso’s exports to China were growing the fastest, up 84 percent 
from the previous year (Chinese Chamber of Commerce for the Import and Export of Textiles, 2009) 
204
 As a small impoverished country, São Tomé e Principe has little bargaining power in the international arena. 
As in the case of Malawi, however the country may be able to extract substantial aid from Beijing in return for 
PRC recognition, in view of the priority Beijing accords the ‘One –China’ policy. 
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Despite the emergence of grey areas, Pearson (2006:242) contends that China will not 
compromise on such issues as ‘non-interference’. One of the primary reasons that non-
interference remains a central tenet of Chinese foreign policy especially towards African 
countries is to refute Western accusations of Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa. Such claims 
have for the most part been sharply contested by both Chinese (Xu, 2007) and African 
scholars (Caromba, 2007; Obiorah, 2008), who point out that African countries are now 
sovereign states, and no longer colonial possessions. Originating in China’s own colonial 
experience, China’s previously rigid stance on sovereignty and non-interference has had 
strong appeal for African leaders. Others have advocated a cautious approach to growing 
links with China, warning of the dangers of slipping into trading patterns similar to those 
held with the West (Gaye, 2006). Such arguments have important implications for the way 
that China’s relations with African countries are conceptualised, as well as the notion of 
African agency and responsibility in this exchange.  
 
3.3 China’s Foreign Policy in a ‘Great Power’ Context 
Rothstein (1968:14) claims that military considerations are not sufficient to define a great 
power. Although Handel (1981:19-21) primarily defines ‘great powers’ in a military sense205 
as they should be able to ‘act on a worldwide scale to defend their interests’, he admits that 
such a conceptualisation must be supplemented by a ‘set of non-quantitative criteria’. 
Mathisen (1971:62) similarly refers to the ‘invisible pattern of the structure of international 
power’, denoting a particular country’s sphere of influence. An emerging ‘great power’, 
China, as discussed in chapter two, aspires to become a ‘responsible stake-holder’ of the 
international community, in line with the prestige that this will confer (Elshtain, 1996:224).  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the triangular battle of rhetoric between ‘Western’ 
countries, China and Africa is pronounced. The tendency for Africa’s relations to become 
internationalised, has led them to have a greater influence on Chinese foreign policy-making 
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 Handel (1981:20) sees great powers distinguishes as having ‘the capacity… to defend itself under even the 
most adverse conditions’   
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than might otherwise be the case. This has led to various tensions inherent in such policies 
coming to the fore.206  Africa is emerging as the crucible in which China’s foreign policy is 
seen to be slowly transforming. Still seen through a geo-strategic lens, even after the Cold 
War, African countries seem to have become the testing ground where China is expected to 
prove itself to the international community as a ‘responsible’ global stake-holder and an 
emerging power worthy of the title. China is thus attempting to increase its influence 
simultaneously in two separate spheres; that of the developing South, and that of the 
developed North.  
 
For China, increased engagement with Africa is also necessary in order to secure access to oil 
and natural resources to fuel an expanding economy. Africa is an area that was until recently, 
considered less strategic in terms of US national interests and thus less of an outright 
challenge to the US global hegemony (Kurlantzick, 2007a) of which China is understandably 
wary.207 Furthermore, China wishes to shore up political support in multilateral fora where 
developing countries’ voices outnumber those of the developed world. 208  This could 
develop into what Handel (1981:132) calls ‘patron-client relationships’ whereby there is an 
implied reciprocity in the assistance China extends to these weaker states. In its most 
extreme forms, this might be termed ‘synchronism’ (Handel, 1981:135), whereby the African 
state would co-ordinate its policies and votes in international fora with those of China. 
Through such an alliance, the African countries could counterbalance the influence of other 
powers such as the US and EU (Rothstein, 1968:62).  
 
Much attention has been given to the development of China’s foreign policy towards Africa, 
particularly as China’s role on the international stage has increased steadily. Less focus has 
                                                 
206
 As in the case with its involvement in the conflict in Darfur, Sudan, however, Chinese politicians have shown, 
as discussed in chapter 2, what Carlson (2006:224) describes as ‘cautious acceptance and incremental change’. 
This holds certain parallels with the Cold War geo-political dynamics in that the African continent was the 
scene for the US and USSR to compete for strategic influence, conforming to Mao’s conceptualisation of the 
‘intermediate zone’ (Gillespie, 2001).   
207
 See discussion on ‘China threat’ in previous chapter. 
208
 This time however, unlike the Mao era, such soft power ambitions are not informed by a conscious ideology 
According to Mierzejewski (2009) this lack of ideological underpinnings is the primary argument of the 
‘Peaceful Rise’ theory.  
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been placed on the institutions and actors responsible for crafting such policies, and the 
degree to which the coherence or conflict of such bodies domestically influences the way 
policy is enacted abroad. The next section will investigate the institutional framework for 
policy formulation towards Africa, with special emphasis on concessional loans, given the 
importance this mechanism takes on vis-à-vis Chinese relations with Angola.  In tracing the 
evolution of such a policy-making framework, it will be shown that domestic agendas and 
rivalries are making an increasingly significant impact on China’s policy formulation towards 
Africa in general and Angola in particular.  
 
3.4 China’s foreign policy actors and institutions 
As China’s foreign policy objectives as regards Africa (and the world) have shifted from more 
ideologically based to more strategic and economically-based considerations, so too have 
the mechanisms for foreign policy making within China’s corridors of power. As observed by 
Li (2008:55): 
‘… over the past three decades China has been transforming away from rule by a 
single charismatic and all-powerful leader toward a more collective form of 
leadership. This shift has ended the era of strongman politics and, to a certain extent, 
China’s long history of arbitrary decision-making by one lone individual.’  
 
Increasingly, there is considerable debate and dissent among the top decision-makers as to 
the ‘correct’ way to handle foreign-policy challenges209, leading to what Bergsten et al 
(2008:62) describe as tendencies towards ‘inner-party democracy’. In matters relating to 
African policy, a complex web of ministries, departments and commissions clash and co-
operate to form the implementation mechanisms of what becomes official policy towards 
Africa, with official structures apparently often bearing little resemblance to de facto 
processes.  Lieberthal (1992:8) has termed such bureaucratic bargaining ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’.  
                                                 
209
 With particular reference to this phenomenon vis-à-vis China’s international petroleum policy, see Bo 
(2010).  
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In comparison to China’s foreign policy towards the US, Japan and the Taiwan issue, Africa is 
not a foreign policy priority (Shirk, 2007; Raine, 2009). At least at the level of political 
rhetoric however, Africa as a bloc has received considerable high-level political attention. 
Both President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have made several multi-country trips to 
Africa in the last few years, showing an active role in China’s African foreign policy.210While 
the Chinese President (Jiang Zemin in 2000 and Hu Jintao in 2006) as the Head of the 
Chinese government addressed the assembled African representatives at FOCAC when held 
in Beijing, it was Wen Jiabao who represented the Chinese government in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia (2003) and Sharm-el Sheikh, Egypt (2009). Such a shower of diplomatic attention or 
‘prestige diplomacy’ (Gill and Reilly, 2007:38), has served to facilitate entry into the erstwhile 
‘forgotten continent’. 
 
Although the State Council, chaired by Wen Jiabao211  may officially bear overall 
responsibility for the strategic direction that policies must take, the Politburo Standing 
Committee is the de facto decision-maker on foreign policy. As with most matters of state 
interest, Chinese Communist Party hierarchy holds more weight than state organs. (Wu, 
2005:101). Furthermore, individual political leaders too, can play a very important role.  
 
Hu Jintao, not only as the Chinese head of state, but also as the highest ranking CCP official 
and chairman of the Central Military Commission, has an important role in formulating 
China’s overall foreign policy, including that towards Africa. In addition, having served as 
President of the Central Party School for 10 years (1993-2002) just prior to his presidency, he 
                                                 
210
 Since taking up office in 2003, President Hu Jintao has toured Egypt, Gabon, Algeria, 29 January -4 February 
2004; Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria from 24-29 April 2006; Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South 
Africa, Mozambique and Seychelles in 30 January – 10 February 2007; Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius, 
10-17 February 2009. Since taking office in 2003, Ethiopia 15-16 December (FOCAC II) Premier Wen Jiabao has 
visited Egypt, Ghana, Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda 17-24 June 2006; Egypt 8-
9 November 2009 (FOCAC IV). 
211
 Proposed matters of policy concerning Africa were referred to Wen Jiabao (interview, Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009). 
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has been influential in shaping the education of successive generations of party cadres (Liu, 
2009:106).  
 
Several other high-ranking party members have considerable influence on foreign policy. 
State Counsellor Dai Bingguo heads up the Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs which 
directs the MFA (Africa-Asia Confidential, 2009b:8). Dai was Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and concurrently MFA party secretary during President Hu’s first term212 and in 2004 
accompanied President Zeng Qinghong on a tour of Tunisia, Togo, Benin and South Africa213. 
Dai has been on two tours to Africa in recent years and in quick succession – once 
accompanying President Hu Jintao on his February 2008 trip, and again in July 2010 when he 
visited Ethiopia, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia.214 
This points towards an influential advisory role on African foreign policy, particularly as Dai 
has also previously served on the CCP International Liaison Department, which has been 
active in strengthening relations between CCP and the respective ruling parties in African 
states (Shinn & Eisenman, 2008:2). The current International Liaison Department head, 
Wang Jiarui is also an important figure in foreign policy circles, but Dai is reportedly the most 
influential outside of the Politburo Standing Committee, and outranks both Foreign Minister 
Yang Jiechi and Minister of Commerce Chen Deming (Jakobsen & Knox, 2010:5-7).  
 
 MFA through its Africa Desk officially has the responsibility of foreign policy implementation 
and ‘oversees and coordinates policies and cooperation and exchanges with relevant 
countries and regions’.215 However, MFA’s role is in decline, in some instances remaining 
only in an advisory capacity.216   
 
                                                 
212
 He also served as Deputy Foreign Minister from 1993-1995,  see Chinavitae: 
http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Dai_Bingguo%7C745  
213
‘ Dai Bingguo Talks about Zeng Qinghong's Visit to Africa, ‘Which is a Trip of Greetings, Understanding and 
Learning from the Continent’ 1 July 2004: http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t142011.htm  
214
 See ‘Remarks by State Councillor Dai Bingguo at dinner  hosted by the Vice President of Zambia’ [Speech], 
27 July 2010:  http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t721613.htm [accessed 28 September 2010] 
215
 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, Africa Department: http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq/2913  
[accessed 23 February 2010]  
216
 Various interviews, Beijing, September –December 2009.  
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MOFCOM plays an increasingly important role in the interpretation and implementation of 
policy towards Africa. The MOFCOM West Asian and African Affairs Department is 
responsible for organising economic and trade co-operation. Furthermore, if official 
diplomatic relations do not yet exist with the African country in question, bilateral relations 
of an economic nature are conducted through this department.217 Of interest, is the fact that 
the Foreign Aid Department is located within MOFCOM, and apparently does not co-
ordinate directly with MFA, to the exasperation of the latter (Brautigam, 2009:109; Jacobsen 
& Knox, 2010:20) . Given the shift in strategic focus of China’s policy towards African 
countries to one of a more trade-centred nature, MOFCOM’s is increasingly important, to 
the extent that it overshadows the influence of MFA.218 One Chinese researcher noted wryly 
that the much bandied about slogan ‘economics in the service of politics’219 was even more 
apt if reversed.  This is played out in the African countries themselves. Whereas the Chinese 
Embassy reports directly to MFA, the Economic Counsellor’s Office, nominally under the 
Embassy’s umbrella structure, is usually physically separate from Embassy itself and actually 
reports to MOFCOM. This can readily cause confusion, as it is apparent in some countries 
that the two offices do not exchange information, as they work for separate Ministries that 
may be competing for influence in Beijing (Reilly and Gill, 2007).  
 
It has become a well-known tradition begun by former Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in 1991 
for the Chinese Foreign Minister to make his first diplomatic visit of the New Year to Africa 
(Bo, 2010:121). Of interest is the recent trend for the Minister of Commerce to make a 
similar visit to a number of different African countries at a similar time. Minister Chen 
Deming visited Kenya, Zambia and Angola in January 2009; Ethiopia, Mozambique and 
Tanzania in January 2010; and Morocco, Equatorial Guinea and Ghana in February 2011. 
While initially perhaps to assuage African countries that they would not be abandoned in the 
wake of the financial crisis, Minister Chen’s recurring visits may signal not only the growing 
importance of MOFCOM in matters pertaining to African policy, but also the growing inter-
                                                 
217
 Chinese Ministry of Commerce Website, West Asian and African Affairs Department:   
http://xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300002546.html?2567248113=3939174942 [accessed 
23 February 2010] 
218
 The Ministry of Finance, through incentives to promote the ‘going global’ policy that benefit mining 
companies, also indirectly has an influence on policies towards Africa (Holslag, 2006:150). 
219
 Translated from ‘经济为外交服务‘  (interview, Chinese Research Institute, Beijing,   22 December 2009) 
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ministerial rivalry that exists. It increasingly appears therefore that the MFA is being 
relegated to greasing the cogs of diplomacy while MOFCOM officials engage in the 
implementation of policy. This is particularly evident where the meting out of concessional 
loans is concerned. 
 
3.5 Chinese Concessional Loans as a Foreign Policy Tool  
 In 1994, China Agricultural Bank, China Development Bank and China Exim Bank were 
created as policy banks220 in order  to relieve commercial banks from policy lending 
responsibilities  and  allow the latter to have a more commercial focus, in a process 
described by a Western banker as ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurship’.221 China Exim Bank’s was 
initially staffed by various departments from the Ministry of Finance. After the streamlining 
of the Central Government in 1998, China Exim received staff from MOFCOM and other 
commercial banks.222 Chinese government concessional loans are a relatively new 
mechanism, piloted under former Premier Li Peng in the early 1990’s.223 China Exim Bank 
began disbursing concessional loans in April 1995224 and is currently one of the largest such 
institutions in the world (Moss& Rose, 2006).  
 
China Exim Bank is the sole agency for the provision of Chinese government concessional 
loans, distinguished by the IMF (2003) from purely commercial loans, by what IMF considers 
their lower-than-market interest rate, a long grace period, or both, in the case of China Exim 
Bank’s loan to Angola. The Ministry of Finance is the sole shareholder of the China Exim Bank, 
which is wholly owned by the Central government (see Li and Zeng, 2007:144), but reports 
directly to the State Council (Suzuki, 2008:20). The China Exim Bank conceptualises these so-
called Chinese government concessional loans as: 
                                                 
220
 Interestingly, a Chinese researcher from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) commented that 
China Exim Bank is not referred to as a ‘policy bank’ in China, rather a ‘state-owned bank’. This is perhaps due 
to the question mark that exists over its commercialisation.  
221
 Interview, IMF, Beijing, 1 September 2009 
222
 Personal correspondence, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 3 November 2009 
223
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009. 
224
 National Development and Reform Commission website: 
http://203.207.194.3:82/gate/big5/wzs.ndrc.gov.cn/gwdk/wgzfdkgbbxml/zdyh/t20081028_243105.htm  
[accessed 23 February 2010] 
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‘…the medium and long-term, low interest rate credit extended by China Exim Bank 
under the designation of the Chinese Government with the nature of official 
assistance.’225 
 
According to World Bank estimates, by 2006 China Exim had disbursed over US$ 12.5 billion 
for large-scale infrastructural projects in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, although China Exim 
Bank’s official reported figures were much less (Bossard,2007:2). More than 80 percent of 
these loans were, according to Broadman (2007:275) to resource-rich African countries, such 
as Angola, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Sudan. Furthermore, China Exim Bank reportedly 
accounted for 92 percent of Chinese finance commitments for infrastructure in Africa 
between 2001 and 2007 (Foster et al, 2008a:40).  
 
Data in this regard is not consistent, even between Chinese sources. According to the 
Chinese State Council Information Office (2011), as of the end of 2009, only RMB 73.55 
billion (approximately US$ 11.32 billion) in concessional loans were disbursed globally. 
Confusingly however, according to China Exim Bank vice president Zhu Xinqiang, as of 2010, 
the Bank, since its inception, had provided RMB 150 billion (approximately US$ 23 billion) in 
loans to African countries alone.226  What is clear, however, is that Chinese policy banks are 
increasingly active. In January 2011, Financial Times reported that according to their 
research, between 2009 and 2010 China Exim Bank and China Development Bank had 
collectively lent more than the World Bank and the IMF combined in the same period ; 
US$ 110 billion versus US$ 100.3 billion (Dyer et al,2011).227 
 
 
 
                                                 
225
 China Exim Bank website: 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/200905/9398_1.html [accessed 29 September 
2010]  
226
 See : http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t770971.htm [21 April 2011] 
227
 As these banks do not publish their overseas lending, Financial Times reportedly collected the information 
from public announcements made by the banks themselves, the borrowers, or the Chinese government. 
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Figure 3.1: China Exim Bank Lending (1996 – 2009) US$ millions  
 
Source (input data): Brautigam (2009:317) 
 
Nevertheless, I will show below, China Exim Bank’s lending practices are not as concessional 
as is widely assumed, and are increasingly more in line with preferential commercial lending. 
These agreements are not contingent necessarily on the recipient country being resource-
rich, merely that the country possesses the means to repay the loan.228 Through the loans 
China can access the mineral wealth of Africa’s cash-strapped but resource rich countries. 
Critically however, it serves another purpose. According to Chinese Exim Bank, the 
concessional loan is designed to:  
“… fund manufacturing projects, infrastructure construction projects and social 
welfare projects in the borrowing country, which can generate promising economic 
returns or good social benefits;” and “finance the procurement of Chinese 
                                                 
228
 Resource payments are merely a more convenient form of collateral. China Exim Bank originally wanted 
Ecuador to put the country’s central Bank assets up as collateral (AFP, 2009b). Ghana, just before the discovery 
of oil in 2007 negotiated to repay the China Exim bank-funded Bui Dam construction with shipments of cocoa 
(Reuters, 2007a) 
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mechanical, electronic products, complete sets of equipment, technology and service 
and other goods by the borrowing country.” 229 
 
According to the China Exim Bank’s concessional loan requirements, Chinese contractors 
must be awarded the infrastructure contract financed by the loan. Furthermore, in principle 
no less than 50 percent of the contract’s procurement in terms of equipment, materials, 
technology or services must come from China.230   
 
Thus, while China Exim Bank may engage in ‘development financing’, its engagement with 
infrastructure projects in developing countries is principally to create a conduit through 
which these countries can buy the products and services of Chinese companies. This thus 
encourages the further internationalisation of China’s firms. In this case, it is therefore no 
different from any other Export-Import bank in the world, save perhaps the size and volume 
of the projects the institution is engaged in globally.   
 
However, unlike loans from the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), these loans are not 
conditional on recipient government fiscal reforms. Aside from the procedural requirements, 
the only substantive condition is that loans must be used for infrastructure, social or 
industrial project sectors231, which until very recently were disregarded by more traditional 
lenders, despite African countries’ pressing need for infrastructural development and 
rehabilitation.  
 
The concessional loan’s management is the responsibility of the Chinese government, 
represented in this instance by the MOFCOM, MFA and Ministry of Finance. According to the 
                                                 
229
 China Exim bank Website:  
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/200905/9398_1.html [accessed 28 September 
2010] 
230
 China Exim Bank website, refer to: http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/business/government.jsp  [accessed 7 
September  2007] 
231
 China Exim Bank website, refer to: http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/business/government.jsp  [accessed 7 
September  2007] 
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MOFCOM Department of Aid Studies, The Ministry of Finance232 is ‘responsible for 
formulating policies and plans, drawing up the signed framework agreement, and 
determining the interest rate of the loan.’ 233 In practice, it appears that these 
responsibilities are deferred to MOFCOM and Exim Bank and the Ministry of Finance is 
required only to sign off on them in order to approve the budget. These loans are managed 
by MOFCOM, sometimes in conjunction with the MFA.  
 
China Exim Bank concessional loans must be greater than 20 million RMB (approximately 
US$ 3 million)234 , but loans in excess of US$ 50 million must be approved by the State 
Council (Freeman, 2008:8).  
 
The African government, with the recommendation of the resident Chinese Economic 
Counsellor’s office, through the Chinese Embassy in their country and their Embassy in China 
will make an application235 to MOFCOM, whose two departments, the department of 
Foreign Aid and the Department of Economic Co-operation will consider the application in 
consultation with China Exim Bank. MOFCOM will study the list of priority projects submitted 
with the application, approve a selection and calculate an approved budget.236 MOFCOM 
assigns a specific amount from the foreign aid budget that will be used to subsidise the 
interest rate of the loan.237  
 
China Exim Bank will offer financing at a rate determined by the bank’s risk analysis 
department in conjunction with the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), subject to approval by 
the Ministry of Finance. The base rate is Libor, with an additional percentage added 
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 The Ministry of Finance is the sole shareholder of the China Exim Bank, which is wholly owned by the 
Central Government. (see Li and Zeng,2007:144) 
233
 Interview, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Co-operation,  
CAITEC, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 5 December 2009 
234
 China Exim Bank website, refer to: http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/business/government.jsp  [accessed 7 
September  2007] 
235
 For a complete list of application requirements, refer to China Exim Bank 
website:http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/business/government.jsp  [accessed 7 September  2007] 
236
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009 
237
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009 
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according to the country’s sovereign credit rating (if it exists), the political situation, 
economic and financial stability.238 China Exim Bank adds management and commitment 
fees to cover marginal operational costs.239 As China Exim Bank was never under pressure to 
turn a profit, it has thus been able to offer lower than commercial lending rates.  
Furthermore, if the loan is granted concessionally, the Chinese government will compensate 
the difference between the concessional interest rate and the loan’s commercial rate (based 
on the lending rate of the Chinese Central Bank ) through MOFCOM’s foreign aid budget 
(State Council Information Office,2011). Thus, important to note is that the loans from China 
Exim Bank are not aid in their entirety; it is only the subsidised portion of interest that is 
considered aid (Brautigam, 2009: 167). Therefore only a small portion of infrastructure 
financed in this way is outright aid (Wang, 2007:21).  Estimates240 of Chinese aid are 
therefore often exaggerated as the entire face value of the China Exim Bank loan is often 
counted (Brautigam, 2010b:27). In this analysis I do not put China Exim Bank’s loans in the 
analytical framework of Chinese aid flows to Africa241. 
 
 The Ministry of Finance and MFA are also involved, and according to the nature of the 
projects, the International Co-operation desks of the Departments of Agriculture, Water, 
Education and Health. The Chinese Economic Counsellor’s Desk242 in the recipient African 
country is involved on a consultative basis. In order to make official such co-operation, a 
report is written to the State Council, following which, on a subsequent visit by a high-
ranking Chinese official to the recipient country or the African head of state to China, the 
loan agreement is announced and signed, firstly an inter-governmental framework 
                                                 
238
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 11 January 2010 
239
 ‘Management Fee is calculated on the basis of the total amount of the loan and paid in one lump sum 
before 
the first drawdown. Commitment Fee is calculated on the basis of the un-drawn amount of the Loan and paid 
on interest collection dates.’ refer to: http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/business/government.jsp  [accessed 29 
September  2010]
 
240
 China does not report its aid figures to DAC (Brautigam,2010:26) 
241
 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
242
 This is a representative office of MOFCOM in foreign countries, and is separate to the Embassy, reporting 
directly to MOFCOM. 
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agreement between the African government’s Finance Ministry and MOFCOM, and then a 
loan agreement with China Exim Bank. The entire process takes approximately one year.243  
 
MOFCOM and China Exim Bank will hold ad hoc meetings to discuss the progress of the 
projects.244  Exim Bank is responsible for project appraisal, loan disbursement, loan 
operation monitoring and collecting principal and interest, which in principle is calculated 
and paid twice a year. 245  It appears that the Bank is involved in the selection of projects, not 
just their feasibility studies; but a respondent from an international financial institution was 
doubtful of China Exim Bank’s ability to reject a project outright even if the feasibility study 
suggested otherwise. He suggested that the agreements were arranged through high-level 
diplomacy as a package of assistance measures. The concessional resources are allocated 
and China Exim Bank is thus only the implementation body. The budget is decided by 
MOFCOM; whereas Exim Bank has a say on the deal structuring, the design and 
implementation and contracting.246 Again, MFA’s role here is marginal.  Through the 
embassies, MFA may be allowed a monitoring role once the project is at the implementation 
stage.247  
 
From this description, corroborated by various respondents, it is fairly evident that the MFA 
seems to have been side-lined. One former MOFCOM official248 was adamant that MOFCOM 
is the co-ordinator of the loan.  A senior journalist of a state-run newspaper agreed that in 
such matters of government co-operation, MOFCOM is the most important, although ‘MFA 
and organisations such as the China Africa Business Council play a role’.249 However, the fact 
that CABC’s participation (a UN-sponsored NGO) was comparable to the MFA’s in such a 
process, is testament to the latter’s marginalisation.  
                                                 
243
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009.  
244
 China Exim Bank website:  http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/yewuarticle/yewu/youhuidk/200811/7639_1.html  
[accessed 14 March 2011]  
245
 Interview, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Co-operation,  
CAITEC, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 5 December 2009,  
246
 Interview, World Bank Institute, Beijing, 14 October 2009 
247
 Interview, former official, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 8 December 2009 
248
 Interview,  former official, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 8 December 2009 
249
 Interview, editor,  Xinhua, Beijing, 6 December 2009 
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While MFA may play a consultative role as far as the progress and facilitation of the loan 
agreement goes, MFA has more of a role to play in multilateral fora such as FOCAC. As 
regards the technicalities of bilateral concessional loans, MOFCOM is the most important 
executive Ministry involved. One Asia-based Western researcher declared that ‘MFA is on 
the bottom of the pile in terms of the pecking order’, pointing out once again that the 
Department of Aid resides in MOFCOM, not MFA.250  
 
Figure 3.2: China Exim Bank Loan Cycle251 
 
Source: China Exim Bank website
252
(translated by author) 
 
3.6 Competing Ministry Agendas   
The World Bank has locked horns with China Exim Bank arguing that given the China Exim 
Bank requirement for a guaranteed revenue stream, the loan should be commercial, and not 
require a sovereign guarantee. Such matters came to a head in September 2007 during the 
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 Interview, researcher, Western think tank, Beijing, 2 August 2009 
251
 As pointed out by Hubbard (2007:11-12), the diagram on the English language version of the site is much 
less detailed. The diagram shown here is from the Chinese language version.  
252
 http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/yewuarticle/yewu/youhuidk/200811/7639_1.html  [accessed 19 February 
2011] 
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negotiations over a proposed US$ 9 billion resources-for-infrastructure deal by a consortium 
of Chinese companies led by China Exim Bank in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).253  
IMF and World Bank managed to persuade China Exim Bank to drop the requirement of a 
sovereign guarantee after the terms of the agreement were amended (Reuters, 2009b).  
Brian Atwood, the former administrator of USAID sums up the attitude of the BWI: ‘Exim 
Bank and MOFCOM do more commercial loans. There is nothing wrong with that, they can 
contribute to development, but they are not ODA [official development assistance].’254   
 
In the case of the Angola agreement, negotiated five years previously, China Exim Bank had 
not even accepted the Angolan Finance Ministry’s offer of a sovereign guarantee. The Bank 
had initially demanded an additional 1 percent interest rate on top of the loan’s agreed 
interest rate payments as ‘insurance’, illustrating intentions of a far more commercially-
oriented structure than many assume. It was only allegedly when the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs intervened to persuade Exim Bank to waive this ‘insurance payment’ that the 
loan structure could be agreed upon.255  
 
‘An MFA official confided: ‘MFA is not allowed to interfere in economic affairs, so when Exim 
Bank asked for MFA’s help, they asked MOFCOM to intervene. It was brought to the State 
Council who co-ordinated the decisions… Exim Bank will first go to MOFCOM if it is in 
difficulties, and then to MFA. MFA are not so pro-active in this regard. The ambassadors 
generally do not like Exim Bank. There is a lot of miscommunication… My experience of the 
Exim Bank staff is that they are not good at banking. They used to be a department of in the 
Ministry of Finance. Although the staff is educated they lack experience.’256 
 
                                                 
253
 The deal is widely believed to have been modelled on the co-operation agreement signed with Angola. The 
IMF eventually succeeded in persuading China Exim Bank to retract its requirement of a sovereign guarantee, 
but the deal was reduced to US$ 6 billion for rehabilitating the mining industry and the plans for US$ 3 billion 
in ‘social infrastructure projects’ were scrapped.   
254
 Presentation at the Foreign Correspondents Club of China, Beijing, 26 October 2009 
255
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009 
256
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Beijing, 29 October 2009 
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Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore appears to agree with the World Bank, as 
regards China Exim Bank’s mandate and consequently the appropriate structure for the 
loans. MFA, when it still had the power to do so, used pressure to steer China Exim Bank 
back to a policy-oriented mandate rather than more commercially oriented financing. This is 
evident not only through the outcome of the negotiations surrounding the Angolan interest 
rate, but also due to the perspective of the Ministry that the Exim Bank, as a policy bank, 
should pursue foreign policy objectives, and not make a profit. It was even commented that 
the bank should commercialise in order to remove the question mark from its agenda, 
illustrating support for the reform proposal with this intention endorsed by the State 
Council.257  
 
This points to a growing rift between MFA on the one hand and MOFCOM and Exim Bank on 
the other as regards the ‘correct’ role for China Exim Bank to play in terms of African foreign 
policy.  Of course, this is illustrative of the different government bodies’ competing agendas. 
The commercial focus of MOFCOM and increasingly China Exim Bank’s mandates have been 
leaving political issues in their wake that are left for MFA to resolve. As a former Chinese 
Ambassador to an African country said: 'It is only when problems occur that the Chinese 
companies contact me, otherwise, they do not see me at all.’  
 
For the time being, Exim Bank does follow a political agenda albeit under duress. 
Nevertheless, this is a very dynamic situation. The Bank seems to prefer to structure more 
commercially- oriented deals and is increasingly doing so.  China Exim Bank President Li 
Ruogu has been vocal in advocating for the Bank to pursue alternative revenue streams. This 
would render the bank less dependent on government injections of funds and consequently 
under less pressure to bend to political whims regarding lending decisions, as these are 
often loss-making. As early as January 2007 China Exim Bank President Li Ruogu stated that 
China Exim Bank would seek to rely less on government subsidies and more on commercial 
lending (Yan,2007). In March 2010, during the National People’s Congress, Li announced that 
China Exim Bank would be transformed into a commercial lender from a government-
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 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009 
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sponsored policy bank (Cao, 2010). Interestingly, it had been reported a few days day earlier 
by China Daily that the bank would remain a state policy lender (Wang & Hu, 2010). Li has 
also defended China’s economic relations with Africa by saying that resource co-operation is 
‘fair play’ when guided by market rules [emphasis added] and that China is ‘committed to 
help Africa improve its capacity for self-development – resources can be translated into 
development.’ He maintains that resource co-operation is effective: ‘Take DRC, 
unfortunately it is the only way to get development – use resources for development capital. 
China is dedicated to help African countries. The process is with the Chinese government - 
MFA, MOFCOM, have to decide to take action. When we try to exercise the right of 
independence we are stopped.’258  
 
Such vacillation between commercial enterprise and state support reveals the ambiguity 
that China Exim Bank navigates with regards to its role. Prior to a large planned capital 
injection to both China Exim Bank and Sinosure by Central Huijin (the Chinese sovereign 
wealth fund) in early 2010 the Central Bank, Ministry of Finance, and China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) drafted an original reform proposal for the institutions that 
was approved by the State Council. However, this was reportedly delayed by the financial 
crisis and the debate by policy-makers as to whether China Exim Bank followed a commercial 
or a policy mandate. Faced with much tougher cost controls should the bank be 
commercialised, Li Ruogu again began emphasising China Exim Bank’s deeply policy-oriented 
role (Zhang, 2010).   
 
Thus for the moment political winds are not in favour of China Exim Bank’s 
commercialisation, indicating the importance of the state-owned bank for foreign policy 
purposes. At the FOCAC meeting held in Egypt in 2009, Premier Wen announced that a 
further US$ 10 billion in preferential loans would be extended to African countries through 
China Exim Bank (State Council Information Office, 2010). The implications that 
commercialisation, if it materialises, will have for the Chinese government’s concessional 
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 Li Ruogu, Chairman and President of China Exim Bank, Presentation at the Tsinghua University School of 
Public Policy and Management Lecture Series, 11 January 2010 
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lending remain to be seen. Until China Exim Bank makes good its commercialisation, it will 
follow a political agenda. Nevertheless, the Bank treads a fine line between structuring more 
commercially- oriented deals and retaining the privileges contingent on remaining a policy 
bank.  
 
3.7 Separating Politics from Economics  
The tussle emerging between MOFCOM and MFA as regards the role of China Exim Bank is 
indicative of the somewhat artificial separation of the spheres of economics and politics 
when considering either China or Africa.  China has been castigated for continuing relations 
with countries whose governments have been ostracized both politically and economically 
by the rest of the international community. Although Chinese diplomats have long insisted 
that commercial enterprise is considered quite separate from political affairs259 (Large, 2006) 
in Africa, it has become increasingly apparent that such a distinction is not always possible.  
 
In the case of Angola, Messiant’s work (2007) pointedly uses a political economy perspective 
in recognition of the overlap of these two spheres. Similarly, Shaxson (2007:215) contends 
that “In Africa’s oil zones, economics is politics”, succinctly referring to the fact that whereas 
political power is derived by control of the oil revenue, the reverse is also true.  
Supplementing such assertions, as regards China, Yeung & Liu (2008:58) have developed the 
concept of economic diplomacy as regards China’s foreign policy manifestations, defined as: 
‘…interstate economic relations transpiring in the form of firm-specific activities.  
Although such economic activities are conducted through national firms, they also 
have distinctive political and diplomatic overtones and thus cannot be viewed as 
pure market-based transactions of the kind often described in prevailing economic 
theories of FDI and transnationals … Instead, they should be viewed as institutionally 
mediated interactions between different nation-states that extend beyond the profit 
motive and economic efficiency.’ 
                                                 
259
 Minister Counsellor Zhou Yuxiao reportedly said: ‘Non-intervention is our brand like intervention is the 
Americans’ brand’ (Large, 2006).  
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This lends credence to the idea not only that it is problematic separating politics and 
economics, it is as difficult to separate diplomatic agendas and profit motives. Bayne and 
Woolcock (2007a:7) argue that the three tensions inherent in economic diplomacy 
(international versus domestic, politics versus economics and state versus non-state actors) 
often prevent Foreign Ministries from ‘getting a word in’. Furthermore, it is recognised that 
despite the imperative to secure oil and raw materials from Africa, China’s relations with the 
African continent are not purely economic, as relations with African countries have strategic 
value for China (Xu, 2008). Yeung & Liu (2008:72) identify this as China developing an 
‘external wing’; much like Japan did with its ‘flying geese model’.  Conceptually this suggests 
that China’s political objectives are overtly bound up with the increasing flows of Chinese 
capital entering countries like Angola.  
 
An initial refusal to concede to the problematic nature of separating business from politics 
caused China’s relations with regimes shunned by the rest of the international community, 
to come under severe criticism. The Chinese government’s attempts to assuage the fears of 
both the African governments in question and the Western regimes opposed to China’s 
policies have led to a certain amount of diplomatic schizophrenia.260  
 
                                                 
260
 This is evident in China’s approach towards relations with so-called ‘rogue regimes’ such as Sudan and 
Zimbabwe. Spurned by the international community in response to the consequences of domestic political 
governance, these regimes have developed strong relations with the Chinese government, whose interest in 
such diplomatic ties stems from access to the countries’ natural resources of oil and platinum respectively. 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe went as far  as to launch his ‘Look East’ policy, intimating that he had 
no further need for relations with the West, given the strength of his relations with Asian countries, among 
them China (Financial Gazette, 2007). China has, together with Russia, repeatedly used its veto right to halt the 
imposition of sanctions on Mugabe and others in his regime (Navarro, 2008). However, Beijing has been 
increasingly cautious in its dealings with Harare in a bid to temper criticism of such relations. Negotiations 
begun in December 2006 for a US$ 2 billion loan from China came to nothing, and President Hu Jintao did not 
stop in Harare on his seven-nation African tour in February 2007. The perceived need to balance the 
diplomatic requirements of both Zimbabwe and the international community has however led to conflicting 
policy impulses. Curiously, When in August 2007, a British diplomat reported hearing from China’s Special 
Envoy to Africa, Liu Guijin, that aid to Harare would be scaled down to only humanitarian assistance, this was 
strongly denied by China’s Embassy in Beijing (Spencer, 2007; Zvomoya, 2007). Indeed, in February 2011, the 
possibility of China Development Bank providing funding of up to US$ 10 billion loan was announced (Smith, 
2011).  
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Acceptance that politics and economics cannot be separated is growing steadily. One former 
MOFCOM official commented that one categorically cannot separate economics from 
politics: ‘A political relationship without economics is empty, and an economic relationship 
without political relations is untenable.  Marx only taught us politics, but we need to look at 
economics as well. The two are linked.’261  
 
3.8 Conclusions 
China’s mechanisms for developing foreign policy towards Africa consist of a complex matrix 
of government bodies, increasingly influenced by external pressures ranging from Chinese 
commercial actors to foreign political tensions. Particularly given the rising importance of 
commercial relations, aid, and concessional loans, MOFCOM is eclipsing MFA’s role in policy-
making. Africa’s political importance remains; as both a large voting bloc in international 
fora such as the UN and as proponents of the ‘One China’ policy.  However, the continent’s 
economic potential as a source of raw materials and increasingly as a market is on the up. 
Consequently this has given rise to the emergence of a multiplicity of new actors vying 
strongly to influence foreign policy. This has served to lessen the grip MFA may have had on 
this process (Jakobsen & Knox, 2010: 49)  
 
However, both the difference between de facto and de jure power structures, and the 
dynamic nature of China-Africa relations render Beijing’s policy-making mechanisms more 
fluid than might otherwise be the case. China does indeed seem to ‘cross the river by feeling 
the stones’262 in terms of its foreign policy outlook to Africa. Its rapid rise to prominence in 
Africa through a very successful foreign policy has not been without its learning curves.  
Gillespie (2001:19-21) suggests that such foreign policy failures were precipitated by 
‘ideological overreach’ and a miscalculation of the complexity of the African context. 
Although she refers to earlier diplomatic faux pas 1960’s and 1970’s, such miscalculations 
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 Interview, former official, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 8 December 2009 
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 This saying is attributed to Deng Xiaoping, referring to the cautious nature that China should adopt in 
formulating policies.  
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are still in evidence in contemporary times, reminiscent of the An Yue Jiang263 arms 
shipment among other examples.264 The lack of a coherent diplomatic response to such 
crises in particular, seems to point to a misreading not only of the circumstances of the 
African country in question as identified by Jackson (1995), but also of the lack of coherence 
domestically between government bodies and other stakeholders which have an interest in 
the situation.  
 
China’s pragmatic policy shift to economic concerns has been deeply reflected in the drive 
behind PRC foreign diplomatic relations, particularly with regard to African countries. 
Increased diplomatic activity has thus, by design, paved the way for the entry of Chinese 
commercial interests into Africa’s economies. This is to access the continent’s natural 
resources and untapped markets facilitated in many cases by the use of concessional loans 
tied to Chinese procurement, as will be shown below. Increasingly guided by economic 
imperatives, in a remarkably short space of time Chinese institutions such as China Exim 
Bank and China Development Bank have emerged important financiers of development 
projects (Corkin, 2008c:6).  
 
As China’s engagement with African countries increases and deepens, the fracturing of 
policy-making bodies will only extend further. The need to disaggregate Chinese actors 
operating in Africa is already a necessity (Taylor, 2008:3). This natural fragmentation will 
result in a number of further pressures on Chinese foreign policy in Africa.    
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 In mid-2008 a controversial arms shipment aboard the ship An Yue Jiang bound for Harare caused 
considerable diplomatic embarrassment for Beijing. The shipment, whose arrival would have coincided with 
the Zimbabwean presidential elections, was at first defended by the Chinese Foreign Minister as ‘normal 
military trade’ between Zimbabwe and China (Dugger and Barbosa, 2008). However, the level of public 
criticism it attracted
263
 forced an announcement of the return of the ship with the cargo undelivered. It 
remains unclear as to whether the arms were in fact eventually smuggled through Angola or DRC, although 
this is denied by the Chinese government (AFP, 2008).  
264
 A further example of a Chinese misreading of an African political climate was the commentary published in 
the Peoples’ Daily (see http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91343/6337848.html) response to the 
Kenyan political violence after presidential and parliamentary elections held in December 2007. An attempt to 
show solidarity with Kenyans and point the finger at colonial heritage by declaring that democracy was not 
appropriate for Africa. Instead it was widely interpreted by Africans as racist slander, insinuating the Africans 
were not developed enough for democracy.  
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China is outwardly supportive of international norms and institutions, as the current global 
order has been very conducive to its growth thus far. China actively supports institutions 
that foster the international environment conducive to its continual growth (He, 2007:10). 
However, increasingly these propounded international norms and institutions are placed at 
odds with China’s activities in Africa. Faced with mounting criticism, and the threat that 
Beijing’s international acceptance as a ‘responsible power’, particularly in Africa, will be 
withheld, Chinese policy-makers are being confronted with the need for increased flexibility. 
 
The implicit contradiction arises whereby China must appease the international community 
in its overtures to Africa, while not appearing to acquiesce for the sake of its own 
sovereignty and that of African countries’. As China struggles to reconcile the two foreign 
policy objectives of being seen to maintain the international norms and structures as well as 
strengthening relations with African countries, such efforts will be exacerbated by the 
Western interpretations of its actions on the one hand, and the as yet under-estimated 
agendas of African actors.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Angola’s China Exim Bank Loan Negotiation  
4.1 China Exim Bank’s Entry into Angola 
China Exim Bank’s first engagement with Angola was in 1991 when a loan of RMB 50 
million265 was disbursed for an Angolan government school project. A framework agreement 
for preferential credit was signed by the Chinese and Angolan governments in 1997, 
indicating an intention to expand co-operation (Angolan Embassy in China, 2008:17). 
However, a senior analyst for China Exim Bank commented that when he visited Angola in 
1998, it was not deemed a viable country for engagement. Underlining what many Chinese 
respondents have voiced, he emphasised repeatedly how important a country’s political 
stability was for China Exim Bank to consider engagement.266  
 
China Exim Bank’s current role only took shape following the end of the Cold War and the 
cessations of Angola’s own civil conflict.  After the death of Jonas Savimbi and the collapse 
of UNITA armed resistance in 2002, the MPLA government needed to access financing to 
rebuild the country after the war. The end of the Cold War had lost Angola its earlier geo-
strategic significance resulting in a lack of interest by the parties that had previously been so 
involved in Angola’s political landscape. President dos Santos wrote to the IMF in June 2001 
requesting additional assistance following the conclusion of an IMF economic monitoring 
programme (Afrodad, 2008:10). The IMF, however, while prepared to offer loans, was 
insistent on increased transparency and a macro-economic stabilization policy, aimed at 
reducing inflation by cutting public expenditure and reducing borrowing. Angola refused to 
cut back on expensive oil-backed commercial financing which also prevented Luanda from 
satisfactorily explaining where its oil revenues went267 (Brautigam, 2009:275; Global 
Witness, 2004; 2011). Furthermore, under IMF constraints, any large-scale infrastructure 
reconstruction programme would have to wait until Angola had achieved a healthier fiscal 
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 This loan was the equivalent of US$ 9.4 million in 1991. The accord was initially signed in 1984 and payment 
delayed due to the civil war until 1991, when there was a temporary cease-fire (Angolan Embassy in China, 
2008:17). 
266
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 15 January 2010 
267
 According to Brautigam (2009:274), Angola had by the end of the civil war taken out 48 commercial oil-
backed loans.  
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situation268 (Lee and Shalmon, 2008: 124). Neither condition was acceptable to Angola, so in 
2002 President dos Santos appealed to China.269 After high-level negotiations270 China 
appeared willing to offer only 2.3 million RMB in grant aid (US$ 280, 000 in 2002), according 
to one senior official formally involved in the negotiations.271 This was not sufficient for 
Angola’s needs however, so China Exim Bank was brought in.272 Lending was cautious and 
gradual at first.  In 2002, China Exim Bank, together with China Construction Bank provided 
financing of US$ 145 million for projects undertaken by Chinese companies. The funds were 
disbursed directly to the Chinese companies undertaking the work (Campos and Vines, 
2007:5; ERA, 2009:81). 
 
China Exim Bank’s role in Angola as a financier of large-scale development projects has since 
received considerable media attention. This is due in part to Angola’s increasing prominence 
as an energy partner for China. Although China has only very recently become a significant 
commercial partner in Angola, the Angolan ruling party (MPLA) now has considerable 
relations with Beijing due to China Exim Bank and several other Chinese financial institutions’ 
sizeable loans to the Angolan government.273  Given China’s well-documented support of 
UNITA274, Luanda’s ties with Beijing underline the inherently pragmatic nature of such 
relations. Indeed, as observed by one Chinese researcher, ‘They [the Angolan government] 
do not stay in the past’.275 
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 In fact, according to Brautigam (2009:275), Germany ‘broke ranks’ with the Paris club decision not to lend 
more money to Angola before its overdue loans were settled. Berlin drew up a debt reduction agreement in 
2003 allowing German companies access to Angola’s market and the extension of further German export 
credits. As seen in Figure 4.3 Deutsche Bank entered with more oil-backed financing shortly afterwards.   
269
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 28 October 2009. According to one respondent, 
President Dos Santos had previously studied the rise of China (interview, university professor, Luanda, 18 
August 2010).    
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According to one well-informed respondent, the Angolan government’s representative came to Beijing and 
talked to the three important people; the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister and the President  (Interview, 
administrator, Chinese construction firm, Luanda, 19 August 2010) 
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 Wang Chengan, Deputy Secretary of Forum Macau, presentation at a conference held by Institute for West 
Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) ‘Symposium on Sino-African Relations: Reflections and Prospects, Beijing, 13 
October 2008. Forum Macau is a multilateral grouping of Macau and the community of Portuguese-speaking 
countries (CPLP). 
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 It is interesting that here; the respondent makes a distinction between ‘aid’ and China Exim Bank loans, 
inferring that the latter is not considered part of the former. This will be explored further in later sections.  
273
 For a list of high-level bilateral visits and signed agreements, see Appendix 2 
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 See Campos and Vines (2007) 
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 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009 
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Whereas in the previous chapter I outlined China Exim Bank’s generic loan process within 
the context of China’s foreign policy in general, in this chapter I investigate the China Exim 
Bank loan process as applied to the case of Angola. I also investigate two sets of 
assumptions; those surrounding the so-called ‘Angola Model’ as the mechanism has been 
dubbed and pre-conceived notions of Chinese companies’ behaviour in relation to the credit 
line.  Finally I put to rest the debate as to whether the China Exim Bank loan is aid, trade or 
investment.  
 
4.2 Angola’s China Exim Bank Loan Agreement Mechanism 
China Exim Bank’s standard procedures for disbursing a Chinese government concessional 
loan have already been explained in the previous chapter. In the case of Angola, the 
procedure follows this pattern for the most part, although some important modifications 
occur as shall be explained below.  
Figure 4.1: Government bodies involved in China Exim Bank concessional loans: 
The Case of Angola 
 
Source: author’s own research. 
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4.2.1 Basic Framework  
Figure 4.2 (above) presents in diagram form the standard procedure as described in the 
previous chapter using the case of Angola as a specific example and including all the 
government bodies purported to be involved in the transaction between the two countries, 
China and Angola. On paper therefore, the process occurs as follows: 
1) The Angolan Government signs a framework agreement with the Chinese 
government, represented respectively by the Angolan Ministry of Finance and the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 
2) The Angolan Ministry of Finance signs a loan agreement with the China Exim Bank. 
3) Sonangol sells oil off-take to China at the international spot price on the day of 
shipment. The monies from the sales are deposited in an account in the Angolan 
government’s name with China Exim Bank. 
4) The joint commission (Grupo do Trabalho Conjunto) formed by the Gabinete de 
Apoio Técnico (GAT276) and the China Exim Bank agrees on a set of projects which are 
then put out to tender for a pre-approved list of Chinese companies.   
5) The Chinese companies complete the projects and present invoices for their work to 
the Angolan Ministry of Finance,  
6) These invoices are paid by China Exim Bank directly to the Chinese companies, 
drawn down from the Angolan’s government’s account with China Exim Bank.   
 
In the Angolan case, Negotiations began in 2002, culminating in the signing of a Framework 
agreement on 26 November 2003 between the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and 
Angolan’s Ministry of Finance (ERA, 2009:81)277. Reportedly this agreement detailed that 
loans would extend up to US10 billion (ERA, 2009:82).278 In March 2004, Vice Premier Zeng 
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 Technical Support Office, Angolan Ministry of Finance 
277
 This source actually refers to an agreement between the Angolan Ministry of Finance and China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation (MOFTEC), but MOFTEC was restructured to become the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in March 2003, 8 months previously. 
278
 Interestingly, the US Ambassador to Angola, Dan Mozena, reported on 27 January 2009 in a confidential 
diplomatic cable leaked by Wikileaks that the Chinese Ambassador, Zhang Bolun, confirmed that lending to 
Angola would be capped at US$ 10 billion. (See:  http://angola-luanda-pitigrili.com/archives/8740 [15 January 
2011]. The Chinese Vice President, on his visit to Angola in November 2009 confirmed that Chinese lending to 
Angola had reached US 10 billion (Angop, 2009b).  
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Peiyan made a state visit to Angola279, during which time the first loan agreement 
amounting to US$ 2 billion with China Exim Bank was announced280, came into effect in 
March 2004, with the first tranche released in December 2004 (Campos and Vines, 2007:6). 
This was later extended by US$ 500 million in supplementary funding on 19 July 2007281 
(GAT, 2008b:2).  On 28 September 2007 the loans were further extended by US$ 2 billion 
(GAT, 2008b: 2).282 In July 2010, the Angolan Minister of Finance Carlos Alberto Lopes 
confirmed that negotiations were underway to finalise a third tranche of US$ 6 billion from 
China Exim Bank to assist with Angola’s reconstruction283. However, in December 2011, 
Lopes reported to the Angolan Parliament that the third tranche was only US$ 3 billion 
(Angop, 2011c), indicating a total pledged loan amount of US$7.5 billion.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
279
 During this visit nine other co-operation agreements were also signed, Two co-operation agreements in the 
fields of energy, mineral resources and infrastructure; an economic and technical co-operation agreement; an 
interest-free loan agreement for funding Angolan projects, amounting to approximately US$6.3 million; a co-
operation agreement between the Angolan Ministries of Oil, Geology and Mining and the National Commission 
for China's Development and Reform; a long-term oil supply contract whereby Sonangol would supply China 
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) with 40,000 barrels of oil per day; two memoranda of 
understanding concerning a joint study of oil concession Block 3 to be undertaken by Sonangol and Sinopec; A 
phone networking agreement between Chinese Group ZTE Corporation International and the Angolan Mundo 
Startel, worth US$69 million (Burke and Corkin, 2006:18; Fidalgo,2011).  
280
 Although the agreement was signed on 2 March 2004 (Angolan Ministry of Finance, 2007); it was approved 
post hoc by the Angolan Council of Minister on 26 March 2004, Resolution 4/04 (BNA,2005:251) 
281
 According to the Ministry of Finance (2007) a memorandum of understanding for the second tranche of 
US$ 2 billion had been in place since 20 June 2006.   
282
 This sequence of events was also confirmed by a respondent from GAT, Angolan Ministry of Finance, 
Luanda, 6 July 2010. 
283
 Angolan Minister of Finance, Carlos Alberto Lopes, broadcast on Radio Nacional de Angola, 4pm, 9 July 2010. 
This deal was mentioned as having been signed in November 2009 by a respondent from China Exim Bank 
(Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009).  In fact the signing of the additional US$ 6 billion loan 
was confirmed by an informed source at China Exim Bank 8 months previously (Interview, China Exim Bank, 
Beijing, 9 December 2009.)  
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Figure 4.2: China Exim Bank loan interest rate (2004 – 2011) 
 
Source: Money Café
284
, Reuters
285
, and author’s own calculations 
4.2.2 Loan Terms  
According to the Angolan Minister of Finance, the first loan tranche of US$ 2.5 billion is 
repayable at 3-month Libor286 + 1.5 percent over 15 years, including a grace period of 3-5 
years and the second tranche of US$ 2 billion is  repayable at Libor+1.25 percent over 18 
years. (Angop, 2011c).  In the Angolan case, added to these terms is the management fee of 
0.3 percent of the loan amount, and 0.3 percent ‘commitment fee’ which is not to be used 
by the individual projects (Dubosse, 2010:75).287  The Angolan government must provide a 
down-payment of 10 percent of the project value of each financed project (see Appendix 3). 
Late payments garnered an interest rate of 3-month Libor +3 percent. (Pinto de Andrade, 
2007:59). These terms render a less expensive financing option than the oil-backed loans 
                                                 
284
 http://www.moneycafe.com/library/3monthlibor.htm  [14March 2011]    
285
 source: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/18/china-economy-rates-idUKTOE71H06920110318  [21 
April 2011]; http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/17/china-economy-rrr-idUSL3E7FH06920110417 [21 
April 2011]  
286
 Interest rate is quoted according to the Angolan Ministry of Finance. Libor, according to the British Banker’s 
Association, is the most widely used benchmark or reference rate for short term interest rates. 
287
 Dubosse does not elaborate on what the significance of this is. According to Dubosse (2010:75) an 
‘assembly commission’ of 1 percent applies if the loan is syndicated. In the case of China Exim Bank, this does 
not apply as the loan was not arranged to be syndicated. Dubosse (2010:75) also states that the interest rate is 
3-month Libor+3 percent, although this contradicts all other sources, see Figure 4.3; Vines et al (2009:47); 
Alves (2010a:11); Interview, Angolan Ministry of Finance, Luanda, 6 July 2010.  
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extended to the Angolan Government by previous financiers, but not by as much as is 
ordinarily supposed. Indeed, Alves (2010a:11) contends that ‘Chinese credit lines are not 
regular loans, as the interest rate at around 1.5% is much lower than standard commercial 
loan rates (around 10%)’. However, this does not take into account the fluctuating values of 
Libor, which have actually rendered a floating interest rate that reached highs of over 7 
percent (see Figure 4.2). Indeed, if compared to the conditions of other loans, both bilateral 
(government-to-government) and commercial (from the private) sector, the loan terms are 
not as different as has often been supposed. Despite the considerable hype  surrounding 
China Exim Bank’s loans to Angola since their announcement, little has been done to 
compare them to the various other financing mechanisms Angola is party to (see Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3: China Exim Bank compared to Angola’s other creditors (June 2009) 
DATE LENDER VALUE  PURPOSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
    Interest Rate Commissions and Fees 
 
Guarantee 
Nov 
2003 
Deutsche 
Bank - Spain 
 US$ 500 
million 
Public 
investment 
projects 
Libor+ 1~5%  1% (flat) arrangement fee  
1% (flat) management fee 
Angolan 
Finance 
Ministry 
Mar 
2004 
China Exim 
Bank 
US$ 2 billion 
(1
st
 tranche)  
Public 
investment 
projects 
3-month Libor 
+1.5% 
0.3%  management fee 
1%  arrangement fee 
(N/A)
288
 
0.3%  commitment fee 
Contract of 
Petroleum 
Supply 
Aug 
2004 
India Exim 
Bank 
US$ 40 million 5 contracts for 
the supply of 
equipment for 
Moçamedes 
Railway 
1.75%  Angolan 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Nov 
2004 
Portugal 
Cosec 
EUR 300 
million 
Public 
investment 
projects 
Euribor+ 0.4~0.6%   0.1% management fee Angolan 
Ministry of 
Finance 
2005 China 
International 
Fund 
US$ 9.8 billion Projects 
managed by 
government 
3-month Libor 
+1.5% 
0.3%  management fee 
0.3%  commitment fee 
Contract of 
Petroleum 
Supply 
Mar 
2005 
Santander 
Bank - Spain 
 EUR 100 
million 
Public 
investment 
projects 
6-month Libor 
+1~1.5% 
0.5% (flat) management fee 
0.25% (flat) commitment 
fee 
Variable insurance fee 
Angolan 
Finance 
Ministry 
Sept 
2005 
Fortis Bank -
Spain 
EUR 250 
million 
Public 
investment 
projects 
6-month Libor  
+0.75~1% 
2% (flat) management fee 
0.5% (flat) commitment fee 
Variable insurance fee 
Angolan 
Ministry of 
Finance 
                                                 
288
 This ‘arrangement fee’ is payable only if the loan is syndicated.  
140 
 
 
 
Dec 
2005 
Korea Exim 
Bank 
US$ 31.4 
million 
Rehabilitation 
of cotton 
project in 
Sumbe 
0.6% 0.1% (above each 
disbursement) management 
fee 
Angolan 
Ministry of 
Finance 
2006 Proex
289
 US$ 580 
million 
Public 
investment 
projects 
Libor 0.5 % (flat) management fee 
0.5% (flat) arrangement fee 
Contract of 
Petroleum 
Supply 
2006 Brazilian 
Development 
Bank 
US$ 750 
million 
Public 
investment 
projects 
Libor +1% 1% (flat) management fee 
0.5% (flat) arrangement fee 
Contract of 
Petroleum 
Supply 
Jul 
2006 
India Exim 
Bank 
US$ 10 million Acquisition 
contract of 
599 tractors 
6-month Libor 
+2.5%  
0.5% (per year) 
management commission  
0.5% (flat) arrangement 
commission 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Jul 
2007 
China Exim 
Bank  
US$ 500 
million 
(supplement 
to 1
st
 tranche) 
Public 
investment 
projects 
3-month Libor 
+1.5% 
0.3%  management fee 
1%  arrangement fee (N/A) 
0.3%  commitment fee 
Contract of 
Petroleum 
Supply 
Sep 
2007 
China Exim 
Bank  
US$ 2 billion  
(2
nd
 tranche)  
 
Public 
investment 
projects 
3-month Libor 
+1.5% 
0.3%  management fee 
1%  arrangement fee (N/A) 
0.3%  commitment fee 
Contract of 
Petroleum 
Supply 
Apr 
2008 
Deutsche 
Bank - Spain 
 US$ 225 
million 
Public 
investment 
projects 
Libor+ 1~5%  1% (flat) arrangement fee  
1% (flat) management fee 
Angolan 
Finance 
Ministry 
Source: Economic Research Department, Japanese Embassy in Angola; Croese (2011:28) 
 
Given the volume of financing involved, even incremental differences in the interest rates 
are significant. China Exim Bank loans have better terms than the commercial loans listed 
above; however they are not as concessional as public loans from Korea or India in interest 
terms (see Figure 4.3). Furthermore, according to Brautigam (2011) US Exim Bank provides 
guarantees for private bank loans at Libor plus an interest rate of between 0-4 percent, 
suggesting that in some instances US Exim Bank provides cheaper financing that China Exim 
Bank. 
 
Where China Exim Bank provides advantageous terms for Angola is in the length of the 
repayment term, which is 15 - 18 years compared to European commercial loans which have 
                                                 
289
 Programa de Financiamento às Exportações - This was a program of the Brazilian government designed to 
facilitate Brazilian exports, deemed illegal under WTO statutes. 
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a repayment period of 4-5 years290. The repayment period of the loan is structured 
according to the time-frame of each project that is carried out under the loan financing 
agreement. Therefore, the grace period (during which time the government does not need 
to service any debt) is the length of time taken to complete the project. After 5 years, the 
loan reverts to having its principle and its interest serviced over 12 years.291   
 
4.2.3 Debt Servicing through Oil 
Exim Bank’s lending policy is to structure a loan so that there is a revenue stream that will 
be able to support the debt repayment.292 Through the framework agreement signed with 
China (represented by MOFCOM), the Angolan government, through Sonangol, sells the oil 
extracted from its concessions to China. 293 The agreement is to supply China with a fixed 
amount of oil on a quarterly basis. Angola has committed to supplying adequate petroleum 
for the repayment of the loan (Pinto de Andrade, 2007:59). In the case of Angola, the oil 
shipments are priced according to the international spot price of the day.294 Thus, while the 
oil is not actually sold on the international market to the highest bidder, the price that China 
as the guaranteed buyer must pay is determined by current international market prices. This 
is very different   from some of Angola’s previous oil-backed financing arrangements 
brokered by Western institutions295 (Shaxson, 2007). This arrangement is not favoured by 
the Chinese government, in whose interest a lower, fixed price would be more palatable, in 
the form of a long-term supply contract (Bo, 2010:120). The Chinese government views the 
role that London’s markets have on the international oil prices (for instance the Brent crude 
benchmark) with suspicion – seeing the pricing as ‘controlled by London’, rather than a 
direct sale.296  Reinforcing this, one informed respondent suggested that although this is the 
                                                 
290
 That having been said, the Chinese loans are easily four to five time the size of the European commercial 
loans. 
291
 This is different to the World Bank where the debtor pays interest during the grace period and then pays 
interest and capital after the grace period has expired (economist, multinational financial institution, Luanda, 
23 July 2010. 
292
 Interview, World Bank Institution, Beijing 14 October 2009. 
293
 The respondent suggested that Chinese companies are eager to buy Angolan oil as ‘…the Gulf oil is 
dominated by the US.’ (Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009) 
294
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009 
295
 Often the price of the barrel of oil was fixed, usually at a preferential price for the buyer, in some cases as 
low as US$ 25 per barrel (Shaxson, 2007). 
296
 Interview, Chinese official, Luanda, 14 July 2010. 
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mechanism through which the oil reaches China, the terms of sale were not set up or 
controlled by China.297 The price at which the oil sells was determined in a separate 
agreement. Yet another commented that the Chinese government ‘do not have full control 
of the financial flows.’ 298  This has reference to other actors influencing the price of Angolan 
oil to China and will be referred to in Chapter 6. 
Figure 4.4 Angola’s Oil Exports to China (2006-2009)  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Value of Oil Exports 
(US$) 
9,938,280,959 12,499,105,512 18,609,657,266.42 15,782,193,917.96 
Quantity of Barrels 163,138,002 175,375,550 195,250,193 250,908,766 
Average value per 
barrel  (US$) 
60.92 71.27 95.31 62.90299 
Percentage of Total  
Exports 
32.9% 29 % 28.9% 39 % 
Angolan Ministry of Petroleum (2010:30-31); author’s calculations 
Such observations are pertinent given that at the inception of the China Exim Bank loan 
negotiations, China considered Angola ‘a truly independent provider’300 and thus a 
preferable source of African oil imports (ERA, 2009:37). This was in comparison to Nigeria, 
which, while at the time a larger producer of crude oil, was considered to be dominated by 
Western oil interests, which it was assumed would prejudice Chinese interests. Furthermore, 
Angola was not a member of OPEC at the time of the first loan agreements, a situation the 
Chinese side considered favourable (Hunter Christie et al, 2010:14). This changed on 1 
January 2007 when Angolan became the organisation’s twelfth member.  Furthermore, as 
explained in Chapter 6, the Angolan government seems in much greater control of the oil 
shipments to China than China would like. 
 
The volume of the shipments is set according to a fixed quantity of barrels and not 
according to a fixed value.301 Reports as to specific quantity involved vary; Alves (2010a:12) 
                                                 
297
 Interview, financial institution, Luanda, 23 July 2010.  
298
Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 July 2010 
299
 According to the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum (2010:30), in 2009 China paid more per barrel on average 
than the United States (US$ 57.83) or Europe (US$ 42.83) or Portugal (US$ 58.69).  
300
 In this context, such a phrase is interpreted as meaning ‘free from untoward Western influence’. 
301
 Interview, Angolan Ministry of Finance, Luanda, 6 July 2010. 
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and Dubosse (2010:75) aver that it is 10,000 barrels per day for the first 2 years and 
subsequently 15,000 barrels per day for the balance of the loan period. Fidalgo (2011) 
reports it to be 40,000 barrels per day for the first China Exim Bank loan agreement and 
100,000 barrels per day for the second China Exim Bank loan.302  
 
The funds that the Angolan government acquire through the quarterly sale of oil to China 
are put into an escrow account.  Although a respondent from China Exim Bank said that the 
escrow account, open to international trading, was opened with China Exim Bank303, a 
respondent in Angola suggested that such escrow accounts are usually held in a third-party 
account.304 The escrow account needs to hold enough funds to service the interest and the 
principle for 6 months. Given the volatile price of oil, the amount transferred to the account 
can vary significantly. If the quarterly payments exceed the minimum payment requirement, 
the surplus is transferred to Angola’s Treasury, Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA). If the 
quarterly payment is less than is required, then BNA needs to make a deposit into escrow 
account.  
 
From this process two thing are clear. Firstly, the China Exim Bank’s loan is actually a 
facilitation mechanism for the Angolan government to convert oil revenues directly into 
construction contracts undertaken specifically by Chinese companies.  Furthermore, the 
mechanism whereby the contracted construction companies are paid directly by China Exim 
Bank ensures that China Exim Bank has full control of project repayments, in an attempt to 
mitigate the perceived risk of the loan money entering the Angolan financial system. 
Brautigam (2010a) calls this an ‘agency of restraint’.  
 
                                                 
302
 There is some confusion, however as Fidalgo (2011) appears to consider the US$ 2 billion loan agreement 
signed in March 2004 as the ‘first’ loan, and a US$ 10 billion package of loans from China Exim bank (US$ 6 
billion); China Development Bank (CDB) (US$ 1.5 billion) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
(US$ 2.5 billion) as the ‘second loan’. Fidalgo (2010) reports that for the second loan ICBC required 40,000 
barrels per day, and China Exim Bank required 100,000 barrels per day, but makes no mention of China 
Development Bank’s required oil repayments. Coupled with the long-term supply contract signed between 
Sonangol and Sinopec in 2005, Fidalgo (2011) calculates that China is receiving 220,000 barrels per day from 
Angola.  
303
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009 
304
 interview, financial institution, Luanda, 23 July 2010 
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Secondly, it is difficult to determine the exact quantity of debt the Angolan government has 
with the Chinese government at any particular time as the escrow account is constantly fluid; 
oil revenue deposits increase the funds available and construction projects’ disbursements 
correspondingly decrease the funds. The debt itself varies, as the debt is only created when 
it has been disbursed for a development project. The amount remains fluid as the debt is 
simultaneously created (or drawn down) as projects are disbursed and paid back in oil 
money deposits that are balanced by deposits to BNA. The loan is then, in essence, 
guaranteed by BNA. Thus China Exim bank’s pledged loan total is merely a ceiling on the 
volume of transactions that China Exim Bank and BNA have agreed to facilitate in this way. 
In December 2011, the Finance Minister reported that Angola’s debt to China was US$ 5.6 
billion, but did not elaborate on how this had been calculated (Angop, 2011c).   
 
4.3 Financing infrastructure projects in Angola  
Angola’s construction industry was, until the financial crisis, the economy’s strongest non-oil 
industry, albeit only making up 5.2 percent of GDP in 2008 (African Economic Outlook, 2011). 
It was largely driven by government spending for the Public Investment Programme (PIP), 
facilitated among others by the China Exim Bank credit line. However, as of 2007, the 
industry also attracted 30 percent of inbound non-oil FDI (ANIP, 2007). Public infrastructure 
spending is thus the mainstay of the non-oil economy (BMI: 2009:6).  
 
 This sector was previously been dominated by Portuguese (Soares da Costa, Teixeira Duarte, 
Mota-Engil) and Brazilian contractors (Oderbrecht, Camargo Corrêa), both of whose 
governments have been extending credit lines linked to buying the respective countries’ 
goods and services305 (see Figure 4.5 below). 
 
 
 
                                                 
305
 This contextualises the Chinese credit line, to be discussed in further sections.  
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4.3.1 China Exim Bank-funded infrastructure contracts 
The loans extended by China Exim Bank are targeted specifically towards facilitating public 
investment in Angola and are officially managed by the Angolan Ministry of Finance  (Burke 
et al, 2007; Vines et al, 2009), specifically the department known as GAT306, previously 
under Madalena Ramalho307.   According to the terms of the loan, Chinese companies are 
largely contracted to undertake required projects. Once the projects have been 
satisfactorily completed, the contractors may present their invoices to the Angolan Ministry 
of Finance which then requests China Exim Bank to disburse the funds. 
 
Figure 4.5: Cumulative bilateral credit pledged to Angola (2010), US$ millions  
Creditor Country Loan Value 
China  14,400308 
Brazil 2,300 
Germany 2,200 
Portugal 1,900 
Canada 1,16 
Spain 600 
South Africa 255 
US 120 
UK 70 
India 50 
Compiled from: US State Department - http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2008/100819.htm; media reports 
                                                 
306
 GAT was created in September 2004 by executive decree specifically to manage the Chinese credit lines 
(Angop,2004) 
307
 Madalena Ramalho was, according to a respondent, side-lined from GAT in early 2011 (interview, journalist, 
Luanda, 2 February 2010.  
308
 This includes credit lines from China Exim Bank US$ 7.5 billion, China International Fund Ltd.’s official 
lending figure of  US$ 2.9 billion,  and China Development Bank US$ 1.5 billion and Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China’s pledge of US$ 2.5 billion (See Gazel, 2010; Angolan Ministry of Finance,2007b, see also chapter 
6). 
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Invoices received by the China Exim Bank for projects constructed under the credit line are 
paid with the funds in the Angolan government’s escrow account. Thus, as previously 
explained, the cost of the projects is drawn down against the money in the account as the 
funds are then paid directly by China Exim Bank to the Chinese construction companies, and 
the bank writes down the contract amount against the loan available to the Angolan 
Government. The Angolan Ministry of Finance and BNA also register these disbursements as 
debts (Angolan Ministry of Finance, 2007b).  
 
The projects themselves are those identified as priorities by the respective ministries, which 
are submitted to a joint committee comprising the Angolan Ministry of Finance and 
MOFCOM, Grupo de Trabalho Conjunto (Joint Working Group) (Afrodad, 2008:14).  
According to an Angolan official, as regards Angola’s concessional loan agreement, China 
Exim Bank ‘always accepts’ the Angolan proposals, lending credence to the idea that China 
Exim Bank does not normally have the political power to refuse them.  In the initial stages, 
Exim was reportedly ‘quite nervous’ and questioned the project decisions frequently, 
making several objections, but now they are more ‘open’ , they have realised that 
fundamentally it is a partnership and they are much more ‘flexible’. The respondent quoted 
that ‘97-98 percent’ of the projects are accepted.309 
 
According to the Ministry of Finance, the Chinese companies are selected by the Chinese 
government, and the Angolan government choose the fiscalização310 company.311According 
to a respondent from the China Exim Bank, the Angolan government would select and 
approve a handful of Chinese companies from those permitted by MOFCOM to tender. At 
least three Chinese companies tender for each contract. The names of these companies are 
                                                 
309
 Interview, senior official, Angolan Embassy, Beijing, 28 October 2009 
310
 This is a Portuguese word; the meaning is roughly translated to ‘due diligence, monitoring and regulation’. 
Fiscalização is thus generally undertaken by engineering consultants.  
311
 Interview, university researcher, Luanda, 28 August 2010. 
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then presented to MOFCOM, which will verify their credentials.312 This is done by two 
bodies within MOFCOM313: The China Chamber of Commerce for the Import and Export of 
Machinery and Electronic Products314; and the China International Contractors’ 
Association.315 These organisations would report to MOFCOM’s Department for Foreign 
Economic Co-operation, responsible for regulating Chinese companies overseas (Gill and 
Reilly, 2007:42).  The construction contracts are then undertaken by Chinese construction 
companies on the approval of the Ministry of Finance in Angola.316  
 
While an impressive array of infrastructure has been completed since 2004, the execution of 
these projects has not been without its challenges. The main hurdles are bureaucratic 
capacity, poor understanding of the operating environment on the part of the Chinese 
companies and supply bottlenecks (Corkin, 2008a). This is unlikely to improve in the short-
term, although it is expected that contracted Chinese companies will learn to be less 
ambitious in setting their projected project completion targets. There are also fears that the 
massive infrastructural spending planned by the government will be misdirected if it is not 
complemented by capacity-building and training programmes to improve Angola’s ability to 
absorb investment of such magnitude. The problem is compounded by the fact that due to a 
lack of local capacity and short supply, most construction materials, and often the technical 
expertise, need to be imported (Burke and Corkin, 2006:37). These issues will be expanded 
on in Chapter 5. 
 
According to a respondent from China Exim Bank, phase I started disbursements in 2005 
(US$ 1 billion); phase II started in 2007 (also US$ 1 billion), as has largely been disbursed.317 
As of December 2008, GAT appears to have thus accounted for most of the first loan 
                                                 
312
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009 
313
 The companies undergo an examination every year to inspect their credentials. The former is generally for 
the larger enterprises and the latter for the smaller firms. In Addition, their credentials for each project is 
checked, according to their experience. 
314中国机电产品进出口商会 refer to http://www.cccme.org.cn/cn/index.asp  
315
 中国对外承包工程商会 refer to http://www.chinca.org  
316
 Interviews, former official, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 8 December 2009; Interview, China Exim 
Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2010. 
317
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009 
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package of US$ 2 billion (phase I and II); with plans drawn up for the US$ 500 million loan as 
well as phase III, the first tranche of the US$ 2 billion loan signed in September 2007 (see 
Appendix 3).  According to Fidalgo (2011) as of 2010, 125 projects had been completed by 
Chinese companies.  
 
4.3.2 Local Procurement Component  
Although in principle China Exim Bank loans require that all projects that it finances are 
undertaken by a Chinese company (see chapter 3), in the Angolan case it was negotiated 
that 30 percent of contract value was to be allocated to the Angolan private sector, to 
encourage Angolan participation in the reconstruction process (Corkin,2011a). This was 
reportedly the maximum concession that China Exim Bank would allow.318 Although a 
minority percentage, it is arguably a realistic condition, given the paucity of skilled labour 
and local industries to support the material requirements of projects of this scale. 
Considering that China Exim Bank’s  primary function is to stimulate demand for Chinese 
goods and services, such a concession to Angola, representing a considerable departure 
from the default position on procurement, is an indication of the strength of Angolan 
bargaining. However, this concession may only extend as far as ensuring that 30 percent of 
contracted labour is Angolan.319 According to one Angolan researcher, contractually more 
than 50% of the work force needs to be Angolan, but there are considerable problems in 
implementing this as the capacity to do so does not exist; only the smaller Chinese 
companies can fulfil this local labour quota.320  
 
Up to 60 percent of tenders awarded to Chinese companies may also be subcontracted to 
local partners. Each project must be to the value of at least US$ 10 million (Ferreira, 
                                                 
318
 Interview, Angolan Ministry of Finance, Luanda, 6 July 2010 
319
 Interview, senior official, Angolan Embassy, Beijing, 28 October 2009 
320
 Interview, university researcher, Luanda, 28 August 2010 
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2008:300).  Furthermore, according to the conditions stipulated by China Exim Bank, in 
principle no less than 50 percent of the project procurement will be sourced in China.321 
 
4.4 Discrediting Assumptions surrounding the China Exim Bank Credit Line  
Due largely to its treatment in popular media, several aspects of China Exim Bank’s lending 
to Angola are misunderstood. The first is the notion of the ‘Angola Model’. The second is the 
idea of risk, in relation to Chinese state-owned actors.  
 
4.4.1 The ‘Angola Model’  
Ostensibly so named due to its initial emergence in Angola, the term ‘Angola Model’ (or 
‘Angola Mode’ as it is sometimes referred to) is used glibly to describe the China Exim Bank 
loan arrangement that is viewed as essentially trading construction goods and services for 
natural resources required by China. This is true on a superficial level. The ‘Angola Model’ 
however also assumes that the Chinese government’s heavy involvement in Angola’s 
national reconstruction programme has allowed Beijing to accumulate considerable political 
capital and easy access to oil equity.  
 
Having first appeared briefly in several publications (see Chan, 2008; Chen et al, 2007; Burke 
et al, 2007:56; and Corkin, 2007a, 2007b), the concept received a more in-depth 
investigation from a World Bank report (Foster et al, 2008:43) after which it became 
common currency as a concept, despite a lack of consensus as to a concrete conceptual 
definition, much like the ‘Beijing Consensus’322. It is in this light that the so-called ‘Angola 
Model’ requires further investigation. 
 
                                                 
321
 China Exim Bank website: 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/200905/9398_1.html  [17 February 2009]  
322
 See chapter 2.  
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It became very clear through numerous interviews, that the ‘Angola Model’ was a concept 
used to loosely describe China’s engagement with Angola, but there was no research to 
support the term as uniquely Angolan, or uniquely implemented by China or even 
specifically as a ‘model’ for China’s engagement with other countries. 
 
A Chinese researcher suggested awkwardly that it was hard to make concepts such as the 
‘Angola Model’ thus ‘completely clear’; and was able to offer little in the way of a definition 
further than ‘exchanging infrastructure for resources’: ‘post-conflict Angola had no money 
to pay for the reconstruction, so the model is to pay for the infrastructure not with money, 
but with what they have.’ 323 Indeed, the concept received little attention in Chinese-
language scholarship beyond this basic definition; and apparently materialised only after the 
term had appeared in English texts (Deng, 2007; Wang, 2009).  
 
Taking this as a departure point, Corkin (2008a:182) and Vines et al (2009:47) assert that 
there is little that is particularly unique about the so-called ‘Angola Model’, given that it is 
not the first time that Angola has secured oil-backed financing to support large-scale 
infrastructure projects (see Figure. 4.3) Furthermore, if the vague nature of ‘oil for 
infrastructure’324  is to be used as a definition325, Angola is not the first country in which 
such co-operation occurred with China. Indeed, as pointed out by one senior African 
diplomat 326 China had entered Sudan 10 years prior to such engagement in Angola327, 
essentially also facilitating exactly the same kind of exchange – oil for infrastructure. He 
even suggested that after Chinese investors’ ‘good experience’ in Sudan, the former began 
looking to move into other African countries, of which Angola was the next.328   
 
                                                 
323
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Beijing, 22 December 2009. 
324
‘贷款换石油’. This literally means ‘loan for oil swap’. See Jiang (2009a); 中国企业报 [China Enterprise 
News],2011) 
325
 As suggested by respondent from Chinese research institute, Beijing, 22 December 2009. 
326
 Interview, senior African diplomat, Beijing, 11 September 2009 
327
 See also http://hi.baidu.com/zhaottn/blog/item/a45715f5ff463420bd310958.html  [18 March 2011]  
328
 Interview, senior African diplomat, Beijing, 11 September 2009 
151 
 
 
 
Interestingly, a respondent from the China Exim Bank offered the explanation that the 
phrase ‘Angola Model’329 had been coined by the China Exim Bank itself.330 When the Bank 
first entered Africa, ‘… lots of African countries were interested in this kind of co-operation, 
and so the bank decided to “do what they had done in Angola” in these countries … hence 
the ‘Angola Model’ as that is where it was first enacted’.331 Burke et al (2007:61) describe 
negotiations between China Exim Bank and Ethiopian officials regarding concessional loans: 
 
‘An important aspect of the negotiations, regularly emphasised by the Chinese 
Government, was the so-called “Angolan Model” of Chinese loan structuring. The 
Ethiopian government officials had no idea what the “Angolan Model” entailed. They 
gradually came to understand the way in which the Chinese had structured 
arrangements with the Government of Angola and the use of unexploited natural 
resources as collateral.’ 
 
In fact, the concept of bartering natural resources for large-scale infrastructure projects 
actually comes from China’s own experience with Japan. As Brautigam (2009:47) notes:  
 
By the end of 1978, Chinese officials had signed seventy-four contracts with Japan to finance 
turn-key projects that would form the backbone of China’s modernisation. All would be 
repaid in oil.’  
 
 Consequently, it is evident that this form of co-operation’s origins are nowhere near Angola; 
it is an example of China formulating its engagement from its own experience as a 
developing country, borrowing heavily, as in many other aspects of its foreign policy, from 
Japan (Brautigam, 2009:18).  
 
                                                 
329
 ‘安哥拉模式’ in Mandarin Chinese 
330
 This seems similar to claims regarding the ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’; where it is deemed expedient to lay 
ownership claims to a politically fashionable concept (see chapter 2). 
331
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 15 January 2010 
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That China’s situation has changed somewhat since such deals were struck with its Asian 
neighbour, bodes well for Angola. It shows that the mechanism itself as a means of 
development, is not fundamentally flawed. Rather the key to its success lies in its 
management, from both the financier side (China) and the resource provider side (Angola).  
 
4.4.2 Negotiating Risk 
Risk is a key consideration in international negotiations (Cross, 1991:179), heightened by a 
lack of familiarity between the parties concerned (Duponte, 1991:336). It appears that 
rather than giving rise to a ‘model’ of any sorts, China’s co-operation with Angola is merely 
structured in order to ensure guaranteed returns on what both China Exim Bank and 
Chinese companies consider a risky undertaking.  
 
Despite assertions that Chinese companies and policy–banks have a ‘risk model that is 
different’ (see for example Davies, 2008:151), implying that they are less bound to profit 
than their Western counterparts, China Exim Bank has been exceedingly cautious in its 
dealings with governments such as Angola’s and remains wary of African projects, due to 
the perceived high level of risk involved.332 Consequently, despite being a ‘policy bank’, 
China Exim Bank has structured its loans commercially, precisely to mitigate the risk of 
lending to a country with a profile such as Angola’s.333 
 
Exim Bank’s lending policy is to structure a loan so that there is a revenue stream that will 
be able to support the debt repayment.334 Thus, as pointed out by one Chinese researcher: 
‘…through the oil revenue acting as a guarantee, Exim Bank feels comfortable to offer its 
loans.’335 Furthermore, as noted, the mechanism whereby the contracted construction 
companies are paid directly by China Exim Bank ensures that China Exim has full control of 
                                                 
332
 Personal correspondence, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 27 October 2009  
333
 This will be expanded on in chapter four. 
334
 Interview, World Bank Institute, Beijing 14 October 2009 
335
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Beijing, 22 December 2009 
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project disbursements, in an attempt to mitigate the perceived risk of the loan money 
entering Angola’s financial system. 
 
In addition to this, as discussed in the previous chapter, during the negotiation, China Exim 
Bank initially demanded a 1 percent interest on top of the agreement’s interest rate 
payments as ‘insurance’, rejecting the Angolan Finance Ministry’s offer of a sovereign 
guarantee. It was only after the Chinese MFA, negotiated the removal of this additional 
percentage point, with BNA standing as the guarantor, that the agreement was sealed.336  
According to an Angolan observer, China Exim Bank was also initially very ‘inflexible’ in 
terms of the projects that it agreed to finance.337 Such actions portray China Exim Bank as a 
very wary actor, not at all as the rash state-owned institution so often described.  
 
China Exim Bank itself is not the only Chinese actor with a high risk aversion. According to 
Chen et al (2008:7) Chinese contractors and subcontractors, contrary to popularly held 
belief, are very profit- oriented. Their preferred method of contract tendering is 
international bids (49 percent) although grants, concessional loans projects and other 
mechanisms facilitated by the Chinese government (generally closed bids between Chinese 
companies only) also make up a substantial portion (40 percent). Furthermore, these 
companies dislike bidding for projects financed solely by African governments as often there 
are payment issues. This is particularly relevant in the context of Angola, as following the 
economic crisis of 2008-2009, the government experienced severe cash flow problems due 
to the dramatic drop in the oil price. Construction companies were not paid for months for 
projects already completed, with severe implications, as will be discussed in the following 
chapter.   
 
It is very evident China Exim Bank’s financing has facilitated Chinese construction companies’ 
entry into Angola, given the level of tied procurement. 338 However, despite the large 
                                                 
336
 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009 
337
 Interview, senior official, Angolan Embassy, Beijing, 28 October 2009 
338
 Interview, marketing manager, Chinese private construction firm, Luanda, 2 August 2010.  
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volumes of loan financing via China Exim Bank, and the resulting volume of contracts 
obtained by Chinese contractors in Angola, reported Chinese FDI to Angola ( i.e. those 
volumes external to the credit line) is remarkably low (see Figure 4.6). Although it is highly 
likely that these figures are under-reported, this tends to suggest that Chinese companies 
are as yet unwilling to venture into the Angolan market of their own accord outside of the 
Chinese credit line. As observed by a Chinese government researcher: ‘… unless the Chinese 
government gives them a special offer they will pursue their own goals, the national 
interests are often not profitable and they are not stupid.’339 This holds important 
implications for the Chinese companies’ appetite for risk.340   
 
Figure 4.6: Chinese FDI in Angola, (2003 – 2009), US$ millions  
 
Source: 2009 年度中国对外字节投资统计公报 [2009 Chinese Ministry of Commerce Statistical Bulletin on 
Chinese Outward Investment 2009] 
 
                                                 
339
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Beijing, 4 December 2009 
340
 Furthermore, given the exemptions the credit line holds from normal investment procedures as regards 
local content, this currently limits potential policy impact on encouraging Chinese companies to create local 
employment and local value addition (see chapter 5). 
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Indeed, contrary to the popular perception that Chinese state-owned companies, with their 
deep pockets, disregard risk completely, Zhou (2010) argues that Chinese state companies, 
due to more bureaucratic management are in fact more risk averse than private companies 
and will only move into overseas markets after state incentivization. Generally large state-
owned firms hold an oligarchic position in the domestic Chinese economy. Consequently, 
cut throat domestic competition, one of the principal reasons that private Chinese 
companies move overseas (Gu, 2009:572), does not apply to them. It was only after the 
introduction of the China Exim Bank credit facility that Chinese SOEs began entering the 
Angolan market. This mechanism is deemed to mitigate the risk of an unknown market as 
the bidding occurs in China. China Exim Bank can also arrange for export credit and other 
financing required by the Chinese SOEs at preferential rates. Most importantly, the Chinese 
companies are paid directly by China Exim Bank rather than the Angolan government.341  
 
Thus due to high risk aversion, without the institutional and financing stability provided by 
China Exim Bank, there might have been resistance on the part of the large Chinese 
companies to enter markets such as  Angola .342 
 
Private Chinese companies, however, receive no such direct incentives from the Chinese 
government to expand overseas. The vice president of a private Chinese firm remarked: 
‘The Chinese Embassy does not help at all … so it is a very sensitive issue indeed. We don’t 
think they help us or do enough. ‘They give the SOEs help, but we are not their 
customers’.343  
 
An illustrative example is the fact that despite the widely held belief that Chinese nationals 
get preferential visa treatment, one private Chinese manager reported paying 5,000 RMB 
(US$ 750) 344 for a 30-day ordinary visa, whereas a work visa would cost 15,000 RMB 
(US$ 2,250). Another private Chinese businessman reported paying 8,000 RMB (US$ 1,200) 
                                                 
341
 Although this did not solve payment problems completely in the case of Angola, it still dramatically reduces 
the risk of non-payment.  
342
 Interview, Beijing, 16 October 2009 
343
 Interview, vice president and general manager, private Chinese construction firm, Luanda, 7 July 2010 
344
 Interview, site manager, private Chinese construction company, Luanda, 3 August 2010. This is in 
comparison to an ordinary visa for a South African which would cost US$ 110. 
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for his ordinary visa.345 Regardless of the possibility that these businessmen may have been 
overcharged, it illustrates their perception of a lack of support from the Chinese Embassy.  
 
Private Chinese companies have thus come to Angola devoid of any overt support from their 
government.346 This is done out of a sense of economic survival due to the Chinese over-
subscribed domestic sectors (Gu, 2009:572; Zhou, 2010) Most viewed Angola as a wide-
open market, given the restricted access to market goods and their expense (Huang, 
2002;2003). Indeed, most private Chinese companies appear to have entered the Angolan 
market engaging in import and export, expanding later to other sectors. Consequently, 
despite less ready access to finance and support, private Chinese companies have readily 
entered Angola (among other African countries); as they are forced to demonstrate a 
decidedly higher appetite for risk in order to survive.  
 
Appetite for risk therefore appears to be a key difference between large state-directed 
Chinese companies and the smaller private Chinese entrepreneurs. Whereas the former are 
pushed to enter Angola through special state incentives, the latter are pushed to do so due 
severe domestic market pressure.  
 
The Chinese government is eager to encourage Chinese companies to expand beyond the 
credit line in order for more stable commercial relations to development between the two 
countries.347  This is part of a broader trend of Beijing trying to encourage Chinese investors 
to rely less heavily on subsidised state financing and pursue more commercial lending 
(Hornby, 2009). 
 
4.5 Categorising China Exim Bank Loans to Angola – Aid, Trade or Investment?  
One of the more perplexing methodological questions for Western researchers concerning 
China Exim Bank’s loans in general, and to Angola specifically, is how to categorise them. 
                                                 
345
 Interview, sales manager, Chinese import-export company, Luanda, 23 July 2010 
346
 Raine (2009:195) argues that even though Chinese companies may not answer directly to the Chinese 
government, they may still have entered the market with indirect state support, such as awareness campaigns 
and advertising for African markets. 
347
 Interview, manager, private Chinese importing business, Luanda, 15 July 2010; Interview, Chinese think tank, 
Beijing, 2 December 2009 
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Media reports have variously and misleadingly termed these loans ‘aid’ and ‘investment’ 
without a proper inquiry into the nature of the phenomenon they are describing. Indeed, a 
challenge I encountered in much of the research on China and Chinese capital flows to 
Africa is the difficulty in imposing the traditional categorization of aid, trade and investment 
on these flows. Regardless of the Western-centric origin of this matrix, it has been used in 
the early work of the Asian Drivers programme, which spear-headed much of the research 
in this regard (Kaplinsky348et al, 2007).  
 
Although ostensibly the use of this methodology in analysing and making sense of Chinese 
capital flows to Africa would seem plausible, in reality it has several weaknesses. Firstly, it is 
very difficult to implement in practice. Asche & Schüller (2008:16) note the difficulty in 
distinguishing ‘foreign policy’ from ‘development policy’. This leads to a problem with 
distinguishing aid, trade and investment as separate categories, as often a disbursed 
amount will fulfil several or all of these functions. Secondly, China is not as yet a signatory to 
the Paris Declaration349 in the capacity of donor, rendering unsuitable Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) definitions for aid and investment (Brautigam, 2010a).  As 
China does not belong to the OECD/DAC as a donor country, Beijing is under no 
compunction to re-align its development assistance practices with globally-set norms (Dahle 
Huse and Muyakwa, 2008:13).  
 
In addition, the Chinese system of aid disbursement reportedly has no set protocol for 
defining aid (Davies, 2007: 50). Although Chinese concessional loans are discussed in the 
State Council White Paper on Chinese Foreign Aid (State Council Information Office, 2011); 
projects financed by concessional loans are categorically not counted as aid projects per se. 
                                                 
348
 ‘The Asian Drivers Programme’ is a generic terms used by several institutions to describe projects that 
investigate the impact of China and India on the developing world. Open University and the Institute for 
Development Studies both house such programmes.  
349
 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed on 2 March 2005 was an agreement under which donors 
pledged among other targets, to harmonise their foreign aid in order to avoid duplication, thus implicitly 
agreeing to share information and co-ordinate their strategies and policies.(see 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html [17 March 2011]   
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This suggests that there is also some confusion amongst Chinese policy-makers as to how to 
group them analytically.  
 
Both Western and Chinese academics have indeed begun to question applicability, or even 
the usefulness, of such narrowly defined terms, suggesting that the bundled or packaged 
nature of Chinese engagement with other developing countries defies the use of these 
separate terms (Davies,2007:51; Kaplinsky & Morris,(2009:560). Indeed, given the strategic 
and pragmatic nature of Chinese ‘aid’ flows, it is questionable as to whether a separation of 
aid and investment in the traditional sense is relevant at all. Such challenges point once 
again to the need to re-evaluate the epistemological points of departure in analysing China’s 
relations with Africa. As identified by Halpern (2006: 58) this is a case of an analysis of the 
interaction of two non-Western political entities using Western methodologies.  
As one Chinese academic underlines this point: 
‘The West has set some standards for certain aid, but I would say there are various 
kinds of aid. I am not an economist, yet personally I don't see any problem for aid to 
be linked with investment. Do you know the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's famous 
saying? "No matter a white cat or black cat, to be able to catch a mouse is a good 
cat". In the field of development, it seems to me that the West controls the 
discourse, they can define everything, modernization, standard of development, real 
or quasi democracy, aid, structural adjustment, even currency’350. 
 
In later work, Kaplinsky and Morris (2009) recognise that Chinese aid and investment are 
bundled together. Indeed, confirming this observation, several Chinese respondents351 refer 
to ‘package’352 deals, inferring that the Chinese state’s engagement with Angola did indeed 
bundle several forms of co-operation. 
 
                                                 
350
 Personal correspondence, university professor, Beijing, 11 June 2009 
351
 Interviews: former official, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Beijing, 8 December 2009, 13 January 2010; 
Interview, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Co-operation, CAITEC, Beijing, 5 December 
2009; Chinese official, Luanda, 10 May 2010 amongst many others.  
352
 Translated from the Chinese ‘一揽子’ 
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A respondent from China Exim Bank also pointed out that ‘package co-operation’353 took an 
integrated approach, taking into consideration that Angolan needed to reconstruct all 
aspects of their economy following the end of the civil war. He contrasted this with the 
World Bank’s methods, which he saw as giving a loan for a singular specific project, defined 
by the creditor rather than the recipient country, and thus lacking the all- encompassing 
nature of China Exim Bank’s engagements.354 While China Exim Bank’s credit lines do not fall 
neatly into the categories of either trade, aid or investment, they do on the other hand 
display characteristics of all three. I discuss this below.   
 
4.5.1 The Case for China Exim Bank loans as ‘Aid’ 
Several reports on China Exim Bank’s loans to Angola have remarked on the ‘deeply 
concessional’ (Vines et al, 2009:47) rates at which the former has provided credit lines to 
the latter. According to a recent report by the World Bank, Chinese Exim Bank loans are 
‘marginally concessional, although significantly less so than those associated with ODA’ 
(Foster et al, 2008a: vi). However, the same report attributes a 50.3 percent grant element 
to at least the first U$ 2 billion tranche of China Exim Bank financing (Foster et al, 2008a:46), 
whereas to qualify for ODA under DAC definitions, it need only be 25 percent355 (Brautigam, 
2010b:10). In fact, in order to determine the percentage of the loan considered by China to 
be aid, we need only note the comparison between the China Central Bank lending rate and 
China Exim Bank’s lending rate to Angola (see figure 4.2). As discussed in chapter 3, the 
Foreign Aid Department located within MOFCOM is required to subsidise the difference 
between these two lending rates. As can be observed, although for a brief period between 
2005 and 2007 the China Exim Bank lending rate was actually higher than that of China’s 
Central Bank, since 2008 and particularly since the beginning of 2009, the subsidy on China 
Exim Bank’s interest rate has increased. However, even its highest rate (since mid-2010) is 
                                                 
353
 ‘一揽子合作’ [author’s own English translation of this term], China Exim Bank, Beijing 15 January 2010 
354
 Interview, China Exim Bank, 15 January 2010 
355
 See definition of ‘official development assistance: 
http://www.oecd.org/glossary/0,2586,en_2649_33721_1965693_1_1_1_1,00.html#1965586  [17 March 2011]  
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4.45 percent. This is effectively the portion of the China Exim Bank loan considered to be 
‘aid’, and would not under DAC definition constitute aid.356   
 
Kragelund (2008:279) notes: ‘… many non-DAC donors do not provide aid in order to 
facilitate economic and social development; rather, they give aid to catalyse trade, make 
use of their own resources, and gain political influence.’ This assumes of course, firstly that 
DAC donors give aid for completely altruistic reasons, and secondly that non-DAC donors 
consider such mechanisms ‘aid’ at all. China only considers that part of the interest rate on 
the loan subsidised by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s Foreign Aid budget as aid, not 
the loan amount in its entirety.357 Moreover, if one compares the interest rate of the China 
Exim Bank loan with other commercially structured deals (see Figure 4.3); the interest rate 
subsidy is much less than widely assumed.358  
 
As a result, while the China Exim Bank does contain a portion of aid, it cannot be considered 
aid outright. As pointed out by one researcher: ‘The “Angola Model” is effectively 
commercial.’359 Significantly, a senior Chinese diplomat told Brautigam, ‘This is not foreign 
aid, but it is a good rate’ (Brautigam, 2009:275). Of note is the fact that that IMF specifically 
excludes lending by export credit agencies (of which China Exim Bank is one) ‘with the pure 
purpose of export promotion’ in its definition of ODA (IMF, 2003). Even in the case of 
development financing, the grant elements of loans and export credits need to be 35 
percent or more to be considered concessional financing (IMF, 2009:17; Foster et al, 
2008b:2). That China Exim Bank loans would not thus be considered concessional under IMF 
conditions, is significant in Angola’s case. On 3 November 2009, The IMF entered into a 
stand-by agreement (SBA) to lend the Angolan Government SDR 858.9 million360, equivalent 
                                                 
356
 Interestingly, were China Exim Bank loans considered ‘aid’ due to their grant element (currently disputed), 
according to OECD definitions, the entire face value of the loan would be considered as aid, rather than just 
the subsidised portion, as China calculates it (Brautigam, 2010a). This may be a reason for the differing 
estimates of Chinese aid to Africa.  
357
 See chapter 3 
358
 This is also pointed out in Brautigam (2009) 
359
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009. 
360
 SDR are ‘special drawing rights’ a unit of international reserve assets defined and maintained by the IMF. It 
is weighted against four currencies: the US dollar, the Japanese yen the British pound and the Euro.  
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at the time of the agreement to US$ 1.4 billion, over 27 months, 300 percent of Angola’s 
allocated borrowing quota. One of the performance criteria of the loan, according to article 
12 of the technical memorandum of understanding (IMF, 2009:17) is that a ceiling would be 
placed on the Angolan government’s non-concessional borrowing. The ceiling, stipulated in 
the memorandum of economic and financial policies submitted with a letter of intent by the 
Angolan government, is US$ 2 billion. Consequently, increased borrowing from China Exim 
Bank is in clear violation of the spirit of this agreement, Indeed, the Angolan government 
signed an additional loan facility with China Exim Bank for several billion dollars the very 
month that the Letter of Intent was sent to the IMF (November 2009).  On closer 
examination however, contained in the memorandum of economic and financial policies, 
article 10, is the following: 
‘However, we are of the view that this borrowing ceiling could be reviewed in the 
context of SBA program reviews in the event that concessional loans to Angola fall 
short of our expectations to avoid jeopardizing our vital infrastructure reconstruction 
process. As concessional resources increase, the level of non-concessional borrowing 
decreases in the same amount. The government is also working with the World Bank 
and the Africa Development Bank to reduce implementation costs of infrastructure 
projects by strengthening the project appraisal framework and improving the 
procurement system.’ (IMF, 2009:4) 
 
Thus exception has been made for Angola as this clause allows the Angolan government to 
override the non-concessional borrowing ceiling. It is unlikely that the Angolan government 
would have entered into the agreement in good faith without the inclusion of a clause such 
as this, and is a clear manifestation of the government’s agency and ability to steer the 
agreement to its own benefit. It is probable that the IMF conceded to such wording in order 
to maintain dialogue and engagement with the Angolan government, from which it had 
become increasingly estranged since 2002 following the collapse of negotiations and the 
entrance of new lenders such as China. Angola for its part has introduced the IMF as a 
counter-measure against the influence of actors such as China on its economic sovereignty.  
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4.5.2 The Case for China Exim Bank loans as ‘Investment’ 
Given the commercial nature of China Exim Bank’s structures, it could be viewed as a kind of 
state-led investment. However, in the case of Angola, the China Exim Bank credit line, a 
bilateral government agreement, is outside of the jurisdiction of the Agência Nacional para 
o Investimento Privado (ANIP). As the agreement takes the form of an oil-backed loan, 
China’s involvement in the Angolan economy does not constitute direct investment361 
(Burke and Corkin, 2006:22).    
 
There is an argument for China Exim Bank’s credit lines having initially assisted in facilitating 
Chinese companies’ investment in Angola in the construction sector and the oil industry. A 
representative from China Exim Bank confirmed that China Road and Bridge Corporation 
(CRBC) , a large SOE, has undertaken US$ 600 million of Exim Bank financed contracts in 
Angola, but ‘…the Angolan government trusted them so much, they have contracted them 
independently to undertake US$ 700 million of additional projects.’362 The Chinese 
Ambassador to Luanda furthermore confirmed that although many Chinese companies 
entered the market through the government financing facility, they are now pursuing 
contracts independently of the state credit line.363  However, even contracts separate from 
the credit line do not necessarily entail direct investment and actual recorded Chinese FDI is 
much smaller (see figure 4.6). Indeed, between 1 September 2004 and 30 September 2006, 
just over 20 private Chinese investment requests totalling a mere US$ 30.5 million were 
approved (Afrodad, 2008:16).  
 
Pursuing another line of argument, Chinese oil company Sinopec’s initial oil equity 
purchases were believed to have been facilitated by China Exim Banks’s first loan agreement 
(Downs, 2007:53; Lee and Shalmon, 2008:120).  However, the loans themselves are not 
Chinese investment as they are structured to be fully repaid by the Angolan government. 
                                                 
361
 A respondent from the Angolan Chamber of Commerce and Industry interviewed by Burke and Corkin 
(2006:22) suggested that the oil-backed loan still involves capital risk through the potential for loan defaulting 
since it is a sizeable sum for a developing African country. However, as explained previously, China Exim Bank 
has structured the loan to mitigate such risks as much as possible.  
362
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009. 
363
 Interview, Chinese official, Luanda, 10 May 2010 
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Indeed, the nature of the loan mechanism (on paper at least) serves to convert Angola’s oil 
revenues directly into public infrastructure construction contracts, undertaken by Chinese 
companies.  If anything, the loans are merely a mechanism to facilitate the Angolan 
government’s own public investment programme, thus expediting the Angolan 
government’s investment in its own economy.  This was implicitly recognised by other 
respondents as well. As noted by one senior Western diplomat : ‘It is Angolan money, not 
Chinese money – as these are loans, not grants, backed by Angolan oil and sanctioned by 
the Angolan government.’364 As commented by one Chinese researcher: ‘Angola however 
has developed their proposals and used China as a channel, so what they have done is 
exceptional. They have used China as their national strategy to launch a take-off.’365 Both 
respondents’ comments strengthen the argument that this mechanism is Angolan, not 
Chinese investment facilitation. 
 
4.5.3 The Case for China Exim Bank loans as trade facilitation  
Most analyses assume that a deepening of engagement with Angola is a direct result of 
China’s need to secure oil resources, preferably at source (Alves, 2010a; Vines et al, 2009; 
Chen et al, 2008). Indeed, Angola is currently China’s largest African trading partner, 
primarily due to China’s hunger for crude oil. According to the Angolan Ministry of 
Petroleum’s (2010:29) latest available statistics, 39 percent of Angola’s crude exports went 
to China, accounting for 15.7 percent of China’s total oil imports (EIA,2010). Angola is 
reportedly the fifth largest African market for Chinese exports (CAITEC, 2010: 10), but these 
are dwarfed by Chinese imports of crude oil (see Figure 4.7), resulting in China running a 
large trade deficit with Angola.   
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 Interview, senior Western diplomat, Luanda, 29 June 2010 
365
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Beijing, 16 October 2009  
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Figure 4.7: Angola-China Trade, (2000 – 2009), US$ millions 
 
Source: UN Comtrade, Chinese Ministry of Commerce  
 
The Chinese Embassy in Angola has made it a priority to increase Chinese exports to Angola 
in order to balance trade figures (Exame Angola, 2010b)366 As a result, the procurement 
policies linked to China Exim Bank’s loans take on a very strategic purpose in that they are a 
concrete measure by which the Chinese government can attempt to reduce the trade deficit 
with Angola. As explained by Wang Chengan, the Deputy Secretary of Forum Macau, the 
deal was structured through China’s export buyer’s credit. Furthermore, because China Exim 
Bank required a sovereign guarantee, oil exports were used to service the loan.  In the case 
of Angola, it happened to be the case that oil was the biggest and most important asset. 
From the Chinese perspective at least, it is apparently a co-incidence that the loan became 
oil-backed and consequently so controversial a deal. Fundamentally, it was devised because 
it was ‘mutually beneficial.367  
 
                                                 
366
 Corroborated by interview, general manager, Chinese import-export company, Luanda, 15 July 2010,  
367
 Presentation by Wang Chengan, Deputy Secretary of the Macau Forum, at conference held by Institute for 
West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) ‘Symposium on Sino-African Relations: Reflections and Prospects’, 
Beijing, 13 October 2009  
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The majority of projects undertaken by Chinese companies in Angola are still funded 
through the China Exim Bank loan.  As discussed in chapter 3, according to the conditions 
stipulated by China Exim Bank, in principle, a Chinese company will undertake the projects 
to be paid for by the concessional loan and in principle no less than 50 percent of the 
project procurement will be sourced in China.368 Although it appears that some policy space 
may exist for African governments to negotiate as regards the terms of the local labour and 
procurement chains for China Exim Bank financed contracts, as in the case of Angola, the 
China Exim Bank lending is still relatively prescriptive, given that the bank’s primary function 
is to stimulate demand for Chinese goods and services. However, China Exim Bank also 
provides financing directly to Chinese construction companies engaging in contracts 
overseas, financed either by the host government, or from development banks such as 
World Bank, African Development Bank etc. Contracts in this case must exceed US$ 1 
million, and the company must be able to afford a down-payment of 15 percent of the 
contract, but the tied procurement requirements to come from China are much lower:  
 
‘The spin-off from exports of Chinese equipment, materials, technology, labor [sic] 
service, and management services that derive from overseas construction contracts 
shall account for no less than 15% of the total contract value of the project’. 369 
 
It would appear that where the Angolan government finances a project directly, rather than 
accessing China Exim Bank financing through the sale of oil, this would achieve greater 
space to allow and encourage the development of local procurement, as in principle, up to 
85 percent of the procurement could be sourced locally, or at least from a country other 
than China.  As discussed above however, due to high risk aversion, there would be 
resistance on the part of the large Chinese companies to enter into such contracts, without 
the mitigating presence of China Exim Bank, 370 particularly given the Angolan government’s 
difficulties with payment in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008-2009.371  
                                                 
368
 China Exim Bank website: 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/200905/9398_1.html  [17 February 2009]  
369
 China Exim Bank website: 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/export/200905/9395_1.html  (accessed 17 February 
2010) 
370
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Beijing, 16 October 2009. 
371
 See chapter 5. 
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For the Chinese government, balancing the trade deficit with Angola (caused due to rising 
oil imports) is politically important. Consequently, it is evident that the Chinese government 
has developed this financing mechanism to encourage their risk-averse companies to enter 
the Angolan market and stimulate Chinese exports to Angola through procurement of goods 
and services. China Exim bank financing therefore appears to be a type of subsidised trade 
financing. China is not unique in this. One Western diplomat observed that one of his 
embassy’s biggest endeavours in Angola was to promote his country’s exports as: ‘…most of 
what we import from Angola is oil and there is a bit of a trade imbalance. Why should those 
petrodollars go to Brazil or China when [his country’s] construction companies could get 
them?’372 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
From the above discussion, several aspects are made clear. Firstly, the ‘Angola Model’ did 
not originate with Angola; China undertook a similar barter agreement with Sudan more 
than 10 years earlier, and was itself on the receiving end of such a mechanism with Japan 
decades earlier. Rather, it appears more to be a basic mechanism whereby China Exim Bank 
secures guaranteed repayment of its credit lines and market access for Chinese companies 
expanding overseas. This does not have to be through natural resources; in the case of 
Ecuador, the China Exim Bank initially demanded the Central Bank assets at collateral (AFP, 
2009d). However, repayment with natural resources is often the easiest solution. Therefore 
ipso facto most such barter agreements are arranged with resource-rich countries.373 
Another Chinese researcher explains ‘After the civil war in Angola and China’s social market 
economy - the market forces in China are strong. China will not provide loans without any 
guarantees.  Oil was used as collateral, in Angola in 2003 and natural resources in the DRC in 
2007….’374  
 
                                                 
372
 Interview, Western embassy, Luanda, 29 June 2010 
373
 In the case of Ghana, where China Exim Bank is partially financing the Bui Hydro-electric Dam, payment was 
secured through shipments of cocoa (Kokutse,2008) 
374
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2010 
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A Chinese academic confirmed this, explaining that while oil co-operation had been 
dominant for a little while, it was not the key factor. She believed that although with 
Angola-China relations ‘at  a glance’, oil is the major issue, as time goes on, oil co-operation 
will play a leading role in that it will act as a kind of ‘gateway’ leading to other forms of co-
operation, such as construction and the services industry.375  
 
Secondly, China Exim Bank loans do not fit neatly into the conventional Western categories 
of ‘aid’, ‘trade’ or ‘investment’. As Lancaster (2007:2) notes, Chinese aid is part of a larger 
package of investment involving export promotion. This perfectly encapsulates China Exim 
Bank financing. Whereas a portion of the loan is subsidised by MOFCOM’s Department of 
Foreign Aid, this is much less than often believed, as seen when compared to the 
commercial rates at which syndicated oil-backed loans are extended to Angola (see Figure 
4.3). Whereas China Exim Bank facilitates Angola’s own public investment programme, and 
may initially have expedited some Chinese companies’ investments, these loans cannot be 
considered Chinese government investment per se. Rather they are a means with which to 
secure an oil supply and open up markets for Chinese (predominantly state-owned) 
companies’ good and services. As pointed out by Hubbard (2008:227) ‘The economic 
development of a recipient country is a condition of the loans, but not its dominant 
purpose.’ 
 
The question of Angola’s ability to deal with debt has been raised. A Chinese respondent 
commented that he thought that current loans were too much of a burden for the country, 
posing great risks.  He said:  ‘In the next 20 years, African will owe a lot of money to China. 
In 1980’s it was money owed to the West, now 20 years later, it might be money owed to 
Chinese banks. This is a problem.’376  
 
                                                 
375
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Beijing, 22 December 2009 
376
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009 
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As a Chinese researcher pointed out: ‘China needs to be flexible. Despite the fact that we 
claim our assistance has no strings, in fact there are strings! There are resources strings, 
such as the co-operation with Angola. Furthermore, there are not political, but economic 
strings.’377 These ‘economic strings’ are not fiscal requirements in the sense of the ill-fated 
structural adjustment programmes of the 1980’s, but more in terms of requirements 
regarding the structuring of the loan mechanism.  Furthermore, the terms of the agreement 
vary significantly between recipient governments. This is highly dependent on the agency of 
the African negotiator. 
 
There is a growing mutual wariness of the economic relationship that has burgeoned since 
2004. Hearty political posturing indicates that both China and Angola see each other as 
necessary strategic allies for the foreseeable future, but this may mask an uneasy marriage 
of convenience.   The project implementation process has not gone as smoothly to plan as 
expectations of either the Chinese or the Angolan actors. This will be explored in more detail 
in Chapter 5.  
  
                                                 
377
 Jiang Hengkun, Assistant Director, African Studies Institute, Zhejiang Normal University, presentation at 
conference held by Institute for West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS) ‘Symposium on Sino-African Relations: 
Reflections and Prospects’, Beijing, 13 October 2008 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Angola’s National Reconstruction Implementation  
 
Angola’s national infrastructure was devastated during nearly four decades of civil 
conflict.378 As previous chapters have explained, the oil-backed credit lines from China Exim 
Bank, amongst others379 form part of the financing that is facilitating the Angolan 
government’s ambitious national reconstruction programme initiated since peace in 2002. 
While in chapters three and four I dealt with the negotiation mechanisms of the credit line, 
in this chapter I will treat the implementation of the projects financed as a result of the 
credit line, and the interaction of the Chinese construction companies with Angola’s local 
context. It has not been without controversy. Chief among the concerns that have arisen 
amongst Angolan respondents, is the lack of Angolans’ participation in the reconstruction of 
their own country, viewed as an important mechanism for national reconciliation and 
poverty alleviation (Marques de Morais, 2011a:68). It will be shown here, that while there 
are specific aspects of the China Exim Bank credit line that do not encourage local 
participation, the latter is incrementally. However, the Angolan government has not actively 
promoted, and has in fact deliberately weakened, the circumstances under which local 
participation in national reconstruction through the Chinese –financed construction projects 
could occur.  
 
5.1 Angola’s Local Construction Industry and Capacity   
Despite the Angolan construction sector’s market potential, circumstances are challenging. 
The World Bank, in its 2010 Logistics Performance Index ranked Angola as 142nd out of 155 
countries380 (Arvis et al, 2010:x). Customs, Infrastructure and Logistics Quality and 
Competence were the worst three performing indicators. Business Monitor International 
(2009:36) places Angola at the bottom of its ranking of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan African 
countries.  The most important impact of Angola’s lack of infrastructure on the construction 
                                                 
378
 Angola had effectively been at war with itself since early 1961 when resistance to Portuguese rule first 
emerged. According to the African Development Bank, 80 percent of Angola’s transport infrastructure was not 
operational in 2009(BMI: 2009:6). 
379
 The sector has previously been dominated by Portuguese (Soares da Costa, Teixeira Duarte, Mota-Engil) 
and Brazilian contractors (Oderbrecht, Camargo Corrêa), both of whose governments have been extending 
credit lines linked to buying the respective countries’ goods and services as discussed previously (see chapter 4, 
figure 4.4). 
380
 Customs, Infrastructure, International Shipments, Logistics Quality and Competence, Tracking and Tracing 
and Timeliness were ranked as respectively 151, 149, 130, 147, 106, and 121 out of 155.  
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industry is the delay (months at a time) it can cause for project completion due to breaks in 
the supply chain. Materials are very expensive due to the excess demand381 and the need to 
import large volumes through congested ports. Furthermore, companies must often source 
their own water and electricity for large projects as they cannot rely on the national grid for 
constant supply. 
 
An embryonic local construction industry is developing in Angola. A local magazine featured 
the story of a young entrepreneur who had started his own construction company using 
Chinese labourers to maintain competitiveness and relying on the extensive network of 
contacts developed during his three and a half year stay in China (O Pais, 2010). While this is 
an encouraging trend, it is telling that even Angolan firms rely on Chinese inputs in order to 
remain viable.  In the context of Angola, so little is produced in-country that often only 
‘locally procured’ (that is through an Angolan handler), rather than ‘locally produced’ 
materials are available. Materials that are locally manufactured are cheaper than imported 
inputs, but the paucity of supply results in procurement of these requiring political 
connections. Furthermore, excess demand places upward pressure on these goods’ 
pricing.382  
 
Local suppliers, such that exist, do not keep up with demand. Not only Chinese companies, 
but other foreign companies look to China for their procurement shortfall. Cement was the 
most imported product in the second quarter of 2010, with more than 600 thousand tonnes 
coming through Angola’s ports. China was the largest source of this import (Exame Angola, 
2010b; CNC, 2010a). As one respondent commented: ‘The most important considerations 
are delivery time and cost. The only people who can guarantee these things are the Chinese 
companies’.383 
 
                                                 
381
 According to Luis Peixoto, Associação dos Empreiteiros de Construção Civil e Obras Públicas de Angola 
(ECCOP),cement used to cost 750 Kw per 50 kg bag (approximately US$10, but there was a drastic increase in 
price due to supply problems. He expressed the hope that Cimangola (a local cement factory) would alleviate 
this. (presentation: ‘Experiências do dia-a-dia com a China no sector de construção e obras públicas em 
Angola’at ‘Reflexões sobre o impacto socio-económico da presença chinesa em Angola: Pontos de vista e o 
papel da Sociedade Civil’ organised by O Programa de Apoio aos Actores Não Estatais (PAANE), 12 May 2010.]  
382
 Interview, vice president and general manager, private Chinese construction firm, Luanda, 7 July 2010; 
interview, local content manager, Western oil company 12 July 2010 
383
 Interview, director, Macau-based company, Luanda, 6 May 2010 
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Another respondent concurred, saying: ‘The Angolan government cannot delay in its 
“conquest of the country”, and now there is no turning back. It is even not as fast as they 
want it to be, but it is what can and could be done – only China can keep up this pace.’384  
 
5.2 Chinese contractors in Angola 
In an interview in May 2010, the Chinese Ambassador estimated that there were 30-40 
state-owned companies in Angola, with another 60-70 private companies385 rendering 100 
companies in total386. However, 5 months later, he was quoted numbering the SOEs at 
above 50 and the private companies 400 in number (Macauhub, 2010a, Macauhub, 2011a). 
This underlines the lack of clarity as to how many Chinese contractors are currently 
operating in Angola (for a list of known contractors, see Appendix 1). Reportedly 77.3 
percent of Chinese private investment is in the construction sector (Angolahub, 2011). 
Official investment figures from Angola’s National Agency for Private Investment (ANIP), 
however, put the figure much higher – almost 99 percent.387 
 
The Chinese companies, as with elsewhere in Africa, generally engage in EPC (engineering, 
procurement, construction) contracts; thus they are largely known to bring in their own 
equipment, materials and labour (CAITEC,2010:7).388 In general, instances of local 
employment and local value addition in the construction sector in Africa as regards Chinese 
companies are extremely weak. This is consistent with Gu’s (2009:576) findings. The 
European International Contractors Association (EICA) has criticised donors for awarding 
Chinese companies contracts despite questionable local benefit (Sleight, 2008). 
 
                                                 
384
 Interview, Western equipment importer, Luanda, 15 July 2010 
385
 Another Chinese industry specialist estimated that there were ‘officially’ 30-40 Chinese private companies 
in operation (Interview, Chinese private businessman, Luanda, 23 July 2010) 
386
 Interview, Chinese official, Luanda, 10 May 2010 
387
 This is according to the raw data of Chinese non-oil investments in Angola 2005 – 2009; raw data received 
by the author from the ANIP office in Luanda.  
388
 Interview, Planning and Concessions Division, Angolan National Roads Institute (INEA), Luanda, 17 August 
2010. As in other parts of the continent, Chinese construction companies have historically focussed on the 
lower-value, labour intensive part of the construction value chain, lacking the consulting expertise for higher 
value services (Liu & Wu, 2008:24). According to one respondent, there is only currently one Chinese 
construction design firm in Angola and 80 percent of the projects won by Chinese SOEs are sub-contracted to 
this firm for design work. (Interview, Chinese journalist, Beijing, 6 December 2009). 
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Figure 5.1: Chinese companies’ Angolan contracts, (2003 – 2009), US$ millions 
 
Source: 商务部对外投资合作国别指南：安哥拉（2010） 
[MOFCOM Country Guide to Foreign Investment and Co-operation: Angola (2010)] 
 
It is apparent that Chinese companies however retain popularity because of their cheaper 
bids relative to market competitors. According to one respondent, Chinese construction 
companies have brought down the price of the construction in Angola, having ‘broken the 
monopoly of the Portuguese and Brazilian companies. As one respondent put it: ‘… using a 
Chinese company leaves the African country in question with more funds, as the contract 
prices are cheaper.’389 This is not without problems however. There is evidence of buildings 
constructed only a few years ago that are already showing signs of structural damage, such 
as several apartment blocks in the Viana area, just outside of Luanda, and the much-
publicized Luanda General Hospital, which had to be evacuated in July 2010 for fear of 
collapse. This suggests problem in the project implementation process that I will discuss 
below.  
 
 
                                                 
389
 Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 July 2010. 
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5.3 Varied Chinese Actors in Angola   
All projects financed by China Exim Bank are subject to a closed tender offered to at least 
three Chinese companies and supervised by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. As each 
project must be at least US$ 10 million in value (Ferreira, 2008:300), it is generally the larger 
state-owned companies that would have sufficient capacity, technology and management 
to undertake such bids.390 Many within the private sector in China believe China Exim Bank 
lacks transparency and the political will to reach out to private Chinese companies.391 
Consequently the nature of ownership of Chinese company considerably affects their access 
to financing in order to expand to overseas projects.  
 
Companies with access to China Exim Bank’s loans (and tenders for other such Chinese 
government aid projects) use these mechanisms as a foot in the door for market entry, and 
then develop their business from there. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has strongly 
denied that SOE’s received subsidies in their outward expansion. (Xinhua, 2010) but this has 
been equally strongly contested within China (Sheng, 2010).This does not however mean 
that these privileged firms unerringly follow a mandate dictated by Beijing. Gill and Reilly 
(2007) examine in detail what they describe as the ‘principle-agent dilemma’; the 
phenomenon whereby state-owned Chinese companies, despite having gained market entry 
through government support, sometimes, to varying degrees, pursue agendas that create 
tensions with the political objectives of Beijing. This is a result of a gradual decentralisation 
of control over the SOEs, amongst other government bodies, a key reform initiative over the 
past few decades (Lieberthal, 1992:6).  
 
A Chinese diplomat392 described the practices of some Chinese companies, both SOEs and 
private. In an effort to access development aid projects, they attempt to manufacture 
demand for their services. The Chinese company will convince an African government of the 
need to undertake a certain project, produce an in-house feasibility study assuring the 
                                                 
390
 Many state-owned companies were used to implement the Chinese government’s aid projects to African 
countries in the 1960’s and 1970’s, giving them the advantage of experience, as the private sector did not yet 
exist in China.   
391
 Interview, Chinese business consultant, Shanghai, 15 September 2009 
392
 Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009  
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government of the company’s ability to undertake a project, and then persuade the African 
government to negotiate with the Chinese government to access project financing. The 
Chinese company then subcontracts to a third party, abdicating from the responsibility of 
the project.393 This is perhaps one of the reasons that the companies are so interested in 
developing their own local political networks, separate from the Chinese Embassy.  As one 
consultant put it: ‘If you do feasibility studies, you may not necessarily get the project, but if 
you develop relations with the political elites of the government of the country in question, 
you will get the project without needing to do the feasibility studies.’394 He stated that while 
many of the embassies in Africa realise that this is a problem, the message has yet to filter 
up to the central decision-making bodies, or garner sufficient political will to have 
something done about it. This was corroborated by an MFA official and former diplomat. Gill 
and Reilly (2007:42) claim that despite the requirement for Chinese corporations with 
overseas investments greater than $10,000 need to register with MOFCOM before investing 
abroad ‘… repeated reiterations of this policy suggest that adherence is spotty at best.’395  
 
Consequently, a range of actors and their agendas are present in Angola. Prior to conducting 
fieldwork, a matrix was developed in an attempt to distinguish the various different types of 
Chinese actors operating in Africa according to ownership396 (see Figure 5.2) divided 
according to centrally state-owned397, provincial government-owned398 or private399.  
                                                 
393
 This describes very aptly the relationship between key figures in the Angolan elite and a private Chinese 
company known as ‘China International Fund’ (CIF) to be discussed in the chapter 6.  
394
 Interview, Chinese business consultant, Shanghai, 15 September 2009 
395
 This is particularly with regard to the national oil companies, which some policy makers allege have ‘hi-
jacked’ China’s foreign policy, due to their powerful lobbies for State Council support for acquiring overseas 
equity (ICG, 2008:17). Particularly as Beijing’s initial support of such moves by the national oil companies in 
Africa has done little to alleviate China’s oil security issues, voices have grown louder to rein in the Chinese oil 
majors. Given their increased political power, this may be akin to closing the door after the horse has bolted. 
Furthermore, as Tsang suggests (quoted in McGregor, 2008) it is also possible that the oil companies are 
merely being used as a scapegoat so that the State Council can be absolved of responsibility for the results of 
their foreign policy in Africa.  
396
 A former Chinese SOE manager characterised Chinese companies in a very similar way to Figure 5.2. (So, 
2010)  
397
 Two of the more important Chinese policy banks in Africa are China Exim Bank and China Development 
Bank, both wholly owned by the Chinese central government, reporting directly to the State Council.
397
 The 
state shareholder of all centrally state-owned companies is the State Assets Supervisory Commission (SASAC). 
Since its establishment in 2003, SASAC’s companies have been reduced from 196 to 123 through 
consolidations (An,2010) 
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It is nevertheless important to realise that any typology is inherently dynamic and individual 
companies can move fluidly between categorisations. This is particularly because is it not 
possible to categorise companies definitively as ‘private’ and state-owned due to continuing 
domestic restructuring in China (Lin,2009). The key issue is the extent to which each 
category of actor is motivated by strategic or commercial considerations and the degree to 
which they are held to account by public or administrative bodies.400  
 
The hypothesis was that the nature of ownership of the Chinese construction companies 
would influence the nature of its operations in an overseas market such as Angola. This 
relates specifically to their role in state-directed initiatives such as China Exim Bank loans to 
foreign governments. As Bo (2010:19) points out, the larger more strategic SOEs retained 
under central government ownership often experience a kind of ‘revolving door’ from 
government ministries in terms of executive management. This means that top executives in 
larger SOEs have good political connections, and were often the superiors to ministry 
officials, giving them clout in policy decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
398
 Chen and Chuan (2009) argue that Chinese provinces have increased their international profiles, primarily 
through the overseas activities of SOEs whose management was delegated by the Chinese central government 
to provincial-level government. They note a remarkable expansion of these companies’ African profile (Chen 
and Chuan, 2009:10). Although provincial SOEs were previously relied upon to enact national policy, especially 
vis-à-vis aid projects, competing interests have increasingly led to frictions between provincial and state actors. 
This is also noted by Gill and Reilly (2007) in the so-called ‘principle-agent dilemma’.  
399
 See Gu (2009) 
400
 At the same time, situations exist in which China foreign policy has been influenced by major firms. Indeed, 
Bo (2010:2) maintains that in the case of the oil sector, national oil companies are ‘co-governors’ of oil policy. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that the heads of large SOEs often hold the same government rank as the heads 
of their monitory bodies, complicating the chain of command (Pan, 2010) 
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Figure 5.2: Matrix of Chinese Actors in Angola 
 
 
A number of foreign consultants who had worked in Angola with Chinese companies 
remarked that they observed no noticeable difference between state-owned and private 
companies that they had dealt with.401 One respondent stated that he was: 
 
‘…more and more assured, in terms of how they see things, that they are all the 
same; they have the same agenda, somewhere, something is for the benefit of the 
country, return for China. They are nationalistic and proud; they work for China both 
private and public. The private sector still does not operate in a way that the 
government would not permit – the control is ferocious, the penalty is harsh if they 
don’t comply with the general framework.’  
 
In his opinion, ‘The private companies’402 cards are not on the table, but they do the same 
thing [as public companies]. They all benefit and are controlled.’403  
                                                 
401
 Interview [telephonic], foreign construction consultant based in Luanda, 27 September 2010; Interview, 
Western construction equipment importer Luanda, 15 July 2010 
402
 The term ‘private company’ must also be used with some caution here. No respondents clarified what they 
termed as a ‘private company’ and the term often differently viewed in China when compared to Western 
understanding of it (Lin, 2009).  
403
 Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 July 2010 
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Several factors may explain this discrepancy. Firstly, whereas all companies might be 
working ‘for China’, this goal is likely to be interpreted differently by different firms. A 
provincially-owned company encouraged to increase its profit, which would ultimately 
accrue to  the Chinese provincial government that owns it, would in all likelihood view this 
as a patriotic duty regardless of whether such profit accrual appeared to conflict with orders 
from Beijing. In the same manner, the various Chinese ministries have come into conflict 
over differing interpretations of what constitutes the national interest. 
 
Secondly, there is considerable confusion in determining whether a company is state-owned 
or private, as ‘[t]he definition of the private sector in China is far from unified (Lin, 2009). 
Thirdly, as previously discussed, the Chinese companies that gain access to the large-scale 
China Exim Bank contracts in Angola are usually SOEs or ‘national champion’ private 
companies that have the same relationship as SOEs with the government. Jakobsen (2009) 
groups Chinese actors into five slightly different groups to Figure 5.2:  
 
1) Officials that represent the ‘state’, government department and centrally-owned 
institutions such as China Exim Bank; 
2) Large successful enterprises whether SOEs or privately owned; 
3) Small and medium enterprises; 
4) Well-connected ‘middle-men’, particularly those who are instrumental in the arms 
trade, including the so-called ‘bamboo network’ of private businessmen and 
diasporic traders. 
5) Chinese migrant labourers 
 
Of interest is the fact that Jakobsen groups SOEs and larger ‘private’ companies together. 
This is firstly because the SOEs are operating more and more like private companies, but 
also because some of the larger private companies have been recognised as ‘national 
champions’ and are starting to receive the same support from the state as the SOEs – 
international CEOs are allowed to accompany the Premier on state visits. 
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This results in their relying on contracts arranged by the Chinese government through the 
China Exim Bank credit line. Consequently, they attach more importance to their 
government contacts than smaller private firms, as there are clear benefits from doing so. 
As a result, potential differences between SOEs and private companies are not as clearly 
observable by those respondents that have interacted with them. Research on the 
difference between SOE and private companies’ market behaviour in Angola is currently 
inconclusive, but the distinction may prove important for later research (Corkin, 2011b). 
 
5.4 China Exim Bank’s Role as Financier vis-à-vis Local Participation  
Ownership of the funds used to finance Chinese construction projects is of key importance 
in determining the potential level of local employment and material and service 
procurement. ANIP stipulates in Angola’s Basic Private Investment Law, Article 54/1 that 
foreign investment projects registered with the organisation must use 70 percent local 
labour (Tang, 2010a:353). However any projects that are funded by the China Exim Bank 
credit line, a bilateral government agreement, are outside of the jurisdiction of ANIP and 
thus are not required to adhere to these regulations. Although China Exim Bank’s 
framework agreement with the Angolan Ministry of Finance does reportedly include a 
clause regarding 70 percent local employment, this refers only to unskilled labour (Tang, 
2010a: 353).  
 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, according to the conditions stipulated by China Exim 
Bank, no less than 50 percent of the project procurement will be sourced in China and 
Chinese companies will undertake the majority of the projects to be paid for by the 
concessional loan and in principle.404 Many Angolan construction industry professionals thus 
feel that Chinese companies are afforded an unfair advantage due to the policies 
surrounding the credit lines.405 The blame for this is laid squarely at the door of the Angolan 
state. However, there is little evidence to show that local Angolan companies have even 
been able to cope with their reserved quota. An Angolan Ministry of Finance official 
confirmed that the 30 percent quota condition was only upheld if it ‘did not compromise 
                                                 
404
 China Exim Bank website: 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/200905/9398_1.html  [17 February 2009]  
405
 Jose Severino, President, Associação Industrial de Angola (AIA), presentation ‘A presença chinesa e o sector 
privado de Angola’, Luanda, 12 May 2010 
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project deadlines’.406 This suggests that while policy concessions are made, little is done to 
support the nascent industries in practice as they try to fulfil their quota of the contract 
work. One Angolan respondent doubted that the 30 percent local quota had been 
implemented. He pointed out that ‘both sides realised, as did the companies, that firstly, 
there were no [local] companies with the necessary experience and experts, and secondly, 
the Chinese were not prepared to work with other companies.’407  The Chinese ambassador 
to Angola in an interview called the 30 percent quote for Angolan companies ‘unrealistic’ 
(De Comarmond, 2011). 
 
Indeed, where local partners have been engaged,   they have in some cases failed to deliver. 
In one example, an Angolan company was subcontracted to clear and level the building site 
of one of the stadiums to be built for the African Basketball Championships408, but this was 
delayed for so long that the Chinese company eventually had to perform this work 
themselves and build the stadium in a matter of weeks to be ready for the tournament. 409   
 
Politically, the Chinese government has recognized the need to address local content issues 
vis-à-vis their overseas projects in order to counteract the negative image some Chinese 
companies are creating. In 2006, at the opening ceremony of the FOCAC Head of State 
Summit held in Beijing, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced, as part of an eight-point 
plan, that China would provide training for 15,000 African professionals and double the 
number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from 2,000 to 4,000 per 
year over the following three years (Hu,2006:10). By 2009, it was announced that this target 
had been reached. Premier Wen Jiabao, at the FOCAC Summit in November 2009 held in 
Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, announced plans to train 2,000 local agricultural personnel, 3,000 
doctors and nurses and 1,500 school principals and teachers, pledging to train 20,000 
African professionals from various fields in total . An increase in Chinese government 
scholarships for African students to 5,500 per year, in order to assist African capacity 
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development, was also promised.410 Furthermore, while some government provision is 
made for such capacity building, SOEs are encouraged to create capacity building initiatives 
independently of government support.   
 
A Chinese academic conceded that prior to the emphasis placed on it by President Hu Jintao 
Chinese companies were not interested in corporate social responsibility; they did not  
realise it was important and ‘need to have their consciousness raised. They need to realise 
there are many other factors; it is not just the commercial deal, there are aspects like the 
training, the environment and sustainability to consider.’411  
 
Some of the larger construction oriented SOEs, such as CRBC and Sinohydro, have both sent 
groups of Angolan students to China in the past two years. Sinohydro sent up to 70 students 
according to one respondent412, whereas CRBC sent 34 -50 students to Changsha University 
to study bridge-building. 413 The students, according to an official Angolan source, are 
engaged in various studies ranging from engineering and architecture to medicine and 
language. On their return to Angola, they are expected to either work for the SOE that 
sponsored their study or become involved in other infrastructure projects in Angola. What is 
interesting, is that the Angolan source suggested that it was an Angolan initiative, 
maintaining that it was the Angolan Ministry of Public Works that had the ‘brilliant’ idea of 
proposing that the larger Chinese SOEs send Angolans to China for training. 414 Another 
Chinese SOE China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export (CMEC) provides 
training for the Angolan workers they employ. This is especially with regards to training in 
the use of the equipment that the company imports from China. 415 As Chinese contractors 
show a marked preference for Chinese standards and design (Chen, Goldstein and Orr, 
2008: 12), the greatest potential for technology transfer and local linkage development is 
through Angolans being trained in China to become familiar with these processes, then 
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 Wen, Jiabao (2009) Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 2009 FOCAC Summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, 
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gradually taking over the maintenance and supply of parts. CITIC Construction, which 
entered the Angolan market in 2008, reportedly began skills training programmes almost 
immediately. A company representative said that as of mid-2010 the company had sent 
between five and seven training teams (totalling approximately 100 Angolans) for between 
one and three months to China. The workers are integrated into the company operations in 
Angola on their return. 416  
 
The State Assets Supervisory and Administration Commission (SASAC), which reports to the 
Chinese State Council  is the government stake-holder in all centrally-owned SOEs 
(Shankleman,2009:20) and is  responsible for managing and monitoring the companies. It is 
a logical assumption therefore that centrally-owned SOEs would be under more pressure to 
adhere to commitments made by the State Council regarding more politically correct 
corporate behaviour such as ‘localisation policies’ and training.  As Gill and Reilly (2007) 
note however, this is not always the case. Nevertheless, it remains the dominant view of 
most Chinese officials and policy –makers that SOEs are more reliable, and have higher 
quality contractors, possibly because in name at least, the government can exercise more 
control over them and curtail diplomatically damaging corporate behaviour. A Chinese MFA 
official stated that in differentiating between private and SOE companies, private companies 
are ‘only interested in money’, and they are also ‘only using Africa as a springboard to the 
US and other markets’. They are interested in ‘quick money’ and not aspects such as CSR.417 
This was corroborated by an Angolan engineer. 418 However, one Chinese academic 
suggested that private companies ‘do very well as they need to manage themselves better 
[without state support]’.419 This suggests that private companies are more adept at using 
local sourcing if it is economically viable to do so (in Angola, this appears yet to be the case).  
SOEs, by contrast, while less flexible, usually engage in longer-term projects, thus their 
interest in local content development would more likely stem from a need to render their 
projects more sustainable in the medium to long term. 420  Chinese companies, regardless of 
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ownership, as yet seem hesitant to develop local linkages in Angola, as it is viewed as too 
risky.  
 
5.5 Chinese Companies’ Procurement Practices in Angola 
Several large Chinese companies have their Angolan subsidiary devise their procurement 
strategies, although these must be approved by the head offices in China. 421  According to 
one respondent from a state-owned company, some basic inputs such as electricity, 
cement, gravel and charcoal are sourced from Angola, but often lack of supply or quality 
force them to procure from elsewhere. He estimated that less than 5 percent of locally-
sourced materials make up the final spend as they are all very basic, low value products.422   
Hence, local quality is still an issue, with companies preferring to import from South Africa, 
rather than use local materials.423 China remains one of the largest sources of imports.  
 
All the larger contractors, such as CITIC construction, CMEC and China Jiangsu, due to the 
volume of their needs, are forced to bring much of their own materials and workers from 
China.424 CMEC appears to have an agreement with another large contractor, Sinohydro in 
terms of importing equipment. Inquiries as to the percentage of the contract value made-up 
by equipment imports were evaded. 425 
 
Some Chinese companies have begun setting up their own factories to manufacture bricks 
and inputs made from locally available materials such as wooden door frames, windows and 
balustrades. This localised production is a development dating from approximately 2008426 
One industry consultant suggested this might become a trend: ‘What it comes down to is 
that some materials are cheaper to produce if they are heavier – like bricks and cement – so 
the companies might be interested to produce these locally; also construction timber.’ 427 
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According to its website, Chinese construction company Golden Nest International has five 
separate factories fabricating steel, concrete blocks, sand products, paint and alnico.428   
 
Of considerable interest is the 1,500 hectare special economic zone that is being developed 
just outside of Luanda and funded by the Chinese government credit line, the only one of 13 
industrial poles being developed across the country that is being funded through foreign 
financing. Very little information was available on these plans; however it is highly likely this 
development will follow the model of other Chinese-funded industrial parks across Africa.429 
It is therefore feasible that this will become a site for Chinese construction companies to 
further ‘localise’ (at least in the geographic sense) their supply chains. While the relocation 
of various inputs from China to Angola is an encouraging trend, of concern however is the 
fact that those parts of the value chain that have been localised geographically are still 
controlled by the Chinese contractors, with very little local labour input. Unless such 
enterprises incorporate local labour or ownership, these developments may have limited 
impact on stimulating the local economy. The value of the pole to local employment 
generation remains unclear. Angola’s Institute for Industrial Development (IDIA430) estimate 
of 2,000 jobs seems conservative given the planned size of the zone. This may indicate that 
largely Chinese labour will be used in its construction.   
 
5.6 A Chinese supply chain   
Evidence points to Chinese service providers having set up a supply chain directly to China. 
Smaller private Chinese companies began following increasingly rapidly in the wake of the 
larger Chinese firms to provide distribution of Chinese products and services required for 
the construction industry.  
 
Generally less able to take on construction contracts of the magnitude required in Angola’s 
public investment program (especially as main contractors), these companies subcontract 
from the larger companies and also set up the procurement chain in order to provide 
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equipment and materials from China. Several have expanded their businesses to other 
consumables. One of many private Chinese businessmen explained how he entered Angola 
by supplying air-conditioning units to Chinese- constructed buildings and had since 
branched out to white goods and other ‘items of daily use’ which he sold at several outlets 
locally.431  
 
An African private consultant who worked extensively with Chinese private companies 
explained that Chinese private companies worked ‘in parallel’ to Chinese SOE activity, 
providing ‘complementary actions’ to SOE projects. He observed that smaller projects and 
investment from private Chinese companies follows the initial bigger projects financed 
through China Exim Bank.432 Essentially he described a scenario whereby the state financing 
attracts the larger, more politically connected Chinese companies to tender for 
infrastructure contracts. This activity leads the smaller, private Chinese companies and 
entrepreneurs to establish themselves in the market in order to provide the goods and 
services required by the main contractors.433 This ensures that the value chain is quickly 
established, but more (significantly for this research) it is transplanted almost in its entirety 
from China, isolating itself from the risk of the local context, but also limiting local content. 
This is consistent with Horizon Consulting’s (2007:180) findings, which distinguish three 
steps in the progression of the value chain: 
 
1) Exporting Chinese goods and services directly to the host country. 
2) Investing in industrial chains whereby parts are imported from China to be 
assembled in the host country. 
3) Establishment of industrial zone for manufacturing. 
 
It is apparent that while many Chinese companies are still engaged in the first phase, steps 
towards phase two and phase three are underway.  For example, Dongfang Nissan 
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of imports Angola began to require (Interviews, various private Chinese entrepreneurs, Luanda, 23 July 2010, 
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established a car assembly plant in Luanda in the Viana Industrial Zone, mentioned above 
(Brautigam, 2009:209). Other Chinese companies, as discussed, are investing in their own 
factories to assemble or manufacture certain inputs.434  
 
Figure 5.3 Chinese contracting and procurement process in Angola 
 
 
Source: author’s own research 
The Chinese brick-making machinery has reportedly replaced Angolan brick-manufacturers 
in the market.435 As a result, local producers are generally only used in an emergency to 
make up a short-fall, if material quantities were under-estimated.436 This also extends to 
basic consumables such as vegetables. One Chinese company, on its website, proudly 
reports the self-sufficiency of the Chinese workers in growing their own produce. It appears 
that some of these Chinese vegetable gardens actually supply urban households in Luanda, 
actively expanding beyond a purely subsistence basis.437 
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The current lack of Angolan value-add may will in all likelihood change over time. Chinese 
companies with a longer presence in other African markets have shown increasing 
adeptness at developing deeper local linkages. This is consistent with Tang’s (2010a) 
findings. It must be remembered that the earliest projects undertaken by Chinese 
construction companies in Angola were as late as 2002, following the cessation of civil 
conflict. However, for the time being, Chinese contractors, whether SOEs or private, seem 
equally less inclined to increase their local content.  
  
5.7 Local Employment Challenges   
A number of frictions have arisen with regards to Chinese companies and labour relations. 
Chinese companies across Africa have been accused of labour abuse (Bearak, 2010; Song, 
2010).These claims stem from the fact that whereas Chinese labour unions are weak and 
essentially an extension of the government, in African countries they can be very powerful 
political forces. Trade unions, generally very strong in Africa, are considered by Chinese 
companies to be a force that reduces the productive environment.438 This is not dissimilar 
from the sentiments of other employers; the difference is that Chinese companies across 
the board are not accustomed to dealing with them given the weakness of trade unions 
domestically.439 Even in Angola, where labour unions are also weak, the Angolan 
government has imposed rigid labour laws. This demonstrates what many Chinese 
businessmen have observed: whereas government-to-government relations between 
Angola and China are good, this is not the case in day-to-day interaction. Chinese companies, 
regardless of their ownership structure have a reputation for being reluctant to hire local 
labour, preferring to bring labour from China. As a result, there is rising discontent about 
Chinese companies generally, among Angolans, as the former are not seen to create local 
employment. Not only are Angolans resentful as a result, but according to Chinese 
managers, because Angolans are most likely to form an impression of Chinese people from 
                                                                                                                                                        
vegetables (in Chinese and English, but interestingly not in Portuguese – suggesting an expatriate market) with 
contact details for orders and delivery.  
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  Interview, reporter, People’s Daily, Beijing, 3 December 2009 
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 One private Chinese businessman said tellingly: ‘Chinese don’t have workers’ laws or rights. The workers 
can really endure a lot to benefit later and resolve things; - I have seen it with my own eyes’. (Interview,  
Western construction equipment importer Luanda, 15 July 2010)  
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uneducated migrant labour, they have a very unfavourable impression of Chinese people in 
general. This is in stark contrast to the view of an Angolan official who maintained that ‘The 
Chinese people do not pose a social problem in Angola, they do not interact that much with 
the local population.’ Despite some cases of ‘bad humour’ he does not regard the situation 
to be serious. He averred that the Chinese workers do not really ‘form part of the life of the 
locals’.440 This in itself is indicative of the lack of integration between Chinese and Angolan 
workers. 
 
Due to Chinese companies' perception of a lack of suitable local labour, the number of 
Chinese workers in Angola has increased fairly rapidly. According to an Angolan engineer,   
the ‘official’ number of Chinese in 2006 was only 4,000 after the first financing tranche by 
China Exim Bank. 441 This number has increased substantially. There are no reliable figures 
for the number of Chinese nationals present in Angola, still less for the number involved in 
construction. However, most respondents put the official (read legal) number between 
40,000 and 60,000442 Chinese nationals in Angola. According to Chinese Ambassador to 
Angola Zhang Bolun, quoted in March 2009, 50,000 Chinese nationals were active in Angola 
(Angop, 2009b). This figure is however very likely an underestimation, as reportedly more 
than 40,000 working visas were issued to Chinese nationals in 2008 alone (Alves, 2010a:7). 
The Angolan government has reportedly said that there are 70,000 Chinese nationals 
working in Angola (Faucon & Su, 2010). The highest estimate encountered was 400,000.443 
Another foreign procurement operator with an extensive list of Chinese clients put his 
estimation at 100, 000 – 150,000 ‘with unofficial numbers adding on another 20 percent’444. 
According to the Chinese Commercial Councillor’s Desk, there are officially 31,072 Chinese 
workers in Angola. However the same report stated that there were in excess of 50,000 
Chinese workers in 2008, reducing to about 47,000 in 2009 (MOFCOM,2010:24;39). 
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Figure 5.4: Visas Issued to Chinese Nationals (2004 – 2007) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Work Visas 192 1,952 14,283 22,043 
Dependents 49 18 39 57 
TOTAL 241 1,970 14,382 22,100 
Source: Angolan Ministry of Interior, quoted in Campos and Vines (2007: 23) 
 
A survey of 32 Chinese contractors in Africa found that labour was sourced 51 percent from 
Africa and 48 percent from China, with 1 percent sourced in third countries. Significantly 
however, the same study found that 91 percent of management positions were held by 
Chinese nationals whereas 8 percent was African, with 1 percent sourced in third countries 
(Goldstein, 2007). Of concern is the fact that in the same study, neither human resource 
issues nor poor local productivity and management were cited by Chinese companies as 
significant threats, suggesting a certain degree of satisfaction with the current modus 
operandi vis-à-vis labour.445  
 
Tang (2010a:353) in a survey of Chinese companies’ projects in Angola in 2007 puts the 
percentage of local labour at between 59.7 percent and 61.8 percent.446 He further 
disaggregates the projects into sectors, and finds that the sectors requiring more technical 
expertise such as telecommunications and hydropower have the lowest rate of local 
employment (37.8 percent and 42.6 percent respectively) whereas agriculture (81 percent), 
catering (75.3 percent) and trading (73.8 percent) have the highest (Tang, 2010a:354). An 
African financial consultant commented that Chinese companies do not yet have confidence 
in the local labour or dealings with Angolans, due to the perception that the locals ‘cheat’ 
them.447 This is consistent with Tang’s (2010a) findings. Figures from the Angolan Ministry of 
Finance as regards Chinese and Angolan employment on projects funded by the China Exim 
Bank credit line are incomplete (see Appendix 3) and thus do little to generate a clear 
picture of local employment generation, let alone at different management levels. From 
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what data is available, aggregate local employee content actually dropped from 63.6 
percent to 55.7 percent between phases I and II of the credit line project execution. 
 
Local employment at a management level is rare. An Angolan researcher was shocked to 
find that even in the Chinese company canteens, the only local staff were casual labourers 
working as the dish-washers while even the chefs are Chinese.448  
 
There are several reasons for the apparent lack of enthusiasm of Chinese companies for 
local labour. I detail these below. 
 
5.7.1 Transplanting of Domestic Modus Operandi to Overseas Markets 
A Western observer commented ‘What many people fail to realise, is that the major 
engineering projects from China are operating in Africa much like they operate in China- 
they bring their own workers. So if a company from Guangdong wins a tender for a project 
in Ningxia, the company recruits all its own workers from Guangdong. It is therefore not 
surprising that the Chinese companies are not using the local labour and suppliers in 
Africa.’449 A Chinese consultant corroborated this stating: ‘The way that Chinese companies 
come in with their own workers in a turn-key type operation is the way that they know; it is 
how they operate in China and in other developing countries - it is the operational model 
that they know.’450 A private client of a Chinese company commented that this was 
sometimes the case even if it was ‘easier, better and more cost-effective to do it another 
way’.451  A foreign construction consultant concurred, observing that that there was ‘… no 
learning, it’s like they want to do it the way they want to do it, even if there is a problem’. 
He commented that the project was often slowed down as ‘…everything was ordered from 
China’, despite a lack of justification, in his assessment. 452 
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5.7.2 Lack of adequately skilled local labour  
In 2008, the Angolan workforce numbered 7.288 million, less than 50 percent of the 
population (INE453, quoted in MOFCOM, 2010: 28). Of this number only 15 percent work in 
the secondary and tertiary industries. Furthermore, education is historically an under-
invested sector. It is alleged that most of the educational budget has gone towards giving 
the children of the political elite bursaries to study overseas (Hodges, 2004). An exception to 
is the oil sector whose level of local participation, innovation and efficiency is ‘ring-fenced’ 
from the failings of other sectors of the economy, particularly as regards skilled and trained 
management (Soares de Oliveira, 2007a: 602,612). Social spending has been approximately 
30 percent of the budget since 2007, revised at 32.4 percent in the 2010 budget (Angolan 
Government, 2010b:62, 67) However, in education it is only 6.55 percent of the total budget, 
and higher education 0.80 percent (Angolan Government, 2010b:70).454    
 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that most respondents observed that one of the biggest 
barriers to increased local employment was a lack of training. Such skilled Angolan labour 
that does exist, is expensive due market scarcity. One respondent from the oil industry 
commented that Angolan nationals are equal to or sometimes more expensive than other 
expats with more experience: ‘You can get someone in London with 40 years’ experience for 
less than an Angolan local. It is almost cheaper to employ expats’. Inevitably Chinese 
companies have therefore used Chinese nationals in higher management positions due to 
the artificially inflated price of Angolan skilled labour.  Conversely, Angolans are less likely to 
work for Chinese companies due to the perception that the pay they offer is lower. 
 
5.7.3 Communication problems 
The language problem was cited as one of the major issues as regards hiring local workers as 
almost no Angolans speak Chinese and few of the Chinese migrant labourers speak English 
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let alone Portuguese. English is used as the medium of conversation as this is more 
accessible, but it is not widely spoken enough to resolve many communication problems.455  
 
In addition, no communication appears to take place between China and Angolan industrial 
organisations. Chinese companies in Angola have two organisations, the Angola-China 
Association for Commerce and Industry and the China Chamber of Commerce in Angola. 
Both these institutions are geared towards facilitating knowledge and exchange between 
Chinese companies, rather than Chinese and Angolan companies. Beyond the training 
courses that some of the larger Chinese companies undertake, there is no integrated 
strategic vision for local content development among Chinese companies. The insular nature 
of these bodies and the absence of interactions between them, their Angolan counterparts 
and Angolan ministries prevent dialogue that could lead to more effective localisation 
efforts being implemented on the part of Chinese companies.  
 
5.7.4 Misalignment of Chinese employers’ expectations 
Almost all respondents commented on the Chinese perception that African employees are 
not used to working as hard as their Chinese counter-parts. A Chinese consultant to Chinese 
companies entering African markets suggested that the companies seem to feel that 
Chinese workers are ‘easier to manage’.456 Put bluntly by one academic, ‘Although many 
construction projects are pursued under international bidding rules, the locals are not 
participating in these projects as the Chinese companies prefer to employ the Chinese 
workers because they are hard-working.’457 Another Chinese policy consultant agreed, 
indicating that there is a tendency for Chinese people to regard Africans as lazy, ‘they don’t 
have the mentality to work’.458  
 
A frequent complaint was the unreliability of local labour; it was a ‘very common thing’ that 
Angolan workers would make some money over a few weeks, and then disappear to spend 
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it and then return. As a result, one company has established an evaluation system with 
penalties to curb such disruptions.459 Another Chinese manager said: ‘Firstly you don’t know 
what their skills level will be like, secondly they don’t know how to do business  - they 
always want to go off sick - , and thirdly they don’t want to work Sundays etc., so it is very 
difficult to manage them. They need training and they need to know how to work.’460 This 
lack of reliability erodes the impetus to invest in training local labour as well. 461 By contrast, 
a commonly cited reason for Chinese labour preference is the Chinese workers’ ability to 
‘eat bitterness’462 or work extremely hard. 
 
The counter-argument to this was made by an African diplomat, who expressed concern 
with regards to a lack of cultural understanding, as Chinese managers are not sympathetic 
to bereavement leave or leave to observe religious practices, regarding these as impacting 
negatively on productivity levels.463 An Angolan industry specialist 464 explained that it was 
difficult for Angolans to get to the construction sites given the state of traffic congestion and 
the disrepair of public transport, whereas Chinese workers live on-site. He also pointed out 
that Chinese migrant workers do not have family responsibilities in Angola, whereas 
Angolans need to observe such traditions as ‘óbito’465. 
 
It appeared that this was a particular issue where deadlines were concerned and that the 
strongest motive for using Chinese materials and workers was in order to ensure that the 
projects are on time and on budget.466 Another Chinese journalist expanded on this, stating 
that the Chinese way was to work until the target for that day is reached – the completion 
of the second story of a building for example. It was not to ‘work a certain number of hours 
and then go home or be paid for overtime.’467 This modus operandi affects how deadlines 
are calculated. In these cases, Chinese labour was used because to train the local workers 
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was seen as delaying project’s completion. This has serious implications for local labour 
training, as Chinese development assistance in the form of facility construction is extensive.  
 
5.7.5 The Cost-benefit of wages  
Angola’s minimum wages are published from time to time. In May 2009, the white-collar 
minimum wage was US$ 115 per month (US$ 1,380 annually), and for blue-collar workers 
US$ 55 per month (US$ 660 annually). According to a labour contract that I was shown by a 
Chinese contractor, his Chinese blue-collar employees are paid 1,500 RMB (US$ 225) per 
month with a bonus of 10,000 RMB (US$ 1,500) payable during the Chinese New Year. Each 
contract is valid for one to three years, depending on the project involved.468 
 
The Chinese Embassy recommends basic salaries for Angolan drivers and truck drivers are 
US$ 4,800 and US$7,200 annually (including ‘social security’ and other basic costs). They 
recommend hiring Angolan labourers on a casual basis and paying them a daily rate of 650 -
750 Kw (US$ 6.80 – 7.80) (MOFCOM, 2010a:28). Angolan workers surveyed the Centre for 
Strategic Research (CEIC469) at the Catholic University of Angola  reported receiving 300 – 
400 Angolan Kwanza (US$ 3.10 – 4.20) per day and an extra 150 Kwanza (US$ 1.60) for 
lunch, thus US$ 141-174 per month and US$ 1,692- 2,088 annually. Both the Chinese and 
the Angolan construction work salaries are above minimum wage, but it is interesting to 
note that the Angolan salaries at Chinese companies are half the Chinese Embassy’s 
recommendations and 23-38 percent less than what the Chinese contract workers received. 
This is consistent with Tang’s (2010a:359) findings that despite the fact that Chinese 
workers are paid more than Angolan labourers, Chinese labour is still more cost-effective 
due to higher productivity levels.  
 
According to CEIC data from survey research on Angolan workers at Chinese companies, 85 
percent of Angolan respondents stated that their Chinese counterparts are willing to work 
for less than they would be prepared to.470 However, it has been pointed out that Chinese 
migrant labour is extremely cheap in China; Chinese workers actually earn more on overseas 
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contracts than at home, even if this is less than the going rate in the host country.471 This 
underlines how the distorted nature of the cost of labour in Angola influences local 
employment by Chinese companies.  
 
5.8 Barriers to Local Content Law Effectiveness 
The Angolan government has an impressive body of regulations governing local content, 
having pursued a local content policy, dubbed ‘Angolanisation’ in the oil industry since 1957. 
However, as noted by one Angolan business consultant, implementation has not matched 
the policy-making, as there has been little effect from this policy despite its existence for 
more than 50 years.472  
 
According to Schmitz (2007: 418) successful industrial policy should challenge enterprises to 
meet certain criteria set by the government and provide support in order for them to do so. 
Unfortunately, Angolan local content policies seem to do the former without the latter. Few 
Angolans in the construction sector feel that they are receiving sufficient support from the 
government.473  Furthermore, while the Angolan government does make it increasingly 
difficult to bring in foreign labour, there are as yet no viable local alternatives.  As a result, it 
appears that Angolanisation policies are patchily enforced in order not to halt the industry 
completely. Thus, despite a body of local content laws, there are several notable examples 
of the contradicting policy environment present in Angola, whereby short-term gain is 
prioritised above local content development. The following factors have been identified as 
reducing the effect of local content policies:  
 
5.8.1 Removal of Import Duties on Construction Materials  
Import duties on construction materials were removed as of 29 July 2009, resulting in all 
construction materials imported for the purpose of national reconstruction being brought 
into the country duty free474.  One large state-owned Chinese company representative 
                                                 
471
 Interview, senior diplomat, Western Embassy, Luanda, 27 April 2010 
472
 Interview, Angolan management consultant, Luanda, 10 May 2010 
473
 Interview, Luanda, 9 July 2010 
474
 See : http://experts.e-to-china.com/analysis/general_analysis/Customs/2009/0807/59849.html [13 
December 2010]  
195 
 
 
 
confirmed that this was an important way in which his company received assistance from 
the Angolan government.  
 
Although in the short term this would lower the costs of all projects as most of the materials 
are currently imported, in the longer term it would make it even harder for a nascent local 
industrial complex to supply construction materials to develop. However, it has relieved 
supply bottle-necks in part. Despite a local supply being unable to keep up with market 
demand, cement duties were an estimated 35 percent in order to protect the local 
industry.475  
 
An Angolan activist pointed out the  lack of long-term strategic priorities: ‘They are making 
imported materials cheaper, much cheaper than it is to produce it locally … at the MPLA 
conference the President stood and up said he did not understand why 82 percent of our 
goods and services are imported, amounting to US$ 8-10 billion. But there are no incentives 
in the economy with the result that cement, “mosaic”, basic construction material, steel, 
must all come from China. There are actually incentives to import, so local industries could 
not compete in a market economy.’ 476  
 
5.8.2 Maintenance of the Hard Kwanza Policy 
The Angolan government, as a source of national pride, has maintained the Angolan 
currency at an artificially high level for some years (Vines et al, 2005). Particularly during the 
economic crisis of 2008-2009, significant funds from the national treasury were spent on 
retaining the currency’s value.477 Given that more than 80 percent of goods sold in Angola’s 
market are imported, the hard currency may in theory render  the standard of living cheaper 
than it might be (particularly as regards imported refined fuel subsidies) but the policy has 
an extremely negative effect on the local business environment, effectively pricing local 
production out of the market.  
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5.8.3 Labour Law Rigidity 
Angola’s Labour Law was published on 11 February 2000478. It stipulates a 44-hour work 
week, with no more than 8 hours work per day479, one day off weekly and 22 days annual 
leave. This is not in line with the pace of construction encouraged due to the urgency of the 
infrastructure projects. Indeed, one Chinese researcher stressed the need for African 
countries to understand the market forces related to labour demand and to create a better 
environment for employment. (Of course, this is from the view point of the employer).480  
However, in an attempt to avoid the regulations that accompany contracted labour, a 
Chinese diplomat confirmed that ‘… on Monday [Chinese companies] will recruit workers, 
on Friday they will lay them off – by retaining them only as weekly workers, they remain 
casual workers and they do not have to pay benefits.481 Chinese employers are unwilling to 
give their Angolan workers contracts, with 86 percent of the workers surveyed by CEIC 
working without one, despite the fact that they would prefer contract labour. This makes it 
difficult to determine how many Angolans are employed by Chinese companies, as there is 
no official record.  Furthermore, it allows Chinese employers to evade the stringent labour 
laws that govern formal employment in Angola. Of concern is the fact that it contributes to 
the casualization of labour. 
 
The Angolan government, like others in Africa, is tempted to allow Chinese companies to 
use their own labour force in order to accelerate the rapid completion of much-needed 
infrastructure projects. The long-term benefit of skills training and employment is 
subordinated to the short-term benefit of alleviating pressures to deliver specific public 
goods (roads, railroads and other infrastructure).  
 
5.8.4 Lack of Implementation 
As one Angolan think tank researcher put it: ‘We are good at rules, but bad at 
implementation.’ 482 Even where local content law is applied, it is rarely monitored. An oil 
major representative admitted that after having promised a certain level of local content in 
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a tender, no one checks to see if this is implemented.483 This is likely to be the case in the 
construction industry. In fact, across the board, Angola respondents claimed that the 30 
percent quota set aside for Angolan companies in the Chinese credit line was seldom 
respected.484  
 
This is characteristic of poor implementation noted by several respondents: ‘The reality is 
that implementation is always the big problem. Some aspects are the capacity of the 
government to implement these things. There is a lack of consistency in the programmes; 
one sometimes feels they are a little bit lost. There is always this dilemma; when there are 
problems, the policy will just be reversed, rather than changed or made public.’485  
 
Many Angolans believed that that special circumstances surrounding the Chinese credit 
lines exempted them from due procedures normally followed in the construction industry, 
although a few were hopeful that this might change. 486  
 
One Angolan construction industry professional pointed out that there is no quality 
certification in Angola.487One respondent commented: ‘No one is going to ask questions, but 
the processes are not so rigorous’.488  He described how many of the Chinese companies 
were resistant to external consultants, preferring to use own in-house experts, arguably a 
conflict of interest.489 Although not exclusively a problem with Chinese companies, the 
process of ‘fiscalização is often ignored, which while expediting the construction of the 
building and reducing its costs, leads to structural problems later on.  
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This is particularly the cases where maintenance is not prioritised. According to the Angolan 
National Roads Institute (INEA490), as regards roads in Angola, regulations stipulate that a 10 
percent (of the value of the contract) bank guarantee be made available to cover the cost of 
structural problems in projects should they occur during the guarantee period of 24 months. 
However, it is recognised that 24 months is not a sufficient maintenance period for projects 
of this nature, and INEA has difficulties enforcing these regulations.491 
 
Interestingly, Chinese think tank researchers and policy makers are also at times frustrated 
with the lack of African implementation: ‘African partners must also have the 
initiative…China is only willing to give advice, not to order the African countries in terms  of 
what to do… to be pragmatic, they can’t really wait.’ 492  
 
5.8.5 Vested Interests and Lack of Political Will  
A key concern that prevents the implementation of local content laws, is that in eagerness 
to have projects completed swiftly, the Angolan government, among other African 
governments with such financing arrangements, forego the policy of insisting on a local 
complement of labour, as such localisation could as one African diplomat put it ‘slow the 
projects down and decreases efficiency and productivity.’493 Recall the respondent from the 
Ministry of Finance who confirmed that local firms would only be involved in construction 
projects managed by the Ministry if ‘it did not compromise the undertaking and delivery of 
the project.’494  
 
A number of Chinese respondents from private firms felt however that the Angolan 
government did little to foster an enabling environment for their businesses.495 One Chinese 
marketing manager even said that ‘…the big problem with this government is that they have 
no plan and no understanding of the circumstances of business and industry... it is not that 
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the government here does not have money, it’s just that they waste a lot of it. …It is also 
probably not appropriate for me to say this, but the corruption is also very serious.’ 496  
 
As one respondent pointed out, the winners of the operating contracts are all linked to the 
key figures.497 Several respondents also felt that political elites have an interest in thwarting 
any local business development in order to prevent the development of an alternative 
economic locus which might in time lead to competition for their economic interests and 
ultimately a political threat.498   
 
A Chinese think tank researcher that had visited Angola corroborated this view: ‘Angola is so 
expensive! The country has neighbours and sea lines, it could import much more efficiently. 
It is elite control of the import and export that creates this inefficiency. The armies, for 
instance have wonderful facilities. There is no visible entrepreneurship yet. It reminds me of 
China in the late 1970’s.’ 499  
 
Consequently, despite Angola’s existing local content policies, a lack of political will to 
enforce them ensures that they are ineffective. As one Angolan business consultant 
observed: ‘We need to reverse some of these policies by the government. The government 
programme and policy statements are fine and use all the right language, but they are 
programmes for 2-3 years [as opposed to long-term strategies].’500 
 
5.8.6 Institutional Reshuffling around Chinese credit lines 
The Angolan executive has made several fundamental changes to government structures 
responsible for economic planning and the national reconstruction programme (which the 
Chinese credit lines finance).    
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Following the national elections in 2008 President dos Santos transferred power from the 
Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of the Economy. A  respondent from the banking sector 
suggested that the recently established Ministry of Economy was more influential in making 
policy  - ‘calling the shots’ , whereas the Ministry of Finance and BNA were ‘…the tools, just 
like in any other economy’. He further suggested that the Ministry of Finance under Carlos 
Alberto Lopes was acting in a more advisory capacity than previously. He suggested that 
under the previous Minister of Finance, José Pedro de Morais, who was more influential, the 
Ministry of Finance had had more influence. However, the BNA had been side-lined by the 
new Ministry of the Economy under Minister Manuel Nunes Junior.501 Nunes Junior did not 
remain in place very long either, as his reform agendas began to compete with the interests 
of the ruling elite (Roque,2011:5). He was replaced by Abraão Pio dos Santos Gourgel, 
former BNA governor, in October 2010. The creation of an Economic Planning Committee 
(announced officially in October 2010) to report directly to the Presidency once again 
shifted power from the Ministry of the Economy and centralised it around the President 
(McClellend and Mendes,2010). Other changes following the 2008 elections saw the 
merging of the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Urbanisation to form the 
Ministry of Construction and Urbanisation. An Angolan engineer commenting on this 
transformation called it ‘the wrong decision’ as there was then essentially half the people to 
do the same amount of work while still getting to grips with the institutional changes.502  
 
These sets of changes, while ostensibly made to streamline the reporting structures and 
improve policy coherency, have also weakened several key ministries ensuring that they 
cannot accumulate power or influence that might threaten the Executive.503 It also has an 
impact on the efficiency of policy implementation as none of the new structures have any 
institutional knowledge. As one respondent commented: ‘The ideas are good, but I don’t 
know if you can find anyone capable of managing it all. The capable ones are all too busy 
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enriching themselves. No one has what it takes. I doubt it will succeed. The Chinese are very 
good.’ 504 This emphasised once again the problems with implementation.   
 
Vines et al (2005:6) claim that an emphasis on infrastructure-led development espoused by 
a patriarchal state illustrates a ‘time-warp’ in Angolan policy-making; as such development 
models have since been rejected worldwide. Shaxson (2006:185) is not optimistic about the 
current rapid growth experienced by Angola, comparing it to the 1970’s oil-driven economic 
boom in Nigeria, the developmental impact of which was negligible. I argue that this ignores 
the fact that Angola, as a post-conflict state, requires the rebuilding of public goods such as 
infrastructure in which private capital is reluctant to invest. Indeed, Shaxson (quoted in 
Weimar, 2009:11) later notes that Angola government’s ‘top-down’ approach to 
development in terms of state-led infrastructure projects may indeed be an easier way for 
the Angolan government to develop the country.  
 
However, the issue of access to knowledge as a means to limiting power came up several 
times during my interviews in Luanda. One Angolan academic suggested that public 
information was intentionally garbled so that the authorities could retain almost total 
control: ‘The government does not prohibit, but it inhibits.’ She suggested that this was 
slowing down the process of rebuilding society, pointing out that ‘Infrastructure is not just 
about buildings.’505   
  
5.9 Conclusions  
The China Exim Bank loan mechanism has given rise to Chinese construction companies’ 
prominence in the Angolan market despite having only entered the market in Angola in 
2002. While it is largely the SOEs that have benefitted from this, smaller Chinese companies 
have followed in order to facilitate links to a supply chain in China, rather than developing 
linkages with local suppliers.  In the case of Angola, many argue that this is not necessarily 
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different to the modus operandi of any other nationality; it is more the scale of the 
undertaking that distinguishes it (Michel and Beuret, 2009:214).  
 
It is clear from earlier examples that only the largest Chinese companies can afford to 
engage in systematic training programmes to the extent that it will earn them useful 
political capital. This was corroborated by a Chinese businessman involved in facilitating 
Chinese-Angolan partnerships.506 No such comparable effort is afforded by smaller Chinese 
companies which claim not to have the resources to provide such training on a large 
scale.507 One Macau-based company director stated that as his firm had newly entered the 
market, and were trying to establish themselves, their budget did not allow for training. He 
regarded employee training as ‘high risk’ as the employees might not stay with the 
company, or would perhaps demand a higher salary in return for remaining with the 
company once training was completed. This is a very real concern given the paucity of 
skilled local labour and the tendency for companies to ‘poach’ from one another. 508  
 
This is not to say that private firms engage in no training at all. It is reportedly increasingly 
possible to find local semi-skilled labourers such as brick-layers and masons on Chinese sites 
now. Having been based in the Angolan market for more than five years, one Chinese 
employer reported seeing the labour situation improving, particularly as she has built up 
relationships with local employees that she liked and trusts.509  This is consistent with the 
observations of William Wang a Chinese IT engineer based in Angola:  
 
‘Back in 2008, maybe you would only see Chinese workers in Chinese companies, but 
that has changed a lot in the last two years. I know a Chinese construction boss in 
Luanda who hires 70 Chinese workers and 500 or 600 locals. It's not uncommon. I 
don't think the Angolans feel we are taking jobs. We have created employment also. 
In the past, I think there were problems because even the brightest Angolans had no 
real expertise. The war meant they didn't have much chance to develop. An IT 
engineer was qualified if he could switch on a computer and type. That's not the case 
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anymore. Universities are training Angolans and they are increasingly skilled. 
Perhaps Chinese companies doing business here incentivized that?’ (quoted in The 
Daily Maverick, 2010)  
 
This indicates not only that the labour situation in Angola is improving incrementally, but 
that the longer a company stays in the market, the more willing it is to make the investment 
of employee training. Furthermore, the fact that private Chinese companies are realising not 
just the financial viability but the necessity of localisation, suggests that the process will be 
sustained in the long-term.  
 
Of interest is the fact that the growing cost of overseas Chinese labour is playing an 
increasing role in Chinese firms’ decisions to localise (Chen et al, 2007:10). Chinese 
managers are increasingly reluctant to work in Africa for long periods, demanding a higher 
salary if they do.510 Using African workers and training them to take these positions will 
reduce their costs (although currently salaries are at times lower than African equivalents). 
Although initially Chinese expatriate labour’s higher productivity rendered it more 
economically viable to employ Chinese nationals despite the added costs involved, as 
African workers increase knowledge on the job, Tang (2010a:364) suggests a break-even 
point occurs where employing local labour is financially preferable. Indeed, he found that 
the average ratio of Chinese to local labourer employed reduced by half after five years 
(Tang, 2010a: 365). This is an encouraging sign, particularly as Chinese companies have only 
been seriously engaged in Angola for less than 10 years.  
 
The Angolan government has in theory put in place a robust set of local content laws, yet 
rarely oversees their effective implementation. It is also apparent that there is a lack of 
interaction between Chinese companies and local policy formulation. One government 
researcher suggested that ‘the African countries need to  ... create a better environment for 
employment’511; another that  there have been ‘half efforts’,  but not much effort on this 
front and that there needed to be co-operation from the African side to make the deal more 
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realistic.512 From the Angolan government’s side however, the political will necessary to 
enforce policies related to local content and skills transfer is not yet adequate. One Western 
observer commented that for Chinese companies to ever seriously consider developing local 
supply chains linkages, ‘… the motivation needs to come strongly from the African country 
and, in the short-term there needs to be a strong economic case to be put to the Chinese 
side, in terms of efficiency and cost effectiveness.’513  
 
 
Several respondents within Angola however reported that the Angolan government’s stance 
towards local content provisions was tightening. Indeed one newspaper quoted the cost of 
bringing over a Chinese worker, including travel and welfare payments as US$ 20,000 (Daily 
Maverick, 2010). This has in the last two years apparently encouraged Chinese companies to 
employ more local workers. It is believed this trend will continue. Tang (2010a:354) also 
finds a distinct resistance on the part of the Angolan government to issue visas for workers 
in ‘low-tech sectors’. Another respondent suggested that Angolan legislators were getting 
‘cleverer’, closing the loopholes used by companies to avoid local content stipulations. ‘The 
Angolans are trying to do the right thing’.514 The Angolan Ambassador to China announced 
recently that the Angolan government was seeking to expand co-operation with China to 
focus specifically on human resource training (Macauhub, 2010a). The Angolan government 
has reportedly taken the decision to adopt a ‘partially protectionist economic policy’ in 
recognition of the disadvantages Angolan firms face in competition with foreign companies 
(Macauhub, 2010a). However, not only is it unclear how this will be implemented, the 
likelihood of it benefitting only the politically connected Angolan firms is high.  
 
While it could be argued that the government is seeking to rebuild the country in the 
quickest and most cost effective way (i.e. through Chinese contractors), it is clear that some 
sectors of the population are being alienated by the approach, as not enough is being done 
to include them in the process, thus foregoing the long-term benefits of nation-building. 
Indeed, the result is state-building through consolidation of the MPLA’s political and 
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economic hegemony in the country.  In fact it  the provision of public goods are being 
effectively being ‘outsourced’ and privatised, whereas it should be the role of the state in 
this context to nurture the growth of local development and nascent indigenous industries, 
particularly during national reconstruction. 
 
A Chinese academic admitted that whereas Angolan high-level officials have ‘a very good 
impression of China’, the local people seem to have some problems.515 This relates not only 
to what it is being built, but how it is being built and who builds it.  
 
Aware of this, a Chinese researcher516 suggested that the current system of loans to the 
Angolan government was not sustainable. He said:  ‘It is a lot of money, and where there is 
money involved, there is corruption  ... There needs to be more projects in terms of what 
the ‘local people want’, not just the elite.’  He clarified that there had been numerous 
prestige projects, but not very many poverty reduction projects: ‘These projects have 
increased people’s standard of living, but it is not enough, the people may get angry. They 
need agricultural, sanitation development.’ He did concede that since 2002 there had been 
improvements and that the Angolan government has been very active and productive, but 
he was concerned that ‘African countries really need to develop ownership and good 
governance practices.’ 
 
Another respondent put it more pithily: ‘It appears that whereas the Angolan government 
has been astute in negotiating the terms of the agreements signed with China Exim Bank 
and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, this has not translated to effective implementation.’  
A further respondent commented: ‘In terms of “the people”, ‘it is not so “win-win” for 
Angola, but there are some who get a nice piece of the cake from this “invasion” of Chinese. 
They [the Angolan government] are very good at negotiation, but in the field, they get 
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screwed. They don’t have the people to check on the quality, the quantity, the “after-sale” 
of the transaction’. 517 
 
There are also issues with the quality of Chinese workmanship. One Angolan banker 
suggested that following negotiations, the Angolan government was surprised, not having 
gotten as ‘good a deal’ as initially expected.    Chinese construction companies have 
historically focussed on the lower-value, labour intensive part of the construction value 
chain, lacking the consulting expertise for higher value services (Liu & Wu, 2008:24). There is 
already evidence of buildings constructed only a few years ago that are already showing 
signs of structural damage. However, as acknowledged by Marques de Morais 
(2011a:70)‘ They [Angolans] are somewhat forgiving of the fact that the structures the 
Chinese build tend to fall down or fall apart, acknowledging that some responsibility for 
these failings goes to their own country’s institutionalized culture of corruption, 
incompetence, and disregard for public safety.’  
 
A respondent involved in the construction industry expressed concern, stating that the 
Angolan government was not thinking in the long-term, but it focussed more on the 
following elections518. He suggested if the projects ‘start falling to pieces’, conditions in 
Angola would be aggravated and the government would have to spend a lot of money 
redoing things. ‘After the construction, in the medium term, if they are not careful, it is 
going to cost them twice what they paid for. 519 An activist suggested that the Angolan 
political elite who have access to the Chinese credit line actively encouraged the lack of the 
projects’ durability as their short-lived nature allows a continual stream of contracts that 
need to be put to tender. This increases their opportunities for rent extraction during the 
process of tender awarding.520 While a clear gain for those in power, this squanders 
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Angola’s resources and arguably removes the long-term benefits of such large-scale public 
infrastructure investments that the Angolan people should hope to receive.   
 
 A Western respondent suggested that the Angolans are ‘not naïve, they are shrewd, but 
this does not mean they are good leaders or managers.’521 This reflects the idea that while a 
good deal for Angola is struck at the negotiating table; many of these benefits are lost in the 
implementation.    
 
Clearly, there is a mismatch between professed policy goals and practical implementation 
illustrating that while the Angolan government is using the China Exim Bank loan-financed 
projects to fortify their discourse of national reconstruction, the lack of follow-through on 
policies suggests a distinct lack of political will to engender broad-based economic 
empowerment. I argue that this is in fact by design, and will discuss this in more depth in 
the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX: Restoring Angolan Agency 
In chapter 1, I argued that Angola is a weak state internally because the economic and 
political power of the elites is dependent on external relations that allow them to cling to a 
fragile domestic legitimacy. Such internal fragility, linked as it is extraversion, has important 
implications for foreign relations. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the management of 
relations with China have been governed by the current regime so as to mitigate the risks 
inherent in continued political power.  
 
One of the weaknesses of Migdal’s (1988) discussion of the nature of the state, as noted by 
Bradshaw, 1990:1062) is his lack of treatment of the power relations between state actors 
and external forces.   In an international context, Handel (1981:68) uses the criteria of 
geographical size, material wealth, human resources and organisational capacities (the 
ability to influence international organisations) to assess the strength of a state. However, 
as Zartman (1997) notes, power is a difficult concept to define and quantify; relating it to 
the possession of resources alone ignores the power inherent in the ‘skill and will’ to use 
these resources.  Zartman (1997) prefers to define power or strength in the following way: 
‘A stronger party is one who can add (or subtract) more value to the other's outcome.’  This 
places more emphasis on the effects of power and its source. Similarly, Underdal (1991:111) 
conceptualises relative power determining how much one party must yield for a concession 
from the other; a kind of ‘exchange rate’ for distributing gains. Thus, power is not 
necessarily measured in the ability to provide payoffs, but rather the need to do so to move 
the negotiations forward (Zartman, 1991: 69).  
 
Jackson and Rosenberg (1982:7) claim that the three factors that determine an African 
country’s level of control, or agency, are ‘domestic authority, the apparatus of power and 
economic circumstances.’ From an economic perspective, at the time that Angola began 
negotiations with China in 2003, the country had been devastated from civil war.  The 
successful negotiation of a financing deal was relatively much more important for the 
Angolan regime’s survival than for their Chinese counterparts. Furthermore, alternative 
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sources of financing from IMF were contingent on conditions that threatened the regime’s 
continued existence. An assessment of China and Angola’s relative positions would 
therefore assume that China’s power was greater than Angola’s in this transaction, 
rendering Angola to be the ‘weaker’ state. This phenomenon of a presumed weaker state 
exacting disproportional benefit in negotiations with a stronger power has been remarked 
upon in international negotiation literature (Hirschman, 1981; Zartman, 1999b; Habeeb, 
1988; Schneider, 2011). Several theoretical devices have been put forward to explain this. 
 
Pertinent to relations between China and Angola, is Hirschman’s (1978:47) concept of 
‘disparity of attention’. In 2003, when China and Angola first started negotiating a China 
Exim Bank credit line, the government’s fiscal survival, short of large-scale reforms which 
would have affected Angola’s political elites, was predicated on acquiring external financing. 
As a result, the Angolan negotiating team would have ‘devote[d] its attention with single-
minded concentration to this uncomfortable situation’ (Hirschman, 1978:47); whereas in 
theory, their Chinese counterparts would not have been operating with the same urgency, 
Angola at the time less than even a bit player in China’s commercial relations. This bears out 
on China’s previous behaviour towards Angola. As Jackson (1995:389) contends, during the 
Cold War, China more often adopted a ‘world view’, seeing Angola’s conflict as a generic 
liberation struggle, rather than a ‘regional view’, taking into account the specificities of the 
Angolan context, to their detriment. Furthermore, Chinese academics and policy analysts’ 
have often treated ‘Africa’ as a unit, as disaggregated countries are considered too small, 
given terms of trade to deal examine individually. This is by no means unique to China, 
particularly during the period of the Cold War, but it does allow for considerable 
underestimation of African counterparts, as has been the case with Angola, as we shall see. 
 
Habeeb (1988) examines the bargaining power of weaker states in more detail. He suggests 
that rather than the aggregate power (the sum of all each state’s resources) being the 
definitive factor in the outcome of negotiations, the context and structure of the 
negotiations itself is central. For Habeeb (1999:19) the ‘issue power balance’, an actor’s 
capabilities and position in relation to the other actor, as well as the ability to harness these 
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resources ‘behavioural power’ can be more decisive. Fundamentally, dynamic changes in 
the ‘issue power balance’ of a mutual concern and how the actors manoeuvre this 
equilibrium closer to their own goals have an influence on negotiations.  Habeeb’s (1988) 
analysis places importance the alternatives to these negotiations, the commitment of the 
actors and the extent of their control of the negotiations as the three determinant variables 
of ‘issue power’ manipulation. Focussed primarily on bilateral rather than multilateral 
negotiations, his analysis is particularly appropriate in the context of China- Angola relations. 
Betzold (2010) extends this argument further, suggesting that weaker states can ‘borrow’ 
power from external power sources, the negotiation context, the third parties, the 
negotiation process or even the stronger target.  
 
A key issue here is the strategic nature of oil. Whereas Angola was undoubtedly in a weak 
position to at the start of negotiations, thus has changed over time. Angola has manipulated 
China’s growing desperation to find sustainable sources of petroleum to feed its galloping 
economy. In 2003, the Chinese leadership was facing a pronounced energy crisis522, as a 
coal-dominated energy supply failed to meet demand and oil demand increased 9 percent 
and a further 17 percent the following year (Bergsten et al, 2008:151). Hu Jintao became 
President that year and made the internationalisation and diversification of oil supplies a 
priority (Chen, 2008:94). Substantial increases in Angolan petroleum exports to China have 
rendered Angola one of China’s largest sources of oil imports, with the result that China is 
considerably more dependent on Angola for petroleum that it was 10 years previously (See 
chapter 4).   
 
Hirschman (1978:46) in his critique of dependency clarifies ‘gains from trade’. It was his 
intention to highlight how a small country can become dependent on its exports to a larger 
country (the importance of the foreign exchange relative to the size of the economy). 
However, due to China’s dependence on oil and the extent to which Angola has become an 
                                                 
522
 According to Bo (2010:60) the severe national power shortages that China experienced between 2003 -
2006 were the result of Chinese domestic oil production declining 20 years previously and an inability of the 
Chinese central bureaucracy to mobilise fast enough in order to address the impending crisis of demand due to 
artificially low fuel prices.  
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important supplier Hirschman’s concept becomes inverted to the extent that China’s 
dependency on Angola is heightened significantly.   
 
The manner in which the Angolan government has positioned itself vis-à-vis China illustrates 
the Angolan government’s active role in manipulating the ‘disparity of attention’ 
phenomenon in order to strengthen its position, thus ‘borrowing power’ (Betzold, 2010:2) 
from China’s own dependence on oil. This is a typical instance where the Angolan 
government has used behavioural power to alter the ‘issue power’ equilibrium (Habeeb, 
1988:19) in crafting and adapting its engagement strategy with China. As Handel (1981:50) 
notes, the misreading of power is the root of politics. An assumed passivity or 
underestimation of Angola on the part of China has allowed the smaller country to 
manipulate the relatively more powerful country’s strength.  Unlike many other African 
countries, the Angolan political elite have carved out considerable policy space through the 
country’s management of its relationship with China. While this does not necessarily 
translate into developmental benefits, it shows an element of African agency that is often 
overlooked in analyses of China-Africa relations. This chapter seeks to explore the 
manifestation of this agency on the part of the Angolan government.  
 
While Chinese actors have made every effort to retain control of the China Exim Bank loan 
facility, Angolan elite have shown an extraordinary ability to shape it to their benefit and 
effectively are in far greater control of the mechanism than their Chinese counterparts. 
Furthermore, increased financing opportunities have raised the potential number of 
alternatives open to the Angolan government. Consistent with Habeeb’s (1988) theory 
prioritising alternatives, control and commitment, this has resulted in a shift in power from 
China to Angola over time. As I will argue here, the facility has been used to strengthen the 
incumbents’ hold on political power, effectively adapting their strategy of extraversion to 
take into account shifting political geographies. The Angolan political elite, primarily the 
Presidency, has seized the opportunities presented by engagement with China to strengthen 
and reinforce mechanisms through which it retains power. These mechanisms are those 
used by weak states engaging in ‘survival politics’ (Migdal, 1988:214).  
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A distinction must be raised here between Clapham’s thesis (2008:366) that African elites 
will come to manipulate Chinese for their own political agendas and Handel’s (1981:44) 
assertion that weaker states will manipulate the great powers for their own ends. Whereas 
Handel (1981:45) assumes that the weak state’s agenda will be in the collective national 
interest, Clapham (2008:366) is referring to the individual agendas of the political elite 
themselves. Similarly, while Ravallion (2010) argues that some countries lack the capacity to 
efficiently redistribute a country’s wealth, he makes the fundamental assumption that the 
government at least possesses the political will to do so.523 As Macdonald and Woolcock 
(2007:66) argue, national interests are defined by governments which serve their most 
powerful interests. In this case the MPLA government is self-serving.   
 
This chapter discusses the role of the Angolan political elite in shaping the process and 
outcome of the China Exim Bank credit lines in the Angolan context. After identifying the 
Angolan political elite, I will outline the specific instances in which their agency manifests in 
the China Exim Bank loan negotiations. These are further placed in the context of the 
Angolan government’s own ambitions in an international, regional and domestic context.  
 
6.1 Angola’s Political Elite 
The Afro-Portuguese, which continue to be the backbone of the MPLA, have a history of 
political dominance in Angola, as outlined by Chabal (2007:5) and Heywood (2000). As 
previously noted, Bayart’s ‘extraversion’, is a continuation of the Luandan urban elites’ 
historical modus operandi since pre-colonial times, where access to foreign trading routes 
and connections afforded them privileged positions in Angola-based Portuguese society 
(Newitt, 2007:47).  Educated and relatively privileged compared to the indígenas, it was 
colonial Portugal’s systematic thwarting of their economic and political aspirations that 
                                                 
523
 Khan (1998:38) argues that: ‘The economic (as opposed to the moral) problem is not corruption per se but 
the political structures which generate growth-retarding corruption.’ Indeed, as pointed out by Sogge (2009:8): 
‘Collusion between foreign and national elites has made Angola a net exporter of capital for decades.’ 
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made the fight for independence so attractive. The MPLA founding fathers, under the 
influence of Marxism-Leninism saw themselves as a kind of ‘vanguard party’ representing 
the Angolan masses. However, ultimately the MPLA assumed control of the colonial 
bureaucracy rather than fundamentally transforming it. The structure of the colonial state 
has remained largely intact by design, retaining the economy’s international dependency. A 
substantial disconnect has emerged and merely widened between the MPLA elite and the 
proletariat they have claimed to represent. This is a well-worn pattern in communist and 
communist-influenced states as recognised by Putnam (1976:209) in his comparative study 
of elites. 
 
Such differences were successfully employed by the MPLA’s political opponents during the 
party’s early years to prevent to the MPLA’s appeal expanding from their urban strong hold 
in Luanda, as discussed above. However, by 1976, the MPLA was in a dominant position by 
virtue of force and control of the Luanda, the capital.  
 
The two most important loci of power in Angola are the military, in the form of a select 
group of generals524 and a small number of ‘extended and interrelated creole families’ 
(Oxford Analytica, 2011:2).  This conforms to the classic case of a political elite as described 
by Putnam (1976:22) as a small, autonomous (in that they are not accountable to those at 
the ‘bottom’ of the pyramid of power) interlinked and privileged group with a shared 
commitment to the political status quo. Their support has been vital for the President’s 
continued political control, both in terms of retaining a monopoly of force (through control 
of the army) and economic rents (ensuring that all business is linked to his patronage). 
Putnam (1976:158) describes this as the modern patron acting as a broker for his clients and 
the wider political system and was as true during war as during peace, constituting a form of 
                                                 
524
 Several generals hold, or have held high positions in the government, such as General Kopelipa; General 
Francisco Higenio Lopes Carneiro (Former Minister of Public Works from 2002 until 2008) and Fernando Garcia 
Miala (Former Intelligence Chief). Although none of these three hold these positions any longer, they are 
reportedly some of the richest men in Angola with extensive business interests. (Africa Confidential, 2011:6). 
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what Reno (2000:221) terms the distribution of patronage to ‘strongmen’.525 This mutual 
dependence leads Marques de Morais (2010b) to question as to whether the President is 
the patron or the hostage of ‘his generals’. 
 
The mechanisms of political control have been gradually consolidated around the position of 
the Presidency beginning with President Agostinho Neto, as discussed in Chapter 1. This 
process was continued under President Dos Santos with incremental amendments to the 
political processes which have only served to defer legitimacy on a system of centralised 
power that has been in force for decades (Hodges, 2004:168; Pearce, 2005:xviii). Originally 
considered a non-threatening compromise candidate, Dos Santos embodies the Pareto ‘fox’ 
characterisation of elites, manipulating and playing rival factions of against each other, and 
disassociating himself from failure, allowing a subordinate to take the fall, despite the fact 
that he is the ultimate authority (Putnam, 1976:167; Clapham, 1985:73).  
 
President Dos Santos has managed to enshrine such a concentration of political power in 
legislation. The 2010 Constitution allows him to remain in power without direct election, 
following the landslide MPLA victory in parliamentary elections. Dos Santos also had the 
courts nullify his presidential rule from 1979 to 2008, on the grounds that it was 
‘unconstitutional’, given that he was in fact not directly elected as was the Angola’s 
constitutional requirement at the time.526 This effectively turns the clock back, allowing dos 
Santos to remain in power for the maximum term specified in the constitution, as his 
previous years in power no longer count, leading to what Marques de Morais (2010d) terms 
‘a constitutional freedom of responsibility’. This subversion of Angolan law nevertheless 
indicates a need for the head of state to prove his legitimacy for rule, suggesting a counter-
intuitive vulnerability in is position. The monopolistic nature of the state by default indicates 
a personal form of ‘survival politics’ (Clapham.1996a:5). 
                                                 
525
 Cillliers (2000:5) and De Beer and Gamba (2000) , in line with Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) concept of the 
‘instrumentalization of disorder’ argue that prolonging the war in Angola was in fact a calculated agenda to 
reap more benefits that peace would allow as the lack of accountability in war is not possible during peace 
time. However, Malaquias (2000:95) points out that describing Angola as purely a ‘resource war’ is accurate 
but overly reductionist.   
526
 Interview, activist, Luanda, 2 February 2011 
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Without the consolidation of such absolute power, the greatest threats to Dos Santos’ 
political power would have come from within the party itself. Roque (2011:6) notes the 
existence of four ‘factions’ within the MPLA, centred around General Manuel Helder Vieira 
Dias Junior (Kopelipa), Carlos Feijó, his two Ministers in the Presidency, Fernando da 
Piedade Dias dos Santos (Nando), vice President and the President’s cousin, and Silva 
Mateus, the last remnant of the Nito faction. Dos Santos’ political survival is contingent on 
maintaining a power balance between these factions and access to sufficient resources to 
ensure their loyalty (Clapham, 1996a:274).  
 
As Woolcock notes (2007:30) governments maximise their utility by serving the most 
powerful interests in negotiation, in patrimonial state, this translates to the military and 
other powerful political factions. Bayart (1993) describes the political imperative for the 
leader of an African country to service a wide-spread patronage network in order to 
consolidate and maintain his position of power.527 Thus legitimacy stems from control of 
rents for distribution528 (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:15) and ensures a shared commitment of 
clients to the system (Putnam, 1976:116).  Essentially, Dos Santos has typically allowed 
public services to be used as privileged access to goods for the elite529 (Ostheimer, 
2000:120). As Hibou (1999:72) notes, this extends to more than just the cessation of public 
enterprises to private actors. It can include the acquisition, the creation or the conquest of 
markets by various means by persons linked to those in power but operating in a personal 
capacity as has extended to the mechanisms managing the Chinese credit lines, as will be 
shown below.  
 
                                                 
527
 This has included President dos Santos’ own family, which is extremely wealthy due to the business empire 
that they have established (Gumede, 2006; Macauhub, 2008). 
528
 Cillliers (2000:5) and De Beer and Gamba (2000) , in line with Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) concept of the 
‘instrumentalization of disorder’ argue that prolonging the war in Angola was in fact a calculated agenda to 
reap more benefits that peace would allow as the lack of accountability in war is not possible during peace 
time. However, Malaquias (2000:95) points out that describing Angola as purely a ‘resource war’ is accurate 
but overly reductionist.   
529
 Shaxson (2007:52) relates how during the war, only politically connected Angolans had access to purchasing 
US currency at the official rate and then selling it on the black market (20 times the official rate in early 1994).   
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Marques de Morais (2010a, 2010b, 2010c); has conducted a series of investigations detailing 
how state assets through the ostensibly legal process of privatisation are sold to high-
ranking government officials in their private capacity.  Similarly government officials have 
been allowed to subcontract public tenders to their own companies, thus using their official 
position to benefit commercially. (Key among these beneficiaries are high-ranking generals 
in order to retain their loyalty in a highly militarised society and to prevent dos Santos’ 
removal by coup.) This is not only contrary to several long standing laws in Angola, but is 
expressly forbidden in the Law of Public Probity passed in November 2009. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Marques de Morais (2009, 2010c), some of the most blatant instances of this 
kind of corruption have occurred simultaneously or immediately following the passing of 
this law.  He argues that this institutionalised form of corruption is justified as ‘They [the 
power holders] plunder, but also allow others to plunder their share.’ Marques de Morais 
(2010b).  
 
As a result of these patronage networks, political and economic power is concentrated into 
the hands of a select few.  Economic opportunity is a function of political access and the 
elites thus fundamentally rely on Dos Santos, as he is the source of this wealth and power. 
And their fortunes are bound to his, just as he relies on them for support to remain in power, 
rendering a classic example of the neo-patrimonial state530. Dos Santos’ most intimate cabal 
of advisors  is known colloquially as ‘Futungistas’ after one of the President’s palaces, 
Futungo de Belas (Shaxson, 2007:51; Sogge, 2009:14). The most important figures are those 
that control the interrelated sectors of oil, banking, and public works. The two figures 
profiled below are representative of the two groups dos Santos holds close to his chest, the 
technocrats, and the generals.  
 
Manuel Vicente, CEO of the Angolan state oil company Sonangol since 1999, is a powerful 
by virtue of his position as head of the parastatal through which the majority of government 
revenues are generated. He has increasingly been instrumental in furthering Angola’s 
                                                 
530
 A full analysis of the nature of the neo-patrimonial oil-state is beyond the scope of this work. For in-depth 
analysis see Soares de Oliveira (2007b); Shaxson (2007) and Hodges (2004).  
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economic diplomacy, especially through Sonangol’s international expansion (Economist, 
2011). Most notable was his meeting with Chinese Vice-president Xi Jinping, the probably 
future Chinese head of state in April 2011. This takes on new significance given that Vicente 
was at the time mooted as Dos Santos’ successor (Reuters, 2011b).  Notably, Vicente while 
Vicente has international credibility as a technocrat, he has no significant domestic political 
support base, thus posing no immediate challenge to Dos Santos while he remains in power 
(Roque, 2011:4). However, in December 2011, apparently after Dos Santos indicated his 
‘availability’ to run in the 2012 elections, Vicente was re-appointed as CEO of Sonangol for 
three years, despite having announced his intention to step down from the post at the end 
of 2011 (Mendes and McClelland,2011).531 Vicente has a wide network of business interests 
and attracted controversy when in 2008 he transferred a 1 percent share of Sonangol’s 
holding company to himself and restructured several Sonangol subsidiaries in his favour 
(Marques de Morais, 2010c). While in direct contravention to Angolan legislation, this was 
only reversed after public outcry. Vicente however retained his position as head of Sonangol. 
  
General Manuel Helder Vieira Dias Junior (Kopelipa) is the minister of State and head of the 
Military House (Casa Militár) in the Presidency and was until mid-2010 also head of the 
National Office for Reconstruction (Gabinete de Reconstrucção Nacional), known by its 
Portuguese acronym GRN. Tasked with the state defence and security, Kopelipa also has 
extensive business interests in various sectors of the Angolan economy, often in partnership 
with Vicente and General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento “Dino”, the head of 
communications in the presidency.532 Marques de Morais (2010d) calls these three figures 
the ‘triumvirate that dominates Angola’s political economy’. Of interest is the fact that while 
Dos Santos is acknowledged as the supreme patron of these figures and the source of their 
political and economic clout, Dos Santos himself has not gone into business with them. 
Instead, his wife and daughters, particularly the elder Isabel dos Santos hold considerable 
business interests (Seabra & Gorjão, 2011:10). As Campbell (2011), notes somewhat bitterly 
                                                 
531
 This is a classic case of the ‘fox’ elite character refusing to anoint a successor in order to retain the upper 
hand in balancing factions as described by Clapham (1985:76).  
532
 For details on their commercial holdings see Marques de Morais (2009, 2010d) and Roque (2011). 
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‘… now the generals and the family around the President have bought into the neoliberal 
idea that the creation of millionaires is the best way for the society to be transformed.’  
 
This arrangement of powerful figures around dos Santos has given rise to a ‘shadow state’ 
(Reno, 2000:49), or rhizome state (Bayart, 1993:35) the political influence of which 
supersedes the checks and balances that the legislature, and government bureaucracy are 
supposed to offer. Roque (2011:3) characterises the components of this  parallel state as the 
Casa Civil (Civilian House) headed by Carlos Feijó, Casa Militar (Military House), headed by 
General Kopelipa, Sonangol, headed by Manuel Vicente and the network of intelligence 
services all of which report directly to President dos Santos. In order to retain loyalty, the 
patronage network is also extended down the hierarchy by Kopelipa and Dino’s to their own 
subordinates ensuring the security of the political pyramid.533  
 
Concurrently, as described in chapter one, dos Santos has allowed the official government 
structures to decay. This is consistent with Van De Walle’s (2001:135) assertion that elites 
prefer a low degree of state capacity as it is less constraining, essentially ‘instrumentalising 
disorder’ for their own ends (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 103). Angola is a prime example of 
this. Pinto de Andrade (2007:14) draws attention to the disastrous economic policies 
enacted throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, whose effects were worsened by the state’s 
reliance on the fluctuating value of petroleum exports and the constant fiscal strain of 
supporting a protracted civil war. During the period 1987-2004, the central government 
promulgated no less than 11 different over-arching economic plans, lasting between a 
fortnight and a few years. Furthermore, between 1990 and 2003, President dos Santos 
appointed and subsequently dismissed 10 Ministers of Finance and 6 Governors of the 
Reserve Bank (Pinto De Andrade, 2007:17). This rendered it plainly impossible to maintain 
even a semblance of policy continuity, much less allow any political figure to build up a 
domestic support base through their own competing patronage system. Mills (2006:128) 
                                                 
533
 Marques de Morais (2010d) describes in detail the transferal of shares in a company owned by Kopelipa, 
Dino and Vicente to two officers subordinate to Kopelipa and finally distributed among officers of the 
Presidential guard.  
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notes that this level of dysfunctionality has been ‘to a degree self-serving’; pointing out that 
the Angolan government actually has a high level of functional capacity, should it be moved 
to use it. This is explored below.     
 
6.2 ‘Angolanisation’ of the China Exim Bank loan 
Angola is arguably one of the Sub-Saharan African countries most jealous of its sovereignty. 
The Angolan executive is careful not to let any one foreign trade partner dominate the 
domestic political or economic arena. The manner of Angola’s loan negotiation with China 
conforms very much to the template of an international business negotiation as described 
by Duponte (1991:331); it is a complementary arrangement comprising a supplier of a 
resource, a buyer with some sort of payment, and negotiated terms and conditions. 
 
It is evident from the manner in which the Angolan negotiations with China Exim Bank have 
departed from the generic blue print  described in chapter 3 that considerable agency has 
been manifested on the part of the Angolan government. One respondent claimed: ‘They 
[Angolans] don’t look at [the Chinese presence] as sweet talk, or a salvation mission; they 
think that “for what we give them, we will get more than they realise, more than they 
thought we could or would get out of the transaction.”’534 Given the centralised position of 
President in the Angolan government, he could operate with relative autonomy and high 
personal discretion (Kahn, 1991:149).  As noted by Clapham (1985:125)‘The leader is not 
simply a symbol of national unity…he is also the person who makes the deals, deals which 
are concerned with his own position as well as with “national” foreign policy.’ The agency of 
the Presidency manifests in several key areas with regards to negotiations with China Exim 
Bank and the way in which Angola’s leverage was used to influence the nature of the 
agreement reached535.   
                                                 
534
 Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 July 2010. The same sentiments were 
expressed by the Chinese manager of a private Chinese importing business (interview, Luanda, 15 July 2010). 
535
 Both Sri Lanka and Ecuador, arguably relatively smaller, weaker states than Angola complained bitterly 
about the terms China Exim Bank was demanding when these countries were negotiating for financing 
(AFP,2009b; LBO,2010).  
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  The Angolan government’s pro-active stance vis-à-vis the Chinese government is visible in 
certain key parameters:   the pricing of the oil shipment used to repay the loans, the local 
content component included in the agreement (both discussed in chapter 4) and the 
Angolan government’s local role in the management of the credit lines.  Officially, the 
Angolan co-ordinator of the China Exim Bank credit line is the Angolan Ministry of Finance, 
with which both the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and China Exim Bank have signed 
agreements.536 However, this remains the case on paper only, as in practice significant 
modifications have been made to the management structure on the Angolan side. As 
Underdal (1991:100) notes, the outcome of an agreement is must be taken to include not 
only the output of the agreement itself, also but the impact and implications of the 
agreement.  
 
6.2.1 The Rise and Fall of the GRN 
Despite efforts by China Exim Bank officials to isolate the loan structure from corruption, 
the financing from Beijing has not remained immune. In late 2004, Finance Minister José 
Pedro de Morais was summoned to Beijing to answer to allegations of misappropriation of 
China Exim Bank funding (Ferreira, 2008:297).  In an ostensible attempt to reform reporting 
structures, the Gabinete de Apoio Técnico (GAT), was established in September 2004 at the 
Ministry of Finance, which reported to an ‘Inter-Sector Monitoring Commission’ led by the 
Minister of Finance at the time, José Pedro de Morais, the Minister of Public Works, Higenio 
Carneiro, the BNA Governor, Amadeu Maurício, the Secretary to the Council of Ministers 
António van Dúnem, and the CEO of Sonangol Manuel Vicente (ERA, 2009:82). State 
Secretary António Van Dúnem was later declared the guilty party in the corruption scandals 
and dismissed.537 In October 2004, ostensibly due to further problems of corruption, in 
consultation with the Chinese government,  President dos Santos and Prime Minister 
                                                 
536
An official from the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to point out that bilateral relations were 
conducted by the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas the more technical issues were worked out by 
the Ministry of Finance. (Interview, Luanda, 29 July 2010). It appears that as in the case of the Chinese 
ministries, the Angolan Ministry of Finance is more important in these negotiations than the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  
537
 According to ERA (2009:82), van Dúnem was dismissed because his prominent position linked the Cabinet 
and the President too closely to the corruption scandal. According to Servante (2005) van Dúnem was forced 
to resign due to Chinese government pressure. 
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Fernando Piedade Dias dos Santos established the National Reconstruction Office (known by 
its Portuguese acronym GRN), headed by General Kopelipa.538 Several Chinese respondents I 
spoke to had great respect for Kopelipa and his knowledge of China.539 Significantly, a China 
Exim Bank director who went to Angola to inspect the projects under way called Kopelipa 
‘the number 2 in the country’540, despite this not being the official governmental chain of 
command. 
 
GRN was an instrument of the executive, as are the various other gabinetes created by the 
executive and was essentially as mechanism through which the President could centralise 
power and achieve direct access to the credit lines through his Futungistas.  One respondent 
commented:  
 
‘The correct assumption is the President is trying to have more control. He is the one 
calling the shots. He is very much trying to be a US administration, but an African 
version – in which decisions are made at the top so he understands fully what is 
going on as the leader of the country, this plays to his strategy…’ 541  
 
This seemingly all –encompassing powers of the GRN scuttled any attempts at 
accountability, as this organ reported directly to the Presidency, under one of his closest 
associates. Given GRN was headed by the highest military authority in the land; access was 
difficult as information regarding the GRN fell under the jurisdiction of state security organs. 
An Angolan activist believed that most of the Chinese funds went to the GRN to finance the 
                                                 
538
 The visit of the President of China Exim Bank at the time, Yang Zilin in September 2004 was reportedly in 
order to resolve issues of embezzlement related to the China Exim Bank credit line (ERA,2009:82) 
539
 Interview, senior official, Chinese embassy, Luanda, 10 May 2010; interview, manager, Chinese private 
importing business, Luanda, 26 July 2010. The latter respondent mentioned that Kopelipa had been to China 
several times and had visited Yiwu, a well-known wholesale market in Eastern China. He suggested that the 
general’s knowledge about China would ensure that he remained close to the Presidency.  
540
 Interview, department deputy general manager, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 9 December 2009. According to 
him, Kopelipa went to China in the 1970’s, met Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, so there has been high-level 
interaction since the 1960’s and 1970’s. 
541
 Interview, Angolan think tank, Luanda, 13 May 2010  
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‘mega-projects’.542  The activist went on to point out that even though the Chinese have a 
considerable presence in Angola, ‘no one knows the extent of the loans.’ Despite the fact 
that the Angolan Ministry of Finance publishes detailed information on the projects 
financed by the Chinese credit line on its website,543 very few Angolan activists give 
credence to these numbers.544 Doubt as to the published loan figures was echoed in the 
business community. 545 While this lack of transparency may have suited the President 
initially, (despite the GRN’s original mandate to improve transparency), it was not a 
sustainable arrangement. Not only did it yield too much power to already powerful figures, 
which may have later threatened the President’s position, but it linked the Presidency too 
closely to the accusation of corruption that followed the GRN. 
 
In mid-2010, the GRN’s power was reportedly removed. Marques de Morais (2011a: 73) 
suggests that General Kopelipa investigated for the way that the previous credit lines had 
been managed. State-owned newspaper Jornal de Angola (2010a) reported in May 2010 
that President Dos Santos had appointed Antonio Texeira Flor, a former Vice Minister of 
Urbanism and Housing, as director-general of the GRN, with Manuel José Cardoso do 
Amaral van Dúnem and Edgar de Carvalho da Costa Santos named as assistant directors of 
technical administration and finances respectively. This restructuring may indeed have been 
due to accusations of mismanagement of funds, or in order to reduce the power of General 
Kopelipa who had  previously had unfettered access to Chinese funds as former head of the 
GRN.546 An Angolan activist remarked that GRN was to all intents and purposes ‘finished’ as 
                                                 
542
 Interview, NGO, Luanda, 18 August 2010  
543
 See www.minfin.gv.ao and Appendix 3 
544
 Interview, NGO, Luanda, 18 August 2010  
545
 Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 Luanda, 2010 
546
One respondent mentioned that: ‘The legacy is questionable for some; some want the decision to scrap it.’ 
(Interview, Angolan think tank, Luanda, 13 May 2010). Possibly related is the fact that a former high-ranking 
general, Fernando Garcia Miala reportedly threatened to identify senior Angolan government officials profiting 
from diverted Chinese credit line funds (HRW, 2010).  This was allegedly part of a power struggle between the 
two generals (African-Asia Confidential, 2007). Miala was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for 
‘insubordination’. Of interest is the fact that in the month immediately after Miala’s sentencing on 20 
September 2007, the Ministry of Finance issued a press release for the purpose of ‘clarifying’ the Chinese 
credit lines (Angolan Ministry of Finance, 2007b). This is the only time the Angolan government has released 
an official government statement in this regard. Furthermore, Miala only served 2 years of his sentence, and 
was released on 9 October 2009 following a Presidential pardon in April of that year (HRW, 2010). 
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the GRN’s former mandate was being handed to Sonangol.547  Indeed, Jornal de Angola 
(2010b) quoted the President confirming as much, with most responsibilities being 
transferred to the newly formed Sonangol Imobiliária548 (Sonangol Real Estate), and ‘other 
entities’.  
 
Even though the GRN has been dismantled, the transfer of its powers to Sonangol is hardly 
an improvement on transparency and accountability.549 The parastatal has long had a 
reputation as an ‘island of competence’ (Soares de Oliveira, 2007a:595) amid Angola’s 
inefficient bureaucracies, but is also almost a parallel treasury, with little accountability 
other than to the President (Hodges, 2004; Soares de Oliveira, 2007a, 2007b; Shaxson, 
2007:51). The oil company, despite having been in existence since 1976, published its first 
externally audited accounts in mid-2010 only because it was part of the IMF stand-by 
agreement requirements.550 Global Witness (2011:5) has found a US$ 8.55 billion difference 
in the reported figures for oil revenue between Sonangol and the Ministries of Finance and 
Petroleum; the accounts of the ministries also appear not to match.  
 
Furthermore, the responsibility has merely been transferred from one member of the 
‘triumvirate’ to another, in this case from Kopelipa to Vicente, Sonangol’s CEO. Tellingly, 
Sonangol Imobiliária sub-contracted the marketing and sale of a large-scale housing project 
built under the credit line, Nova Centralidade de Kilamba Kiaxi, to Delta Imobiliária - 
Sociedade de Promoção, Gestão e Mediação S.A. Created in December 2007, this private 
real estate company is owned by Manuel Vicente, General Kopelipa and General Dino, 
                                                 
547
 Interview, activist, Luanda, 2 February 2011 
548
 Sonangol Imobiliária, according to a report by Novo Journal (2010) was created as a subsidiary of Sonangol 
designed to amalgamate the responsibilities of the Cashew Co-operative (Cooperativa Cajueira) and the 
Engineering Directorate (DENG), previously responsible for construction undertaken by Sonangol. The director 
of DENG, Orlando Veloso was mooted to assume directorship of Sonangol Imobiliária. Jornal de Angola (2010c) 
confirmed that by November 2010 Veloso was the President of the Administrative Council of Sonangol 
Imobiliária. The Company reportedly owns a 20 percent share in Mota-Engil Angola (Vines, et al, 2011:4). 
According to the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum (2010:77) the company manages civil construction projects 
undertaken by Sonangol and in 2009, managed US$ 208 million of investment, twice the amount initially 
expected for that year.  
549
 For an in-depth discussion of the level of transparency and reliability of Sonangol’s accounts, see Global 
Witness (2011). 
550
 See IMF (2009) 
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fronted by several of their subordinate officers (Marques de Morais, 2011c). This is clearly a 
conflict of interest, given the positions of the individuals involved. Furthermore, the Kilamba 
Kiaxi project, had been originally unveiled by the President as part of the MPLA campaign 
promise to build a million houses in the following four years. The President announced in 
August 2010 that the state-subsidised housing units would be sold to Angolan families for 
the maximum price of US$ 60,000. However, Delta marketed these units at US$ 125,000 – 
US$ 200,000, two to three times the promised price and well beyond the means of the 
families for which they were ostensibly intended (Marques de Morais, 2011c). This indicates 
that despite the rhetoric employed by MPLA and the President regarding national 
reconstruction, these projects primarily serve as a vehicle for wealth generation for the 
politically connected.   
  
6.2.2 Parallel Structures of Chinese Financing in CIF 
Of significance is the presence of another private Chinese financing structure in Angola that 
competes directly with that of China Exim Bank. From 2005, credit lines from China 
International Fund Ltd (CIF), a Hong Kong-based company were placed under the auspices of 
GRN.   
 
On the surface of it, CIF is a private institution through which private Chinese clients can 
channel investments into Africa and beyond. Deeper investigation presents a more 
intriguing picture.  CIF is one of a complex web of 60 companies with the business address 
of 88 Queensway in Hong Kong, leading a group of US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission  Congress researchers to dub them, the ’88 Queensway group’ in a report 
(Levkowitz et al,2009). 
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A Hong-Kong-based businessman, Xu Jinghua, known by a variety of other aliases551 is the 
driving force behind CIF (Vines et al, 2009:69). Xu Jinghua reportedly attended a Soviet 
academy in Baku in the 1960’s where he met a young Eduardo dos Santos (Economist, 2011), 
and worked for the Chinese intelligence department as the secret service552 contact 
facilitating arms provision to the MPLA on behalf of the Chinese government (Lu,2007). This 
intermediary role provided Xu with high-level contacts that he exploited for commercial gain 
following the end of Angola’s civil war (Long, 2010).  Xu has reportedly boasted that his ‘slice 
of the Angola construction pie’ was worth more than US$ 30 billion (Zhou 2007). He 
reportedly has access to an Angolan diplomatic passport, which he uses in his frequent 
travels on a luxury jet to his African client governments, among them Zimbabwe, Guinea 
and Madagascar. (The Times, 2011; Morrissey et al, 2011). 
 
 Xu has two associates, Veronica Fung (冯婉筠 Feng Wanyun) variously reported as a 
possible family member, wife and girlfriend (Economist, 2011; The Times, 2011; Morrissey 
et al, 2011) and Lo Fong Hung (罗方红). Lo, the daughter of a Chinese general and formerly 
a translator to Deng Xiaoping is chairperson of CIF (Campos and Vines, 2007; Vines et al, 
2009, Ferreira, 2008).   
 
Although Xu’s own name is rarely seen on documentation pertaining to the ’88 Queensway 
Group’ of companies, both women are each named as directors of a large collection of the 
interrelated companies (Economist, 2011; Vines et al, 2009:64), among them New Bright 
International, the company with an indirect controlling share CIF, of which Lo and Fung own 
30 percent and 70 percent respectively. New Bright International owns 70 percent of Beiya 
International Development Company, formed in 2003 and later renamed Dayuan 
International Development Corporation.553 Dayuan owns 99 percent of CIF.   
                                                 
551
 Xu Jinghua (徐京华), has been referred to as Sam King, Mr Sam, Sam Pa, Ghiu Ka Leung and Samo Hui (The 
Times, 2011; Levkowitz et al, 2009:6; Vines et al, 2009:69) 
552
 Electronic correspondence, US-based researcher who has done field research in Angola, 18 June 2008 
553
 Beiya Industrial Group, a railway construction company based in Harbin, in northern China owns the 
remaining 30 percent of Dayuan International Development Corporation (Murray, 2011).  
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The CIF loans managed by GRN, were estimated to be approximately US$ 9.8 billion within a 
year of the office’s establishment.554 However, the controversy surrounding these loans 
prompted the Angolan Ministry of Finance (2007) to issue its first ever official press release 
regarding the various Chinese credit lines.  The Ministry of Finance (2007b) clarified that CIF, 
described as a ‘private institution’ had been created for the following purpose: 
1) Creating facilities or credit lines to finance projects within the framework of the 
National Reconstruction Office; 
2) Obtaining new funds on more competitive terms; 
3) Promoting national and international venture capital investment in Angola.  
The same press release reported that CIF had only made available financing amounting to 
the lesser amount of US$ 2.9 billion. These funds were earmarked for carrying out various 
construction projects, such as the building of a new international airport in Luanda555, roads 
and railway rehabilitation as well as drainage in Luanda city. Due to difficulties in securing 
financing, the Angolan government instructed the Angolan Ministry of Finance to secure 
domestic funding through the sale of treasury bonds to the value of US$ 3.5 billion (Angolan 
Ministry of Finance, 2007b). Prior to this bail-out by the Angolan government, CIF had had 
to stop all payments for 8 months in 2007. The Angolan government, with an eye on 
elections in 2008, had been forced to intervene to ensure that promises of infrastructure 
were kept, regardless of the cost (Economist, 2011).  
 
CIF’s lack of delivery as regards its infrastructure commitments is a common theme among 
several other African countries in which it is involved, such as Zimbabwe, Guinea and 
Madagascar. Furthermore, according to Hong Kong court records Xu Jinghua has been sued 
more than 15 times on charges including bankruptcy, unpaid debts and tax delinquency 
(Murray,2011).  
                                                 
554
 Interview, foreign-invested bank in Luanda, 7 June 2006 
555
 Interestingly, although several reports have commented on the new flagship airport having been 
abandoned, in November, 2011 a local newspaper Novo Journal reported that the airport, expected to be 
completed in late 2012, have been awarded to CIF to manage for 25 years (Mendes, 2011b).  
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Increasingly known for its opacity, CIF has generated considerable international controversy 
following the announcement of less than transparent loan agreements in Latin America and 
other African countries to fund infrastructure which does not materialise (The Economist, 
2011; Morrissey et al, 2011; Murray et al,2011; Africa-Asia Confidential, 2009a). It was also 
related to a highly publicised case of insider trading on the Shanghai stock market. In March 
2007, previously little-known Hangxiao Steel, a Zhejiang-based Chinese company announced 
it had won US$ 4.4 billion in contracts from CIF to sell construction material and services for 
a public housing project in Angola. Shortly afterwards the China Securities and Regulation 
Commission (CSRC) undertook to investigate the company, which was listed on the Shanghai 
stock exchange. Hangxiao’s share price had risen by the maximum of 10 percent for 10 
consecutive days until 16 March; the deal had been announced on 13 March (Kurtenbach, 
2007). In April CSRC fined the company and 5 employees, including the chairman and 
president a collective RMB 1.1 million (US$ 143,000) for insider trading. The company soon 
ran into difficulty with the contract. By August 2007, the company had received law suits 
from 22 investors claiming RMB 2.7 million (US$ 360,000) (China Daily, 2007).   
 
The Chinese government, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has distanced itself 
from CIF, and all the Chinese respondents I spoke to were adamant that CIF had nothing to 
do with the Chinese government and was a private entity. 556   In a Wikileak cable Chinese 
Ambassador Zhang Bolun confided to Ambassador Dan Mozena that CIF had ‘weak 
management and poor leadership in Angola, despite its close links to the Angolan 
presidency’. 557  A MOFCOM report has also accused CIF of high-jacking Chinese economic 
policy by introducing potential foreign clients to phony diplomatic representatives of Hi 
Jintao and bribing foreign officials (Caixin, 2011).  
 
Several Chinese respondents and Chinese sources have commented on the important and 
yet harmful (to Chinese government interests) role that CIF is playing in Angola (Long, 2010). 
                                                 
556
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009; Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 
October 2009; interview, manager, Chinese import company, Luanda, 15 July 2010.  
557
 http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/01/09LUANDA51.html 
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Chinese sub-contractors are left in difficult positions if projects are halted and Chinese 
workers, stranded in Angola with no pay, have reportedly demonstrated outside the 
Chinese embassy in Luanda (Caixin,2011). According to Marques de Morais (2011a:71) a 
Chinese official is reported to have said of them: “CIF is a company that has no construction 
record or credentials…Largely they are brokers who get contracts from the Angolan 
government and sell them to other Chinese companies for huge profits.” However, this 
describes the role of any main contractor in the construction industry and is hardly sinister 
in and of itself. Of more concern is the fact that the projects under CIF jurisdiction are not 
carried out satisfactorily and their execution is not transparent.  
 
The idea that CIF has no link to the Chinese government is becoming more and more 
difficult to countenance (Vines et al, 2009:51; Levkowitz et al, 2009:33). Reportedly, two of 
CIF’s general managers are former diplomats. 558 Ju Lizhao, the current CIF director in Angola, 
at one time worked at the Chinese Embassies in Angola and Brazil. According to Levkowitz et 
al(2009:52) Ju is a former senior colonel at the PLA General Staff Department’s Foreign 
Affairs Division, the military office that is responsible for military exchanges in China. This 
would seem to indicate that he might have been military attaché to the Embassies at which 
he was stationed.  He became associated with CIF about four years after his retirement from 
the PLA.  Ju Lizhao is now listed as the director of China Sonangol (Shanghai) Petroleum Co. 
Ltd.559 A Mr Gu who was general manager in 2008 once worked in the office of Zhao Ziyang 
(former Chinese Premier from 1980-1987 and CCP General Secretary 1987-1989) and later 
was a major in Henan province, China.  In addition, state-owned Bank of China has lent 
money to CIF and its affiliates secured by oil contracts (Murray, 2011).  This is inconsistent 
with a Chinese respondent who explained that the Chinese government had mandated all 
the state-owned companies not to help CIF in undertaking their projects. According to him, 
the Chinese government through its state-owned banks would reportedly like to assume 
ownership of the projects CIF currently manages. 560  This has happened in some cases, 
which may mean that they have assumed CIF’s debt as well.  
                                                 
558
 Electronic correspondence, US-based researcher, 18 June 2008 
559
 Information from Business Development manager, oil company, Luanda, 4 May 2010 
560
 Interview, manager, private Chinese importing business, 15 July 2010 
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For example, CITIC Construction, a large Chinese state-owned company, has assumed the 
management of the Kilamba Kiaxi project which had previously been billed as a CIF 
project.561 However that Lo Fong Hung, chairperson of CIF is married to Wang Xiangfei, non-
executive director of the CITIC group and well as a director of other CIF subsidiaries 
(Levkowitz,2009:5; Morrissey et al, 2011). As a result, this handover does not signify a 
removal of CIF influence and closely mirrors the Angolan shift of responsibility for the 
Chinese companies from General Kopelipa to Manuel Vicente.  
 
It is clear that CIF must have high-level access to the Angolan government and operates 
under the consent of the Angolan President. Interestingly, one Chinese respondent 
commented that agreements predicated on personal contacts between individuals is not 
sustainable as an institutionalised agreement, as the positions of the contacts may change, 
drawing the parallel between several deals negotiated in Nigeria under President Olusegun 
Obasanjo and scrapped under the subsequent Yar’ Adua administration.562  
 
In Angola’s case, however the powerful connections have persisted for some time. Aside 
from President Dos Santos, Manuel Vicente, CEO of Sonangol is naturally an important 
figure in CIF’s relations with the Angolan state. Like Lo and Fung, Vicente is listed as the 
director of several companies in the 88 Queensway syndicate (Vines et al, 2011:64). The 
following politically connected individuals have also facilitated CIF access in Angola:  
Hélder Bataglia claimed in an interview to have single-handedly ‘initiate relations with the 
Chinese’ (Botelho,2010), although this is likely to be an exaggeration. He is Chairman of 
Espírito Santo Commerce (Escom), an affiliate of the Portuguese Bank Espírito Santo 
Financial Group (Africa Intelligence, 2009). Escom holds a 40 percent share in a joint-venture 
(China Beiya Escom International) formed in 2004 with Beiya International (now renamed 
                                                 
561
 The author visited the construction site of this project. The project is valued at US$ 3.5 billion and 
encompasses 20,002 residential apartments, 246 commercial units, 24 kindergartens, 9 primary schools, 8 
secondary schools, 2 electrical substations over 8.8 km
2
, according to CITIC Construction company information. 
This may very well be the project CIF initially awarded to Hangxiao Steel.   
562
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009. For more details regarding the Nigerian 
negotiations, see (Vines et al, 2009). 
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Dayuan), one of the so-called Queensway 88 Group of companies, which owns 60 percent 
(Botelho,2010). In January 2011, Sonangol bought a 67 percent stake in Escom from Espírito 
Santo. Bataglia, who previously owned 33 percent of the Escom sold a 23 percent share, 
retaining 10 percent. He is to be kept on as the Escom’s CEO (Macauhub, 2011b). 
Pierre Falcone, an Algerian-born French national was extensively involving in arms brokering 
for the MPLA during the civil war (Global Witness, 2002). He acts as an advisor to China 
Sonangol International Holdings (CSIH), a CIF affiliate, through his private equity company, 
Pierson Asia, which reportedly advises Chinese companies investing in Angola Levkowitz, 
McLellan Ross and Warner (2009: 34). His clients include state-owned Chinese companies 
such as CITIC and Norinco (Levkowitz, McLellan Ross and Warner, 2009: 52). He is also a 
close confidant of Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos (Africa-Asia Confidential 
(2009c:1) It is reported that he now lives in China563.  
 
Lev Leviev, an Israeli-national with extensive diamond concerns in Angola personally owns 
0.13 percent of China Sonangol Resource Enterprises, a CSIH listed in on the Hong Kong 
stock exchange. His company Africa-Israeli Investments Ltd owns 5.88 percent of the 
company (Oster and Mitnick,2009). However, Levkowitz, McLellan Ross and Warner (2009: 
29) report that Leviev along with two of his companies Africa Israel Financial Assets and 
Memorand Management (1998) Ltd bought 10 percent of Artfield Group Ltd on 23 August 
2008. Artfield was later renamed China Sonangol Resources Enterprises on 4 June 2009 
Levkowitz, McLellan Ross and Warner (2009: 30)in In about 2008, CSIH reportedly began 
negotiations to purchase real estate in Manhattan, New York owned by Leviev worth 
approximately US$ 710 million (Levkowitz, McLellan, Ross and Warner,2009:ii) While this 
deal was apparently not concluded, CSIH did buy the former JP Morgan building at 23 Wall 
Street for US$ 150 million according to Richard Marin, chief executive of Africa Israel 
International-USA (AFI USA) through which Leviev manages some of his holdings (Oster and 
Mitnick,2009). In May 2011, it was reported that Leviev sold his 18 percent stake of Angola’s 
largest Diamond mine Catoca to China Sonangol for US$ 400million (Els,2011) 
                                                 
563
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009. 
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What is clear is that the reporting lines, described  in the official lines of communication 
with regard to the Chinese financing in Angola, have been blurred and subverted 
considerably (see figure 6.1). Leading to what Bayart (1999:96) has called a ‘parallel 
government, without the official government ceasing to exist.’ 
 
Figure 6.1 Angolan parallel management structures 
Source: author’s own research 
6.2.3 The Oil Intermediary 
CIF’s role in the China Exim Bank mechanism takes on considerable significance in terms of 
the oil sales to China used as repayment for the credit lines. The oil is transferred by China 
Angola Oil Stock Holding; a subsidiary of Dayuan International Holding, the same parent 
company of CIF (Alden and Alves, 2009:13). This company also has links to China Sonangol 
(Vines et al, 2009: 50). China Sonangol is jointly owned by Sonangol (30 percent) and New 
Bright International Development Ltd (70 percent) and has effectively become the broker 
for Angolan oil sales to China (Murray, 2011). 
 
The company’s creation was originally to serve as a special purpose vehicle in order to 
facilitate a loan to Sonangol in 2005. Sonangol’s previous debt commitments prevented the 
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company from taking on additional loans. In September 2005 Calyon Bank, the banking 
institution used by Sinopec, arranged a syndicated US$ 3 billion 7-year loan through China 
Sonangol, an intermediary company, as the borrower (Katsouris,2009; Trade and 
Forfaiting,2006). The oil was secured against a long-term off-take agreement between 
Unipec, a Chinese off-taker linked to Sinopec, and China Sonangol, with the Chinese market 
as destination.564   
 
This situation is not condoned by the Chinese government, which would rather receive the 
oil directly.565   As explained by one respondent, CIF profits considerably from its role as 
intermediary and some of the profits go towards the financing of CIF’s projects in Angola.566 
Indeed, he further intimated that the Angolan President himself was profiting through the 
intermediary firm. He suggested that this corruption was reducing developmental benefits 
that Angola could attain through oil co-operation with the Chinese state directly.  
Corroborating this, Vines et al (2011:4) quote reports suggesting that President Dos Santos’s 
son, José Filomeno ‘Zenu’ dos Santos, is China Sonangol’s official representative. According 
to the Economist (2011), China Sonangol buys the oil at a price per barrel fixed in 2005 and 
sells the oil on to the Chinese state at current spot market prices, accruing the difference as 
profit. While this ‘fixed’ price is unknown, it is likely to have been based on lower than 
market prices, and seven years later, the market price of oil has easily doubled (see Figure 
6.2), indicating significant profits for the oil intermediary. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
564
 Syndicated lending partners included Banco BPI; BNPP; Deutsche; DZ Bank; Fortis; HSH Nordbank; KBC Bank; 
Natexis; Nedbank; RBS; Société Générale; Standard Bank; Sumitomo; UFJ; WestLB. See  
https://www.westlbmarkets.net/cms/sitecontent/westlb/westlb_de/en/ul/bs/wlba/wlbaf/angolan_oil.standar
d.gid-N2FkNDZmMzU4OWFmYTIyMWM3N2Q2N2Q0YmU1NmI0OGU_.html 
565
 Interview, manager, private Chinese importing business, Luanda, 15 July 2010 
566
 Interview, manager, private Chinese importing business, Luanda, 15 July 2010 
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Figure 6.2: Fluctuating Price of Brent Crude Oil, US$ millions (2002 – 2011) 
 
Source: Index Mundi
567
 
6.2.4 Elite Subversion of the China Exim Bank credit line 
The importance of the Public Investment Programme (PIP), the set of projects financed by 
China Exim Bank, is evident in that it is so centrally controlled. Presidential decree 31/10 
governing the Public Investment Program (Angolan Government, 2010a) effectively places 
the President in absolute control of the process.568 For instance, according to section II, 
article 20/7; direct approval must be granted by the President for any projects exceeding Kw 
1 billion (approximately US$ 10.7 million). Recall that the minimum project that will be 
financed by China Exim Bank is US$ 10 million. 
 
National reconstruction has been advanced rhetorically as an urgent priority by the Angolan 
government, not only as a short-term election campaign promise, but also in order to 
bolster long-term regime legitimacy.  However, the mechanism through which this 
reconstruction is pursued focuses only on the projects themselves as constitutive of the 
physical rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure. This is the part of the process that the 
                                                 
567
 http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil-brent&months=300 [14 December 2011] 
568
 According to article 172 of Angola’s constitution, the National Assembly is supposed to approve all 
provisional presidential decrees before they are entered into law. Given that the MPLA in the 2008 elections 
won 87 percent of the house, this effectively means that all presidential decrees will automatically be passed.  
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Presidency can directly control569 and thus dictate the distribution of rents derived from 
their construction. The management of Chinese funds have been passed from GRN to a 
subsidiary of Sonangol570. While this process gives the appearance of reform, it in essence 
ensures the President’s continued control without interrupting necessary elite access to the 
patronage it generates.   
 
Drawing on Clapham (2008:366) and Soares de Oliveira (2007a:595) the consolidation of the 
management of the Chinese credit lines, is clearly a continuance of Sonangol ‘… as the 
centrepiece in the management of Angola’s “successful failed state”, highlighting the extent 
to which a nominal failed state can go on surviving and indeed thriving amidst widespread 
human destitution, provided that basic tools for elite empowerment exist to ensure the 
viability of incumbents.’ 
 
The Angolan government, while portraying the Chinese credit line as crucial for ‘national 
reconstruction’ has not focussed on rebuilding of ‘soft’ infrastructure, such as the 
concurrent institution- and capacity-building through local participation. While the official 
reason is that such processes slow projects’ completion schedules, it is evident that political 
elites have a vested interest in retaining a monopoly over existing economic activity and 
preventing the formation of Migdal’s (1988:211) alternative ‘power centres’.  This averts the 
rise of independent entrepreneurs operating outside of the central patronage networks and 
ensures regime stability (Bayart, 1993:91).571 To use Migdal’s concept of balancing act 
between political stability and economic growth, it is clear that (short-term) political 
stability prevails. The contradictory policy environment described in chapter five ensures 
that only the politically connected may benefit from the reconstruction process, thus 
                                                 
569
 Soares de Oliveira describes (2007b:121) the ‘privatisation’ of oil states whereby essential services and 
public goods are effectively outsourced to NGOs or private firms’ CSR programmes. In the case of national 
reconstruction, a lack of indigenous human resources and industrial inputs have, it could be argued,  
necessitated the Angolan state ‘outsourcing’ the national reconstruction projects’  financing and 
implementation to Chinese companies. 
570
 Sonangol is also instrumental in the China Exim Bank loans as facilitator of payments in oil to China (see 
chapter 4.) 
571
 Soares de Oliveira (2007a:91) details how Sonangol’s expansion into non-oil sectors and services has 
‘crowded out other entrepreneurs as Sonangol not only commands greater resources, but also demands that 
international firms form joint ventures with its own subsidiaries, thus making market entry and/or 
technological transfer opportunities for other fledging Angolan businesses hard to access.  
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reinforcing the political and economic status quo maintained by patronage.572 In this way, 
the political elite have adapted the patronage system to serve in peace time, or 
instrumentalized the post-war environment, as suggested by De Beer and Gamba (2000).  
This is described by Soares de Oliveira (2007a:148) as having ‘adapted its grip to a peace-
time gear.’  
 
President dos Santos is adept at balancing the institutions tasked with managing national 
reconstruction. In the case of the Chinese financing, it is clear that the establishment of the 
GRN under a close presidential associate was designed to balance the growing clout of the 
Ministry of Finance under José Pedro de Morais which managed the China Exim Bank loans. 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the parallel structures have made is difficult to co-ordinate 
the process, reducing the efficacy of both as centres of power as they act as counterweights 
to one another, as described by Migdal (1988:211).  
 
The President is also adept at reshuffling key positions in order to prevent the 
institutionalisation of figures in places of power. Migdal (1988:214) identifies this as a 
crucial strategy that intentionally weakens bodies within the state so that they pose no 
threat to the executive. Access to the Chinese credit lines, although nominally managed by 
the Ministry of Finance, is closely monitored by the President. The President has been quick 
to reshuffle the line of command if any political figure is suspected of gaining too much 
influence by their proximity to the credit lines, ensuring that he alone is the sole source of 
political continuity. Indeed, he has gone a step further and re-arranged the institutional 
structures as well. The power to be able to enact such bureaucratic changes rests with the 
President’s powers of appointment, enshrined in the 2010 Constitution, which extend to all 
high-level positions in government as well as the judiciary573 (Orre, 2010:13). President dos 
Santos also exercises these powers to identify a scapegoat for political issues574 while 
                                                 
572
 This is an example of elites using the market as a policy instrument in order to accrue policy-generated 
rents (Staniland, 1985:59). As Bayart (1993:266) notes, ‘networks founded on inequality perpetuate inequality.’ 
573
 Although presidential decrees can be overruled by parliament, in the unlikely event of this occurring, the 
President can veto parliamentary laws (Orre,2010:13) 
574
 An example is the dismissal of Housing Minister Diekumpuna Sita José in April 2009, as political pressure 
mounted over an MPLA campaign promise to provide 1 million houses for the poor. 
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simultaneously distancing the President from the issue in question, despite the fact that 
most national policies require   executive approval.575  
 
6.3 Further Debunking the ‘Angola Model’ 
Despite not being the only Chinese financier of Angola, let alone the only provider of oil-
backed loans, China Exim Bank’s credit lines have received the most media scrutiny, 
particularly due to claims that China Exim Bank’s loans were extended to Angola in order 
firstly, to secure access oil equity and secondly, to secure China political favour and 
preferential status as Angola’s trade and investment partner. In fact, the Angolan 
government has successfully manipulated circumstances to evade conceding to China such 
preferential status.  
 
6.3.1 Angola’s policy of finance diversification 
Although Angola may have accelerated relations with China; this is not necessarily at a cost 
to other economic partners. As Tang (2010b:60) points out, Portuguese and South Korean 
firms retain their market dominance in the construction industry, ‘fully demonstrating the 
Angolan side’s ability to choose their commercial interests according to interest-based co-
operation’576. Angolan foreign ministry officials repeatedly emphasised that Angola was 
‘open to all’ – indicating a desire to diversify foreign economic relations:  
‘The other countries are just jealous. We went to Europe to ask them to help us 
develop, but they had all these conditions. We did not accept these conditions. So 
they are jealous. China does not have these conditions; they respect us. They are 
                                                 
575
 Elite advisors are often ‘recycled’. Several prominent figures have fallen from grace only to be re-instated or 
promoted in later years. Examples are current Minister of State (Civilian House) Carlos Feijó, disgraced several 
years previously, and General Miala, imprisoned for insubordination, but pardoned several years later. 
576
‘这充分体现了安方自主选择能力和以商业利益为本进行合作的原则.’ (Tang, 2010b:60) [author’s own 
translation]  
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also much cheaper. But we are open to all; we have a policy to have good and open 
relations with our neighbours. We have co-operation.’577 
An Angolan official was quick to insist: ‘China is here to make a good example of the kinds of 
relations that countries like Angola need. For us, in Angola, the industrialised countries will 
always be welcome; we have very close ties with them, with more than 500 years of 
colonisation with Portugal.578 Indeed, others have described this as an ‘à la carte’ approach 
(Weimar, 2009:2). One respondent suggested that following the experience of too close an 
alignment with the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, Angola is consciously diversifying its 
international relations in order never to be in such a position again:  
‘China has its own needs, perhaps sometimes they coincide with ours … There are 
different “friendships” or interests. We are not the stupid ones; we want good 
relations with everybody… until 1992, The Soviets were our best friends and as the 
PRC were their great enemies, we could not be friends. This changed after the Cold 
War; China was not the partner it is today. It did not have the same interests, such as 
raw materials. Things changed for them and things changed for us. These are 
relations between states, made with certain interests in mind, not relations between 
friends.’579 
Several other credit lines arranged along similar structures to that of China have been 
extended by other countries. Spain in 2007 alone provided US$ 600 million in construction 
aid (Angop, 2007).  Furthermore Canada’s Export Development Bank signed an agreement 
with Angola’s Banco de Poupança e Crédito for US$ 1 billion in 2009 to finance government 
infrastructure projects and US$ 16 million for private enterprise projects.  Brazil's Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social (BNDES) disbursed US$1.5 billion to fund 
the purchase of Brazilian construction equipment in Angola in the first five months of the 
2009 and further offered US$250 million to fund projects in Angola. Angola has recently 
attracted the interest of other financiers, most notably the World Bank, which will extend 
loans of US$ 1 billion from 2009 – 2013 to assist with the African country’s economic 
diversification. Credit lines from European countries, while forthcoming, are not comparable 
                                                 
577
 Interview, Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luanda, 3 May 2010 
578
 Interview, Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luanda, 29 July 2010 
579
 Interview, Angolan research institute, Luanda, 27 April 2009 
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in size to those of China. In the first half of 2009 Germany extended US$1.7 billion to Angola, 
in early 2009, Portugal US$ 500 million (Macauhub,2009), US Exim Bank has offered US$ 120 
million and Britain has offer US$ 70 million in credit in comparison (see chapter four, Figure 
4.4).  
 
These credit extensions may have been initiated as other institutions became emboldened 
by the confidence their Chinese counterparts were showing in Angola. It is more likely 
however, that these governments fear that their own companies are losing out to Chinese 
companies that, it is perceived, are given an unfair advantage through state support. Their 
fears are largely unwarranted. China is not the only country to extend credit lines to the 
Angolan government. Brazil and Portugal have for years extended oil-backed credit lines to 
facilitate the import of their companies’ products and services, particularly in the 
construction sector (Burke and Corkin, 2006: 16).  These credit lines are all primarily geared 
towards facilitating infrastructure construction, a stated priority of the Angolan Government. 
Consequently, barring the size of the loans, there is little difference between the Chinese 
credit lines and those of other countries. All the credit lines are contingent on their use to 
purchase products and services from their own companies respectively.  Thus far from 
allowing China preferential treatment as a trading or investment partner, Chinese financing 
seems to have encouraged other countries to extend credit lines in order to allow their own 
companies and products to compete on a similar footing. This has been strongly promoted 
by Luanda. As a result, the emergence of multiple alternative sources of financing has as 
described by Habeeb (1988:19) has shifted the power balance distinctly in Angola’s favour 
as China no longer holds the advantage  of being Angola’s primary source of financing. 
Indeed, the loss of this position has spurred increasing amounts of financing from Beijing in 
order to regain such an advantage, particularly over CIF.  
 
6.3.2 More Chinese State Financing  
The Chinese Ambassador confirmed in March 2011 that Chinese institutions had facilitated 
financing totalling US$ 14.5 billion (de Comarmond, 2011).  Separate channels of funding 
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come from two other state-owned Chinese banks. China Development Bank580 (CDB) has 
shown interest in investing in Angola’s agriculture potential, pledging US$ 1.5 billion in this 
sector (Alves, 2010a:13; Gazel, 2010)581. Further to this, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) 582 announced intentions of providing US$ 2.5 billion in financing to Angola 
(Angop, 2009b).  
 
Several respondents have suggested that these financial institutions had been encouraged 
to enter Angola by the Chinese government in order to assist with the financing of projects 
that had originally been billed as CIF projects.583 One interpretation was that it was in order 
to make up for the embarrassing financial difficulties CIF had faced in 2007, inferring a 
connection between CIF and the Chinese state. However, this could also merely be Chinese 
state-owned institutions seizing the opportunity presented by the failure of rival CIF to 
consolidate a position in Angola. In addition, the entrance of three separate Chinese state-
owned banks further diversifies the risk of lending to Angola.  
 
6.3.3 An Angolan chimera: China’s access to oil equity 
The implication of previous reports on China’s infrastructure financing is that its provision 
also secures Chinese companies access to exploitable resources (Foster et al, 2008a). This 
certainly appeared to be the case in Angola initially. Chinese interests first entered this 
sector in 2004 when China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, (Sinopec) formed a joint 
venture with Angolan Sonangol. This vehicle, Sinopec-Sonangol International (SSI), with 
                                                 
580
 Previously a fully-fledged policy-bank, CDB is in the process of commercialising, although this may have 
been shelved indefinitely due to the 2008 financial crisis. 
581
 A reported US$ 1 billion was initially earmarked for investment in this sector, and  CDB  Governor Chen 
Yuan has stated that this amount may be extended if necessary (AFP,2009a). It later was.  
582
 ICBC is China’s largest commercial bank and currently the largest bank in the world by asset value. ICBC also 
has a strategic partnership with Standard Bank, Africa’s largest Bank. Standard Bank has had a representative 
office in Angola since 2006 and achieved a commercial banking licence in 2009.   
583
 For a list of the projects that CIF claims to be undertaking in Angola, see 
http://www.chinainternationalfund.com/projects1.asp [24 March 2011]. Following the financing difficulties 
experienced by CIF, the Chinese government reportedly stepped in to assist the Angolan government with 
these projects, in order to curry further political favour (Interview, manager, private Chinese importer, Luanda, 
15 July 2010). Indeed, the vice President of ICBC was present at an audience with the Angolan President to 
report on the progress of a housing project Kilamba Kiaxi, formerly to be built by CIF, but now the 
responsibility of Chinese SOE CITIC. (Angop,2011a) This infers that ICBC is involved in the project’s financing. 
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Sinopec as 55 percent shareholder in the joint-venture584, bought a 50 percent stake of 
Block 18 for the reported sum of US$ 725 million (Financial Express, 2006). Sinopec’s entry 
into Angola’s oil blocks was marred by controversy, as it appeared that Shell, the former 
owner of the 50 percent stake had several months previously signed a purchase agreement 
with Indian oil company ONGC Videsh. This deal was however refused approval by the 
national state-owned oil company Sonangol, also the industry’s concessionaire, as Sonangol 
had not been previously consulted. The stake was instead awarded to SSI (Vines et al, 2009: 
17). In late 2004/2005, SSI acquired Block 3/80, owned previously by Total, after Sonangol 
did not renew the French company’s contract (Ferreira, 2008:307).585 Sinopec’s entry into 
Angola also coincided with the announcement of China Exim Bank’s US$ 2 billion loan 
facility to the Angolan government to finance infrastructure reconstruction.  
 
 
Particularly as this was the first entry of a Chinese national oil company into what was 
considered a strategic African country, China Exim Bank is believed to have indirectly 
supported Sinopec’s oil acquisition through the provision of a loan facility (Downs, 2007:53). 
Furthermore, as observed by Lee and Shalmon (2008: 120) although there is no explicit link 
to China Exim Bank’s loan to Angola and the awarding of oil blocks to Sinopec, ‘… there is a 
strong suggestion that they are linked. The coincidence is too great.’   
 
Although China Exim Bank’s loans to Angola are speculated to have assisted Sinopec’s bids 
for Angolan oil blocks, this has not continued to be the case. Indeed, Chinese national oil 
companies are very junior partners in the Angolan oil industry.  
 
It initially appeared that Sinopec had made rapid inroads into Angola’s oil industry. Through 
its shareholding in SSI, Sinopec acquired equity in several other Angola oil blocks, with SSI 
                                                 
584
 There is some controversy as to the ownership of the remaining 45 percent shareholding in SSI. Although it 
was initially widely reported on its formation that Sinopec held 75 percent and Sonangol 25 percent, this 
appears to have changed. Vines et al (2009:42) report the shareholding as Sinopec (55 percent), Beiya (now 
Dayuan) International Development Ltd; (31.5 percent) and China Sonangol (13.5 percent). Wall Street Journal 
(2011) reports that China Sonangol owns the entire remaining 45 percent shareholding.  
585
 This is thought to be in order to ‘punish’ French interests in Angola after French courts opened an 
investigation regarding the sale of arms to the Angolan government during the civil war, dubbed ‘Angola-gate’. 
It was later agreed between Sonangol and Sinopec that China Sonangol would explore this bloc.  
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attaining 27.5 percent, 40 percent and 20 percent in the off-shore blocks 17, 18 and 15 
respectively. The signature bonuses of US$ 1.1 billion of the concessions in block 17 & 18 
were the highest ever offered in the history of Angola’s oil industry (Burke, et al, 2007:37). 
Sinopec had also been in negotiations with the Angolan Government to develop a 200,000 
barrels-per-day oil refinery, Sonaref, at Lobito.  
 
Despite a promising start, Sinopec has now largely retreated.  The refinery deal was called 
off in March 2007, reportedly due to a lack of consensus as to the intended destination of 
the refined product, although it is unclear which side imposed the deal-breaker.  It emerged 
in late 2008 that US engineering firm KBR had been awarded the contract for construction 
on the refinery, then estimated to have a cost of US$ 8 billion.  In October 2008, Sinopec 
and China National Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC) negotiated with Marathon the purchase 
of a 20 percent stake in Bloc 32 for US$ 1.8 billion (Winning & Faucon, 2008). By October 
2009, Angolan national oil company Sonangol, as an existing equity holder, had exercised its 
right of first refusal, blocking the Chinese purchase by announcing its own intention to buy 
it.586  The sale was finalised in February 2010. It was subsequently awarded to China 
Sonangol (see figure 6.3 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
586
 The stake was later reportedly awarded by Sonangol to China Sonangol (Interview, Western oil Company, 
Luanda, 4 May 2010)   
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Figure 6.3 Chinese companies’ shareholding in Angola (2010) 
Shareholder Year Acquired Oil Block Stake (%) Other 
shareholders 
Operator  
SSI 2004 Block 18 50   BP (50%) 
China 
Sonangol 
2005587 Block 3/05 
Block 3/05A 
25 AJOCO (20%); ENI 
(12%); Somoil 
(10%); INA (4%); 
Naftagas (4%) 
 
Sonangol 
(25%) 
SSI 2006 Block 15/06 20 Sonangol (15%); 
Total (15%); Statoil 
(5%); Petrobras 
(5%); Falcon Oil 
(5%) 
ENI (35%) 
SSI 2006 Block 17/06 27.5 Sonangol (30%); 
Falcon Oil (5%); 
ACREP (5%); Partex 
(2.5%)   
Total (30%) 
SSI 2006 Block 18/06 40 Sonangol (20%); 
Falcon Oil (5%) 
Geminas (5%) 
Petrobras 
(30%) 
China 
Sonangol  
2010 Block 31 5 Esso (25%); 
Sonangol (29%); 
Statoil (13.33%); 
Marathon (10%) 
BP (26.67%) 
China 
Sonangol  
2010 Block 32 20 Sonangol (20%); 
Esso (15%); 
Marathon (10%); 
Galp (5%) 
Total (30%) 
Source: Sonangol Concessionary Map
588
, Vines et al (2009:44); Amanat (2011);  
Despite speculations of a link between China Exim Bank’s inaugural loan and Sinopec’s first 
successful bid for equity in block 18 through SSI, there is little evidence to support 
continued preferential treatment at the bidding table for Chinese state-owned oil 
companies due to extensive Chinese loans. Indeed, Chinese companies do not possess the 
technology to exploit Angola’s deep and ultra-deep blocks in the Gulf of Guinea, and as such 
have been side-lined since 2006. (Downs, 2007:46-47).  
                                                 
587
 Confusingly, although the Sonangol concession map portrays China Sonangol as the owner of the 25 
percent stake, Vines et al (2009:44) maintain that while the stake was intended for China Sonangol, it was 
handed over to SSI in 2007. This change does not seem to have been reflected in the concession map, if it 
indeed occurred. 
588
 See Sonangol website: 
http://www.sonangol.co.ao/wps/wcm/connect/1fabe00048cf7ee586d697467ef0967d/GAD-MC-1007004-
I.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=1fabe00048cf7ee586d697467ef0967d  [28 April 2011]  
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Of note is the fact that China Sonangol has been increasingly more successful than Sinopec 
through SSI in acquiring oil blocks. Sonangol, the oil industry concessionaire, owns a far 
greater percentage of China Sonangol than SSI. Sonangol has access to 4.05 percent of SSI 
through its 30 percent shareholding of China Sonangol, which in turn is a 13.5 percent 
shareholder of SSI589. However, Sonangol owns 30 percent of China Sonangol with the result 
that the concessionaire stands to benefit much more from China Sonangol’s rather than 
SSI’s increased oil equity. It is also an indicative of the connections between the Futungistas 
and CIF’s top management.    
 
A Chinese researcher590 admitted that buying equity in Angola was ‘not so easy’.  He 
suggested that the Angolan government was ‘more pragmatic that the Chinese government’ 
about more partners and different footholds, suggesting that the Chinese government 
expected better returns for their loans to Luanda. He suggested that China’s initial entry 
into Angola was expedient purely due to the timely exploitation of circumstance. Indeed, as 
pointed out by Aguilar and Goldstein (2009:1557), Angola is an expert at isolating its oil 
industry from political influence, having achieved this through the Cold War. Consequently, 
contrary to Beijing’s initial thinking, China Exim Bank financing has not facilitated access to 
oil equity.  
 
Once again, this indicates a shift in power from Luanda to Beijing. During the initial 
negotiations in 2003, the Angolan government’s weaker position would have persuaded it 
to agree to Chinese acquisition of oil blocks, despite the Chinese state companies’ lack of 
experience. However, a strengthened situation due to a higher oil price and an increased 
number of financiers several years later has ceded the Angolan government more control. 
Luanda no longer needs to commit to awarding oil blocks to Chinese state companies. In 
                                                 
589
 Even if China Sonangol’s stake in SSI is 45 percent as reported by Wall Street Journal (2011); this would give 
Sonangol an indirect 13.5% in SSI, less than half of its shareholding in China Sonangol if the latter owns oil 
equity directly.   
590
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009 
244 
 
 
 
fact, the very eagerness of the Chinese state to acquire oil equity works in Angola’s favour, 
allowing Luanda to ‘borrow power’ (Betzold, 2010) from China’s own position.  
Figure 6.4 Angola oil exports by Chinese Company (2005-2009) 
Company 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Barrels 
‘000 
USD 
‘000 
Barrels 
‘000 
USD 
‘000 
Barrels 
‘000 
USD 
‘000 
Barrels 
‘000 
USD 
‘000 
Barrels 
‘000 
USD 
‘000 
China 
Sonangol 
  1,970 128,022 2,955 210,643 985 115,537 1,969 143,519 
SSI     3,924 339,664 25,581 2,430,181 25,851 1,607,896 
Source: Angolan Ministry of Petroleum
591
 (2010:26) 
Figure 6.4 shows the oil equity exported by companies with Chinese shareholders. The oil 
equity attributed to the Chinese partners is the percentage of the total corresponding to 
their stake in the company. As noted previously, Sinopec owns 55 percent of SSI, with the 
remaining shareholding owned by private Chinese interests.592 Total Sinopec oil equity 
through SSI is: 11% of Block 15(06), 15.125% of Block 17(06), 22% of Block 18(06), 13.75% of 
Blocks 3(05) and 3(05A), and 27.5% of Block 18 (Vines et al, 2009: 43). 
 
While a secure supply of oil might be forthcoming to the Chinese state, any aspirations the 
Chinese Government may have had of smoothing the entry of its national oil companies into 
Angola’s oil fields have been thwarted. Exim Bank has so far had far more success in 
facilitating the entry of Chinese construction companies into the Angolan market.  
 
Interestingly, while there is a grand debate in the State Council, supported by the Chinese 
oil company lobby, of the importance of oil equity (Chen,2008:90), this may not necessarily 
be the best option for China, if the government is seeking a secure supply.   According to 
Downs (2007:47-48) and Bo (2010:142), control of the energy sector in China is highly 
fragmented and unco-ordinated and the national oil companies (NOCs) represent a 
powerful lobby.593 Chinese oil companies may very well resell their equity oil on the 
international market rather than bring it back to China due to the transport costs involved 
                                                 
591
 Interestingly, ostensibly due to both of these companies being joint ventures between Chinese interests 
and Sonangol as a joint-venture and subsidiary in the case of SSI and China Sonangol respectively, they are 
classified as ‘national companies’ Angolan Ministry of Petroleum (2010).Sonangol began paying tax in 2006 
and SSI in 2007 (Angolan Ministry of Petroleum, 2010: 47). 
592
 See footnote 55. 
593
 Chinese NOCs have even been accused of ‘hi-jacking’ Chinese foreign policy (ICG,2008:17) 
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(Chen, 2008:95). Furthermore, petrol’s price is fixed at lower than market rates in China, 
causing it to be largely a loss-making exercise (Bo, 2010:24). Through the Angolan loan 
agreement however, a secure supply of oil has been acquired for as long as the China Exim 
Bank loan needs to be repaid. It appears that much of this does find its way to China, given 
Angola’s position as a leading oil supplier to China, and this may well be precisely because 
China NOCs do not have control over this oil as it is not oil equity, but governed by a supply 
agreement. Therefore, it is unlikely that they would have the option to resell it on the 
international market.  
 
6.3.4. Not a preferred Creditor  
Higher oil prices and increased production saw Angola reach double digit growth between 
2004 and 2008; GDP grew tenfold between 1997 and 2008 (Croese, 2011:10).  As a result, 
non-concessional lending poured into the country (see chapter 4, figure 4.3). The country 
began developing at a rapid rate, importing capacity where non-tradables could not keep up 
with demand.594  The economic crisis caused the oil price to plunge and consequently, 
government revenues, two thirds of which come from oil receipts (Global Witness, 2011:4) 
suffered a corresponding decrease, resulting in the Angolan government falling into arrears.  
 
The Angolan government eventually confirmed that it had received invoices in arrears 
amounting to US$ 9 billion from foreign construction companies (Almeida, 2010). The 
Portuguese government extended US$ 700 million in credit in order to facilitate the Angolan 
government’s payment of its debt to Portuguese companies (Angop, 2010). A respondent 
commented that it was unusual for credits to be used in this way, but the necessity was 
great, as well as a perceived need to compete with China.595 The Angolan government has 
said it would repay Portuguese companies with bonds; prioritising small and medium firms 
(Reuters, 2010).  
 
                                                 
594
 Interview, economist, multinational financial institution, Luanda, 23 July 2010 
595
 Interview, senior Western diplomat, Luanda, 3 May 2010 
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The Chinese companies did not receive special treatment in relation to other contractors. 
According to one Chinese respondent, the Angolan government refused to sign off on 
invoices that would have released the monies for contract payment.596 During the economic 
crisis in 2008, thousands of Chinese workers were sent home as the projects were stalled 
due to lack of funds. 597 The Chinese Ministry of Commerce estimates that the Chinese 
expatriate worker population was reduced from over 50,000 to 47,000 (MOFCOM,2010a:39); 
but the Chinese Ambassador to Angola confidentially estimated some 25,000598 Chinese 
workers were sent home. Furthermore, the last report from the Angolan Ministry of Finance 
regarding China Exim Bank financed projects was published in June 2008 (see Appendix 3) 
and no further information has since been forthcoming, suggesting a stall in progress.   
 
6.4 Extraversion in the context of China Exim Bank loans 
It is clear from the discussions in the last few chapters that the process of national 
reconstruction facilitated by China Exim Bank’s credit lines is in principle a positive process 
for both countries, espousing the concept of ‘win-win’. However, in practice, the 
implementation has shown that not all parties are equal winners; in fact some are not 
benefitting from the process at all. Consequently, it is visible that gains on the part of 
Angolan government do not necessarily represent gains on behalf of the Angolan population. 
The Angolan elite in general and the Presidency in particular have accrued significant 
benefits several ways.  On a very practical level, the Chinese credit line represents a new 
source of economic rents, centrally controlled by the Presidency in order to preserve 
political dominance as the gatekeeper to such wealth. The President and his closest 
associates have managed to instrumentalize the credit lines for a wider set of objectives and 
subverted the China Exim Bank loan process in order to consolidate and retain both 
economic and political power. Interestingly, the entrance of CIF shows that this subversion 
of official channels of financing has also occurred on the Chinese side, to the benefit of a 
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 Interview, manager, private Chinese importing business, 15 July 2010 
597
 Interview, senior diplomat, Chinese embassy Luanda, 10 May 2010 
598
 The US Ambassador to Angola, Dan Mozena, reported on 27 January 2009 in a confidential diplomatic cable 
leaked by Wikileaks that the Chinese Ambassador Zhang Bolun had mentioned this figure. (See:  http://angola-
luanda-pitigrili.com/archives/8740 [15 January 2011] 
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select group of Angolan actors and their Chinese business partners involved in the 
‘Queensway 88 Group’, to the marked disadvantage of the official Chinese government 
actors.  
 
6.4.1 Balancing International Relations 
Accepting loans from China was politically expedient for the Angolan political elite for 
several reasons. Firstly, Angola had been experiencing difficulties securing other sources of 
capital on conditions acceptable to the dos Santos regime. Particularly since 2005, on the 
back stronger oil prices and Angola’s debt normalisation, Luanda has been approved an 
increasing number of credit lines from a number of countries as noted above.  Aside from 
the material assistance that China’s Exim Bank loans have provided, the provision of funds 
seems to have acted in part as a kind of financial catalyst for other flows of financing.599   
 
An agreement was also put in place for the Angolan Government to service its Paris Club 
debt. The bulk of the US$ 2.3 billion had been paid by December 2007, and plans were 
made to service the US$ 1. 8 billion in interest accrued during the civil war (Kiala, 2010:324). 
It was also hoped that debt regularization will further allow the government to access credit 
from a more diversified portfolio of lender countries, rather than leaning too heavily on 
China.  Thus, while circumstances provided a number of financing alternatives to Luanda, 
the Angolan government has actively been pursuing an agenda to increase the 
opportunities.  
 
Such developments led to a considerable thawing of relations between Angola and the 
international financial institutions. Recall that in 2002, negotiations with the IMF had 
collapsed over the loans’ conditionalities, leading Angola to turn to China for financing. It 
appears that the World Bank has pursued a different approach in order to avoid 
marginalisation by other emerging financiers. The Bank has also been mollified by the 
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 Interview, senior diplomat, Angolan embassy, Beijing, 28 October 2009 
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Angolan Government’s policy of debt normalization in an attempt to move away from using 
oil as collateral for commercial loans. As discussed, the IMF has also made provisions for a 
standby loan of US$ 1.4 billion for Angola (see chapter 4). Indeed, far from alienating 
financial institutions such as IMF and the World Bank as some have claimed (Soares de 
Oliveira, 2007b:295), one could argue that Angola has actively courted them, in order to 
balance China’s influence in the country. Improvements have also been made in terms of 
transparency and access to information, partly in line with the conditions of the IMF stand-
by loan and thus symbolising Angola’s ostensible efforts to reform and improve ‘good 
governance’.  
 
The Angolan government is however adept at making incremental changes that do not 
fundamentally alter the structure of the economy. Instead, these ‘easy’ reforms act as a 
release valve for potential dissension and obfuscate the actual lack of reform occurring (Van 
de Walle, 2001:37); what Migdal (1988:242) calls ‘tokenism’. Indeed, as Global Witness 
notes (2011), increased information does not always lead to increased transparency.  Even 
in the conditions of the IMF loan certain key conditions were waived. Messiant (2008:275) 
argues that the IMF provided the Angolan government with the tools to ignore its own 
prescriptions with impunity. She views the international community as complicit in the 
MPLA’s abuse of political power (Messiant, 2008: 389). Soares de Oliveira (2007b:297) 
points out that the IMF cannot afford to disengage with the Gulf of Guinea states, as this 
will marginalise its role globally. Such concessions continue. Recall the clause inserted into 
the 2009 stand-by agreement allowing Angola to continue to access non-concessional 
financing (see chapter 4). Reno (2000:222) comments that some researchers from the 
international financial institutions value internal political stability above overly zealous 
attempts to dismantle patronage networks, indicating a train of thought that Angola should 
not be pushed too hard to reform.  As a result, the incremental changes that the Angolan 
government does institute are warmly welcomed for what they are at face value, and the 
difficult questions surrounding structural reform are put aside.   
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 Angola, therefore, despite international concerns, particularly in the context of 
strengthening China-Angola relations, will strongly resist becoming or being perceived as a 
client state of any other country and will continue to engage with all international actors. 
Indeed, Martins (2010:1) describes Angola has having a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy, 
managing ‘… to keep a balance of interests regarding foreign intervention in its domestic 
markets’. Angolan is also distinct from most oil states as encouraging Western business 
rather than fostering anti-Western sentiment.600  
 
6.4.2 State Infrastructure Provision and the 2008 National Elections 
Chinese funding has also allowed the Angolan government to initiate a series of prestige 
projects, which may have a tenuous link to development, but have been important in 
galvanizing the regime’s image domestically and internationally.601 The majority of the 
stadiums custom-built for the African Basketball championships held in August 2007 
(Afrobasket) as well as the African Cup of Nations (COCAN) held in January 2010 were 
constructed by Chinese companies. Despite severe delays in the undertaking and numerous 
other difficulties, the stadiums were completed just in time for these events. In theory at 
least, aside from elite gains, the Angolan population is receiving the infrastructure so 
desperately needed, much faster than might otherwise be the case. One Angolan 
respondent commented that Angola would not have been able to achieve this in such a 
short space of time if it were not for the Chinese.602 As one Western machinery importer 
noted cynically:  ‘… all the Angolans are interested in is: “…how soon can it be done, and 
what is the price?”’603. 
 
                                                 
600
 Of course, as pointed out by both Sogge (2009:8) and Soares de Oliveira (2007b:52) the nature of Angola’s 
extroverted economy necessitates that Angolan political elites collaborate with Western business interests in 
order to maintain access to the oil wealth that fuels their patronage networks.    
601
 An Angola respondent commented: ‘The regime is arrogant; they need to be legitimate, to be recognised. 
There was frustration with the national community in the post-war phase…’ (Interview, university academic, 
Luanda, 14 July 2010).  
602
 Interview, Sonangol, Luanda, 2 August 2010. 
603
 Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 Luanda 2010 
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Some of the infrastructure projects have had genuine developmental benefits for Angolan 
citizens. With an eye on the inevitability of national elections, which took place in 2008, the 
ruling party saw the political dividends of public investment in infrastructure. An Angolan 
researcher commented that there were many ‘hidden motives’.604 Many of the works were 
presented as MPLA achievements, rather than government achievements, once again 
blurring the distinction between the party and the state. This calculated merging of ruling 
party and state institutions allowed the MPLA to benefit from the successful delivery of such 
public works. These were particularly important in rural areas where infrastructure was not 
only sorely needed, but MPLA image required bolstering.    
 
The MPLA, Pawson (2008) argues, has used its political dominance to subvert the electoral 
process of September 2008 in order to gain international sanction for the consolidation of 
the ruling party’s hold on power. This resonates with Messiant’s (2007:106) description of 
MPLA manipulation of the previous elections in 1992 in what she terms the ‘consolidation of 
hegemonic power’. The 2008 elections, during which MPLA secured 87 percent of 
parliamentary seats, provided much needed legitimacy to MPLA rule, not only for 
international observers, who declared the ballot ‘free and fair’ (Orre, 2010:8) but for their 
domestic constituencies. Furthermore, the landslide parliamentary victory whereby the 
MPLA achieved 87 percent of the seats facilitated a new constitution which further 
consolidated incumbent power, albeit it in legitimate procedure.605 This indicates the 
importance of the legitimacy conferred by the 2008 elections.   
 
6.5 A Chinese case for ‘win-win’ 
The Chinese government receives several benefits from China Exim Bank’s co-operation 
with them.  Most prominently, as discussed above, while not successful in securing oil 
equity, China has a long-term supply contract in place to ensure loan repayments. This is 
doubly beneficial, given that the crude is shipped back to China, whereas oil equity off-take 
                                                 
604
 Interview, university researcher, Luanda, 28 August 2010. 
605
 For an in-depth discussion of this, see Orre (2010). 
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might be sold on the international market as it is (as explained above) more profitable for 
the Chinese firms to do so.606   
 
In addition, as per its ‘going global’ mandate, the China-Exim Bank-funded infrastructure 
contracts have provided a successful market entry strategy for the larger state-owned 
Chinese companies with little previous experience in the Angolan market. This is, I argue, a 
much greater success story than the initially anticipated access to oil equity. Given their high 
level of risk aversion discussed in chapter four, it is unlikely state-owned Chinese companies 
would have accessed this market without the security provided by China Exim Bank. It is 
specifically state-owned companies that have benefitted directly from this mechanism. It 
seems that even if SOEs are not directly owned by the central government, and may have 
their own agendas (as in the case of provincially owned SOEs) they are still more likely than 
private firms to access state support (Raine, 2009: 195).  
 
 
Furthermore, although dwarfed by Angolan oil imports, Chinese exports to Angola have 
increased substantially under the tied procurement agreements of the loan, as have the 
number of jobs for Chinese labourers as discussed above. Although these numbers are 
insignificant when compared to China’s global figures, Angola forms part of a broader 
positive trend of increased exports and overseas contracting.   
 
Whereas the rationale behind lending substantial funds to Angola may have originally been 
to facilitate the entry of Chinese national oil companies into Angola, China Exim Bank, and 
other actors in Beijing, have had to re-adjust their strategy according to a changing context. 
Should they have been predicated on acquiring oil at source through equity, China Exim 
Bank and other Chinese policy-making bodies involved may be reassessing the motives for 
entering Angola. Chinese oil companies have not received preferential treatment at the 
bidding rounds for oil blocks and are indeed junior players in Angola’s oil industry (figure 
6.3). 
                                                 
606
 The government-capped price of oil prevents Sinopec from passing on the rising costs of petroleum to its 
domestic Chinese customers. In March 2010 Sinopec paid US$ 2.5 billion for Angolan assets owned by its 
parent company in a bid to reduce dependence on refined oil sales in China (China Economic Review, 2011).  
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On China’s part, the China Exim Bank process was designed to minimise corruption (and 
thus financial risk on return) in host countries through bids taking place in China and 
Chinese companies being paid directly by China Exim Bank.607 However, it is evident that this 
has not prevented powerful Chinese SOEs and private Chinese companies from forming 
alliances with Angolan political interests.  
 
However, it continues to be in the Chinese state’s interest to remain aware of the 
consequences of its actions in another sovereign state. From a purely realist perspective this 
is less due to a normative ‘responsibility to develop Africa’ as is implied by much of the 
literature, but because China’s own international image is damaged if it can be presented 
through the rhetoric of others as propping up unsavoury regimes.608   It is important to point 
out that while this thesis argues that China’s engagement with Angola has been a factor in 
the regime’s continued existence, it does not subscribe to the body of literature that asserts 
that China is actively propping up ‘rogue regimes’.  To do so is to once again deny agency on 
the part of the Angolan actors. I conversely argue that Angolan elites have actively 
developed and structured relations in order to consolidate their position. Nevertheless the 
same elites are astute in employing rhetorical language to their own advantage (Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999:117).609  
 
 
                                                 
607
 There also is no evidence of China free-riding off Western debt alleviation (Asche & Schüller, 2008:41). 
Indeed, most Western debt relief programmes are for the poorest countries that are perceived to lack the 
capacity to repay their debts. China’s lending profile is very different, precisely because China Exim Bank lends 
only to those countries with a proven ability to repay their loans. 
608
 The hypocrisy inherent in such rhetorical pronouncements, made often by Western actors is noted. As 
observed one Western respondent: There are so many grey areas in China and Africa. ‘And Europe has shown 
them the way. They are not necessarily doing a better job; they are just not wasting time by repeating the 
same acrobatic relationship’ (Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 July 2010). 
609
 The Angolan government specifically employed a well-oiled public relations campaign throughout the civil 
war, successfully demonising Savimbi for the international community and continually managing to convince 
an exhausted and marginalised domestic population that the war was ‘almost won’ for more than a decade 
(Messiant, 2008:259). The argument is not that Savimbi was unjustifiably vilified, but that he was successfully 
painted as the villain while the MPLA’s own transgressions were left unchecked during the civil war. She thus 
characterises Angolan society as suffering from MPLA repression, rather than Savimbi’s tyranny (Messiant, 
2008:244).   
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6.6 Conclusions  
Angola’s relationship with China has matured from a heady embrace of mutual convenience 
to a reassessment of each other’s strategic significance as partners. Indeed, relations with 
China seem to have formed part of a successful strategy employed to bolster regime 
stability domestically and boost the Angolan government standing internationally.   
 
That the relationship hinges largely on oil, despite its importance, does not bode well for its 
sustainability. Although, as I argue here, construction contracts facilitated by China Exim 
Bank are a much bigger success story than securing oil equity, Angola’s market is too small 
to be considered a coup in the context of China’s go-out strategy. Rather it is required in 
order to balance the widening trade deficit China is running with Angola.  
 
A Chinese researcher610 commented that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce had been 
overwhelmed by the rapid development of China’s commercial relations with Africa, 
resulting in the department falling behind ‘the actual situation’. He added that at the 
Angolan Embassy, the personnel numbers were as they were in the 1990’s, inferring that 
that dramatic increase in commercial relations with this country rushed them off their feet, 
particularly given the bureaucratic procedures involved. This suggests a reduction in agency 
in the Chinese Embassy – perhaps inferring that the important decisions are taken in Beijing 
– more likely by China Exim Bank. It also once again recalls Hirschman’s (1978) ‘disparity of 
attention’ argument in that the embassy of an Africa country that has gradually become 
pivotal in China’s energy security has been neglected. A Chinese respondent commented 
that relations were not as good as widely assumed. In his opinion, dos Santos has not come 
to China that many times, despite the considerable assistance that China has given Angola, 
in the form of infrastructure.611  
 
                                                 
610
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009 
611
 Interview, editor in Chief, Xinhua, Beijing, 6 December 2009 
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For Angola, China remains an important trading partner, whose demand for Angolan crude 
and ready credit lines has taken on increasing significance following the oil price fluctuations 
in the wake of the financial crisis.  Angola, as a key oil supplier to China is of similar 
consequence as a trading partner. Angola is balancing the need to retain China Exim Bank as 
a financing partner with denying the less experienced Chinese national oil companies access 
to exploration blocks that they cannot operate. Should they have been predicated on 
acquiring oil at source through equity, China Exim Bank and other Chinese policy-making 
bodies involved in may be reassessing the motives for entering Angola.  
 
With regards to the Angolan government’s domestic role in the economy, it is clear that the 
MPLA government has rhetorically upheld national reconstruction as a priority since the end 
of the civil war. This is designed to consolidate President Dos Santos’ role as the ‘peace-
maker’, having vanquished UNITA to bring an end to the country’s protracted armed conflict 
in 2002. It is also targeted at bolstering the Angolan government’s internal legitimacy, 
particularly in the run-up to legislative elections which were finally held in 2008.  However, 
despite claiming to promote national reconstruction ‘for the people’, Angola’s population 
has been kept largely separated from the process. Marques de Morais views the Chinese 
credit line as a new avenue for elite enrichment under the guise of national reconstruction. 
He (2001a:73) argues:   
‘Such economic arrangements have insulated the Dos Santos regime from the will of 
the Angolan people, who remain economically and politically irrelevant. China’s new 
prominence is part of an effort by the ruling elite to keep them that way by excluding 
society at large from the task of national reconstruction.’ 
 
The lack of broad-based participation in the China Exim Bank process means that the 
implementation of the construction projects is not rendering as much benefit to local 
industries as it could. The regime is approaching national reconstruction rather as a 
patrimonial provision of services by a paternalistic government in order to reinforce the 
government as the source of all public goods. National reconstruction is thus portrayed as 
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the delivery of a turn-key product rather than an interactive process required to re-establish 
a connection between the rulers and the ruled. Furthermore, it is increasingly a paid for 
service, outsourced to foreigners with no provision for Angolans to maintain or even 
organically expand on what external contractors provide.  Marques de Morais (2011a:71) 
argues that:  
 
‘It [the Chinese role] has enabled a string of political measures aimed at 
perpetuating the power of the president’s inner circle, while setting back internal 
dialogue on national reconstruction even within the ruling party itself. The Chinese 
presence has also spawned a mass fantasy about national goals that bears no 
resemblance to what can really be accomplished—the sheer weight of which, along 
with threats of repression, often silences critics of the Dos Santos regime.’  
 
In rebuttal, Chinese commentators have pointed out that the onus is not on China to 
develop Africa; rather this is the responsibility of African governments themselves.612 Given 
the ease with which the Futungo has incorporated Chinese funding into the consolidation of 
domestic political power, it is unlikely that Angola’s development or lack thereof is a result 
of genuine lack of capacity. It is far more due to a lack of political will and institutions 
weakened by design. Moreover, I argue that the lack of support for broader-based local 
participation in the national reconstruction process is a conscious strategy to prevent the 
creation of economic growth independent of the patronage linkages of the political elite. 
This is to deter political challenges to the ruling party’s control from an alternative economic 
base of power which could contest the regime’s internal legitimacy. 
 
Mustapha (2002) argues that Bayart’s conceptualisation of extraversion, which I have used 
throughout this thesis, is reductionist and deprives the ‘the people’ of political agency, 
reducing them to a ‘passive mass’. For many years, this did not pose an epistemological 
problem. The internal party purge and wide-spread bloodshed that occurred in 1977 
following the Nito Alves coup was used by President Agostinho Neto to oust rivals and 
                                                 
612
 Victor Yu, Managing Director, Standard Resources (China) Ltd, presentation at American Chamber of 
Commerce Event ‘China Outbound: Investing in Africa and Latin America, Shanghai, 16 September 2009 
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consolidate power (Hodges, 2004:46). It is still in living memory, and, coupled with the 
fatigue of several decades of war, is one of the reasons why there had not until 2011 been 
any concerted popular uprisings against dos Santos. 
 
However, since early 2011 MPLA, and more importantly the President’s attempts to 
monopolise Angolan political life started to backfire. Constitutionally all parties failing to 
achieve 1.5 percent of the vote in the 2008 legislative elections became defunct. MPLA’s 
strongest electoral opposition is UNITA, but with just 16 parliament seats and a dependence 
on state funding, it poses no serious challenge. As the only political game in town, for some 
time, the President and his government are directly responsible for the country’s political 
economy. As discussed in chapter one the president sought in his 2010 State of the Nation 
address to dismiss tensions arising from sustained income disparities between Angola’s 
small political elite and the rest of the population as well as widespread corruption.  
 
The passage of time has nevertheless given rise to a generation of jobless and disaffected 
youth with no memory of the civil war or Soviet-style purges. Inspired by the so-called ‘Arab 
Spring’ that toppled dictators like Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi in in 2011, political 
protests have begun to break out sporadically in Luanda capital (although by no means on 
the same scale as those in Egypt and Libya). Between since March and December 2011 and a 
total of six anti-government rallies calling for Dos Santos’ resignation were organised 
through social media (Laxmidas, 2011).  
 
Such unrest is unprecedented and significant in the context of Angola, given the previous 
iron grip of the MPLA and the population’s exhaustion after more than 30 years of conflict. 
In his State of the Nation address in October 2011, President Dos Santos was much more 
conciliatory, admitting to a need for ‘dialogue’ with the youth (Dos Santos, 2011b). ‘Pro-
government’ rallies organised in retaliation have received waning popular support.613 Such 
developments, unthinkable only a few years ago underline the MPLA’s constant 
                                                 
613
 Personal correspondence, Angolan activist, 18 October 2011.  
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vulnerability to weak internal legitimacy.  This indicates that despite a perceived strong 
domestic position, the MPLA government and President dos Santos in particular will be 
forces to engage in ‘survival politics’ and tactics of extraversion in order to retain political 
power.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusions 
Several themes emerged from this body of research. In this chapter I will outline these, as 
well as assess the significance of findings that may contribute to future research.   
 
7.1 Emerging themes 
It is clear from discussions in chapter two that rhetoric is constitutive of China’s relations 
with Africa. This is particularly evident when set in the global context of China attempting to 
balance its own foreign policy aspirations with Western fears that China’s rise is irrevocably 
disrupting the international architecture. China has good reason to cultivate and maintain 
allies in developing countries, especially in the face of such suspicion from the industrialised 
nations. Consequently, Beijing has attempted to alleviate such tensions by projecting itself 
as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ as conceptualised by the West, particularly with regards to 
development assistance, while developing ‘win-win’ partnerships in solidarity with the 
global South.  
 
The tension inherent in a dual role as both a provider of developmental assistance and an 
‘equal partner’ with developing countries is not viewed by Chinese respondents as a 
contradiction. Indeed it was striking how many Chinese businessmen described the Chinese 
role in Angola couched in developmental rhetoric.614 Generally this was emphasised more 
by representatives of SOEs, but not exclusively.  While the commercial opportunities in 
Angola were recognised, many insisted they were there to raise the standards of living of 
the Angolan people and help Angola rebuild itself. One respondent even said:  
‘Coming to Angola has many benefits, but we have also come across many 
difficulties: the government is very corrupt, the police give a lot of hassles, there are 
low levels of work ethic and the roads are not good. The living conditions here are 
                                                 
614
 Interview, manager, private Chinese importing business, Luanda, 15 July 2010; interview, chief executive 
officer of a Chinese import-export company, Luanda, 10 August 2010; interview, secretary of the general Party 
branch, administrative deputy general manager Beijing Construction Engineering Group, Luanda, 10 August 
2010  
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very low, but this is a developing country, in order to serve others we must ‘eat 
bitterness.’615   
 
The broader Chinese foreign policy rhetoric touts China’s engagement with Angola as a 
successful form of South-South co-operation, and a concrete example of China’s 
relationship with African countries bringing tangible development-oriented results to a 
country previously ravaged by a Cold War-fuelled civil conflict and subsequently ignored by 
the international community.  This speaks once more to Jackson’s (1995) characterisation of 
China’s ‘world view’ rather than a ‘regional view. ’China’s growth trajectory is not conveyed 
as a model616 in the sense of providing a blueprint for development, quite the contrary. 
Beijing offers an alternative to engaging solely with Western countries, and advocates 
formulating a development path according to a country’s own specific context (Obiorah, 
2008:4).  
 
However, it is clear that equality between China and Africa, difficult enough to substantiate 
in public rhetoric is not always upheld in personal views. In an illuminating metaphor, a 
senior official from China Exim Bank, in describing the triangular relationship between China, 
Africa and Western countries drew a parallel with a child giving a toy that he was tired of to 
his younger brother. ‘After you have given it to your younger brother, it is not your right to 
tell the younger brother how to play with it.’617  Without reading too deeply into the 
metaphor, it gives a piercing insight into the way China’s relations with Africa are viewed 
and how passivity is attributed to Africa as a continent by this respondent, despite formal 
rhetoric of ‘equal partnership’. At the very least China’s rhetoric about its role in Africa 
smacks of noblesse oblige, implying a superior attitude to African countries. Furthermore, 
China’s engagement with African countries is predicated on the need to alleviate its own 
pressing domestic problems; energy security, securing new export markets and poverty 
                                                 
615
 Interview, chief executive officer of a Chinese import-export company, Luanda, 10 August 2010 
616
 Of interest however is that some countries see China as providing a kind of ‘model’ for their engagement 
with Angola. Japan, on whose original foreign aid methods China’s own development financing is based, has 
announced a development assistance package for Angola similar to China’s approach, albeit in smaller volumes. 
(Angop, 2011b)  
617
 Interview, China Exim Bank, Beijing, 15 January 2010 
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alleviation are far more important drivers of China’s foreign policy than South-South 
solidarity (Cargill, 2010:37).  
 
From a more institutional standpoint, as regards Chinese foreign policy, Li Ruogu, President 
of China Exim Bank has repeatedly emphasised what he sees as the unrequited success of 
Chinese firms in Africa, both commercially and as having produced results where Western 
assistance agents have failed. He sees China Exim bank for example as much more efficient 
than the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), particularly in the case of African countries:  
 
‘Take DRC, unfortunately it is the only way to get development – use resources for 
development capital. China is dedicated to helping African countries. We are in 50 
countries in Africa and 130 countries globally… Angola has been helped by China 
with over 100 projects. It has proceeded well. Over the past three years 50-60 
projects have been completed. Both [countries] benefit from this and continue to do 
so.’ 618 
 
Increased Chinese engagement on the African continent, while sparking reactions from the 
international community, has further led to confrontations regarding civil society within the 
continent and foreign non-state actors. Many international business groups have accused 
Chinese companies of low labour and environmental standards in their protests against 
market entry of Chinese companies. These allegations are often dismissed by the African 
host governments as ‘sour grapes’. Furthermore, numerous examples of substandard 
environmental practices by Western companies have seriously diminished the credibility of 
Western-supported lobby groups for important issues of this nature, regardless of their 
saliency. Li Ruogu is dismissive of so-called Western standards, arguing that they are 
inappropriate for developing countries: 
                                                 
618
 Li Ruogu, President of China Exim Bank, Presentation at the Tsinghua University School of Public Policy and 
Management Lecture Series, Beijing, 11 January 2010  
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‘You need one or two generations to sacrifice; don’t believe the human rights 
advocates, they are simply put in the wrong time. They are forcing these things 
which are results of growth, not pre-conditions.’619 
 
This has led commentators such as Richardson (2010) to suggest that China’s engagement 
with Africa: ‘… has gone beyond simply a relationship based on trade to a boom in 
investment that is challenging the classic development paradigms established by Western 
IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank’. Circumstances differ in this regard from country to 
country in Africa. In the case of Angola, such claims are overstated. IMF’s continued 
engagement with Angola has been encouraged by Luanda, not least to balance China’s 
influence.  
 
Chapter three outlined China’s relations with Africa within the context of foreign policy 
more generally, paying particular attention to the development of the China Exim Bank loan 
structure to developing country governments. Far from the ‘grand strategy’ concept 
espoused by Pehnelt & Abel (2007:9), Chinese strategic foreign policy, as discussed by Bo 
(2010:81), is developed incrementally, largely on a trial and error basis and often as a 
dialogue between principles and agents i.e. the various government bureaucracies and 
state-owned enterprises themselves.  
 
Although Chinese foreign policy overtures to African countries have increased, this must be 
taken in the context of a more global outreach generally. As Cargill notes (2010:32) ‘There is 
huge interest in China’s African involvement, probably disproportionately large outside 
China compared to within it’. Nevertheless, Chinese diplomatic and commercial activity on 
the continent has increased dramatically from a very low base; despite Africa not being a 
foreign policy priority relative to other concerns. 
 
                                                 
619
 Li Ruogu, President of China Exim Bank, Presentation at the Tsinghua University School of Public Policy and 
Management Lecture Series, Beijing, 11 January 2010 
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An important reason for this, naturally, is China’s need for natural resources, particularly 
petroleum620, in which Angola, in terms of securing a long-term supply, has been 
instrumental. However, new foreign markets are just as important as a release valve for the 
excess domestic capacity present in nearly all China’s productive sectors. A Western 
respondent observed: ‘Africa is a necessary terrain, to practice “going out”.  The Chinese 
couldn’t do it in Europe, they would be “crucified”; they can’t in the US - it’s all funds, loans 
and stock. In Latin America it would never have worked. In this “virgin” continent it allows 
them to do what they needed, the only one is Africa.’621  
 
Africa is thus an important stepping stone in Chinese companies’ internationalisation, 
providing crucial lessons in a less challenging environment than would be provided by other 
markets. 
  
When put in historical context, it appears that China and Angola’s hasty partnership dating 
from 2004 was a strategic action to address both state’s pressing needs at the time. China 
was experiencing a crippling energy crisis; this period also coincided with the ‘going global’ 
policy having been officially endorsed by the top Chinese leadership.622 The Angolan 
government’s oil wealth, which was experiencing financing difficulties just at that time, may 
have seemed to present a perfect solution. From the perspective of Beijing, several years on 
the question has been raised as to whether such relations are sustainable as they currently 
stand.623 Far from serving as a kind of ‘model’ for other resource rich countries’ relations 
with China, it has been suggested that the strategic partnership forged between Luanda and 
Beijing was done so at an opportune moment of equal need, for financing and oil resources 
                                                 
620
 Bo (2010:65) notes that from 1992 – 2009, 63 out of 208 investment projects took place in Africa, denoting 
the region’s  importance in terms of China’s oil-related foreign policy. 
621
 Interview, Western construction equipment importer, Luanda, 15 July 2010 
622
 As discussed by Bo (2010:41) Chinese NOCs had been engaging in overseas operations for more than a 
decade before the central leadership realised its importance to the economy and promoted it as a general 
trend for other sectors to follow.  
623
 Interview, Chinese think tank, Beijing, 16 October 2009 
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respectively.624 This speaks to Angola seizing a ‘window of time’ (Habeeb, 1988:34) which 
presented a unique opportunity. 
 
Furthermore, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in view of previous involvement in 
Angola’s history, may have felt it politically expedient to conclude a deal, overruling any 
reservations that that Exim Bank may have harboured.625 The outcome of the arrangement, 
has, contrary to the expectations of some, not rendered Chinese oil companies greater 
access to Angola oil blocks, although supply of oil as collateral has been secured.  Despite 
China providing Angola with substantial financing, this has not facilitated Chinese NOC entry 
into the oil industry.  Chinese companies will continue to bid for oil blocks in Angola, but 
their progress has been slow. As regards the ‘going global ’ policy,   China Exim Bank has so 
far had far more success in facilitating the entry of Chinese construction companies into the 
Angolan market. China Exim Bank has been largely successful in opening the door for a 
number of Chinese private and state-owned construction enterprises with guaranteed 
project contracts and procurement shipments totalling several billion dollars. Chinese 
construction projects under the China Exim Bank credit line are continuing, with US$ 2.5 
billion in projects reportedly having been executed as of June 2008 and phase III of the 
national reconstruction programme underway (GAT, 2008b:2).  Chinese companies have 
more than US$ 22 billion worth of new contracts signed as of mid-2009 in Angola alone (see 
Chapter 5, figure 5.1). Consequently, engagement in Angola could be considered a 
remarkable success as regards the China Exim Banks’ mandate to promote Chinese goods 
and services. Larger state-owned Chinese companies have entered Angola largely on the 
back of the China Exim Bank credit line, as these state financing structures mitigated the risk 
that would otherwise have prevented these Chinese firms from entering the little known 
Angolan market.  
 
Significantly, the oil repayments provide China with secure long-term supply of oil. Angolan 
exports to China have increased considerably since the China Exim Bank credit line 
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 Interview, Chinese research institute, Beijing, 9 September 2009 
625
 Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 29 October 2009 
264 
 
 
 
agreement (see chapter 4, figure 4.6). This seems to point to the fact that the oil is indeed 
shipped to China, rather than resold on the international market. That the oil must be sold 
directly to the Chinese state (rather than to a Chinese NOC) is particularly important for 
China to build up its strategic reserves. As Bo (2010:93) notes, Chinese NOC’s oil equity is 
often not sent back to China, but sold on the international market at a higher price than can 
be achieved in China, where the price of oil is controlled. The arrangement between China 
and Angola thus bypasses the Chinese NOC, alleviating this strategic concern.  
 
Turning to the implementation of the projects discussed in chapter five; while there are 
arguably benefits from the physical infrastructure provided as a result of the Chinese 
contracts, the monitoring of the project execution is questionable. Furthermore, Chinese 
companies’ interaction with Angolans on a commercial level is very weak, limiting 
opportunities for broader economic stimulation through the reconstruction process itself. 
This is due to a number of factors; the nature of the Chinese government loans which are 
specifically a mechanism to ensure that a large proportion of the procurement comes from 
China (thus reducing China’s trade deficit with Angola) and attempted risk mitigation due to 
Chinese companies’ lack of local market knowledge.  
 
In many cases the Chinese companies’ competitive advantage lies in their ability to deliver 
projects faster and cheaper than their competitors, encouraging quick builds to maximum 
cost and time efficiency. This leaves little room for local content development. Loans from 
foreign governments, linked to purchasing their national companies’ goods and services, 
especially such as those from China, further reduces the ability of local firms to enter the 
value chain. A dire lack of training and capacity in a working population that has just 
emerged from more than three decades of civil war worsens the situation. However, this 
situation is exacerbated by Angola’s weak institutional framework, lack of political will on 
the Angolan government’s part, vested interests preventing local content policy 
implementation and lack of capacity in the local market.  
 
As outlined in chapter six, the Angolan elite have leveraged its growing relationship with 
China on several levels: the international, the national and the regional. In the past few 
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years Luanda has acquired access to various lines of credit from a variety of different 
partners. This points to the Angolan government’s successful strategy of diversification of 
finance sources, compared to its situation immediately following the end of the civil war.    
The Angolan government, always fiercely protective of its sovereignty, eschewed an IMF 
structural adjustment package in 2003 for China’s less interventionist financing. Considered 
a ‘quick-fix’ at the time, Luanda continues to be wary of allowing Chinese interests to hold 
too much sway in the economy. The standby loan agreement drawn up six years later in 
2009 between the IMF and Angola points not only to a rapprochement between the African 
country and the BWI, but is also a determined effort to balance China’s perceived influence 
in the economy. It sends a clear message that Angola is willing to engage with other 
potential partners. Nevertheless, Chinese financing has been important. It is viewed in some 
quarters626 as having acted as a kind of catalyst in attracting financing from other countries.   
 
Regionally, Angola is playing a more active and influential role in forums such at the African 
Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Weimar, 2009:4). 
Despite Sogge’s (2009:10) dismissal of Angola’s interest in regional bodies such as SADC, he 
does point to Angola’s resurgence of interest in the Nigeria-initiated Gulf of Guinea 
commission, now headquartered in Luanda. Dos Santos, as the region’s longest serving head 
of state, and leader of the second largest economy after South Africa, is accorded new 
respect (Mangena, 2011). Furthermore, Angola became the President of OPEC in 2009, two 
years after becoming its newest member in January 2007.   
 
On the domestic front, in the early years following the end of the civil war, China Exim 
Bank’s loans provided the means to begin national reconstruction. Aside from its practical 
necessity following the destruction of the civil war, the MPLA government has utilised 
Chinese financial assistance to kick-start a state-building process through which the 
government, controlled by the ruling party, could consolidate political and economic power. 
It also lent credence to the narrative of national reconstruction employed by the 
government. This was essential from the perspective of political survival and proved 
                                                 
626
 Interview, senior official, Angolan Embassy, Beijing, 28 October 2009 
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successful, given the MPLA’s landslide victory in the legislative elections of 2008. This is 
what Hodges (2004: 169) calls ‘manufactured legitimacy’.  The ruling parties’ continued 
control of the credit lines ensured a monopolisation of both the process and the economic 
rents it implies. Despite a rash of policies and public overtures concerning economic 
diversification and local participation, the economy’s fundamental structural contradictions 
have not been addressed. Anti-government protests although only in their infancy, are 
appearing in unprecedented fashion. This underlines the weakness of the Angolan state 
discussed in detail in chapters one and six. This thesis has demonstrated the political 
adaptability of the Angolan regime to navigate its internal and external weaknesses with 
remarkable ‘behavioural power’ (Habeeb, 1988:34). However, the political turn of events 
indicates that the Angolan government will have to further innovate or risk losing its grip on 
power.  
 
7.2 Evaluating the ‘strategic partnership’  
In evaluating the nature of the so-called ‘strategic partnership’ between Angola and China, 
what emerges is a picture far more complex than previous analyses suggest.   
 
Given that Angola has been China’s top African trading partner since 2007, there is a marked 
disparity in the level of China-Angola trade and the corresponding level of China-Angola 
investment, relative to other resource-rich African countries.  With US$ 195.5 million, 
Angola ranked 11th in terms of its Chinese FDI stock in 2009, albeit that Chinese FDI stock in 
the top 10 African countries were more than double that of Angola’s. In 2009, Chinese FDI 
accounted for 1.12 percent of Angola’s total FDI stock (MOFCOM, 2010b; UNCTAD, 2010). 
This seems to infer that while Angola is considered an important source of oil, particularly 
within the West African region, Chinese companies do not regard Angola as a strategic 
location for investment, beyond acquisitions in the oil industry. This may change given the 
recent interest of additional Chinese banks such as ICBC and CDB. However as it stands, 
according to Vines et al (2009:47) the Angolans themselves suggest that Chinese interests in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo will eclipse those in Angola. Furthermore, various Chinese 
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think-tanks have voiced the opinion that South Africa is in fact considered to be a more 
strategic African partner.627 
 
This may be explained by several factors. Firstly, Angola’s investment climate is severely 
lacking (see chapter 4, figure 4.5). The African country is ranked by the World Bank’s 2011 
‘Doing Business report’ as 163 out of 181628.  According to this report, although ranked 59th 
for ‘protecting investors’, Angola has a ranking of 164 for starting a business and 181 for 
‘enforcing a contract’. There is little wonder therefore that most Chinese construction 
companies’ entry into Angola’s market has been through a tightly managed high-level 
bilateral agreement between the Angolan government and China Exim Bank or CIF. 
Furthermore, Angola, due to its relative lack of infrastructure and integration into the 
Southern African region, a legacy of decades of civil war, is not a strategic location of export-
oriented manufacture, nor is it a particularly attractive market, with a population of 
approximately 18 million, almost 80 percent of which are considered to be impoverished. 
Chinese companies benefit predominantly from the Angolan government’s oil-fuelled public 
investment programme facilitated by China Exim Bank. Investment outside of this credit line 
is not substantial as yet.    
 
Where Chinese companies are interested in investing is in the oil sector. The Angolan 
government, which for decades has directed the Angolan oil industry through its parastatal 
company Sonangol, has been less open to Chinese investment in the oil industry than 
originally expected.  As noted in chapter 6, several blocks that various Chinese national oil 
companies had shown a keen interest in purchasing, were denied them. This may well be for 
pragmatic reasons; Chinese companies have yet to develop the technology required to 
exploit deep and ultra-deep water oil resources, indeed, they have been looking to learn 
such techniques in partnership with Western oil majors in Angola. Nevertheless, it sends a 
strong political message to Beijing,  and points to shrewd management of the oil industry on 
                                                 
627
 Interview, Chinese research institute, Shanghai, 17 September 2009; Chinese research institute, Beijing, 16 
October 2009 
628
 See:  http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/angola/ [23 March 2011]  
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the part of the Angolan government, whose management of increasing Chinese interest in 
the oil sector has been much more deft than Nigeria’s (Vines, et al,2009).    
 
7.3 Contribution to Research 
This work has contributed to literature that emphasises African agency as a key tenet in 
analysing Africa’s international relations. Critically it has linked the conceptualisation of 
Angola as a weak state domestically to its behaviour as a perceived weak state in the 
international system. Angola’s internal and external weaknesses are linked firstly by Bayart’s 
concept of extraversion, but also as mutually interacting circumstances as described by 
Putnam’s (1988) ‘two level game.’  This recognises the ability of African actors in carving 
policy spaces despite the lack of a ‘level playing field’ in international fora. It also however, 
signifies responsibility for the development trajectory of African countries. Rather than 
attributing their current contexts to path dependencies, it must be recognised that the 
actions of the leadership are at least as important, and as a result, they must accept most of 
the responsibility for the outcome of such actions (Soares de Oliveira, 2007b:124).  
 
Conceptually, this work also underlines the constitutive nature of rhetoric in shaping 
perspectives surrounding China and African countries’ relations with each other and 
necessarily with the West. Both China and, in this specific case, Angola, are leveraging their 
mutual bilateral relations in order to elevate their standing internationally, and thus their 
relations vis-à-vis Western countries, the nominal architects of the current global political 
system. As such, political rhetoric is of utmost importance and cannot be isolated from a 
discussion of China-Africa relations, given that both parties use rhetoric as a tool to achieve 
certain concrete goals, as discussed. Thus, in taking the use of the rhetoric seriously, the use 
of Chinese-language literature and Angolan sources has been important in developing a 
valid discussion. 
 
From an empirical standpoint, the mechanisms of the China Exim Bank loan in general and 
to Angola is particular have been illuminated. This serves to quash several preconceptions. 
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Firstly, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is indeed in existence publicly available 
documentation from both Chinese and Angolan sources, about the general loan structure 
and the projects it finances respectively, albeit not in the English language.629 A more valid 
concern is the level of reliability of this information.  
 
However, even with these concerns, it is evident that an ‘Angola Model’ does not exist apart 
from the superficial description of a financing mechanism that is secured with a barter 
arrangement. As noted in previous chapters, China has neither secured a preferential oil 
price (unlike other commercially arranged loans) nor has it secured preferential market 
access to oil equity on a long-term basis. Chinese companies do have secure market access 
to construction contracts, but this is not different from the companies of other countries 
that have also extended export buyer’s credits to Angola, such as Brazil and Portugal. The 
difference in China’s case is of course the size of the financing amounts. This 
notwithstanding, Angola’s political elite has proven adept in managing relations with China, 
and the Chinese government cannot not lay claim to untoward political influence in Angola. 
They remain as posited by Campbell & Chaulia (2009:44) ‘unequal equals’.   
 
Consequently, from the analysis in this chapter, we can see that ‘win-win’ is largely 
accorded to political elites in both countries, and business interests that form part of their 
patronage networks. One key distinction however, is that whereas the Chinese political 
leadership have arguably succeeded in large-scale poverty reduction630 in addition to the 
success of state institutions and companies, in the Angolan case, at least for now, the 
accumulation of state power is done at the expense of the Angolan people.   
 
  
                                                 
629
 The China Exim Bank website does contain an English language explanation of Chinese government 
concessional loans, but it is much less detailed than the Chinese version. Compare 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/businessarticle/activities/loan/200905/9398_1.html [English version] with 
http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/yewuarticle/yewu/youhuidk/200811/7639_1.html [Chinese version] 
630
 According to Kiala (2009:314) China has lifted 400 million people out of poverty since the 1980’s.  
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Appendix 1: Chinese companies in Angola (May 2010) 
 
Rank Name Investment Type Sector Locally 
Registered 
Head Office 
1 Sinohydro Contract Civil Engineering In process Beijing 
2 China 
National 
Construction 
and 
Agricultural 
Machinery 
Corporation 
(CAMCO) 
Contract, Trade Mechanics In process Beijing 
3 Sinomach Contract Civil Engineering No Beijing 
4 China North 
Industries 
Group 
Corporation 
(NORINCO) 
Contract Technology 
Industry 
Investment 
Yes Beijing 
5 ZTE Trade, Contract Communications 
Engineering 
Yes Shenzhen 
6 Sinopec Resource 
Exploration 
Oil Exploration In process Beijing 
7 CITIC 
Construction 
Contract Contract 
Engineering 
In process Beijing 
8 China 
Jiangsu 
International  
Contract Investment, 
Trade 
Yes Nanjing 
9 CGCOC 
Group 
Contract Engineering, 
Trade 
Yes Beijing 
10 Chongqing 
Guangsha 
Contract Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Chongqing 
11 Golden Nest 
International 
Contract, 
Manufacturing 
Engineering, 
Manufacturing 
Yes Xi’an 
12 Highsee Iron 
and Steel 
Group 
Company Ltd 
Contract, 
Manufacturing 
Contract 
Engineering 
In process Dandong 
13 Nanjing 
Zhongtai 
Contract Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Nanjing 
14 Angola 
Huafeng 
Contract, 
Property 
Developers 
Engineering, 
Trade 
Yes Qingtian, 
Zhejiang 
province 
15 Fujian 
Sanming 
Processing Manufacturing Yes Sanming, 
Fujian 
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Auto 
Industry 
province 
16 Zhejiang 
Zhongsheng 
Trade Developers Building 
Materials 
Freight 
Yes Hanzhou 
17 Guangde 
International 
Company Ltd 
Construction, 
Trade 
Construction, 
Trade 
Yes Beijing 
18 Anan 
International 
Holdings Ltd 
Contract Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Hefei 
19 Huaxi-
Haishan 
International 
Group 
Contract, Trade Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Nantong, 
Sichuan 
20 Guangxi 
Water 
Resources 
and Electric 
Power 
Group Co. 
Ltd, 
Construction Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Nanning 
21 Guanxi 
Tiezhou Fish 
Industries 
Manufacturing, 
Trade 
Fishing, 
Processing, 
Sales 
Yes Dalian 
22 Tianhe 
Chemicals 
Transport/Freight Customer Goods 
Freight 
Yes Liaoning 
23 China Road 
and Bridge 
Corporation 
Engineering 
Company 
Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Beijing 
24 Huawei 
Technologies 
Communications Contract 
Engineering, 
Sales 
Yes Beijing 
25 Pan-China 
Construction 
Construction Contract 
Engineering 
No  Shenzhen 
26 China 
Railway 20th 
Bureau 
Construction Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Xi’an 
27 China 
Railway 4th  
Bureau 
Construction Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Beijing 
28 Transtech 
Engineering 
Company 
Construction Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Chengdu 
29 China 
Harbour 
Engineering 
Construction Contract 
Engineering 
Yes Beijing 
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Company 
Ltd. 
Source: 商务部对外投资合作国别指南：安哥拉（2010） 
[MOFCOM Country Guide to Foreign Investment and Co-operation: Angola (2010)] 
 
Goldstein (2007) lists other construction market players as: 
 China National Overseas Engineering Corporation (COVEC), 
 China National Machinery Industry Complete Engineering Corporation (Complant), 
 Shanghai Urban Construction Group,  
 Hunan Engineering Group Corporation,  
 Qingdao Construction Group Corporation 
The Angolan Consulate in Macau lists in addition as ‘large Chinese companies with projects 
in Angola’:  
 
 China State Ship-building Corporation (CSSC),  
 Sinosteel Corporation,  
 Top Builders International Angola Lda631,  
 Wuhan Iron and Steel, China International Machinery Building International,  
 China International Fund, Geocapital.632   
Afrodad (2008:35) lists the following as well: 
 
 Agir Huang-Mecanical & Electrical Company, Ltd 
 Lucky Man Angola Development, Ltd 
 Preseana Tian He-Indústria, Comércio Geral, Importação and Exportação 
 S.A.S.L.- Sociedade Angolan de Siderurgia 
 Yewhing (Angola)-Comércio and Indústria, Ltd 
 Ancon Construtora, Ltd 
 Baroque- Construction and Empreendimentos, Ltd 
 China State Construction Engineering Corporation 
 Gaki-Soc. De Empreendimentos, Ltd 
 Gotica Construction, Ltd 
 Immobile Activities, Rentals and Service Delivery Companies 
 BGP-Geophysical, Ltd 
 China Yideli (Angola) Co. Ltd 
 Chinangol, Ltd 
 Soniamar, Ltd 
 Trusvest-Comércio Geral, Importação and Exportação, Ltd 
 Yanming Angola, SA 
                                                 
631
 Based in the Special Administrative Region of Macau 
632
 Report issued by the Angolan Consulate in Macau: ‘Angola’ (2010) 
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Appendix 2: Official Bilateral Co-operation 
 
High-level visits between China and Angola: 
Chinese dignitaries’ visits to Angola633 
 
May 1983   Gong Dafei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
August 1989   Qian Qichen, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
August 1995   Zhu Rongji, Vice Premier of the State Council 
April 1996   Li Zhaoxing, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
September 1997  Ji Peiding, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs 
January 2001   Tang Jiaxuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
October 2001   Li Tieying, Politbureau member, CCP Central Committee  
April 2002 Wang Wenyuan, Vice President, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Committee 
July 2002   Yang Wenchang, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
September 2004  Yang Zilin, President of China Exim Bank634 
March 2004   Zeng Peiyan, Vice Premier of the State Council 
February 2005   Zeng Peiyan, Vice Premier of the State Council635 
July 2005   Lu Xinhua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
                                                 
633
 Source: Angolan Embassy in China (2008:17); Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2914  [28 February 2011]; Macauhub: 
http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2011/03/17/china%E2%80%99s-deputy-prime-minister-wang-qishan-
starts-african-tour-in-angola-thursday  [17March 2011] ); Chinese Economic Counsellor’s office: 
http://ao2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bilateralcooperation/inbrief/200411/20041100003882.html  [5 May 2011]; 
Angop: http://allafrica.com/stories/200804171177.html [5 May 2011]; Angop: 
http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2010/6/27/Eximbak-China-anuncia-novo-
emprestimo-para-Angola,a12bf85d-b9c2-4a37-b08b-41dd035c8a37.html  [5 May 2011] 
634
 He met with the Angolan Ministers of Petroleum and Finance, the CEO of Sonangol and the governor of the 
National Bank of Angola (Ferreira, 2009:297).  
635
 Vice Premier Zeng was accompanied by Wang Yang, Departmental Secretary of the State Council; Deputy 
Minister of Trade Wei Jianguo; Zhang Guobao, Minister in the National Development Commission; Cai Xiyou, 
Vice-President of Sinopec and a number of ranking officials from the Defence and Foreign ministries.  They met 
with Defense Minister Kundy Payama, Deputy Prime Minister Aguinaldo Jaime, Finance Minister José Pedro 
Morais, GRN Chairman General Helder Vieira, Sonangol CEO Manuel Vicente, among others (ERA, 2009:38).  
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November 2005  Jiang Yaoping, Vice Minister of Information 
June 2006   Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council 
September 2007  Li Ruogu, President of China Exim Bank 
April 2008 Gao Jian, Deputy President China Development Bank, head of 
China-Africa Development Fund  
January 2009   Chen Deming, Minister of Commerce 
March 2009   Jiang Zengwei, Vice Minister of Commerce  
March 2009   Chen Yuan, President of China Development Bank 
October 2009 Yan Kaisheng, President of Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China 
July 2010   Li Ruogu, President of China Exim Bank   
November 2010  Xi Jinping, Vice President 
March 2011   Wang Qishan, Vice Premier of the State Council 
May 2011 Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress 
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High-level visits between China and Angola: 
Angolan Dignitaries’ visits to China636 
 
October 1988   Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President 
November 1993 Fernando José de França Dias Van Dunem, Speaker of the 
National Assembly 
March 1994   De Mora, Minister of Foreign affairs 
September 1998  Lopo do Nascimento, MPLA Secretary General  
October 1998   Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President  
May 2000   Kundy Payama, Defence Minister 
May 2000   João Lourenço, MPLA Secretary General  
May 2001   Roberto de Almeida, Speaker of the National Assembly 
March 2004   Manuel Vicente, CEO of Sonangol 
May 2004   Fernando da Piedade dos Santos, Prime Minister 
May 2004   João Bernardo de Miranda, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
September 2004  Jose Pedro de Morais, Angolan Minister of Finance 
June 2005 General Agostinho Nelumba Sanjar, Commander of the 
Angolan Armed Forces 
September 2006  Joaquim Icuma Muafuma, Minister of Commerce  
September 2006  Irene Neto, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
November 2006  Fernando Piedade Dias dos Santos, Prime Minister 
October 2007   Antonio Burity da Silva, Minister of Education 
August 2008   Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President  
December 2008  Jose Eduardo dos Santos, President  
April 2011   Manuel Vicente, CEO, Sonangol  
                                                 
636
 Source: Angolan Embassy in China, (2008:17); Ferreira (2009:297); Campos and Vines (2007:4); Chinese 
Economic Counsellor’s office: 
http://ao2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bilateralcooperation/inbrief/200411/20041100003882.html  [5 May 2011] 
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Bilateral agreements signed between China and Angola637 
22 December 1988  Cultural Accord 
8 September 1990 Cultural and Educational Cooperation and Execution 
Programme; Protocol on Conditions of Chinese specialists to 
Angola  
August 1991    Credit Accord of RMB 50 million 
October 1997  A Framework Agreement on Preferential Credit provided by 
the Chinese government to the Angolan government 
October 1998   (During President dos Santos’ state visit to China) 
    Donation of RMB 5 million 
General Accord for bilateral economic and technical co-
operation worth RMB 30 million 
Cooperation Protocol between the Angolan Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade 
Cooperation Protocol between the China and Angolan 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs   
February 2005  (During Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan’s state visit to Angola) 
    Energy, mining and infrastructure agreements; 
The re-establishment of a bilateral cooperation commission; 
Technical cooperation that included a new loan from the 
Chinese Government to Angola, of US$ 6.3 million; 
Cooperation between the ministries of Oil, Geology and 
Mining of Angola and China National Commission on 
Development and Reform; 
Long-term supply agreement between Sonangol and Sinopec; 
MOU linked to a joint study on the oil exploration of Angola's 
Block 3/05 (formerly Block 3/80), between Sonangol and 
Sinopec; 
                                                 
637
 Source: Angolan Embassy in China (2008:17); ERA (2009:38) 
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MOU on the joint exploration of new Angola’s proposed oil 
refinery, Sonaref; and 
A new telephone network cooperation contract between 
Chinese ZTE Corporation International and the Angolan firm 
Mundostartel, estimated at US$69 million;   
 
Angola-China Joint Economic and Trade Commission Meetings638 (est.October 1988) 
December 1999 
May 2001 
March 2007 
March 2009
                                                 
638
 Source: Ferreira, (2009:297), Alves (2010:5)  
APPENDIX 3639:  
Projects financed by the China Exim Bank Credit Line  
First US$1 billion tranche of US$ 2 billion loan signed on 2 March 2004 
Phase 640I: (as of 31 December 2007) 
Sector Project Contractor 
 
Contract Value 
(US$) 
Contract 
Signed 
Contract 
Start 
Date 
Projected 
Handover 
date 
Initial Payment 
(US$) 
Financed (US$) No, of 
Angolan 
workers 
No, of 
Chinese 
workers 
Transport Support to bus 
transport641 (250 
vehicles) 
 13,840,468.00 09/08/04 27/12/04      
Education
642 
Construction of 2 
agriculture schools 
in Huambo and Bié 
Sinohydro 
 
45,562,685.12 4/03/05 19/10/05 20/08/05 4,556,268.51 41.006,416.61 98 41 
 Construction of 
agricultural school 
in Malange 
CMEC 
 
19,950,351.06643 
16,950,351.06 
10/03/05 09/03/06 20/03/07 1,695,035.11 15,255,315.95   
 Construction and 
equipping of 3 
CMEC 17,959,601.79 10/03/05 20/03/06 30/04/07
644; 
1,795,960.17 16,163,641.55 15645 39 
                                                 
639
 All information presented in these tables is from GAT reports (2007a; 2007b; 2008a; 2008b) and their appendices. Translation is author’s own 
640
 All projects were assigned a due diligence consultant. These were variously PROFISCON; SOAPRO; Consulprojecto, AMBIO,TILCA, TECNO4, FZ Trading, Internel, Gamek, 
ANHERC, Dar-Al- Handasah (Angola); Gestão de Consultoria e Investimento, Africonsult, FASE, SIPCA and Interserviços. 
641
 Of the 250 vehicles, they were assigned as follows: ‘former combatants’ (189); ‘for distribution (non-conformity of documentation)’ (23); ‘delivered to the Military 
House’ (25); ‘reserved’ (10); ‘special cases’ (3). (GAT, 2007b:8). The three reserved vehicles were sent to local government projects. A provincial breakdown of the vehicles 
sent to former combatants is also provided (GAT,2007b:9)  
642
 According to the report issued by GAT (2007b:6),  US$ 147.309.415.00 were set aside for ‘complementary projects’ in order for the projects to ‘confer a larger impact’  
643
 The values for this project are different in the report (GAT, 2007:3) and the appendix I citing the financial position of the projects under execution as of 20 July 2007 in 
the same report. The appendix cites the smaller amount. 
644
 Where there is more than one date, each component of the contract had a separate start and handover date.  
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secondary schools 
in Luanda, 1 in 
Benguela 
30/04/07; 
12/07/07; 
25/07/07  
 Construction and 
equipping of 4 
technical schools in 
Luanda, 4 in 
Benguela 
CMEC 58,938,709.20 10/03/05 20/03/06 22/05/07; 
22/05/07; 
20/05/07; 
20/05/07; 
20/05/07; 
12/04/07 
5,893,870.92 53,044,838.28   
 Construction of 2 
secondary schools 
in Malange 
Sinohydro 7,978,297.20 10/03/05 20/03/06 18/09/07 797,829.72 7,180,467.48 71 33 
 Construction of a 
technical institute 
and a secondary 
school in Huila 
Sinohydro 14,313,018.63 10/03/05 17/04/06 11/10/07 1,431,301.86 12,881,716.77 150 47 
 Construction and 
equipping of two 
agricultural schools 
in Kwanza-Sul and 
Kwanza Norte 
CAMCO 45,825,306.72 09/03/05 15/06/06 15/09/07 4,582,530.67 41,242,776.05 230 158 
 Construction of 
technical institute 
in Sumbe 
CAMCO 9,630,700.98 15/06/06 15/06/06 31/07/07 963,070.10 8,667,630.88 112 58 
Health646 Rehabilitation and 
equipping of 
Malange Hospital 
Sinohydro 29,185,499.00 09/05/05 09/06/06 09/12/07 2,918,549.90 26,266,949.10 49 33 
 Rehabilitation and 
equipping of 
Sinohydro 40,521,731.00 09/05/05 03/06/06 03/09/07 4,052,173.10 36,469,557.90 57 30 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
645
 The number of Angolan and Chinese workers listed applies only to the school in Luanda. 
646
 Complementary projects such as doctors’ quarters, morgues purchasing; oxygen factories, solar power systems, ambulances and bore hole construction were allocated 
US$ 159.413.272,36 from the June 2007 US$ 500 million credit line (GAT,2007a:9). 
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Benguela Regional 
Hospital 
 Construction and 
equipping of 3 
health centres in 
Malange647 
Sinohydro 12,010,431.00 09/05/05 10/08/06; 
01/08/06;  
10/08/07; 
01/11/07 
1,201,043.10 10,809,387.90 77 57 
 Construction and 
equipping of 
regional hospital in 
Namibe 
Sinohydro 9,263,864.00 24/10/05 01/11/06 10/01/08 926,386.40 8,337,477.60 40 35 
 Construction and 
equipping of 
regional hospital in 
Lubango 
Sinohydro 48,060,432.43 24/10/05 10/07/06 10/01/08 4,806,043.24 43,254,389.19 127 68 
 Rehabilitation and 
equipping of 
Huambo central 
hospital and 
provision of 86 
ambulances 
Sinohydro 36,520,308.99648 24/10/05 01/08/06;  
vehicle 
delivery 
21/04/07 
01/02/08 3,652,030.90 32,868,278.09 57 30 
 Construction and 
equipping of health 
centre in Huambo 
Sinohydro 4.003,477.00 24/10/05 01/08/06 01/08/07 400,347.70 3,603,129.30 30 25 
 Construction and 
equipping of 2 
municipal hospitals 
in Kwanza Norte 
and Kwanza Sul 
CAMCO 18,527,728.00 29/10/05 17/11/06; 
01/11/06 
17/02/08; 
01/02/08 
1,852,772.80 16,674,955.20 25 20 
 Construction and CAMCO 8.006,954.00 29/10/05 25/10/06; 25/09/07; 800,695.40 7,206,258.60 62 47 
                                                 
647
 One of the health centres in Caculama was later transformed into a Regional Hospital on application by the provincial government. The additional costs of 
US$ 10.875.000.00 were supplied from the US$ 500 million auxiliary China Exim Bank credit facility approved in July 2007 (GAT,2007a:7). 
648
 According to GAT (2008:5), the stand alone cost of the hospital is US$ 32.134.308.99. The cost of the ambulances is US$ 4,386.000.00 (GAT,2007b:4) 
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equipping of 2 
health centres in 
Kwanza Norte and 
Kwanza Sul 
10/10/06 10/10/07 
Agriculture Phase I: Irrigation 
of Luena, Caxito, 
Gandjelas e Waco-
Kungo 
Sinohydro 95,306.000.00 02/03/05 28/07/05 31/08/07 9,530,600.00 85,775,400.00 307 72 
 Purchase of 
agriculture 
equipment for 
MECANEGRO 
CMEC 32,079,124.00 11/03/05 29/09/05  3,207,912,40 28,871,211.60   
 Purchase of  
agricultural 
equipment, 
machines and tools 
 22,368,090.00 11/08/04 29/09/05  2,236,809.00 20,131,281.00   
Energy and 
Water649 
Rehabilitation and 
Expansion of 
Luanda electrical 
grid phase II 
CMIC 44,509,315.02 05/07/04 05/06/05 30/09/07 4,450,931,50 40,058,383.52   
 Reconstruction of 
LT 60 Kv and 
substation at 
Quifangondo, 
Mabubas 
CMIC 14,594,171.56 09/03/05 06/12/05 15/03/07 1,459,417.16 13,134,754.40   
 Construction of 3rd 
LT 220 Kv for 
Cambambe-Luanda 
CMEC 38,367,701.00 09/03/05 08/11/05 09/2007 3,836,770.10 34,530,930.90 60 120 
 Construction of 
substations and LT 
CMEC 29,516,582.00 09/03/05 09/11/05 09/2007 2,951,658.20 26,564,923.80 60 136 
                                                 
649
 Complementary projects in the energy and water sector were allocated US$ 76.450.000.00 (GAT,2007a:6) from the June 2007 US$ 500 million China Exim Bank auxiliary 
credit line extension 
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220 Kv in Luanda-
Sul, Cazenga  
 Construction of LT 
220 Kv Capanda-
Lucala-Ndalatando 
CMEC 28,248,625.00 10/03/05 08/11/05 31/07/07 2,824,862,50 25,423,762,50   
 Partial 
rehabilitation of 
the water supply 
system in Luanda 
CMEC 44,695,419.00 12/03/05 18/11/05 10/2007 4,469,541.90 40,225,877.10 150 153 
 Rehabilitation of 
the water supply 
system in Huambo 
CMEC 22,374,027.00 09/03/05 08/11/05 10/2007 2,237,402,70 20,136,624.30 65 42 
 Rehabilitation of 
the water supply 
system in Caxito, 
Catete, Uige 
CEIEC 21,539,269.00 09/03/05 08/11/05 10/2007 2,153,926.90 19,385,342.10   
Social 
Communi-
cation 
Construction and 
equipping of TPA650 
production centre 
in Camama 
CEIEC 66,905,200.00 03/2005 18/11/05 07/12/07 6,690,520.00 60,214,680.00 120 280 
Public 
Works 
Rehabilitation of 
the highway 
Quifangondo-
Caxito- Uíge-
Negage651 
CRBC 211,684,100.65 28/02/05 13/12/05 30/06/08 21,168,410.07 190,515,690.59 1336 367 
TOTAL   1,109,287,188,28    110,928,718,83 998,358,469,45 3,298 1,891 
% of Total       10% 90% 63.6% 36.4% 
 
                                                 
650
 Angolan state-owned television station 
651
 From the auxiliary credit line, US$ 56.336.500.00 (GAT,2207a:16) was approved to resurface the roads in the cities Caxito, Uige and Negage 
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Projects financed by the China Exim Bank Credit Line (second tranche of US$ 1 billion) 
Second US$1 billion tranche of US$ 2 billion loan signed on 2 March 2004 
Phase II652: (as of 30 June 2008) 
Sector Project Contractor 
 
Contract Value 
(US$) 
Contract 
Signed 
Contract 
Start 
Date 
Projected 
Handover 
date 
Initial Payment 
(US$) 
Financed (US$) No, of 
Angolan 
workers 
No, of 
Chinese 
workers 
Health Construction and 
equipping of 3 
municipal hospitals 
in Huambo, Huila, 
Benguela; 2 health 
centres in 
Benguela; 2 health 
centres in Huila 
Sinohydro 43,805,500.00 09/05/05 17/01/07 15/10/08 
hospitals; 
05/09/08 
centres 
4,390,550.00 39,424,950.00 89653 73654 
Education Construction and 
equipment of 2 
secondary school s 
in Huambo, 2 
Sinohydro 69,096,735.60 27/07/06 17/07/07 17/09/08 6,909,673.56 62,187,062.04 189655 147656 
                                                 
652
 All projects were assigned a due diligence consultant. These were variously FZ Trading, PROFISCON, TILCA, AFRICASE, Dar-Al- Handasah (Angola); MARHELL, Interserviços, 
JTEC (Japan);  
Gestão de Consultoria e Investimento, Africonsult, FASE, SIPCA and Interserviços 
653
 Numbers are incomplete as they only include workers for the hospitals in Benguela and Huambo. 
654
 Numbers are incomplete as they only include workers for the hospitals in Benguela and Huambo. 
655
 Numbers incomplete as this only includes workers for the technical institute in Bié, the administration centres in Bié, Cuando Cubango and Cunene.  
656
 Numbers incomplete as this only includes workers for the technical institute in Bié, the administration centres in Bié and Cunene. 
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secondary schools 
in Huila, 2 technical 
institutes in 
Huambo, Huila and 
Bié, 4 centres of 
administration and 
management in 
Huambo, Bié, 
Cunene, Cuando 
Cubango 
 Construction and 
equipping of 4 
technical institute 
in Luanda, Bengo, 
Cabinda and  
Namibe, 5 
administrative and 
management 
institutes in  
Luanda (2), 
Benguela , Zaire (1) 
and Namibe (1);  2 
each in Luanda 
Benguela and 
Namibe 
Sinomach 93,232,440.78 27/07/06 17/07/07 TBC 9,323,244.08 83,909,196.70 863657 738658 
 Construction and 
equipping of 3 
technical institutes 
in Luanda Sul, 
Lunda Norte and 
Sinohydro 67,313,137.80 27/07/06 15/08/07 TBC 6,731,313,78 60,581,824.02 453 205 
                                                 
657
 These are partial figures as the number of workers for the Luanda technical institute and the secondary school in Namibe were not supplied. 
658
 These are partial figures as the number of workers for the Luanda technical institute and the secondary school in Namibe were not supplied 
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Uíge, 1 agricultural 
institute in Uíge,2 
administration and 
management 
institutes in   
Uíge and Moxico 
and 1 secondary 
school in Uíge 
Public 
Works 
Completion of 
University Campus 
China 
Jiangsu Int,  
48,420,000.00 07/10/05 18/06/07 18/12/08 4,842,000.00 43,578,000.00 120 200 
 Completion of the 
Justice Palace (High 
Court) 
China 
Jiangsu Int, 
41,070,000.00 07/10/05 18/06/07 18/12/08 4,107,000.00 36,963,000.00   
Fishing Provision of 25 
30m boats and 100 
4,15 m canoes659 
CMEC 98,119,525.00 01/2006 20/06/06 11/07/09 9,811,952.50 88,307,572.50   
 Provision of 5 
46,9m patrol 
boats, 10 46,9m 
shrimping boats 
and 2000 canoes  
CMEC 97,847,205.00 01/2006 20/06/06 11/07/09 9,784,720.50 88,062,484.50   
 Provision of 10 
33,56m line fishing 
vessels, 1 49m 
speedboat 
 49m, 1 89,96m 
naval launch base, 
5 29,7m fibreglass 
patrol vessels in 
fiberglass , 1 34m 
tugboat 34m 
CMEC 70,880,779.00 01/2006 20/06/06 11/07/09 7,088,077.90 63,792,501.10   
                                                 
659
 GAT (2008b:19) reports that 830 of the 1000 canoes were delivered without a motor. 
286 
 
 
 
Agriculture Phase II of 
irrigation for 
Caxito, Gandgelas, 
Luena and Waco-
Kungo 
Sinohydro 54.006,958.00 21/04/07 18/09/07 18/03/09 5,400,695.80 48,606,262.20   
Post and 
Telecoms
660 
Construction of 
new generation 
network for Bengo, 
Bié, Kwanza Norte, 
Kwanza Sul, 
Luanda, Malange 
and Moxico 
CMEC 74,331,285.00 13/02/06 24/10/06 08/04/09 7,433,128,50 66,898,156.50   
 Construction of a 
new generation 
network for 
Benguela, Kwanza 
Norte, Cunene, 
Huambo, Uíge, and 
Zaire 
CMEC 67,954,756.00 13/02/06 21/10/06 08/03/09 6,795,475,60 61,195,280.40   
 Construction of a 
new generation 
network for Bié, 
Huambo, Huila, 
and Luanda, 
including optic 
fibre cabling, IP, 
VSAT, intelligent 
network  
CMEC 75,275,357.00 13/02/06 24/10/06 08/02/09 7,527,535,70 67,747,821.30   
 Construction of 
new generation 
 58,745,791.00 13/02/06 24/10/06 08/02/09 5,874,579,10 52,871,211.90   
                                                 
660
 Of interest is the fact that the project contracts list several provinces twice. It is unclear as to whether this is because various types of network are being provided each 
province 
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network for Bié, 
Huambo, Huila, 
and Luanda 
Energy and 
Water661 
Rehabilitation and 
expansion of the 
MT/BT networks in 
Luanda city  
 28,486,325.47    2,848,632.55 25,637,692.92   
 Rehabilitation and 
expansion of the 
MT and BT 
networks in 
Malange 
 29,851,345.18    2,985,134.52 26,866,210,66   
 Rehabilitation and 
expansion of the 
MT and BT 
networks of  
Lundas Sul and 
Norte, Dundo and 
Saurimo 
 50,697,236.00    5,069,723.60 45,627,512.40   
 Rehabilitation and 
reinforcing of the 
water system in 
Lundas Sul and 
Norte, Dundo and 
Saurimo 
 35,796,967.36    3,579,696.74 32,217,270.62   
TOTAL   1,104,931,344,19    110,493,134,42 994,438,209,77 1,714 1,363 
% of Total       10 % 90% 55.7% 44.3% 
 
 
                                                 
661
 These projects are not listed in GAT (2008b) 
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Projects financed by the China Exim Bank Credit Line - Complementary Actions  
Complete disbursement plan of US$ 500 million loan signed 19 July 2007 
As of 30 June 2008 
Sector Project Contractor Contract Value 
(US$) 
Initial payment 
(US$) 
Financed  (US$) Status 
Education Complementary 
actions for the 
agricultural schools 
in  Huambo and Bié 
Sinohydro 29,500.000.00 2,950,000.00 26,550,000.00 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
Complementary 
actions for the 
agricultural school in  
Késsua, Malange 
Province 
CMEC 11,964.000.00 1,196,400.00 10,767,600.00 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
Complementary 
actions for the 
agricultural schools 
in  Kwanza Sul and 
Kwanza Norte and 
for the technical 
school in Sumbe 
CAMCO 37,310,415,50 3,731,041.55 33,578,373.95 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
Complementary 
actions for the 
technical schools in  
Cacuaco, 
Sambizanga, Viana, 
Cazenga, Benguela 
Sinomac 29,515,500.00 2,951,550.00 26,564,950.00 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
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and Lobito 
Complementary 
actions for the 
secondary schools in  
Cacuaco, Nova Vida, 
Sapú and  Benguela 
Sinomac 10,027,500.00 1,002,750.00 9,024,750.00 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
Complementary 
actions for the 
secondary  school 
and technical school 
in Huíla and 2 
secondary schools in 
Malange 
Sinohydro 14,775.000.00 1,477,500.00 13,297,500.00 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
Complementary 
actions for the 
technical school in  
Cabinda  
Sinohydro 14,216,999.32 1,421,169.93 12,795,299,39 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
Energy 
and 
Water 
Execution of 26,000 
new domestic links 
expansion of SE PS05 
- Catete road 
(Contract  for the 
rehabilitation, 
expansion of Luanda 
Electrical network, 
phase II)  
CMIC 10,659,860.00 1,065,986.00 9,593,874.00 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
MT,BT and IP 
Network expansion 
for Caxito city and 
the rehabilitation 
Quifangondo - 
CMIC 22,903,510.00 2,290,351.00 20,613,159.00 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
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Cazenga line  
(Contract 
reconstruction of 60 
Kv  LT de 60 KV  and 
substation 
Quifangondo- 
Mabubas) 
Expansion of tab and 
water network in 
Huambo city, 20 
fountains,  2,000 
new domestic and a 
water treatment 
plant with one year 
assistance with 
systems 
management   
CMEC 9,779,511.52 977,951.15 8,801,560.37 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.)  
Construction of 
water treatment 
station 
(Quifangondo), 
construction of 
distribution centre in 
Cacuaco municipality 
and execution of 
new domestic links 
(Contract for the 
rehabilitation of the 
water system in 
Luanda) 
CMEC 28,798,375,35 2,879,837.53 25,918,537.82 Contract remitted to China Exim 
Bank for approval  
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Expansion of tab and 
water network in 
Catete and Caxito 
cities, fountains,  
2,000 new domestic 
links and 
rehabilitation of a 
water treatment 
system for Uige and 
expansion of water 
supply network and 
one year 
management 
assistance 
CEIEC 6,517,146,93 651,714.69 4,865,432.24 Preparatory work for the 
disbursement of funds (visa from 
the Treasury, license from BNA 
etc.) 
Health Complementary 
actions for  regional 
hospitals (Huambo, 
Malange, Benguela 
and Huíla) 
Sinohydro 75,917,724,36 7,591,772.43 68,325,951.92 Required documents sent to 
China Exim Bank. Awaiting 
disbursement of funds.  
Complementary 
actions for 7 
municipal hospitals 
and 9 health centres  
Sinohydro 72,620,548.00 7,262,054.80 65,359,493.20 Required documents sent to 
China Exim Bank. Awaiting 
disbursement of funds.  
Additional 
expenditure for the 
municipal hospital in 
Caculama 
Sinohydro 10,875.000.00 1,087,500.00 9,787,500.00 Required documents sent to 
China Exim Bank. Awaiting 
disbursement of funds.  
Public 
Works 
Rehabilitation of 
roads for Caxito 
(20km), Uíge (22km) 
and Negage(10km) 
cities 
CRBC 56,336,500.00 5,633,650.00 50,702,850.00 Awaiting approval of China Exim 
Bank  
Fisheries Purchase of  40,000,000.00 4,000,000.00 36,000,000.00 Commercial contract being 
292 
 
 
 
refrigeration trucks 
and isothermic 
vehicles  
examined by GAT  
Post and 
Telecom  
Construction of 
418,750 new 
telecommunication 
lines   
 65,000,000.00 6,5000,000.00 53,500,000.00 Required documents sent to 
China Exim Bank. Awaiting 
disbursement of funds. 
  TOTAL  546,717,590.98 54,671,759.10 492,045,831.88   
 % of Total   100 % 10% 90%  
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Projects financed by the China Exim Bank Credit Line    
US$ 2 billion loan signed on 28 September 2007 
As of 30 June 2008 
Sector Project  Estimated Contract 
Value (US$)  
Initial Payment (US$) Financed (US$) Status  
Energy and Water  Rehabilitation and expansion 
of MT and BT networks for 
Benguela, Huambo e Bié 
(Part 1 -Huambo) 
49,902,081.20 4,990,208.12 44,911,873.08 Contract negotiated  
 
 
Rehabilitation and expansion 
of MT and BT networks  for 
Luanda, Phase 4 
143,865,890.00 14,386,589.00 129,479,301.00 Contract negotiated 
Rehabilitation and expansion 
of MT and BT networks for 
Lubango (Phase 2) 
22,500,000.00 2,250,000.00 20,250,000.00 Project in preparation 
phase   
Reinforcement of water 
improvement and supply 
system in Luanda city 
(tranche 4)  
83,278,800.00 8,327,880.00 74,950,920.00 Contract being 
negotiated   
 Agriculture Purchase of agricultural 
equipment  
20,000,000.00 2,000,000.00 18,000,000.00 Tender process 
between companies 
proposed by the 
Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce underway 
Public Works Rehabilitation of 
Caxito/Nzeto highway 
477,456,579.00 47,745,657.90 429,710,921.1 Contract signed  
  Rehabilitation of  
Nzeto/Tomboco/Mbanza 
Congo highway 
160,000,000.00 16,000,000.00 144,000,000.00 Contract signed 
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Integrated infrastructure for 
Cabinda, phase I (total value 
US$ 253,7 million) 
73,031,352.80 7,303,135.28 65,728,217.52 Tender process 
between companies 
proposed by the 
Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce underway 
Integrated infrastructure for 
Zaire phase I (total value 
US$ 400 million) 
113,151,577.50 11,315,157.75 101,836,419.75 Tender process 
between companies 
proposed by the 
Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce underway 
Integrated infrastructure for 
Malange phase I ( total value 
US$ 237,1 million) 
84,095,000.00 8,409,500,00 75,685,500.00 Tender process 
between companies 
proposed by the 
Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce underway 
Transport Purchase of 1,500 vehicles 
(phase II) 
57,000,000.00 5,700,000.00 44,3000,000.00  Several clauses in the 
commercial contract 
are being altered at 
the suggestion of GAT  
  Purchase of railway 
transport equipment 
(locomotives and carriages) 
61,970,200.00 6,197,020.00 55,773,180.00 Tender process 
between companies 
proposed by the 
Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce underway 
Purchase of collective urban 
transport for Luanda, 
Benguela, Huambo, Uige, 
Malange (total 5,500) 
440,000,000.00 44,000,000.00 396,000,000.00 Preliminary 
investigation 
underway  
  TOTAL   1,786,251,480.50 178,625,148.05 1,607,626,332.45   
  (%) of Total  10%  90%    
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